The Beaverton

273 F. 539, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 628
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 28, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 273 F. 539 (The Beaverton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Beaverton, 273 F. 539, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).

Opinion

LEARNED HAND, District Judge.

[1] I have delayed the decision in this case for five months, hoping that the Supreme Court, in The Gleneden, 254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185, 65 L. Ed. -, would settle the question of the Daisai Maru’s immunity from arrest on December 22, 1917. That is the critical date, because the libel was then filed, and it is clear from the stipulation that the libelant held off the [540]*540arrest at the request of the proctors for the Daisai Maru. At that time she was merely under charter to the French republic, not in its possession nor owned by it, though both facts changed within a few days. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals on May 14, 1919, in The Carlo Poma, 259 Fed. 369, 170 C. C. A. 345, decided that the test of immunity was the possession of the foreign sovereign, not its ownership. A fortiori the relation of charterer will not give immunity. It is true that, strictly speaking, the decision in The Carlo Poma, supra, was only that, when both ownership and possession co-existed, the ship was immune ; it was not necessary to say that possession was the test.. However, the opinion is a distinct declaration of the law by a tribunal whose word is authoritative upon me, and it seems to me undesirable any longer to delay decision, since upon an appeal my error, if any, may be corrected, if the Supreme Court shall have decided that the test is whether the ship is engaged upon a venture of a foreign sovereign which will be impeded or frustrated by arrest.

I proceed, therefore, to the merits. That the Daisai Maru is prima facie at fault is of course accepted by all sides; she was a moving vessel in collision with an anchored. The only questions open are, first, whether the Beaverton was also at fault; second, whether the tugs share the blame with the Daisai Maru; third, whether the towing company is also liable, if the tugs be liable.

[2] The Beaverton’s supposed fault consists of no more than failing to observe in season the approach of the Daisai Maru and to veer chain. Kennedy was at the forecastle head of the Beaverton, at work coiling ropes, etc. While he was in no sense an anchor watch, it was not as though no one had been on deck. He could and did see the approach of the Daisai Maru, and did not suppose, at first, as no one did, that she would endanger the Beaverton. Normally she would not, and certainly she should not, have done so. It was only when she was about a length or more away that he observed that she was not under control. I am not disposed to scrutinize too nicely his conduct, and to treat the case as though he was bound to keep a sharp lookout. The Beaverton was at anchor on an anchorage ground where she had the right to be; the weather was fair and calm and reasonably clear; the Daisai Maru was scarcely under way and in charge of four tugs, an unusual number under the circumstances.

The suggestion that such a situation demands anything in the nature of continuous observation appears to me extreme. Lind v. Penn. R. R., 139 Fed. 233, 71 C. C. A. 359. An anchor watch is not an absolute necessity in broad daylight and fair, calm weather. Wells v. Armstrong (D. C.) 29 Fed. 216; The Rockaway (D. C.) 19 Fed. 449. Kennedy’s presence at the forecastle head, his observation of the Daisai Maru out of the tail of his eye, were quite all that was to be expected. Had he ever given up his work and kept his gaze fixed on her, it is doubtful whether he would have found occasion for action sooner than he did. I will assume that he might, for it would in my judgment make no difference. He was not bound to take such action towards a vessel which threatened so little danger.

As soon as he did observe that she was not under control, he did all [541]*541that he could, by calling his chief officer, who at once gave orders to veer chain. It is clear that these orders were carried out with all proper expedition. Whether the chain in fact paid out at once is a matter of some doubt; but it is immaterial, because, if it did not, it was because the Beaverton was at the moment riding forward on her chain through some trick of the tide, which I own seems to me questionable, but which nevertheless may have happened. In any aspect, I cannot sec how the Beaverton, an anchored vessel, in apparent safety, with every means to be avoided, can be! charged with joint fault in what certainly was a strangely unjustified collision. I hold her, therefore, free from fault.

[3] There remains, therefore, the apportionment of fault between the Daisai Maru and her tugs, which were the only wills that set her in motion. Feldhusen was the Daisai Maru’s pilot, regularly employed by the ship as such, for whose faults, under the rule ever since The China, 7 Wall. 53, 19 F. Ed. 67, she was absolutely responsible. I shall therefore speak of him as though for the time he were the ship itself. He was a young man of some two years’ experience as a qualified pilot, who impressed me on the stand as straightforward and reasonably intelligent, but without great force of character. When he arrived at Brady’s dock, he found that three tugs had been ordered, to which later a fourth was added. The ship was not under steam— except for her winches, etc. — and it was necessary to rely wholly on die tugs. His purpose was only to move her out to the anchorage grounds, to a safe berth outside the Beaverton. South of the last, and about a length or two away, say 600 feet, lay the Chippana, and north of her another unknown vessel, about the same distance astern. Except for the Java which was docking at the north side of Brady’s dock when the Daisai Maru emerged, there was no other shipping in the vicinity. It was Feldhusen’s purpose to take the Daisai Maru between the Beaverton and the Chippana, in doing which he necessarily reckoned on the absence of any current, for the space was not great.

I think that he had to choose between three alternatives,, although the testimony is in some conflict: First, to do as he planned; second, to go across the bows of the Chippana, the safest way; and, third, to go astern of the Beaverton, which would have been possible, had he waited till the Java had docked, or at least so it seems. All three of the anchored vessels were about 1,000 feet off the pier end, and he had therefore ample room to turn the Daisai Maru. I find that he did not disclose to any of the tugs just which course he was going to take, though he did say that he was going to take her out to a berth on the anchorage.

The disposition of the tugs was as follows: The Nichols, which was the most powerful, was on his port bow; the Starbuck, the next most-powerful, on a hawser leading the Smith on the starboard bow and the Edith on the starboard quarter. There is some controversy as to whether Feldhusen ordered the Edith to where she actually went, or alongside the Nichols, on the port bow. Her actual order came from Wray, the Nichols’ master, who says he got it from Feldhusen, which Feldhusen denies. It seems to be more probable that Wray did not undertake to place the Edith on his own responsibility than that Feld[542]*542husen should now have forgotten what he told Wray. Therefore I find that the Daisai Maru has not proved that Wray gave an unauthorized order to the Edith. I also find that the Nichols had out only one line. Much the most reliable evidence is to that effect, and it is extremely unlikely that, knowing, as he did, that he might be expected to hold up the Daisai.Maru, he should have had two.

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Bluebook (online)
273 F. 539, 1919 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 628, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-beaverton-nysd-1919.