OPINION
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Gary Lanigan, Jennifer Velez, John Main, Jonathan Poag, Merrill Main, Shantay Braim Adams, and Jackie Ottino assert that the District Court erred by failing to grant them qualified immunity—raised in their motion to dismiss—in a suit by Thaddeus James Thomas and Ronald Nash, who are civilly committed under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to 27.38.
Plaintiffs raise Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims. We will affirm the order of the District Court denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss.
We have jurisdiction to review final decisions of a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291'. However, we also have jurisdiction to hear appeals where a district court’s order “finally determined claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). We can review an order denying a claim of qualified immunity because it puts at stake the Appellants’ entitlement “not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct” and it is therefore considered “conceptually distinct” from the merits of the action.
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511 527-28, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
Nonetheless, we do not review the accura
cy of the plaintiff’s statement of facts, nor do we even decide if the plaintiff has actually stated a claim.
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Rather, our jurisdiction extends only to consider an issue of law, including: “whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.”
Id.
Appellants raise such an issue of law on appeal. However, citing to
Rouse,
they contend more pointedly that the District Court erred by failing to conduct a “highly individualized inquiry” to determine whether Thomas and Nash properly pleaded the violations of a clearly established constitutional right.
Rouse v. Plantier,
182 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1999). They maintain that the District Court did not identify or address the particular conduct of each Appellant that allegedly violated Appellees’ liberty interests.
A plaintiff must present enough facts about the conduct of each defendant to show that it is plausible that each defendant, individually, violated a clearly established right.
Mitchell,
472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. However,
Rouse’s
notion of a “highly individualized inquiry” arose in the context of summary judgment, and its application to the analysis of a District Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be interpreted as imposing a heightened pleading standard.
Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). As
Iqbal
elaborated:
[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). This is true as to each Appellant. However, the District Court makes its determination of plausibility by drawing inferences from the facts pleaded using its experience and common sense.
Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft,
643 F.3d 60, 69 (3d Cir. 2011).
Appellants do not challenge the District Court’s determination that the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act created a liberty interest rooted in a mentally disabled prisoner’s right to receive mental health treatment. Appellants also agree with the District Court that Thomas and Nash did not plead a violation of that right through respondeat superior liability. Rather this appeal centers on the District Court’s conclusion that the complaints adequately plead claims that Appellants’ policy decisions (specifically those that ultimately were the moving force behind changes in and/or denial of Thomas’ and Nash’s prescribed medical care for non-medical reasons) violated their liberty interests.
The Supreme Court noted that a core concept “animating” the qualified immunity doctrine is whether each “official’s duties legitimately require action” implicating clearly established rights.
Mitchell,
472 U.S. at 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The District Court correctly reasoned from our precedent that the standard for holding officials liable in their individual capacity for deliberately indifferent wrongs is whether there is at least circumstantial evidence to plausibly infer that:
(a) [the] supervising officials make sys-temwide determinations; (b) these determinations become the moving force behind the circumstances under which the subordinate officers effectively have no choice but to deny/reduce/change an inmate’s prescribed medical/mental treatment for non-medical reasons; and (c) such denial/reduction/change in prescribed treatment was foreseeable under the systemwide determinations the supervisors made.
J.A. 43-44 (citing
Durmer v. O’Carroll,
991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993);
White v. Napoleon,
897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990);
Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011); and
Leamer v. Fauver,
288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002)).
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OPINION
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Gary Lanigan, Jennifer Velez, John Main, Jonathan Poag, Merrill Main, Shantay Braim Adams, and Jackie Ottino assert that the District Court erred by failing to grant them qualified immunity—raised in their motion to dismiss—in a suit by Thaddeus James Thomas and Ronald Nash, who are civilly committed under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to 27.38.
Plaintiffs raise Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims. We will affirm the order of the District Court denying Appellants’ motion to dismiss.
We have jurisdiction to review final decisions of a district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1291'. However, we also have jurisdiction to hear appeals where a district court’s order “finally determined claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). We can review an order denying a claim of qualified immunity because it puts at stake the Appellants’ entitlement “not to be forced to litigate the consequences of official conduct” and it is therefore considered “conceptually distinct” from the merits of the action.
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511 527-28, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
Nonetheless, we do not review the accura
cy of the plaintiff’s statement of facts, nor do we even decide if the plaintiff has actually stated a claim.
Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 528, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Rather, our jurisdiction extends only to consider an issue of law, including: “whether the legal norms allegedly violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of the challenged actions.”
Id.
Appellants raise such an issue of law on appeal. However, citing to
Rouse,
they contend more pointedly that the District Court erred by failing to conduct a “highly individualized inquiry” to determine whether Thomas and Nash properly pleaded the violations of a clearly established constitutional right.
Rouse v. Plantier,
182 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1999). They maintain that the District Court did not identify or address the particular conduct of each Appellant that allegedly violated Appellees’ liberty interests.
A plaintiff must present enough facts about the conduct of each defendant to show that it is plausible that each defendant, individually, violated a clearly established right.
Mitchell,
472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806. However,
Rouse’s
notion of a “highly individualized inquiry” arose in the context of summary judgment, and its application to the analysis of a District Court’s denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be interpreted as imposing a heightened pleading standard.
