IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00704-COA
THE ESTATE OF BARBARA ANN RALEY, APPELLANT DECEASED: KENNETH RICHARD SIMPSON
v.
BILLY WAYNE KEEL, ADMINISTRATOR, APPELLEES BILLY WAYNE KEEL, INDIVIDUALLY, JOHN RUSSELL KEEL, JAMES VIRGIL KEEL, AND CHARLES ARNOLD KEEL
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/07/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LAWRENCE LEE LITTLE COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: CALHOUN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: EDWARD DUDLEY LANCASTER ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: PAUL M. MOORE JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - INSURANCE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/05/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ.
McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Two cousins were co-tenants of a piece of property in North Mississippi. One owned
a house with fire insurance; after her death, the home burned. Although he was not listed on
the policy, the surviving cousin claimed he should receive benefits from the insurance
contract. Instead, the chancery court found the descendants of the deceased cousin would
inherit the proceeds.
¶2. The surviving cousin appeals. Finding the chancery court followed both the general
rule that an insurance policy does not run with the land and, specifically, that there was no
proof the surviving cousin contributed to the cost of the insurance or that the insurance was for his benefit, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶3. The paramount facts of this case are not greatly in dispute. Claude Raley owned
property in Calhoun County. In 1981, he executed a special warranty deed to two beloved
family members, Barbara Raley and Kenneth Simpson. This deed specifically noted the
consideration included “the love and affection which I have for my niece and nephew[.]”
The interest in the land conveyed to both was “joint tenants with rights of survivorship and
not as tenants in common[.]” Ms. Raley subsequently moved to the property.
¶4. But in 2019, she obtained insurance coverage for what was listed as a frame
construction home on the property. The policy included coverages of $50,000 for the
dwelling, $25,000 for personal property, and other amounts for physical harm and medical
payments. The declarations page of the policy has a line that states, “No Related Private
Structures Coverage.” The premium was $1,081. Ms. Raley was the sole named insured.
¶5. This policy was current at the time she passed later that same year in September 2019.
She died without children and without a will. Very soon thereafter, under circumstances not
contained in the record, her home burned.
¶6. Ms. Raley’s cousin and co-tenant, Simpson, then filed a claim for loss with the
insurer. He later alleged a check from the insurer was “delivered” to him in the amount of
$67,158.27. The check expired, as it was not cashed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶7. The following year, Ms. Raley’s brother Billy Wayne Keel petitioned the Calhoun
2 County Chancery Court for letters of administration, which was joined by Ms. Raley’s other
brothers. The chancery court appointed him to fulfill that role, finding “that the deceased’s
estate consisted chiefly of real property, as said deceased owned very little personal
property.” It appears that the insurance company then wrote another check to Keel in his role
as administrator of the estate.
¶8. A petition for a determination of heirship followed, which alleged “Barbara Ann
Raley was the owner of a certain parcel of real property located in Calhoun County,
Mississippi,” and asked for the four brothers to be named as her heirs.
¶9. At this point, Simpson intervened in the action, pointing out that while his cousin had
possessed an ownership interest in the land, the interest was “as a joint tenant with Right of
Survivorship” with him “and not as [a] tenant in common.” As such, he alleged he “became
the owner of all such real estate in fee simple” upon her death. He then pointedly denied that
the four brothers should be allowed any ownership interest in the land.
¶10. Simpson went further and cross-claimed for the insurance proceeds resulting from Ms.
Raley’s burned home, less the contents of the house. He claimed that upon her death any
interest in the real property and attached home reverted to him, so he should receive the
benefit of the policy for the house, less the contents, to the complete exclusion of the
brothers.
¶11. A series of hearings were held. Notably, no witness ever testified despite the urging
of the learned trial judge that a dispute over proceeds like this required more than mere
allegations. Guided by precedent, the trial court repeatedly inquired as to who exactly
3 tendered the premiums on the policy—whether it was Ms. Raley alone, or if her cousin Mr.
Simpson assisted. No evidentiary proof was made on this point by testimony or affidavit.
Ultimately, counsel for the parties asked the trial court to rule on the briefs and legal
arguments of the parties alone.
¶12. The trial court found in favor of Ms. Raley’s adjudicated heirs. Relying on a key
decision from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the trial court made a finding of fact that Ms.
