The Buckingham

129 F. 975, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 325
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 22, 1904
DocketNos. 12, 15
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 129 F. 975 (The Buckingham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Buckingham, 129 F. 975, 1904 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 325 (E.D. Pa. 1904).

Opinion

J. B. McPHERSON, District Judge,

i. The Buckingham is a British steamship, and was chartered to the Pacific Transport Company and James Griffiths for eight shillings and sixpence per ton, gross register, under a time charter, for the period of six months. Delivery of the vessel, which was on a voyage from Hong Kong to Tacoma when the contract was made, was accepted by the charterers at Seattle on May 27, 1901. The charter party contained the provision that the ship might be employed “in such lawful trades as the charterers or their agents shall direct, but not north of Vancouver, and no part of North America except Pacific side.” This restriction was modified by cable a few days before the ship was delivered, so as to permit the charterers to make one voyage to St. Michael’s, Alaska, for which privilege they were to pay the additional hire of two shillings and sixpence per ton. This voyage was the first enterprise upon which the ship was to enter, and the first subject of dispute now is: When did the voyage begin- and end ? The relevant facts are as follows: Immediately upon delivery of the vessel the charterers loaded some bunker coal, and on May 29th the ship left Seattle for Nanaimo, another port on Puget Sound, where she took on board a further supply of bunker coal and about 75 tons of cargo for St. Michael’s. On May 30th she crossed the sound to Vancouver, where she loaded a general cargo of 2,400 tons; leaving that port on June 6th, and recrossing the sound to Dadysmith, where she completed her cargo by loading 2,000 tons of coal. She left Dadysmith on June 10th, and proceeded directly to St. Michael’s, merely touching at Victoria to put the pilot ashore. She returned to Puget Sound on July 30th, making a brief stop only at Port Townsend, and arrived at Seattle four or five hours later on the same day, where she was again taken in charge by the charterers, and accounts for the voyage were settled with the master. On these facts, I agree with the position taken by the proctors for the Buckingham, that the voyage began and ended at Seattle. The charterers’ contention that the voyage did not begin until June 10th, when the ship left her last port of loading-with a complete cargo, finds no support in the authorities. No decision was cited in which the point has been so ruled, but there are several cases in which it has been distinctly decided that a voyage begins when a ship sets about doing what is to earn freight for the owner. Bruce v. Nicolopulo, 11 Exch. 129, questioning the authority of Crow v. Falk, 8 Q. B. (55 E. C. L.) 467; Barker v. McAndrew, 18 Com. Bench (N. S.) 114 E. C. L. 758; Valente v. Gibbs, 6 Com. Bench (N. S.) 95 E. C. L. 270; The Carron Park, 15 Prob. Div. 203; Nottebohn v. Richter, 18 Q. B. D. 63; Fearing v. Cheeseman, 3 Cliff. 91, Fed. Cas. No. 4,710. The English cases are summarized in Carver’s Carriage by Sea (3d Ed.) § 148, in the following language:

“A doubt sometimes arises as to when during the agreed voyage the ordinary exceptions of perils apply. Do they relate only to that part of it in which the ship is carrying the charterer’s goods? Or do they also cover risks which frustrate or delay the-voyage before the goods are taken on board? Say, in going to the port of loading, and during the loading there.
“Where such and such perils are to be ‘always excepted,’ the shipowner seems to be relieved from liability for any failure to perform his contract, if caused by those perils, whenever they may have occurred. But where the [977]*977clause runs ‘during the voyage always excepted,’ as It frequently does, there may he an ambiguity in the word ‘voyage.’
“If the vessel is to proceed to a different port from that at which she is lying, and load there, the voyage thither is considered to be part of the chartered voyage, even though the vessel be allowed by the charter to take, and in fact takes, a cargo outwards for other merchants, and although in doing so she proceeds first to another port, out of the route to the loading port. And if the vessel is prevented or delayed in getting to the loading port, or if the loading is prevented, or a loss occurs during the loading at that port by a peril excepted ‘during the voyage,’ the exception applies.
“So, again, where the vessel is lying at her port of loading, if she has to move from the place at which she is lying to a loading berth, the ‘voyage’ to which the exceptions relate commences as soon as she breaks ground to go to that berth.
“But it seems that the exceptions do not apply to matters which may happen before the ship has entered upon the voyage dealt with by the charter party. So that, if she were disabled by perils of the sea while still completing a voyage on which she was engaged at the time of chartering, the shipowner would not be excused.
“If the ship is to be loaded at the place where she is lying, it does not appear to be settled whether the ‘voyage’ may begin before she has commenced her transit, in such a sense that the exceptions may relate to risks during or prior to the loading. In Crow v. Falk it was decided that it did not. But that decision has more than once been dissented from.”

In view of these authorities, I think it is clear that the point must be decided against the charterers’ contention.

2. The second ground of dispute concerns the sum of $67.50 that was paid to three Japanese firemen who were employed by the master at Ladysmith. The owners were bound by the charter party to furnish a full complement of officers, seamen, engineers, and firemen for a vessel of the Buckingham’s tonnage, and to pay their wages. The charterers’ contention is that this sum of $67.50 was paid to the firemen as wages for doing that particular work, and therefore is not a proper charge. The evidence satisfies me, however, that the money was not paid for firing, but for work done in discharging the cargo at St. Michael’s, and was paid by the express authority of the charterers themselves. Indeed, the item appeared in the account rendered by the master of the Buckingham on his return to Seattle, and wa's approved and paid by the charterers at that time without objection. No reason whatever has been shown for opening that settlement, and the objection to this item seems to be an afterthought, probably suggested by subsequent controversies, over other matters.

3. A similar remark may be made concerning the charterers’ claim of $108, which is said to be an overcharge for boarding several men who were sent by the charterers to St. Michael’s to help in discharging the cargo. These men were not seamen, nor in the employ of the ship, but were carried by the captain without other charge than $1 per day for boarding. The charterers claim that 40 cents per day is the usual rate paid upon the Pacific Coast for boarding, but I do not think it necessary to decide whether the claim is well founded, for this item also was included in the account rendered by the master upon his return, and was paid without a word of objection, and no reason has been shown for opening that settlement.

4. The charterers further assert that they should be allowed the sum of $i,qoo for damages suffered by the wrongful conduct of the master of [978]*978the Buckingham at the port of St. Michael’s. Upon this point the libel contains the following statement:

“That on the arrival of the said vessel at St.

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