Rel: September 26, 2025
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS SPECIAL TERM, 2025 _________________________
CL-2025-0234 _________________________
The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for its Division, University Hospital
v.
Carolyn Todd
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court (CV-21-900578)
PER CURIAM.
The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama for its Division,
University Hospital ("UAB Hospital"), appeals from a judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court ("the trial court") that, among other things,
directed the clerk of the trial court to disburse $7,570 of interpleaded CL-2025-0234
money to Carolyn Todd. Todd had interpleaded the money to cover a
hospital lien that UAB Hospital had filed against her for the amount it
had charged her for treatment she had received at its facility for injuries
she said she had suffered in a fall. The trial court also dismissed Todd's
second amended complaint against UAB Hospital in its entirety on the
ground that UAB Hospital was entitled to State immunity from the tort
claims that Todd had asserted against it. This appeal does not involve
the dismissal of the tort claims. For the reasons discussed herein, we
reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Background
This matter began in February 2021 when Todd commenced in the
trial court a personal-injury action against a grocery store where she had
fallen in June 2020. In her complaint against the grocery store, Todd
alleged that she had incurred an unspecified amount of medical expenses
when she was treated for injuries that she said she had suffered in the
fall. In October 2020, UAB Hospital filed a hospital lien against Todd in
the amount of $7,570, which it asserted were the reasonable and
necessary charges arising out of the treatment Todd had received at its
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facility. UAB Hospital was not named as a party in Todd's original
complaint.
On April 1, 2024, after receiving leave of court, Todd filed her first
amended complaint adding UAB Hospital as a defendant. In the first
amended complaint, Todd averred that she had reached a settlement of
$30,000 from the grocery store in the underlying personal-injury action.
She claimed that UAB Hospital had a hospital lien in place that attached
to her settlement of that action. She sought an interpleader hearing and
asked the trial court to determine the reasonableness, relatedness, and
necessity of the medical charges secured by the hospital lien. She also
asked the trial court to determine whether the lien was valid or, in the
alternative, to determine the fair and reasonable amount UAB Hospital
was owed for its services and asked permission to interplead the amount
of the hospital lien.
Todd also asked the trial court to declare whether, under § 35-11-
370, Ala. Code 1975, UAB Hospital was a "person, firm, hospital
authority, or corporation" authorized to place liens upon third-party
financial recoveries for injuries. Todd also alleged a claim of unjust
enrichment and claims asserting violations of her constitutional rights to
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equal protection and due process. She also sought to enjoin UAB Hospital
from charging her for what she says are unreasonably high medical bills
and to compel UAB Hospital to amend or withdraw the lien. On April 8,
2024, the trial court entered an order dismissing the grocery store as a
defendant. On May 13, 2024, the UAB formally appeared in the case. On
July 3, 2024, again with leave of the trial court, Todd filed a second
amended complaint adding numerous tort claims against UAB Hospital
and Thomas Elmes, in his official capacity as the manager of patient
financial services for UAB Hospital.
On August 12, 2024, UAB Hospital filed a motion to dismiss Todd's
second amended complaint in its entirety on the ground that, as an agent
of the state, UAB Hospital and its agent, Elmes, were entitled to
sovereign immunity, also known as State immunity, under § 14 of the
Alabama Constitution of 2022, which provides that "the State of Alabama
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity." It also
argued that, in his individual capacity, Elmes was entitled to State-agent
immunity.
In the motion to dismiss, UAB Hospital observed that the lien was
a "net lien" that automatically encumbered any recovery Todd obtained
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and that only liens for attorney fees would take priority over the hospital
lien. It argued that the only claim against it and Elmes that Todd had
alleged in the second amended complaint over which the trial court "could
possibly obtain jurisdiction" was the claim for interpleader relief, adding:
"However, in its current state, the [trial c]ourt does not have jurisdiction
and the claim is due to be dismissed as a matter of law." (Emphasis in
original.) UAB Hospital explained that Todd had "coupled with her
interpleader claim an additional request for the [trial] court to 'determine
the reasonableness, relatedness and necessity of the medical treatment' "
she had received and to order a reduction in the amount of the hospital
lien. That request, UAB hospital said, suggested that Todd was seeking
the trial court's review of the hospital lien, which, it said, is authorized
under § 35-11-373, Ala. Code 1975.