Raley “obtained and paid for the policy without contribution” from her cousin. “She was the
owner and named beneficiary in the policy,” and of the relevant inquiry established by
precedent, “the insurance policy was taken out solely for [her] benefit,” so “the proceeds of
the policy are property of the estate.”1 In so finding, the trial court dismissed Simpson’s
arguments with prejudice and confirmed he was now vested with a fee simple interest in the
entirety of the property.
¶13. Simpson appealed, and the case was assigned to us for review.
DISCUSSION
¶14. On appeal, Simpson raises four assignments of error, which center on property law
rather than the insurance cases applied by the trial court. His core argument is that as a co-
tenant of the real property with Ms. Raley, upon her death he should have automatically
received the proceeds of the insurance his cousin received for her home. Before turning to
his arguments, we first address the applicable precedent in cases of this type.
1 The trial court’s order concludes that Ms. Raley lived in a mobile home. Because we find the application of the insurance contract is dispositive, the type of home does not impact our analysis.
4 The General Rules of Property and Insurance
¶15. The cousins, in this case, were granted interests in the property “as joint tenants with
rights of survivorship.” When a “devise[] of land [is] made to two (2) or more persons,” the
conveyor may expressly choose to “create an estate in joint tenancy . . . with the right of
survivorship” as opposed to an estate in common. Miss. Code Ann. § 89-1-7 (Rev. 2021).
“By virtue of survivorship, the property descends outside of probate from the deceased joint
tenant to the surviving joint tenant.” Jones v. Graphia, 95 So. 3d 751, 753 (¶7) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2012). “The decedent’s share does not have to pass to the survivor because the survivor
already owns the whole.” Id.
¶16. This case involves a dispute over whom should be paid the proceeds of an insurance
contract. “An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the insured.” Clarendon
Nat. Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 837 So. 2d 779, 780 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). “A contract is
to be construed and enforced as written.” Id.; see Lynch v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,
880 So. 2d 1065, 1070 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (“Mississippi law acknowledges that the
standard insurance policy is a contract, and its terms are a matter of usual contract
interpretation unless some statutory imperative controls”); Miss. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v.
Blakeney, 54 So. 3d 203, 205 (¶6) (Miss. 2011) (“An insurance policy is a contract with an
insurance company, whose duty to pay claims ordinarily is contractual”).
¶17. Accordingly, the law has generally held that the proceeds of an insurance policy are
not impacted by ownership of land but solely governed by the language of the contract.
“This court is committed to the doctrine that fire insurance is an indemnity to the insured and
5 the proceeds thereof do not run with the land.” King v. King, 163 Miss. 584, 143 So. 422,
424 (1932); Necaise v. U.S.A.A. Cas. Co., 644 So. 2d 253, 257 (Miss. 1992) (quoting King
with approval).
¶18. As the Court concluded in Necaise, “[t]he company’s duty is to pay benefits to the
party with whom it contracted.” Id. at 257. This holds so long as the insured has an
insurable interest, and “[a]ll that is required for one to have an insurable interest in property
is that the insured will suffer an economic loss if the property is destroyed.” Id. at 258.
¶19. The general rule is illustrated by a case fairly like the one at hand. A widow and her
“four adult children” lived on property owned by her deceased husband, which included “a
house and lot which constituted his homestead, and certain furniture and household effects.”
Collette v. Long, 179 Miss. 650, 176 So. 528, 528 (1937). “She procured an insurance policy
. . . on the house and the furniture therein, against all direct loss and damage by windstorm,
cyclone, and tornado,” and at some subsequent point, “the property insured was destroyed
and the widow was killed by a tornado.” Id.
¶20. The administrator of her estate requested payment from the insurance company, but
it declined. Id. The widow’s children claimed the money belonged to them as owners of the
property and should not be paid to her estate. Id. So the insurer had the money put into the
registry of the trial court pending adjudication of the same question presented in today’s
case—“for the purpose of determining to whom the money belongs.” Id.
¶21. The Lee County Chancery Court found the money belonged to the widow’s estate.
Id. The children appealed, claiming that because they “were cotenants of this property, each
6 having an undivided one-fifth interest therein,” the “ policy of insurance inured to the benefit
of all of the cotenants.” Id. at 529.
