The Edda

173 F. 436, 97 C.C.A. 638, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5080
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedOctober 21, 1909
DocketNo. 806
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 173 F. 436 (The Edda) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Edda, 173 F. 436, 97 C.C.A. 638, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5080 (1st Cir. 1909).

Opinion

PUTNAM, Circuit Judge.

This is a question of collision in Vineyard Sound between a steamer and a sailing vessel, in the evening, clear, but yet, of course, such as to compel each vessel to rely on the lights within range. The testimony from each is directly contradictory, [437]*437both as to the courses and the lights, without any clear proof from either where the collision occurred. The only two, established propositions are that the steamer was running in a westerly direction, leaving the gas buoy near the eastern end of Hedge Fence on her port, and that the sailing vessel changed her course at Nobska Light, and from there steered in an easterly direction. With reference -to everything else, any determination of the courses pro or con would not assist the determination of the bearings of the lights of the two colliding vessels. Neither would a determination of the latter assist a determination of the former. In other words, the proofs from each vessel involve inevitably questions of both courses and lights. The determination, with anjr accuracy, of the place of collision, might enable us to work back to the determination of the other issues; but the place of collision we cannot fix with any certainty.

The ultimate question is whether the sailing vessel held her course or swung around some five to six points, bringing her into collision with the steamer at almost right angles, or whether the change of course was on the part of the steamer. It would clearly have been on the part of the steamer, if she had volüntarily headed towards Squash Meadow, where she finally sunk; but her testimony is that she was brought up on Squash Meadow some time after the collision by the action of the wind and the currents. The parties have not solved the case, but have simply arrayed witnesses against each other. We find some circumstances which discredit the case of the steamer, and we find other circumstances, to some of which we will refer, which strengthen it, and the conclusion in her favor reached by the District Court.

The schooner urges anew on us, with persistency, the proposition that it is exceedingly improbable that she should have swung off from her course so many points as are involved in the claim that she was in fault. She calls our attention to the fact that we have several times observed on this, especially in The Metamora, 144 Fed. 936, 940, 75 C. C. A. 576, decided February 21, 1906. It is true we agree that, as between two sailing vessels, it is much more probable that one of them will fall off from her course than that the other will swing many points therefrom. Nevertheless, this is only one element, and it applies with less force to a collision between a steamer and a sailing vessel. In the case of a steamer there is no question of falling off; and the inherent improbability to be applied to the present case is quite as great with the one as with the other. We see nothing of this character sufficient to guide us safely between the parties here.

It is also claimed by the schooner that she was sailing with her booms well off on the starboard side, and that, if she had changed her course to starboard, as claimed by the steamer, her sails would have been taken aback and jibed over. They did jibe over, but whether before or after the collision cannot be ascertained from this record with any degree of. certainty.

The counsel for the schooner also comment on the lack of qualification and the youth of the steamer’s lookout, and call attention to the fact that he admits that he did not know the points of the -compass. [438]*438The opposing counsel, as well as the learned judge of the District Court, commented on, and criticised as effectively, the schooner’s lookout; and the'criticism made .of the latter might have been even more vigorous than it was. This lookout says that, when the steamer “made a dash across,” he saw the red light, but that he did not see it until then. Yet the theory of the schooner was red to red all the time until the steamer made her alleged change of course. Probably, if the case of either vessel depended on the qualifications of the lookout, one would' neutralize the other.

The schooner relies especially on a drawing made on a United States chart of the locality in question, from which she maintains that the courses claimed by. the steamer were 'impossible. I f these had been laid down by an expert, they might have given us some light; but a rule of thumb drawing like this is of no value in a case where a dispute about courses involves margins so narrow as those here.

Pier counsel also comment on the proposition that the steamer was not navigating on the starboard side of the channel. Neither what is the channel, nor the relations thereto of either vessel, is sufficiently established to enable us to apply this proposition with any satisfaction.

Also, as to a claim that the steamer was at fault for attempting to cross the bow of the schooner, this is merefy begging the whole case. If, on the other hand, the claim had been made in a suitable manner in the District Court that under the twenty-third article, or under the twenty-ninth article, the steamer, when, as she says, she saw the schooner swinging, should have slackened her speed, or stopped, or reversed, it may be that we would have held that the collision could thus have been avoided. We might, therefore, have held that there was mutual fault. But no such proposition is before us, or can arise on the record as made in the Circuit Court, or under the assignment of errors filed in connection with taking this appeal.

On the other hand, we think that the testimony of Capt. Cooper referred to by the District Court essentially determines the case in favor of the steamer. Pie was a skilled mariner, and on the. night of the collision was second officer of the towboat Carlisle. The position of the Carlisle requires some explanation. A tow of three barges was heading easterly on the southerly side of the channel. The schooner was sailing easterly on a course parallel, or approximately so, to that of this tow. The Edda was, as she claims, heading westerly on a course which took her between the tow on the south and the schooner on the north. The Carlisle was heading easterly through the lane between the tow of three barges on her starboard and the steamer on her port. Cooper was on the watch at the window of her pilot house using his glasses. He was the only witness who had a correct perspective. In other words, he was like one who, at one end of a piece of highway, looks down through the center of the highway, and can thus arrange the order of what is approaching thereon. His testimony is clear and unshaken upon two points, either of which is important, and one of which is quite determinative. He saw the Edda coming down, contrary to the theory of the schooner, between the schooner on her starboard and the tow on her port, and he saw the [439]*439schooner swing on her course, with the collision immediately following. In view of what we have stated, aside from the testimony of Cooper, it would be impossible for us to satisfy ourselves that we. could reach a conclusion which would approve itself to us better than that of the learned District Judge; and, with the testimony of Cooper, we feel that the burden preponderates in favor of the steamer.

The schooner appealed against a determination of a question of costs which was in accordance with our decision in The City of Augusta, 80 Fed. 297, 303, 304, 25 C. C. A. 430, an opinion passed down in 1897.

The decree of the District Court is affirmed, with interest and costs in both courts.

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Bluebook (online)
173 F. 436, 97 C.C.A. 638, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5080, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-edda-ca1-1909.