However, citing Roberts v. University of Alabama Hospital, 27 So.
3d 512, 514 n.1 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008), and Board of Trustees of University
of Alabama v. Richards, 405 So. 3d 267 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024), UAB
Hospital argued in the motion that, for the trial court to obtain
jurisdiction over the claim for interpleader relief, three things had to
occur: (1) the settlement money had to be interpleaded with the trial
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court, (2) UAB Hospital had to be added as a party to the action, and (3)
the judgment determining the amount of the lien must be entered after
the settlement and dismissal of the underlying tort claims. Because Todd
had not yet interpleaded the settlement money into the trial court, UAB
Hospital argued, the trial court lacked custody, control, and supervision
of that money and thus had not obtained subject-matter jurisdiction, that
is, it had not yet obtained in rem jurisdiction over the settlement money.
Therefore, UAB Hospital concluded, the claim for interpleader relief was
due to be dismissed as a matter of law.
In response to the motion to dismiss, Todd argued that the
contested settlement money had been held in trust by her attorneys and
that she had "already offered the contested funds for deposit." She
asserted that, under Rule 22(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which governs
interpleader procedure, depositing money with the clerk of the court is
permissive rather than mandatory and that, therefore, the trial court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim for interpleader relief. She
further asserted that, out of an abundance of caution, on September 12,
2024, she had filed a motion to interplead the full amount of the hospital
lien -- $7,570 -- which was pending. On September 13, 2024, the trial
6 CL-2025-0234
court granted Todd's motion to deposit the money; however, it does not
appear that Todd filed anything in the trial court giving notice of that
deposit.
On November 12, 2024, UAB Hospital filed a supplemental brief in
support of its motion to dismiss, in which, among other things, it noted
that Todd had interpleaded the amount of the hospital lien and clarified
its position that Todd's second amended complaint was due to be
dismissed with the exception of the claim for interpleader relief.
The case-action-summary sheet indicates that, on February 20,
2025, the trial court held a virtual hearing and status conference.1 A
transcript of the hearing is not included in the record on appeal; however,
it is undisputed that the trial court did not take any evidence. That same
day, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the second amended
complaint in its entirety -- including the claim for interpleader relief. In
the judgment, the trial court wrote that, during the February 20 hearing,
UAB Hospital had conceded that the trial court had in rem jurisdiction
1We note that, in its brief, UAB Hospital advises that the trial court
heard oral arguments on its motion to dismiss on November 5, 2024. The case-action-summary sheet does not indicate that a hearing was held on that date; instead, it indicates that a virtual hearing was held on February 20, 2025. 7 CL-2025-0234
over the money that Todd had deposited with the trial court on
September 23, 2024. The trial court found the following regarding the
interpleaded money:
"This Court retains in rem jurisdiction of the $7,570 currently held by the Clerk of this Court. Count I of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint [the claim for interpleader relief] remains pending in all respects against [UAB Hospital]. This Court retains jurisdiction as conferred by The Hospital Lien Statute, Ala. Code [1975, §] 35-11-370 et seq., to fully determine how said funds are to be disbursed and thereby resolve all claims with respect to the hospital lien filed by [UAB Hospital] and the settlement funds held by the Clerk of Court. Accordingly, said funds in the amount of $7,570 shall be disbursed to [Todd] effective immediately."
The trial court dismissed the remainder of the second amended complaint
on the basis that UAB Hospital was entitled to State immunity.
On February 24, 2025, UAB Hospital filed a "motion to reconsider
order for payment and motion for status conference." In that motion,
UAB Hospital asserted that the trial court had not yet taken evidence
regarding "the reasonableness and relatedness of" the hospital lien and
pointing out that nothing in the record justified the complete denial of
the lien, which, it said, was the effect of ordering the disbursement of the
interpleaded money to Todd. UAB Hospital asked the trial court to
vacate that portion of the judgment directing that the interpleaded
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money be disbursed to Todd and to schedule a hearing on the issue of the
reasonableness and relatedness of the lien. On February 24, 2025, the
trial court amended the judgment to award Todd the interpleaded money,
plus interest. The trial court did not rule on UAB Hospital's "motion to
reconsider"; therefore, that motion was deemed denied by operation of
law. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. UAB Hospital timely appealed to this
court.