¶22. The Supreme Court rejected the claim by the children, focusing instead on the general
rule that the proceeds from the contract would be governed by the insurance policy. Id. “In
their very nature, policies of insurance are not incidents of the property.” Id. (quoting
Bernheim v. Beer, 56 Miss. 149, 153 (1878)). “They are contracts between insurers and
assured for indemnity of the assured, and not for loss or damages which another person may
have sustained because of the destruction of the property, no matter what the interest of that
person may be, as mortgagee, creditor, or otherwise.” Id. In the end, the Court determined
that “[i]f another person has an interest in the property, he may insure for himself.” Id.
The Specific Rule of Insurance and the Property Rights of Co-tenants
¶23. But there is an exception to this general rule where the law has evolved to
accommodate others for whom the insurance benefits. In situations where equity requires
it, a co-tenant or third party may be allowed to receive insurance benefits even when not
listed on an insurance policy. This has been allowed when “one securing insurance for the
benefit of the other insurable interests in property holds the proceeds in trust for those
interests.” Sullivan v. Est. of Eason, 558 So. 2d 830, 833 (Miss. 1990). In other words, an
insurance policy might be found to benefit all co-tenants if there is proof this was intended
when procuring the policy or if equity requires it given the circumstances. Id.
¶24. In Sullivan, five children were born to the Easons, who owned a home and property
in Smith County. Id. at 831. Both parents died intestate, and the property passed to the
7 children. Id. One child had the parents’ home insured. Id. While she only had a one-fifth
interest in the home, the policy was made solely in the name of her and her husband. Id.
¶25. Just as in this case, “the residence and contents [were] totally destroyed by fire.” Id.
Unlike this case, the insurer did not then issue a check to the policyholders but, instead, “to
all of the heirs at law” of another one of the children, “the last survivor of the parents, for the
damage caused by the fire.” Id. The policyholders objected to the disbursement of the funds,
with the conflict focusing on “whether the insurance purchased and the premiums paid were
for the benefit of all co-tenants.” Id. at 832.
¶26. Unlike this case, in Sullivan testimony showed that one of the other daughters paid
“the first quarterly insurance premium” not from her own funds but from “a telephone refund
check” that had been issued to her mother, and the administratrix of the parents’ estate
“testified th[e] [daughter who obtained the policy] had made representations to the other
siblings that the insurance coverage would be for the benefit of all of them and that she had
detrimentally relied on these representations.” Id. Two other witnesses, including the
policyholder’s niece, testified that “the insurance proceeds were to be divided equally among
the children.” Id.
¶27. While the daughter who obtained the policy denied the insurance was for the other
children, “the trial court ruled that the insurance was procured for the benefit of all
heirs-at-law by Barbara Sullivan and that the proceeds should be shared by all co-tenants.”
Id.
¶28. On appeal, the Supreme Court first acknowledged the general rule “that insurance is
8 a personal contract of indemnity to protect the insured.” Id. at 833. But there could be an
exception, recognized in other jurisdictions, when “one securing insurance for the benefit of
the other insurable interests in property holds the proceeds in trust for those interests.” Id.
¶29. While not expressly adopting a test as to when this exception would be applied, the
Supreme Court noted, “[O]ther courts have used the following test in deciding whether a
party who holds less than a full interest in a piece of property is entitled to the entire
insurance proceeds or whether such proceeds must be shared:”
(1) [W]hether the insurance was obtained for the sole benefit of the person who procured it; (2) whether by express or implied agreement the person who took out the insurance did so for the benefit of the owners of the other interests in the property; and (3) whether the owners of the other interests contributed to the cost of the insurance.
Id. at 833-34. After reviewing the proof from the trial, the Supreme Court concluded the
other children had indeed established they should recover under the insurance policy even
though they were not listed as beneficiaries. Id.
¶30. The factors from Sullivan have subsequently been used to determine if a third party
should be allowed to recover insurance proceeds even when not listed as a policyholder or
beneficiary. See Necaise, 644 So. 2d at 256 (finding a non-party was not entitled to benefits
due to lack of proof on the factors); In re Holyfield, No. 08-10735-JDW, 2015 WL 4458885,
at *12 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. July 20, 2015) (applying Sullivan and finding former renters of a
mobile home had no right to insurance proceeds when no proof showed the policy was meant
to benefit them and they “did not pay any of the cost of the premium”).
