Texas v. United States ex rel. Community Services Administration

426 F. Supp. 74, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12568
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedOctober 28, 1976
DocketCiv. A. No. A-76-CA-182
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 426 F. Supp. 74 (Texas v. United States ex rel. Community Services Administration) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas v. United States ex rel. Community Services Administration, 426 F. Supp. 74, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12568 (W.D. Tex. 1976).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERTS, District Judge.

The above styled cause came for hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and advanced and consolidated trial on the merits on October 22, 1976. The Court, having carefully considered all the evidence, the briefs and the argument in the case, is of the Opinion that declaratory relief should be granted and that an injunction should issue.

The material facts in this case are not contested. On May 25, 1976, the Office of Economic Development of the Community Services Administration (CSA) received an application from Zavala County Economic Development Corporation (ZCEDC) for financial assistance pursuant to Title VII of the Community Services Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2981, et seq. The grant application contained no evidence that it had been submitted to appropriate state and local clearinghouses for review and comment as required by Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 4201, et seq. and by rules and regulations prescribed under the Act by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in OMB Circular A-95. The CSA accepted the application and did not return it to ZCEDC for compliance with A-95 nor did the CSA notify the State of Texas or local, Texas public entities that the application for financial assistance had been submitted.

CSA approved the grant application and awarded a grant (No. 60141-F-76-02) of $1,500,000 to ZCEDC on August 11, 1976. The State of Texas first received notice of the application and grant when The Governor of Texas received a letter on August 16, 1976, notifying him that the grant already had been made. Governor Briscoe immediately notified The President of the United States that the grant had been made in violation of OMB Circular A-95.

Notwithstanding this telegram, on August 20, 1976, a letter of credit for $1.5 million was issued pursuant to the grant. Additional correspondence and communications between the State of Texas and agencies of the United States failed to result in suspension of the financial assistance.

Under the letter of credit and applicable CSA instructions and regulations, funding pursuant to the grant essentially is divided between administrative expenses and money for capital investment. Funds to pay administrative expenses total approximately $500,000 for the twenty-four (24) month term of the grant. Funds for capital investment total $996,058. ZCEDC has withdrawn funds for administrative expenses in the sum of $120,000. On October 1, 1976, this Court issued a temporary restraining order preventing further disbursement of funds under the Grant. The TRO was extended by this Court to October 22, 1976. No funds have been withdrawn since issuance of the TRO.

Plaintiff, State of Texas, seeks a declaration that the federal Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of OMB Circular A-95 in accepting and approving the application for federal aid to the Defendant-Intervenor, Zavala County Economic Development Corporation, and that the grant is therefore void. Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin the federal Defendants from distributing any funds until a grant has been approved in accordance with all of the required procedures, to enjoin ZCEDC from expending any funds obtained pursuant to the grant, and to require ZCEDC to return all funds already withdrawn under the grant. The Defendant-Intervenors contend that this grant was exempt from the A-95 review procedures, and therefore, there was no violation of Federal law or regulations in [76]*76connection with the grant in question, and furthermore, that even if the A-95 review procedures should have been applied to the grant, this case is not one in which injunctive relief should be granted.

The Court finds that no exemption to A-95 review procedures was made possible for the grant in question by the 1976 amendments to A-95. 41 Fed.Reg. 2061 (January 13, 1976). Although the Community Services Administrations was authorized by the modifications to A-95 to issue rules and regulations which provide exemptions to certain grants made by the Community Services Administration, these exemptions to A-95 review did not become effective until July 2, 1976, when the CSA published its final A-95 review regulations. Since the application for the grant in question was filed prior to the effective date of these amended regulations, it must be governed by the regulations in effect at the time it was filed, and therefore, it cannot benefit from an exemption to A-95 review that became effective on July 2,1976. Furthermore, the exemption to A-95 review, which became effective on July 2,1976, was predicated upon the theory that certain operational grants should be exempt from A-95 review because the planning grants, which preceded the operational grant, had been subject to A-95 review. Since in the instant case the planning grants that preceded the operational grant were not subject to A-95 review, the regulations providing operational grants exemption from A-95 review should not be effective to exempt this grant from A-95 review. If the regulations were construed so as to exempt the grant in question from A-95 review, it would result in a situation where the grants to ZCEDC were never subject to A-95 review, and this result would be clearly contrary to the purposes and policies of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. Thus, this Court finds that the grant in question was not exempt from A-95 review procedures, and that the grant application and grant were made in violation of A-95 review procedures.

Because this Court has the authority to review the action of the Community Services Administration in making the grant in question, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq., the relief that can be granted because the grant was made in violation of proper administrative procedures is controlled by 5 U.S.C. § 706. § 706 provides, in pertinent part, that:

The reviewing court shall .
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; .
(D) without observance of procedure required by law; .

Thus, this Court has the power under § 706 to declare the grant void and set it aside in its entirety. It has been held, however, that despite the language of § 706, a court has the power to take equitable factors into consideration in determining what type of relief to grant for violations of proper administrative procedures. Rodway v. United States Department of Agriculture, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 387, 514 F.2d 809 (1975); Public Service Commission for the State of New York v. Federal Power Commission, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 516 F.2d 746 (1975). Thus a Court can, as a matter of equity, grant a remedy that is less drastic than that of voiding the action in question.

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Related

State of Tex. v. US BY AND THROUGH COMMUN. SER.
426 F. Supp. 74 (W.D. Texas, 1976)

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Bluebook (online)
426 F. Supp. 74, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-v-united-states-ex-rel-community-services-administration-txwd-1976.