Analysis
Before proceeding to the merits, first we must decide whether the
trial court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment disbursing the
interpleaded money to Todd. Section 35-11-373 confers jurisdiction upon
a court to determine any matter relating to a hospital lien, including the
disbursement of the interpleaded funds, when the claim upon which the
lien has attached is before the court and the claim "has been reduced to
judgment." In Roberts v. University of Alabama Hospital, supra, this
court determined that a court overseeing a personal-injury action may
exercise jurisdiction over a dispute concerning a hospital lien when the
personal-injury claim to which the lien had attached had been settled and
dismissed, the settlement funds in dispute had been interpleaded, and
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the hospital had been added as a party. In this case, the trial court had
jurisdiction over the tort claims against the grocery store, to which the
hospital lien had attached. Before the trial court adjudicated the dispute
over the hospital lien, Todd added UAB Hospital as a party by serving it
with the first amended complaint. The trial court entered a judgment
dismissing the grocery store as a defendant, and Todd interpleaded the
funds. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction over the dispute regarding
the hospital lien when it entered its judgment.
Turning now to the merits of the appeal, UAB Hospital contends
that the trial court erred in sua sponte awarding all interpleaded money
to Todd without explanation or without evidence to support that award.
Todd asserts that the trial court's judgment is essentially a judgment on
the pleadings. Although, in its opening brief, UAB Hospital notes that
Todd did not file a motion for a judgment on the pleadings or argue that
she was entitled to such a judgment, it contends that, even if she had,
such a judgment would be improper under the circumstances. In its reply
brief, UAB Hospital expands on its argument that, even if the judgment
is treated as a judgment on the pleadings, the trial court erred in entering
it.
10 CL-2025-0234
Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
In Medlock v. Safeway Insurance Co. of Alabama, 15 So. 3d 501,
507 (Ala. 2009), our supreme court observed that a sua sponte judgment
on the pleadings is unusual. In Lary v. Flasch Business Consulting, 909
So. 2d 194, 197 n.3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), this court wrote:
"Although Rule 12(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., envisions the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings by one of the parties to an action, caselaw and commentary addressing the analogous Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., indicate[] that a trial court may properly enter a judgment on the pleadings sua sponte in a particular case 'if it is clear that one side is assured of victory as a matter of law and there is no material factual dispute.' 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1367 & n.25 (3d ed. 2004) (citing Flora v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 685 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1982), Vickery v. Jones, 878 F.Supp. 1179 (S.D. Ill. 1995), aff'd, 100 F.3d 1334 (7th Cir. 1996), and Bajenski v. Chivatero, 818 F.Supp. 1083 (N.D. Ohio 1993))."
(Emphasis added.)
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When the trial court entered the judgment in this case, it did not
have before it a motion for a judgment on the pleadings or a motion for a
summary judgment, and it is undisputed that it had no evidence before
it, whether documentary or testimonial. In other words, the trial court
had only the pleadings to consider when it entered the judgment.
Therefore, we will treat the trial court's judgment as having been entered
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 12(c), governing judgments on the
pleadings in a case. See Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d 840, 841-42
(Ala. 2000); Medlock, 15 So. 3d at 507.
"A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings disposes of a
case when the material facts are not in dispute." McCullough v. Alabama
By-Prods. Corp., 343 So. 2d 508, 510 (Ala. 1977). In considering a motion
for a judgment on the pleadings, "the trial court reviews the pleadings
filed in the case and, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of
material fact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for the
party entitled to a judgment according to the law." B.K.W. Enters., Inc.
v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989, 991 (Ala. 1992). The trial court
cannot enter a judgment on the pleadings if the pleadings demonstrate
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Universal Underwriters
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Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 85 (Ala. 2000). A judgment on the
pleadings is subject to a de novo review. Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d
1254, 1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
As UAB Hospital explains in its brief, § 35-11-370 ("the hospital-
lien statute") provides for an automatic hospital lien on tort and
insurance recoveries as to " 'all reasonable charges for hospital care,
treatment and maintenance of an injured person.' " Roberts, 27 So. 3d at
514; see also Ex parte University of S. Alabama, 761 So. 2d 240, 244 (Ala.