¶31. In the court below, Simpson claimed he was entitled to recover for the loss of the
9 burned home even though he was not on the policy and never paid for it. As such, he bore
the burden of proof. See Sullivan, 558 So. 2d at 834 (explaining “these questions were to be
determined from the evidence presented at trial and the circumstances of the parties”).
¶32. But instead of calling witnesses at a trial, Simpson rested on the purely legal theory
that the policy’s benefits automatically shifted to him upon Ms. Raley’s death by virtue of
his interest in the property as a joint tenant with the right of survivorship. Yet as set out
above, the insurance contract did not list him as a beneficiary, and he did not provide proof
that he helped pay the premiums on the policy or that it was secured to protect his interest as
a joint tenant.
¶33. So when the trial court applied the specific rule from Sullivan, which allows a co-
tenant like Simpson to recover, the court found that “all three factors . . . favor the estate.”
“No evidence was presented to indicate that Kenneth had an ownership interest” in his
cousin’s home “or paid any of the insurance premiums,” and “the policy was taken out solely
in Barbara’s name.” Critically, the trial court held that if the “home burned prior to her
death, the Court does not believe that Kenneth could have claimed any of the insurance
proceeds.”
¶34. Given the utter lack of proof, we cannot say the trial court committed manifest error
warranting reversal under our standard of review; “rather, the record supports such a finding”
that Simpson was not entitled to the proceeds. Id.
¶35. Simpson attempts to sidestep this binding law by focusing on novel legal theories not
based on the above precedent. In his first assignment of error, Simpson claims that the
10 Sullivan test “is not relevant” (emphasis his), focusing on his idea that “the brothers and heirs
. . . have no partial ownership and insurable interest in the real estate and home at issue
herein as of the date of the Deceased’s death[.]”
¶36. This misses the mark. It is true the descendants of Ms. Raley have no interest in the
real property, as it passed to Simpson upon her death by virtue of his status as a joint tenant
with a right of survivorship, but the trial court did not make that ruling. Instead, the trial
court ruled that the descendants are allowed to recover from the policy that only benefitted
Ms. Raley, which she alone contracted for, and she alone paid for. This is standard insurance
law. Further, Sullivan indeed applies in cases of this type, as it is the only route that a non-
party to the insurance contract may take to recover when the sole basis of the claim to policy
proceeds is co-tenancy.2
¶37. As a corollary to this assignment of error, Simpson claims that if we apply Sullivan,
as the trial court did, we violate the rule against parol evidence. Yet this ignores precedent.
Sullivan itself reckoned with this argument but held fast to “the general rule that the parol
evidence rule applies only to controversies between parties to the agreement.” Sullivan, 558
So. 2d at 832. In cases of this type, “the insurance company is not a party,” so the rule
against parol evidence is not applied when interpreting who benefits under a contract. Id.
¶38. As his second issue, Simpson argues that upon the death of his cousin, “the real
2 Furthermore, as well explained by the separate opinion, analogous authority has precluded a third party from raising this argument in actions regarding life insurance. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held “as a general proposition, . . . only the insurance company which issued the life insurance policy can raise the issue of insurable interest,” unless “allegations of fraud or deception” regarding the procurement of the policy are made. Cundiff v. Cain, 707 So. 2d 187, 190 (¶7) (Miss. 1998).
11 property and home of the deceased became [his] whole property in fee simple,” so any
recovery should be his alone. Per statute, Simpson did indeed gain the full interest in the
property upon his cousin’s death, as they held the property as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. See Jones, 95 So. 3d at 753 (“The decedent’s share does not have to pass to
the survivor because the survivor already owns the whole”).
¶39. But Simpson ignores that the only way one can recover for this fire loss is through
insurance and that the insurance was only in the name of his cousin, the policyholder. He
does not cite any law in support of his theory that his interest in the real property
automatically converted him into a beneficiary under the policy, nor does he try to distinguish
the ample caselaw to the contrary.
¶40. Third, Simpson protests that it would be inequitable for the brothers of Ms. Raley to
receive the insurance proceeds, arguing that this “would constitute unjust enrichment.” Yet
to do equity is to do what is fair. In Necaise, the Supreme Court concluded that when an
insurance policy was purchased by a husband’s second wife “with her own funds,” and the
ex-wife “did not pay any of the costs of the insurance,” then “[t]o allow her to collect on this
policy would be to grant her an absolute windfall.” Necaise, 644 So. 2d at 257.
