The Aroostook Medical Center v. Graves

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: February 21, 2018
• Docket: AROcv-17-78
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

ST ATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT LOCATION: CARIBOU AROOSTOOK, ss DOCKET NO. CARSC-CV-17-78

THE AROOSTOOK MEDICAL ) CENTER, ) Plaintiff ) vs. ) ORDER REGARDING ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION ) TO DISMISS DEFENDANT'S ) COUNTERCLAIM STEPHANIE GRAVES ) Defendant )

The Aroostook Medical Center, Plaintiff: (hereafter referred to as T AMC) has brought suit

against Stephanie Graves, Defendant, (hereafter referred to as Graves) to recover a portion of

monies paid to Graves in the form of a sign on bonus and educational loan assistance. Graves

timely answeied the complaint and also brought a counterclaim seeking damages for loss of

income and emotional distress arising from her tem1ination from employment. On December 1,

2017 TAMC filed a Motion to Dismiss Graves' counterclaim.

In its Motion to Dismiss, T AMC asserts Graves' counterclaim is moot due to Graves not

complying with 5 M.R.S. § 4622 of the Maine Hwnan Rights Act and is ban-ed from recovering

monetary relief. In her objection to the motion Graves asserts she is not seeking redress under the

Maine Human Rights Act and instead asserts her claim for relief is based on breach of contract

and that her employment was terminated without cause.

From a review of the pleadings, the following facts are not in dispute. T AMC extended Graves 1 D

an offer of employment by a Letter of Employment Offer dated July 21, 2015. Graves accepted

1 the offer and began employment on September 20, 2015. The employment agreement included a

sign on bonus of $15,000.00 and educational loan assistance of $18,411.40. The employment

agreement further contained terms for repayment of a portion of the sign on bonus and ~ educational loan assistance if employment was terminated within three years and ten years ~

respectively. On September 15, 2016 TAMC suspended Graves' employment, and on September f: 30, 2016 TAMC terminated Graves' employment for cause. 1 See Complaint and Answer, :i ~

paragraphs 1-18, 22, 24-26. I' ~ ~ A predicate to addressing T AMC' s Motion to Dismiss is determining what claim for relief is ~ f being made by Graves. M.R.Civ.P. 8(a) states: . ~

A Pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether m1 original claim, counterclaim, f cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim ~ showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief ~ which the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded. r I! I

The purpose of the rule is to give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the ~ " K grounds on which it rests. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41. A complaint should not be dismissed i t 1.mless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any facts he might tt II

prove to support his claim. 2 Harvey, Maine Civil Practice, §8.2 at 358 (3d eel. 2015-2016). P. ~ li Graves does not assign a title to her counterclaim theories, such as "breach of contract",

~· "wrongful termination", or "discrimination." Rather, Graves makes averrnents that generally II

explain the source of stress causing her to suffer from a disability, which she identifies as Severe • f I'. 1 In her answer to the complaint, although Graves admits the tennination was based by TAMC as for cause, she t denies the allegations of making inaccurate entries or violating any duties and otherwise denies that her conduct authorized TAMC to te1minate employment for cause, i ~ I 2 1 Adjustment Disorder with Disturbance of Emotions and Conduct. Counterclaim paragraphs 3-6.

She further describes communications between her and T AMC regarding the effect of the stress

on her work performance. Counterclaim paragraphs 7-10, 12. And Graves specifically avers that

she was "at all times capable, with reasonable accommodations, of performing the essential

functions of her job." Counterclaim paragraph 13. But to ascertain what claim is being made, it

is helpful to identify those averments that describe what a defendant did or failed lo do that is

actionable. In her counterclaim, Graves makes two such averments.

In paragraph 14, Graves avers that TAMC failed to provide accommodations and failed to allow

her an oppmtunity to undergo treatment Counterclaim paragraph 14. And in paragraph 15

Graves avers TAMC terminated her position as a result of her disability. Counterclaim

paragraph 15.

Lastly, in her counterclaim Graves avers the effect of the alleged actions and the relief sought,

specifically a loss of income and emotional distress. Counterclaim paragraph 16.

In short, the claim being made by Graves in her counterclaim can best be interpreted as a claim

for wrongful employment termination due to a disability. She describes her disability and alleges

TAMC terminated her position without making any accommodations. 5 M.R.S . § 4572( 1)(A) of

the Maine Human Rights Act deems it unlawful employment discrimination for an employer to

refuse to hire or discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because of physical or

mental disability. Graves' counterclaim in all respects appears to make a claim for employment

discrimination as defined by the Maine Human Rights Act.

3 But the Maine Hwnan Rights Act precludes an award of civil penal damages, compensatory

damages, punitive damages or attorney fees if a complaint has not been timely filed with the

Maine Human Rights Commission. 5 M.R.S. § 4622(1) states:

Attorney's fees under section 4614 and civil penal damages or compensatory damages and punitive damages under section 4613 may not be awarded to a plaintiff in a civil action under this Act unless the plaintiff alleges and establishes that, prior to the filing of the civil action, the plaintiff first filed a complaint with the commission ..... .