1999). Whether a hospital is entitled under the hospital-lien statute to a
lien for all the unpaid charges for which it has billed the patient may
properly be deemed a "mixed question" of law and fact. Roberts, 27 So.
3d at 514-15. Additionally, our supreme court has recognized that the
hospital-lien statute is to be construed broadly so as not to defeat a just
hospital claim. Guin v. Carraway Methodist Med. Ctr., 583 So. 2d 1317,
1319 (Ala. 1991).
It is undisputed that, after her fall in the grocery store, Todd sought
treatment at UAB Hospital's facility for the injuries she received in that
fall. In her claim for interpleader relief contained in the second amended
complaint, Todd asked the trial court to determine the reasonable and
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necessary amount UAB Hospital could charge for that treatment; in
other words, she challenged whether UAB Hospital was entitled to
recover the entire $7,570 that was secured by the hospital lien. No
evidence is contained in the record to dispute the reasonableness or
necessity of that amount.
The pleadings also indicate that Todd settled the underlying
personal-injury case she had against the grocery store for $30,000, which
was sufficient to cover the hospital lien. Because the record contains no
evidence from which the trial court could have determined that UAB
Hospital was not entitled to recover the entire amount of the lien, it erred
in ordering trial-court clerk to disburse the interpleaded money to Todd.
In her appellate brief, Todd makes numerous arguments in support
of the judgment. She contends that UAB Hospital waived its right to
present evidence to the trial court on the issue of the reasonableness and
necessity of the amount it charged Todd for her treatment. The record
does not support that contention, however. Nothing in the record
indicates that the hearing on the motion to dismiss, which, according to
the case-action-summary sheet was conducted virtually, was intended to
be an evidentiary hearing. After reviewing the record, it does not appear
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that UAB Hospital had an opportunity to present evidence regarding the
reasonableness and necessity of the charges secured by the hospital lien.
By the same token, Todd did not have an opportunity to present evidence
challenging the reasonableness and necessity of those charges.
Therefore, when the trial court entered its judgment disbursing the
interpleaded money to Todd, it did so without having any evidence to
support its decision, and the portion of the judgment releasing the
interpleaded money to Todd cannot stand.
Todd also argues that, under Rule 12(c) and its jurisdiction under §
35-11-373, the trial court had the authority to enter the judgment
awarding Todd the interpleaded money and to determine how to disburse
the interpleaded money. She argues that the judgment was
"procedurally supported and respected due process, even without
evidence." Todd's brief, p. 15. It is well settled that procedural due
process requires "a fair proceeding including an impartial hearing before
a legally constituted court; an opportunity to present evidence and
arguments; information regarding the claims of the opposing party; a
reasonable opportunity to controvert the opposition's claims; and
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representation by counsel if it is desired." Crews v. Houston Cnty. Dep't
of Pensions & Sec., 358 So. 2d 451, 455 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978).
There is no question that, when the trial court entered the
judgment, it had the authority and the jurisdiction to consider the issue
of the propriety of the hospital lien and to enter an appropriate judgment.
However, merely having the authority and jurisdiction to enter a
judgment does not relieve the trial court of its responsibility to heed the
requirements of due process. Todd cites no authority for the proposition
that the trial court had unfettered discretion to determine how much, if
anything, UAB Hospital was entitled to for the treatment Todd had
received at its facility.
Neither UAB Hospital nor Todd had the opportunity to present
evidence to support or to challenge the amount of the hospital lien -- that
is, whether the amount UAB Hospital charged for the treatment Todd
received at its facility was reasonable and necessary -- before the trial
court decided the matter and awarded Todd all the interpleaded money.
The trial court, without any evidence, necessarily determined that UAB
Hospital was not entitled to recover any of the amount it charged for the
treatment Todd had received at its facility. In doing so, the trial court
16 CL-2025-0234
thwarted the purpose of the hospital lien, and it denied UAB Hospital its
right to due process. If, under the same circumstances, the trial court
had awarded UAB Hospital the entire amount of the interpleaded money
without allowing Todd an opportunity to present evidence challenging
that amount, the result would be the same. Todd's defense of the
judgment on this ground is without merit.