¶41. The same would be true in this case. The record shows that only Ms. Raley bought
the insurance policy using her own money, and it was limited to the modest value of her
home and its contents; the contract was to benefit her and her alone. In 1932, the Supreme
Court ruled that “[t]he right of contract is a public policy in this state.” King, 143 So. at 424.
In doing so, the court soundly rejected a challenge like Simpson’s when a remainderman
12 sought to recover under an insurance policy secured by a life tenant. Id. When a person with
a property interest “fail[s] to exercise his right to insure his interest in the property[, there]
is no reason for permitting him to claim an interest in the independent contract between the
life tenant and the insurance company, no[r] can the courts invade it.” Id. Therefore, based
on this precedent, we find that it was not unjust for Ms. Raley’s heirs to recover under the
fire hazard policy.
¶42. Last, Simpson makes the argument that he “can find no provision in common law that
makes a hazard insurance contract survivable beyond the life of the contracting party” and
turns to statutes to argue there is some kind of grace period that benefits him. This again
ignores key legal rulings cited above from the years 1937, 1990, and 1992—all of which
involved hazard insurance that clearly survived the death of the insured.
¶43. Finding no manifest error, the Calhoun County Chancery Court’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, SMITH AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED IN PART BY McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.
WILSON, P.J., CONCURRING IN PART AND IN RESULT:
¶44. I concur that the judgment of the chancery court should be affirmed. I write separately
to address Simpson’s argument that Raley’s heirs were not entitled to the insurance proceeds
for the loss of Raley’s former home3 because the heirs had no insurable interest in the home
3 The chancery court’s judgment stated that Raley’s home was a “mobile home.” However, the subject insurance policy described it as a “frame home,” and Raley’s estate admitted that it was a “frame home,” “not a mobile home.” There is no evidence in the
13 following Raley’s death. For the reasons discussed below, Simpson is correct that the heirs
had no insurable interest in the home; however, Simpson lacks standing to raise that issue.
¶45. Raley and Simpson held the subject property as joint tenants with rights of
survivorship. Therefore, Raley’s interest in the property did not pass to her heirs. Jones v.
Graphia, 95 So. 3d 751, 754 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). Rather, “at the moment of [Raley’s]
death, ownership [of the real property] vest[ed] exclusively in [Simpson as] the surviving
joint tenant.” Seymour v. Turner, 228 So. 3d 343, 346 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis
added) (quoting Jackson v. Est. of Green, 771 N.W.2d 675, 677 (Mich. 2009)). Accordingly,
Raley’s heirs never possessed any ownership interest in the real property or home.
¶46. “Mississippi follows the general rule that in order to be entitled to proceeds from an
insurance policy, the purchaser of the policy must have an insurable interest in the property
. . . insured.” Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Davidson, 715 F. Supp. 775, 776 (S.D. Miss. 1989)
(Lee, J.). “All that is required for one to have an insurable interest in property is that the
insured will suffer an economic loss if the property is destroyed.” Necaise v. U.S.A.A. Cas.
Co., 644 So. 2d 253, 258 (Miss. 1992). However, “Mississippi law requires a purchaser of
property insurance to have an insurable interest in the subject property at the time of purchase
and at the time of loss.”4
record that the home was a mobile home. 4 Nationwide Mut. Ins. v. Baptist, No. 2:12-CV-00097-SA-JMV, 2013 WL 4829262, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 10, 2013) (Aycock, J.) (emphasis added), aff’d, 762 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2014); accord, e.g., Breeden v. Buchanan, 164 So. 3d 1057, 1070-71 (¶¶64-66) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015), cert. denied, 160 So. 3d 704 (Miss. 2015); Ferrara Land Mgmt. Miss. LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins., No. 1:19-CV-956-HSO-JCG, 2021 WL 5053526, at *5 (S.D. Miss. July 7, 2021) (Ozerden, J.); Landmark Am. Ins. v. Gatchell, No. 2:11-CV-189-KS-MTP,
14 ¶47. Simpson argues that Raley’s heirs are not entitled to receive insurance proceeds for
the loss of the subject home5 because the heirs never possessed any insurable interest in the
real property or the home. I agree with Simpson that the heirs had no insurable interest in
the home. As explained above, Raley’s entire interest in the real property vested exclusively
in Simpson immediately upon Raley’s death. Therefore, the heirs had no interest in the
property to insure.