No such allegation is made in Graves' counterclaim. By all accounts Graves did not file a

complaint with the commission. And at this time, any filing with the commission would be

w1timely as complaints must be filed with the commission within 300 days of the alleged act of

unlawful discrimination. 5 M.R.S. § 4611.Graves was terminated on September 30, 2016, which

would result in a deadline for filing of July 2 7, 2017.

Section 4622 has been interpreted by the Law Court to render moot untimely claims. In Gordon

v. Cummings the law Court stated "Before a plaintiff with a MHRA claim may recover attorney

fees and damages, the plaintiff must establish she first brought a claim before the Maine Human

Rights Commission." 2000 ME 68, ,r 11. In Gordon, there were no other remedies available to

the plaintiff pursuant to section 4613 other than attorney fees and civil damages, so the Comi

deemed plaintiffs claim moot. Id

In this case, Graves did not timely file a complaint with the Maine Human Rights Commission.

Pursuant to Section 4622, Graves is barred from pursuing a claim pursuant to the Maine Human

Rights Act for a monetary award for attorney's fees, civil penal damages, compensatory damages

4 I or punitive damages. The only relief pursuant to the Act potentially remaining available is

reinstatement pursuant to section 4613(B)(2). 2

In her objection to the Motion to Dismiss, Graves acknowledges her claim is not based upon the

Maine Human Rights Act, but is rather a breach of contract claim and that T AMC lacked cause

for terminating her employment. From the pleadings, T AMC and Graves are in agreement that

an employment agreement existed, and that TAMC terminated her position. The Letter of

Employment Offer, which T AMC and Graves agree is part of the employment contract, (See

Complaint and Answer paragraph 8) sets forth a termination provision. In the paragraph titled

TERMINATION, a list of "for cause" reasons for immediate termination are set forth, but the

termination clause also states that either may terminate the employment without cause at any

time upon Ninety (90) days written notice. And TAMC and Graves also agree via their pleadings

that TAMC's reason for termination was based on cause. Complaint and Answer paragraph 24.

But Graves denies that her conduct was in violation of any duties and denies that cause for

termination existed. Answer paragraph 19-21,23.

Although generally employment for an indefinite period is terminable at the will of either party,

"parties may enter into an employment contract tenninable only pursuant to its express terms-­

as "for cause"-by clearly stating their intention to do so, even though no consideration other

r As for reinstatement, Graves did not request such form of relief in her counterclaim. And in an email from her attorney dated November 27, 2017, it was indicated that due to a new employment opportunity she was not seeking equitable relief and was seeking only monetary I ~ damages. But in her objection to this motion Graves indicated her new job was subject to multiple conditions and she was reserving for trial her right to seek reinstatement.

5 than services to be performed or promised is expected by the employer, or is performed or

promised by the employee." Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc, 486 A.2d 97, 99-100

(Me. 1984).

It would appear the parties had entered such an agreement in this case. The employment jl agreement was for an indefinite period, but contained a specific termination clause setting forth I specific reasons for immediate termination for cause, but also termination by either party on

ninety (90) days written notice. And through thefr respective pleadings in the Complaint and ! Answer, TAMC and Graves agree a contract existed, and that the reason given by TAMC for

terminating her employment was "for cause", but Graves denies such "cause" existed. In other

words, the pleadings clearly identify a factual issue in dispute being whether "cause" existed.

And whether or not "cause" existed would impact TAMC's recovery on its claim for .,r reimbursement of a portion of the sign on bonus and educational loan assistance. 3 ~ f. J. I ll ~ For a breach of contract claim, a litigant would need to establish the existence of a contract, ! ' breach of said contract, and the extent of damages caused by said breach. A complaint need not

identify the particular legal theories that will be relied upon, but it must describe the essence of

the claim and allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that the complaining party has been injured in

a way that entitles him or her to relief. Burns v. Architectural Doors & Windows, 2011 ME 61, ,r

17. A party may not proceed on a cause of action if that party's complaint has failed to allege I facts that, if proved, would satisfy the elements of a cause of action. Id. In her counterclaim,

Graves alleges she was hired by T AMC to work as a physician's assistant. Counterclaim

3 Although the Court notes that claims for reimbursement may be made in the event employment is terminated for "any" reason.