Todd also contends that it would be fundamentally unfair for UAB
Hospital to have all the claims against it dismissed and still attempt to
enforce the hospital lien. Specifically, Todd argues, once the trial court
determined that UAB Hospital was entitled to State immunity and
dismissed the claims she had asserted against it in the second amended
complaint, UAB Hospital could not avoid the ramifications of that ruling.
In other words, she argues, it cannot now seek to enforce the hospital lien
without affording Todd an opportunity to have the hospital lien judicially
reviewed because the claim seeking that review has been dismissed.
Todd's argument misrepresents the context in which UAB Hospital
sought the dismissal of the interpleader claim. When it initially sought
to have the second amended complaint dismissed, UAB Hospital made
clear that the reason the interpleader claim was due to be dismissed was
17 CL-2025-0234
because Todd had failed to interplead into court the amount of the
hospital lien she challenged, as required by Roberts to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court over the hospital lien pursuant to § 35-11-373.
After Todd interpleaded the disputed funds, UAB Hospital withdrew its
motion to dismiss the interpleader claim. The trial court did not dismiss
that claim, which specifically requested judicial review of the hospital
lien before disbursement of the interpleaded money. We therefore reject
the premise of Todd's argument.
Todd also contends that UAB Hospital cannot operate as a state
agency and as a corporate entity at the same time, and, therefore, she
says, it could not have been an "authorized statutory hospital lienholder
under [the hospital-lien statute]," which allows "[a]ny person, firm,
hospital authority, or corporation operating a hospital in this state" to
obtain a hospital lien. The court may affirm a judgment on any valid
legal ground. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama
Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003) (holding
that, subject to due-process constraints, appellate courts "will affirm the
trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless
of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the
18 CL-2025-0234
trial court"). However, we find no legal basis for removing UAB Hospital
from the protection of the hospital-lien-statute on the ground that it is a
state agency and a corporate entity. UAB Hospital is clearly within the
scope of the phrase " '[a]ny person, firm, hospital authority, or corporation
operating a hospital in this state,' " which, we note, must be construed in
favor of preserving the lien. See Guin, 583 So. 2d at 1319 (quoting § 35-
11-370).
Finally, Todd contends that UAB Hospital argued for the first time
in its postjudgment motion that, to decide the merits of Todd's request
for judicial review of the lien as set forth in her interpleader claim, the
trial court needed to take evidence outside the pleadings. In the same
sentence, Todd also contends that UAB Hospital makes no argument to
show that outside evidence must be considered.
The pleadings indicate that, when the trial court entered the
judgment dismissing all the claims in the second amended complaint and
ordering the disbursal of the interpleaded money to Todd, UAB Hospital
had essentially withdrawn its request to have Todd's interpleader claim
dismissed. UAB Hospital had no reason to believe that, when the trial
court entered a judgment dismissing all the claims, it would also award
19 CL-2025-0234
the interpleaded money to Todd. It follows, then, that the first time UAB
could challenge the trial court's decision to award the interpleaded money
to Todd would be in a postjudgment motion.
Moreover, to determine whether the amount of the hospital lien was
reasonable and necessary, the trial court would necessarily have to
consider information outside the pleadings, which would necessarily
require the consideration of evidence, whether presented in conjunction
with a motion for a summary judgment or during a trial. We have
already rejected the other reasons Todd says support the judgment;
therefore, the only remaining reason the trial court could have denied
UAB Hospital at least a portion of the interpleaded money would be
because it had determined the cost of Todd's treatment was
unreasonable, unrelated, or unnecessary, and that could not be done
without evidence. Consequently, we find that this issue also fails to
provide a basis for affirming the judgment.
Conclusion
Reviewing the trial court's judgment on the pleadings de novo, as
we must, we conclude that there remains a factual dispute, unresolved
by the pleadings themselves, concerning the reasonableness, relatedness,
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and necessity of the amount of the charges secured by the hospital lien.
Therefore, the trial court's judgment is reversed, and the cause is
remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All the judges concur.