Rule 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). As
Iqbal
elaborated:
[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal citations omitted). This is true as to each Appellant. However, the District Court makes its determination of plausibility by drawing inferences from the facts pleaded using its experience and common sense.
Argueta v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enft,
643 F.3d 60, 69 (3d Cir. 2011).
Appellants do not challenge the District Court’s determination that the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act created a liberty interest rooted in a mentally disabled prisoner’s right to receive mental health treatment. Appellants also agree with the District Court that Thomas and Nash did not plead a violation of that right through respondeat superior liability. Rather this appeal centers on the District Court’s conclusion that the complaints adequately plead claims that Appellants’ policy decisions (specifically those that ultimately were the moving force behind changes in and/or denial of Thomas’ and Nash’s prescribed medical care for non-medical reasons) violated their liberty interests.
The Supreme Court noted that a core concept “animating” the qualified immunity doctrine is whether each “official’s duties legitimately require action” implicating clearly established rights.
Mitchell,
472 U.S. at 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 819, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). The District Court correctly reasoned from our precedent that the standard for holding officials liable in their individual capacity for deliberately indifferent wrongs is whether there is at least circumstantial evidence to plausibly infer that:
(a) [the] supervising officials make sys-temwide determinations; (b) these determinations become the moving force behind the circumstances under which the subordinate officers effectively have no choice but to deny/reduce/change an inmate’s prescribed medical/mental treatment for non-medical reasons; and (c) such denial/reduction/change in prescribed treatment was foreseeable under the systemwide determinations the supervisors made.
J.A. 43-44 (citing
Durmer v. O’Carroll,
991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993);
White v. Napoleon,
897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990);
Brown v. Plata,
563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011); and
Leamer v. Fauver,
288 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 2002)).
Appellants are convinced that Thomas and Nash did not sufficiently plead such facts because the complaints do not allege the particular acts of each that violated that right. Appellants also maintain that the District Court glossed over this shortcoming of the complaints by making impermissible references to sources outside the complaints, and by referring to the Appellants generically as “DOC defendants.” In particular, Appellants point to the District Court’s discussion of N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:4-27.34,
a particular executive order of Governor Whitman’s (Executive Order 118), and the ruling in
County of Hudson v. State Dept. of Correction,
(2009 N.J. Super Unpub. LEXIS 1188, at *2-16), contending that these (rather than the pleadings) grounded the District Court’s inferences that led it to conclude that the constitutional right was clearly established here. We disagree.
As the District Court stated, Thomas and Nash have pleaded that each official’s
“own
decisions and acts” causally connected Appellants to the reduction or elimination of prescribed treatment. J.A. 51. Towards this end, they state each Appellant’s job title within the Department of Corrections and Department of Human Services (J.A. 15-16), and they specify the particular types of policy decision and rulemaking responsibilities each had that was relevant to the housing and care of Thomas and Nash.
Moreover, the pleadings focus upon disruptions in treatment occurring after Thomas and Nash were transferred from the Kearney facility to the East Jersey State Prison, inextricably intertwining the constitutional violation claims about treatment disruptions with policy decisions concerning the transfer.
The District Court’s review of the complaints highlights the rather unique alignment between the specific right at issue and the particular decision-making responsibilities of each Appellant that enabled it to reach a conclusion about whether the right was clearly established. The District Court noted that Thomas and Nash were pleading that a subset of the decisions these officials made were at issue—those related to the movement of the sexually violent predator program from Kearney to East Jersey State Prison. It said “the decisions and acts at issue, by their very nature, could not have possibly escaped the scope of the DOC defendants’ personal responsibilities.”
J.A. 51-52. Given the alignment between the distinct scope of decisions at issue and Appellants’ job responsibilities, this is a reasonable inference.
Moreover, the District Court viewed the liberty interest at issue to be well defined, saying that this constitutional right is “scalpel-narrow” and has been the subject of extensive “practical guidance” for over a decade. J.A. 57. Therefore, as to these officials, and this subset of decisions concerning the management of the sexually violent predator program, it was reasonable for the District Court to conclude that Appellants had “fair warning” of the constitutional implications of any decision foreseeably resulting in “denying, reducing or changing Plaintiffs’ prescribed mental treatment for non-medical reasons.” M
To the extent that the District Court’s review of the statute, executive order, and state court case were relevant to its qualified immunity analysis, these judicially cognizable sources underscored the reasonableness of the District Court’s conclusions. The District Court’s reading of the statute was consistent with the pleadings alleging each official’s responsibilities. Moreover, the Executive Order and the ensuing decade-long litigation over the location of the sexually violent predator program provided further evidence that the state government was engaged in decision making, consistent with the pleadings, that was directly relevant to the housing and treatment of both Thomas and Nash, sexually violent predators who have been detained at the facilities at the center of the Executive Order and state court case.
We do not regard these sources as the foundation of the District Court’s qualified immunity analysis. But, there is no doubt that they support the reasonableness of the District Court’s conclusion that the complaints plausibly pleaded sufficient facts suggesting that each official violated a clearly established right. Therefore, the District Court correctly concluded that Appellants’ claim of qualified immunity failed.
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.