The Casco

5 F. Cas. 242, 2 Ware 381, 4 Law Rep. 471, 1842 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39
District Court, D. Maine·Decided February 10, 1842·Published

Opinion

ATARE, District Judge.

The first question, which was raised and discussed at the bar, was whether, under this charter-party, the vessel in specie is liable for any loss, which the charterer may have sustained from damage to the cargo. It is contended on behalf of the respondents, that there was a demise of the vessel herself to the charterer, by which the possession was transferred to him; that he, under the charter-party, became owner for the voyage, and thus his own carrier, and consequently, if any damages have been sustained from the fault of the master or crew, his remedy is solely against the master, and not against the vessel. This is a question which must be determined by the-terms of the instrument itself.

The charter-party is in its form somewhat special and peculiar. It sets forth -that it is made and concluded between Allen G. York, the master, who is also part-owner, and John B. Brown, the libellant; and the master, in consideration of the covenants and agreements of the libellant, does covenant and agree on the freighting and chartering of said vessel to the said party of the second part (the libellant), for a voyage from the port of Portland, ‘to one port in the island of Porto Rico, and from thence to her port of discharge in the United States, touching' a.t Turk’s Island for a cargo of salt, if required by the party of the second part.’ The-charter-party then proceeds to state the covenants on the part of the master; firsT, that the vessel shall be kept, during the voyage, tight, staunch, and well fitted, tackled with every requisite, and with men and provisions necessary for such a voyage; secondly, that the whole vessel, with the exception of the-cabin and the necessary room for the crew, and the sails, cables, and provisions, shall be at the disposal of the charterer; ai.d thirdly, he engages to receive on board all such lawful goods and merchandise as the-[243] charterer or liis agents may think proper to ship. The libellant, on his part, agrees to furnish cargoes for the vessel at Portland and Porto Iiico, or Turk’s Island, and to pay, for the charter of the vessel, 1,175 dollars. one half to be considered as earned at her port of discharge, and so much to be paid as may be required for the vessel's disbursements, and the balance on the delivery of the cargo in the United States, and also to pay all the expenses of loading at Portland. It seems very clear from these covenants that the possession of the vessel was intended to be in the master. He is to victual and man her, he agrees to receive on board such goods as the charterer shall choose to ship. The charterer agrees to furnish the cargoes, to pay the expenses of loading at Portland, and to advance, at her outward port of deliver}', so much of the freight as may be required for the vessel’s disbursements. Why should these covenants be inserted if the possession of the vessel was to be transferred to the hirer, and to be navigated by him? It is quite evident that this charter-party was a contract of affreightment for the transportation of goods, and not a demise of the vessel; that the owners retained possession under their master, and must be considered, therefore, as carriers.

There is. in the common form of charter-parties. a clause by which the ship and freight are specifically bound for the performance of the covenants in the charter-party. There is none such in this, but this is a condition which, by the marine law, is tacitly annexed to every contract entered into by the master for the transportation of goods, whether by bill of lading or charter-party. The ship is, by operation of law, hypothecated to the shippers for any loss she may sustain from the insufficiency of the vessel or the fault or the master or crew. There is another peculiarity in this instrument. It is usual, in charter-parties of af-freightment. as well as in bills of lading, to insert a clause specially exempting the mas-u>r and owners from losses occasioned by the dangers of the seas. This instrument contains no such exception, but, this, as was justly contended in the argument for the respondents, is an exception, which the law itself silently supplies without its being formally expressed. It is a general rule of law, founded upon the plainest and most obvious principles of natural justice, that no man shall be held responsible for fortuitous events and accidents of major force, such as human sagacity cannot foresee, nor human prudence provide against, unless he expressly agrees to take these risks upon himself. “Casus fortuitous nemo praestat.” Pothier, Des Obligations, No. 142. 6 Toullier, Droit Civil, Nos. 227, 228; Dig. 50, 17, 23; Story, Bailm. § 25. There is an exception to this rule, that is entirely consistent with the principle of the rule itself. It is, when the party to be charged has been guilty of some fault, without which the loss would not have happened. The liabilities of the owners, in this ease, are precisely the same, and no more ex- ■ tensive than they would have been if the usual exception of the dangers of the seas had been inserted in the charter-party.

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The Casco, 5 F. Cas. 242, 2 Ware 381, 4 Law Rep. 471, 1842 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39 (D. Me. 1842).

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