THACKER v. WALTON
This text of 491 P.3d 756 (THACKER v. WALTON) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
THACKER v. WALTON
2021 OK CIV APP 5
491 P.3d 756
Case Number: 118301
Decided: 03/08/2021
DIVISION III
IN THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, DIVISION III
Cite as: 2021 OK CIV APP 5, 491 P.3d 756
KIRT THACKER, Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SCOTT WALTON, individually and in his official capacity, Defendant/Appellant,
and
JOHN SINGER, individually, Defendant/Appellant,
and
CHARLES ROGERS, individually, Defendant.
ORDER
¶1 This matter comes before the Court for consideration of the parties' competing requests for attorney fees, Appellant Scott Walton's Motion for Appellate Costs, and Appellant John Singer's Motion for Appellate Costs. We previously determined the trial court should have dismissed pursuant to the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act (OCPA) Thacker's state law claims, thereby reversing in part the trial court's denial of Walton's and Singer's motions to dismiss. As articulated in our Opinion, Thacker's federal claims are not subject to the OCPA, and therefore, we affirmed the trial court's denial of the appellants' motions to dismiss to the extent they sought dismissal of the federal claims. Each party now seeks an award of appeal-related attorney fees based on varying interpretations of the applicable fee statute, 12 O.S. § 1438, which provides:
A. If the court orders dismissal of a legal action under the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act, the court shall award to the moving party:
1. Court costs, reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action as justice and equity may require;
and
2. Sanctions against the party who brought the legal action as the court determines sufficient to deter the party who brought the legal action from bringing similar actions described in the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act.
A. If the court finds that a motion to dismiss filed under the Oklahoma Citizens Participation Act is frivolous or solely intended to delay, the court may award court costs and reasonable attorney fees to the responding party.
¶2 Walton and Singer argue § 1438(A)(1) mandates an award of attorney fees in their favor because they secured by virtue of our Opinion dismissal of Thacker's state law claims under the OCPA. Thacker refutes the contention. He asserts dismissal of some but not all claims was not a dismissal of a legal action as contemplated by the OCPA and also that an award of fees under § 1438(A)(1) is discretionary. As support for the latter contention, Thacker points to the language, "as justice and equity may require," which, according to Thacker's interpretation, means a court may opt not to award fees to a moving party even if the party's motion to dismiss a legal action under the OCPA is successful.
¶3 We first address whether or not fees are mandatory under § 1438(A)(1). This Court, in Steidley v. Community Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 2016 OK CIV APP 63, ¶ 19, 383 P.3d 780, 788 previously answered in the affirmative, holding:
Now, in the event the special motion to dismiss [filed pursuant to the OCPA] is granted, the claimant is responsible for mandatory attorney fees . . . .[T]he trial court must award such damages leaving only the appropriate amount of the award to the discretion of the trial court.
We hereby reaffirm that specific holding, which is further supported by the last antecedent rule, pursuant to which "a limited or restrictive clause contained in [a] statute is generally construed to refer to and limit and restrict the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent." Matter of Estate Tax Protest of Leake Estate, 1994 OK CIV APP 157, ¶ 13, 891 P.2d 1299, 1302-03. We note, "The rule is an aid to construction and will not be utilized where extension to a more remote antecedent is required." Id. The phrase in § 1438(A)(1), "as justice and equity may require," applies exclusively to the last antecedent, "other expenses incurred in defending against the legal action." The phrase does not convert 1438(A)(1) into a discretionary fee provision. A holding otherwise would render meaningless the following language in § 1438(A) mandating fees: "the court shall award to the moving party[.]" (Italics supplied).
¶4 We next address as a matter of first impression whether the mandatory fee provision applies when some claims are dismissed under the OCPA special procedure but other claims are not. Attorney fees must be awarded under 12 O.S. § 1438(A)(1) only when there has been a dismissal of a "legal action." Therefore, as indicated by the parties, the determination of whether Walton and Singer are entitled to an award of attorney fees now turns on the interpretation of "legal action"--more specifically, whether the term includes individual claims. The definitions section of the OCPA broadly defines "legal action" as "a lawsuit, cause of action, petition, complaint, cross-claim, counterclaim or any other judicial pleading or filing that requests legal or equitable relief." 12 O.S. § 1431(6); see also, Steidley v. Singer, 2017 OK 8, ¶ 5, 389 P.3d 1117, 1118. The definition is unclear about whether a single claim within a lawsuit containing multiple claims constitutes a legal action, and because the definition is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, it must be subjected to rules of statutory interpretation. Odom v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 2018 OK 23, ¶ 18, 415 P.3d 521, 528. We are bound to provide a construction that avoids absurd consequences, without violating legislative intent. Id.
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