The “Colorado”

91 U.S. 692, 23 L. Ed. 379, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1424
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedJanuary 31, 1876
Docket65
StatusPublished
Cited by90 cases

This text of 91 U.S. 692 (The “Colorado”) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The “Colorado”, 91 U.S. 692, 23 L. Ed. 379, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1424 (1876).

Opinion

Mr; Justice Cllfeord

delivered the opinion of the court.

Lights and other signals are required by law, and sailing rules are prescribed, to prevent collisions and to save life and property at sea; and all experience shows that the observance of such regulations and requirements is never more necessary than in a dense fo'j. whether, in.the .harbor or in the open ocean, if the vessel is in the common pathway of commerce.

Mariners dread a fog much more than high winds or rough seas.-. Nautical skill, if the ship is seaworthy,'will usually enable the -navigator to overcome the dangers .of the wind and waves; but the darkness of the night, if the fog is dense, brings with -it extreme danger, which the navigator knows may defy, every precaution within th,e power of the highest nautical skill.

Signal-lights in such an. emergency are valuable; but they may not be seen.. Bells and fog-horns, if constantly rung or blo’vtn, may be more effectual; but they may not be heard. Slow speed is indispensable ; but it will not entirely remove the danger; nor will all these*precautions, in every case, have that effect. Perfect security, under such circumstances, is impossible.

Danger attends the vessel if she ceases to move,, as other vessels astern may come up;. and, even if she goes about and takes the back track, she is still in danger from the vessels, astern which have not changed their course. Such a change of course is not required by the sailing rules or by. the usages of navigation. Instead of that, the best precautions are bright signal-lights, very slow speed, just sufficient to subject the vessel to the command of her helm, competent lookouts properly stationed and vigilant in.the performance of their duties, constant ringing of the bell or blowing of the fog-horn, as the case may *694 be, and sufficient force at the wheel to effect,'if necessary, a prompt change in the course. of the vessel. Where all these precautions are faithfully observed, such:disasters rarely occur, and the courts hear very little about inevitable accidents.

. ■ "Injuries were received by the bark, as her .owner alleges, on the 11th of May, 1869, in a collision which took place on Lake Huron between the bark.and the propeller “Colorado,” off Saginaw Bay, about half-past eleven o’clock at night, whereby the bark was sunk in the lake, and with her cargo, consisting of 45,000 bricks and 35,000 bushels of oats, became a total loss. Compensation is claimed in the libel for the value of- the vessel, freight, and cargo.

By. the record, it appears that the bark — a sail vessel of 425 tons' — was bound down the lake on á voyage from Milwaukee to -Buffalo; and that the propeller, — a large steamer of .1,500 •tons, — with a small cargo of general merehañdise, was bound up the lake on-,,a voyage from Buffalo to Chicago.

• Service was made, and the owners of the propeller appeared and filed an answer'. * Testimony was taken; and, the parties having been fully heard, the District Court entered an inter-r locutory. .decree in favor of the libellant, and referred the cause to a master to ascertain the amount of' the damages. Hearing was had before the .master, and he made a report* Exceptions -were taken to the report by the respondent, some of. which were sustained,'and others were overruled; and the District Court entered a final decree'in favor of the libellant for the sum of f33,675.26, with interest and costs,.as set-forth' in the decree. Immediate appeal was taken by the respondents to the Circuit Court, where, the decree of the District Court was in all things affirmed; and the respondents appealed to /this court.

Errors .of fact are assigned by the owaouSts. of the' propeller,, all of which deny that the propeller was, kb fault; which is- the principal question in the case* Fault' is also imputed to .the -bark; but the evidence to support the accusation is-so slight; that it-will not demand any extended examination.- Sufficient .appears to-show that the night was dark, and that the fog was quite dense at the time of the collision; that the wind at that time was south; that the bark was sailing by the wind, close-hauled, on her starboard tack, heading ^south-east by east; that *695 she had pursued that course for some time, and continued to pursue it without changing her helm, until the collision was inevitable, when her helm was put to starboard; that she was stanch and strong, and well manned and equipped; that she showed the requisite signal-lights; that she had competent lookouts properly stationed on the vessel, and that they were vigilant in the performance of their duty; that she blew her fog-horn as required by law and the custom on the lakes, and that her speed was moderate. Two blasts were given by her fog-horn; which signify in that locality that the approaching vessel is on the starboard tack, close-hauled. Signals of two blasts were given in order .that approaching vessels might be able to determine her course, and that 'she was on the starboard tack.

Prior to ten o’clock, the bark was making good speed; but, when the fog became dense, the bark commenced to shorten sail; and the evidence shows that all her light sails were taken in half ah hour before the collision. Her speed before the light sails were furled did not exceed five' or six knots an hour, and subsequently did not exceed four miles, as appears by the weight of the evidence.

Steamers must keep out of the way of sailing ships when the two are proceeding in such directions as to involve risk of collision ; and in such a case the rule is that the sailing ship shall keep her course, so that the steamer may not be baffled or misled in the performance of the duty required of her to keep out of the way. Special circumstances may exist in certain cases rendering a departure from that rule necessary in order to avoid immediate imminent danger; but there is no evidence in this case making it necessary to consider any of the qualifications to the general rule. The Warrior, Law Rep., 3 Ad. & Ecc. 555.

• Beyond all doubt, the evidence establishes the proposition that the bark did keep her course, as required by the eighteenth article of the sailing rules; and, it appearing that there is no evidence tending to bring the 'case within any of the qualifications contained in the nineteenth article' of the same rules, the prima fade presumption is ’ that the propeller was in fault.

*696 Three answers are given to that theory by the owner of the propeller, either of which, if true, is conclusive that the decree below is erroneous(1.) That the bark was in fault. (2.) That the propeller was not in fault. (3.) That the collision was the result of inevitable accident.

1. Much discussion of the first proposition is unnecessary, as it has already been shown that the signal-lights of the bark were well displayed; that she had competent lookouts properly stationed, and that they were vigilant in the performance of their duty. Due signals from her fog-horn were given as frequently as required by law or the custom of the lakes, and her speed was moderate; her foresail and all her light sails having been furled of taken down at least a half-hour béfore the disaster.

What more the bark ought to have done the owner of the propeller does not state.

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Bluebook (online)
91 U.S. 692, 23 L. Ed. 379, 1875 U.S. LEXIS 1424, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-colorado-scotus-1876.