¶48. However, as a general rule, the objection that a claimant lacks an “insurable interest”
“is available only to the insurer, and not to other parties.” Neely v. Pigford, 181 Miss. 306,
314, 178 So. 913, 914 (1938). When the insurer “recognizes the validity of the policy, as by
paying the amount thereof to the person named therein or into court, ordinarily adverse
claimants to the fund may not raise the objection of lack of insurable interest.” Cundiff v.
Cain, 707 So. 2d 187, 190 (¶7) (Miss. 1998) (quoting 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 244 (1993)).
2015 WL 1806843, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 21, 2015) (Starrett, J.); Rentrop v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, No. 1:07-CV-0384-LTS-RHW, 2008 WL 4371375, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 18, 2008) (Senter, J.); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ramsey, 719 F. Supp. 1337, 1339-41 (S.D. Miss. 1989) (Lee, J.); see also Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Pike Cnty. Nat’l Bank, 706 So. 2d 227, 230 (¶14) (Miss. 1997) (holding that the insured had “an insurable interest in the property” because it “acquired record title . . . and had record title at the time of the loss”); Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. Koch, 216 Miss. 576, 583, 63 So. 2d 103, 105 (1953) (stating that the named insured could not recover under her policy because she lacked “an insurable interest in the property at the time of the loss”); Est. of Murrell v. Quin, 454 So. 2d 437, 444 (Miss. 1984) (Prather, J., dissenting) (“[C]ase law has recognized in fire insurance cases that an insured must not only have an insurable interest at the time of inception of the policy, but also at the time of loss claimed under the policy.”); Jeffrey Jackson & D. Jason Childress, Mississippi Insurance Law and Practice § 4:13, at 119 (2023 ed.) (“An insurable interest in property must exist at the time of the loss.”). 5 Simpson concedes that Raley’s heirs are entitled to retain the proceeds paid for the contents (i.e., personal property) destroyed in the fire.
15 Our Supreme Court has recognized one exception to this rule, holding that when “there have
been allegations of fraud or deception” related to the issuance of a life insurance policy, the
estate of the insured “should have standing to recover the benefits paid to some other
beneficiary.” Id. However, that exception is inapplicable here, as there are no allegations
of fraud or deception related to Raley’s property insurance policy. In this case, the insurer
recognized the validity of the policy by making payment to Raley’s estate.6 Id. Therefore,
Simpson lacks standing to seek to recover the proceeds based on the heirs’ lack of an
insurable interest. Id.
¶49. Simpson fails to identify any other legal or equitable basis for requiring Raley’s estate
to pay the subject insurance proceeds to him. As the majority explains, Simpson is not a
named beneficiary under the policy, he presented no evidence that Raley intended or agreed
to obtain the policy for his benefit, and he did not contribute to the cost of the policy. See
Sullivan v. Est. of Eason, 558 So. 2d 830, 834 (Miss. 1990). As for Simpson’s claim of
“unjust enrichment,” our Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]here is nothing inherently
unjust about enrichment. The principle does not proscribe mere enrichments, only those
objectively seen as unjust.” Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 92 (Miss.
1992). In this case, each side makes a reasonable argument as to why each should receive
the subject proceeds. Raley’s estate emphasizes that Raley paid the premiums for the subject
policy, but the estate must acknowledge that Raley’s interest in the house did not pass to her
6 At a hearing in the chancery court, counsel for Raley’s estate represented that the insurer had issued a check payable to Raley’s estate, which counsel had deposited in his trust account. Simpson does not dispute this representation.
16 heirs. In contrast, Simpson emphasizes that he was the house’s only owner when it
burned—that he, not Raley’s estate, actually suffered the loss of the house. But Simpson
paid nothing for the policy and offered no proof that he was an intended beneficiary of it.
Under these circumstances, reasonable minds may differ as to what would be a fair result,
but it does not rise to the level of “objectively . . . unjust” for Raley’s estate to receive the
proceeds of Raley’s insurance policy. Id.
¶50. In summary, Simpson lacks standing to raise the issue of a lack of an insurable interest
in the subject home, and he failed to establish any other legal or equitable right to the subject
proceeds. For those reasons, I concur that the judgment of the chancery court should be
McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ., JOIN THIS OPINION IN PART.