Thammavong v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedMarch 18, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-02051
StatusUnknown

This text of Thammavong v. Social Security Administration Commissioner (Thammavong v. Social Security Administration Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Thammavong v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, (W.D. Ark. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS FORT SMITH DIVISION

GEORGE THAMMAVONG PLAINTIFF v. Civil No. 2:20-cv-02051-PKH-MEF ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff, George Thammavong, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) denying his claims for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), and supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). In this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). I. Procedural Background Plaintiff filed his applications for benefits on April 12, 2017, alleging an onset date of April 10, 2017, due to congestive heart failure, cardiomyopathy, diabetic retinopathy, diabetes, obstructive sleep apnea, depression, hypertension, and high cholesterol. (ECF No. 15-3, pp. 2-4, 17-18). Plaintiff was 34 years old when he filed his applications. (ECF No. 15-3, p. 3). He had past relevant work as an appliance assembler, a shipping clerk, and a floor distributor or utility worker. (ECF No. 15-2, p. 21; ECF No. 15-3, pp. 3-4). The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s applications initially and on reconsideration. At Plaintiff’s request, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held an administrative hearing on December 12, 2018. (ECF No. 15-2, pp. 35-78; ECF No. 15-4, p. 18). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. On May 22, 2019, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: dilated non-ischemic cardiomyopathy and cardiomegaly, status post-automatic implantable cardioverter- defibrillator (“ACID”) placement; diabetes mellitus; obstructive sleep apnea; obesity; osteoarthritis; hypertension; chronic sinusitis; and a history or bilateral carpal tunnel surgery.

(ECF No. 15-2, p. 14, Finding 3). The ALJ concluded, however, that the impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (ECF No. 15-2, p. 16, Finding 4). The ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to do the following: After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant can only occasionally climb ramps and stairs and can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; the claimant can frequently, but not constantly, handle and finger bilaterally; and the claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to temperature extremes, humidity, fumes, odors, dusts, gasses, poor ventilation, and hazards, including no driving as a part of work. (ECF No. 15-2, p. 17, Finding 5).

With the assistance of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ found Plaintiff could perform work as a charge account clerk, credit card call-out operator, and document preparation clerk. (ECF No. 15-2, pp. 22-23). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act during the relevant period. (Id., p. 23). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on February 4, 2020. (ECF No. 15-2, pp. 2-7). Plaintiff then filed this action on April 3, 2020. (ECF No. 2). This matter is before the undersigned for report and recommendation. Both parties have filed appeal briefs (ECF Nos. 17, 18), and the case is ready for decision. II. Applicable Law This Court’s role is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s findings. Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 2010). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Blackburn v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2014). If there is substantial evidence in the

record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id. A claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines “physical

or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(D). A Plaintiff must show that his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. The disability determination process is not an adversarial process; instead, the Commissioner’s duty exists alongside the claimant’s burden to prove his case. See Noerper v. Saul, 964 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2020). The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). Only if he reaches the final stage does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light of his residual functional capacity. See McCoy v.

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Thammavong v. Social Security Administration Commissioner, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/thammavong-v-social-security-administration-commissioner-arwd-2021.