The Dolphin

7 F. Cas. 868
District Court, S.D. Florida·Decided July 1, 1863·Published

Opinion

MARVIN, District Judge.

This steamer, of the net burthen of one hundred and twenty-nine tons, Eustace, master, was captured by the United States vessel Wachusett, near the island of Porto Rico, while ostensibly prosecuting a voyage from Liverpool to Nassau. A claim to the vessel and cargo has been exhibited by the master, on behalf of William J. Grazebrook, a merchant, residing in Liverpool, who, it appears, shipped the whole cargo, and consigned it, by the bills of lading, to his own order, and, by the freight bill accompanying it, to Messrs. Chambers & Raw, of Nassau. Surveyors, appointed by the court to examine the cargo, which consists of a general assortment, report that it corresponds, in the number of packages, their marks and contents, with the freight list found on board, except as to forty-six cases, which contain rifles, and twenty cases, which contain cavalry swords, all of which are classed in the freight list as “hardware.” Each case of rifles contains twenty rifles, and each case of swords one hundred and twelve swords. Thirteen small boxes, containing cotton cards, were found on board, which are not on the freight list; also, one box of paint brushes, 'if we suppose the vessel and cargo to be owned as claimed, and that there was no intention on the part of the owner that the vessel should proceed with the cargo to a port of the enemy, then there would be no ground whatever to justify the capture or condemnation of either of them. Subject to the right of belligerent cruisers to visit and search merchant vessels, to ascertain their neutral or hostile characters, and the characters of their cargoes, and the legality of their voyages, neutrals possess an undisputed right to trade and carry on commerce among themselves in any kinds of merchandise they please, whether of the nature of contraband of war or not Indeed, there can be no such thing as articles contraband of war in a strictly neutral trade. But if, on the other hand, it was the intention of the owner that the vessel should simply touch at Nassau, and should proceed thence to Charleston, or some other port of the enemy, then the voyage was not a voyage prosecuted by a neutral from one neutral port to another, but was a voyage to a port of the enemy, begun and carried on in violation of the belligerent rights of the United States to blockade the enemy’s ports aad prevent the introduction of munitions of war. The act of sailing for a blockaded port, with the knowledge of the existence of the blockade, and with an intent to enter, is itself an attempt to break It, which subjects the vessel and cargo to capture in any part of the voyage. The Columbia, 1 C. Rob. Adm. 154; The Neptunus, 2 C. Rob. Adm. 110. So, also, the of-fence of attempting to carry articles contraband of war to the enemy is complete, and the vessel liable to capture, the moment she enters upon her voyage. The Imina, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 167. The offence consists in the act of sailing, coupled with the Illegal intent The cutting up of a continuous voyage into several parts, by the intervention, or proposed intervention, of several intermediate ports, may* render it the more difficult for cruisers and prize courts to determine where the ultimate terminus is intended to be; but it cannot make a voyage which, in its nature, is one, to become two or more voyages, nor make any of the parts of one entire voyage to become legal, which would be illegal if not so divided. When the truth is discovered, it is according to the truth, and not according to the fiction, that the question is to be determined. The Maria, 5 C. Rob. Adm. 365; The William, Id. 385; The Richmond. Id. 325: The Thomyr.’s. Edw. Adm. 17.

It is argued, that it was lawful for the vessel to go to Nassau, notwithstanding the existence of an intention that she should proceed, thence to Charleston; for the reason that, until after she had entered on the last stage of her voyage, the whole matter rested in possibility merely,—in intention only, and not in act,— and that the intention to commit an offence in futuro is not tantamount in law to its actual commission in praesenti. But this argument begs the whole question. It was not lawful for the vessel to go to Nassau, with an intention of continuing the voyage thence to Charleston in a direct course, without going to Nassau at all. The fallacy consists in supposing, that there is something in the intention to stop at a neu[870]*870tral port, which, in itself, is innocent enough, that will extinguish the illegality of an additional guilty intention to proceed on, beyond such a port, to a blockaded port, and thus legitimatize the first stage of the voyage. But the voyage is one, from the port of lading to the port of delivery, and, if unlawful in any part, is unlawful throughout

It is also argued, that a locus penitentione existed until the vessel had departed from Nassau, on her voyage to a blockaded port; and that the voyage might be ended there, or changed to a lawful port But this argument will apply with equal force to a voyage in which no intermediate port is intended to be interposed. The owner or master may, in any case, in port or in the middle of the ocean, abandon the illegal • purpose, and change the voyage. If this be done voluntarily, before capture, the original offence is extinguished, and the vessel will be restored; but, if the illegal purpose exists at the time of capture, the vessel is taken in delicto, whether the voyage is prosecuted in a direct course or circuitously. If the illegal purpose is shown to exist .at the inception of the voyage, it will be presumed to exist up to the time of capture, unless it is satisfactorily shown that the purpose had been abandoned and the voyage changed. The Imina, 3 C. Rob. Adm. 167.

Let us see now what the testimony is in relation to the fact of the existence of an intention, at the time of capture, that the vessel should proceed to a blockaded port The master, in his affidavit made in support of the claim, swears, “that* said voyage, of his own positive knowledge, would have terminated at Nassau, N. P., had said voyage not been arrested by the capture aforesaid; that this deponent’s instructions were positive and unconditional, requiring him to proceed to Nassau, and deliver said steamer to Chambers & Raw; that, when he had so delivered said steamer, this deponent’s connection with said steamer ceased; that he had no further command or control over the same; and he further says, that, of his own knowledge, said voyage was to end at Nassau.” Prize courts often have occasion to echo the remark made by Sir William Scott, in delivering his opinion in the case of The Odin, 1 C. Rob. Adm. 252: “It is a wild conceit that any court of justice is bound by mere swearing; it is the swearing credibly that is to conclude its judgment.” The master does not tell us how he acquired such positive knowledge of the intentions of the owner, nor show us any written instructions to end the voyage at Nassau, or to deliver the vessel- to Chambers & Raw, nor tell us what disposition or use was to be made of the vessel or cargo after arriving at that port. Vincent Lazzalo, the mate, swears that the voyage would have ended at Nassau, had the vessel not been captured. Banning, the purser, swears that the vessel would have been subject, at Nassau, to the orders of Chambers & Raw, the consignees. Leefe, the cook, thinks the vessel would have returned from Nassau to Liverpool. The other witnesses generally concur in saying, that they do not know what port the vessel would have gone to, after leaving Nassau.

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The Dolphin, 7 F. Cas. 868 (S.D. Fla. 1863).

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