6 paragraph 1. This allegation, coupled with the parties agreement in their pleadings that an

employment agreement existed (see Complaint and Answer paragraph 8) is sufficient notice of

the existence of a contract. And in her counterclaim, Graves alleges TAMC terminated her

position as a result of her disability. Counterclaim paragraph 15. As previously discussed

Graves denied all assertions that T AMC had cause to terminate her position. Complaint and

Answer paragraphs 18-19, and 23. TAMC cannot sustain that it was not on notice that Graves

was alleging that TAMC did not have cause to terminate her position. Lastly, in her counterclaim

Graves alleges that as a result of her termination she suffered a loss of income. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Graves has sufficiently plead a claim for breach of contract for terminating her

position without-cause which would expose TAMC for damages for not giving Ninety (90) day

notice in accordance with the agreement. Those damages are limited however to lost wages for

those Ninety (90) days and Graves is not entitled to damages for emotional distress. Gayer v. ,. I' " Bath Iron Works Cmp., 687 A.2d 617. r

In summary the Court grants TAMC's motion to Dismiss in part, in that any claim for monetary

damages that could be awarded pursuant to the Maine Human Rights Act is moot and Graves is

barred from pursuing such damages. Graves may however pursue her counterclaim for lost wage

damages based on her allegations that T AMC terminated her employment without giving proper

Ninety (90) day notice, but those damages are limited to Ninety (90) days of wages. 4The Court

reserves ruling further on Graves' "reserved" claim for reinstatement. TAMC asserts Graves has

4 By this rnling the Couit is in no way suggesting the sustainability of Graves proving this claim at trial; ifTAMC succeeds in meeting its burden of proof establishing it had cause to te1minate Graves, then her counterclaim would fail.

7 given inconsistent responses regarding a request for reinstatement. The Court will rule on that

issue either at trial or by motion in limine.

Justice, Superior Court

8 STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT LOCATION: CARIBOU AROOSTOOK, ss DOCKET NO. CARSC-CV-17-78

THE AROOSTOOK MEDICAL ) CENTER, ) Plaintiff ) vs. ) ORDER DENYING ) ATIACHMENT ) ) STEPHANIE GRAVES ) Defendant )

The Aroostook Medical Center, Plaintiff, has brought suit against Stephanie Graves, Defcndanl, to recover a portion of monies paid to Defendant in the form of a sign on bonus and educational loan assistance. Defendant commenced working for the Plaintiff in September 2015 pursuant to a Letter of Employment Offer dated July 21, 20 l S(hereaftcr contract). Terms of the contract included a sign on bonus of $15,000 and also a provision for additional compensation of $692.30 per month for educational loan assistance, up to a maximum of $90,000. With respect to these payments, the contract states that portions of both the sign on bonus and educational loan assistance be repaid to the Plaintiff in the event of termination of employment within three years for the sign on bonus and ten years for the educational loan assistance. 1

On September 30, 2016 Plaintiff terminated Defendant's employment/or cause. (Complaint, 1 24). Per the Complaint Plaintiff seeks judgment in the amount of $26,345.35 for repayment of a certain portion of the sign on bonus and educational loan assistance as calculated by the formulas set forlh in the contract. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Approval of Attachment and Trustee Process for the same amount, $26,345.35. Defendant has answered the complaint and also filed a counterclaim alleging wrongful termination as a result of a disability. Defendant also filed an objection to the attachment. Hearing on the Motion for Attachment and Trustee Process was held telephonically August 2, 2017.

To grant a motion for either attachment or trustee process, the l:.ourt musl find that it is more likely than not that the moving party will recover judgment. M.R.Civ.P. 4A(c) and 4R(c). The contract provides that certain portions of both the sign on bonus and cducalional loan assistance, as calculated by the formulas set forth in the contract, may be

1 The contract sets forth a formula lo calculate the amounts lo be rep,1id. For Lhe purposes of this motion, the pmties seem to concur how the fonnula is intended to he applied to calculate the amounts . recouped in the event that" ... employment is tenninated for any reason ... " (See sections captioned Sign on Bonus and Educational Loan Assistance in the contract, attached lo the Complaint as Exhibit 1). The contract also has a specific section captioned "TERMINATION" that sets forth how the Defendant's employment may be terminated. That section lists several reasons for immediate termination/or cause. And the section also states that either party may terminate the employment without cause upon ninety (90) lays wr illcn notice. In this case, it is alleged by Plaiut iff and admitted by Dcfondanl that Plaintiff terminated De fendant's employment/or cause. 2

Again, the contract provides that portions of either the sign on bonus or educational loan assistance may be recouped if " ..employment is terminated for any reason .." But the court interprets such phrase to mean that employment be terminated in accordance with and in the manner presribed by the contract. Per the contract, termination can be done immediately for cause, or upon ninety (90) day written notice without cause. Per the pleadings and submissions, in this case Plaintiff terminated Defendant's employment.for cause. Termination was not accomplished by the altemati ve method of a ninety (90) day notice.

In her pleadings and in her affidavit supporting her objection to the motion, Defendant denies there was a basis to terminate her for cause. From a review of the pleadings and submissions, without an evidcntiary hearing, it is not possible to find that it is more likely than not that the Plaintiff will recover judgment, because based solely on said pleadings and submissions it is not possible to dete1mine whether or not there was a proper termination/or cause. The criteria for granting an attachment or trustee p ·ocess pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 4A(c) and 4B(c) not being satisfied, Plaintiffs moi is·"d'E.tHe.9_ 7

(V'~~~ /. Dated: August 7, 2017 LS-( .,. \• Justice.· Sttperior Court

2 Defendant docs not admit that Plaintiff had a valid reason to terminate her employment

for cause, and indeed has asserted a counterclaim essentially alleging wrongful letmination .