Thao v. Lynch

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 13, 2023·No. 2:21-cv-00731·Unknown

Opinion

CHAKONG THAO, et al., No. 2:21-cv-0731 KJM AC P Plaintiffs, v. ORDER LYNCH, et al., Defendants. This case is before the court on defendant Swarthout’s motion to quash (ECF No. 40), which plaintiffs oppose (ECF No. 44). The parties have filed a joint discovery statement in compliance with Local Rule 251 and the undersigned’s standing order.1 ECF No. 50. I. Relevant Background Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint against Swarthout, a prison psychiatrist; Lynch, warden at California State Prison (CSP)-Sacramento; and Does 1-10, in which they alleged the defendants were responsible for the death of their son/brother, who was murdered by his cellmate, Negrete. ECF No. 6. Swarthout and Lynch moved to dismiss the complaint (ECF Nos. 8, 18), and the motion was granted as to Lynch (ECF No. 30). To date, no Doe defendants have been

1 The parties are advised that the undersigned’s standing order has been updated to reflect amendments to Local Rule 251 that provide that joint discovery statements are to be filed at least fourteen days before the scheduled hearing date. substituted with a named individual,2 and this case currently proceeds on plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Swarthout. Plaintiffs served two subpoenas and a deposition notice on non-parties California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and CSP-Sacramento seeking production of five categories of documents and to depose the person(s) most knowledgeable in eleven categories. ECF No. 52. All of the specified categories seek information related to housing decisions generally and to the specific decision to house the decedent with Negrete. Id. at 5-8. Defendant Swarthout seeks to quash the subpoenas on the grounds that they seek disclosure of protected matters, plaintiffs have already disregarded the protective order in this case, the discovery sought is irrelevant to the claims against Swarthout, the information sought could be obtained through less burdensome methods, and the expenditure of time and money required to attend and order transcripts for up to eleven depositions would impose a clear burden on defendant. ECF No. 40; ECF No. 50 at 2-5. Plaintiff opposes the motion and argues that defendant has no standing to bring a motion to quash, the discovery sought is relevant to the claims against the Doe defendants, interrogatories to defendant would be unlikely to yield the information sought and if provided would be hearsay at best, and the requests are not burdensome as each category would require only brief questioning of the deponent. ECF No. 44 at 2-6, 10-16; ECF No. 50 at 7-21. Plaintiffs also seek to compel compliance with the subpoenas and sanctions against defense counsel. ECF No. 44 at 6-8, 15-17; ECF No. 50 at 7, 20-21. //// 2 In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district judge noted that [i]f a defendant’s identity is unknown when the complaint is filed, plaintiffs have an opportunity through discovery to identify them. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). But the court will dismiss such unnamed defendants if discovery clearly would not uncover their identities or if the complaint would clearly be dismissed on other grounds. Id. The federal rules also provide for dismissing unnamed defendants that, absent good cause, are not served within 90 days of the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). ECF No. 30 at 1 n.1. II. Discussion A. Motion to Quash Defendant seeks to quash a Rule 45 subpoena issued by plaintiffs to non-parties CDCR and CSP-Sacramento. ECF No. 40. “As provided in Rule 45, a nonparty may be compelled to produce documents and tangible things or to permit an inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c). Rule 45 permits a party to issue a subpoena commanding the person to whom it is directed to “attend and testify; produce designated documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things in that person’s possession, custody, or control; or permit the inspection of premises.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(A)(iii). The recipient may object to a subpoena, or move to quash or modify it. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(b), 45(d)(3). The Ninth Circuit has yet to address the question of whether a party has standing to bring a motion to quash since usually only the subpoenaed non-party may move to quash. The general rule, however, is that a party has no standing to quash a subpoena served upon a third party, except as to claims of privilege relating to the documents being sought. Cal. Sportfishing Prot. All. v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 299 F.R.D. 638, 643 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Windsor v. Martindale, 175 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D. Colo. 1997)). Under this general rule, defendant lacks standing to object to the subpoenas on grounds of relevance or undue burden, and to the extent she relies on such arguments, the motion is denied.3 See H.I.S.C., Inc. v. Franmar Int’l Imps., Ltd., No. 16-cv-480 BEN (WVG), 2018 WL 2095738, at *2-3, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76879, at *6, 8 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2018) (with respect to both subpoenas duces tecum and deposition subpoenas “[a] party has no standing to move to quash a subpoena on the ground that it is unduly burdensome when the non-party has not objected on that basis” (citations omitted)); G.K. Las Vegas Ltd. P’ship v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., No. 04-cv-1199 DAE GWF, 2007 WL 119148, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97869, at *12 (D. Nev. Jan. 9, 2007) (“A party’s objection that the subpoena issued to the non-party seeks irrelevant information or imposes an undue

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Related

Gillespie v. Civiletti
629 F.2d 637 (Ninth Circuit, 1980)
Windsor v. Martindale
175 F.R.D. 665 (D. Colorado, 1997)