Texas v. Gaines

23 F. Cas. 869, 2 Woods 342

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Texas
• Decided: June 15, 1874
• Status: Published

Opinions

BRADLEY, Circuit Justice.

I will consider the last motion first; The first section of the civil rights act (14 Stat. 27) declares, that citizens of every race and color shall have the same right, in every state, to make contracts, sue, give evidence, inherit, purchase and hold property, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments and none other, any law, statute or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. The second section makes criminal and imposes penalties on any attempt to deprive any citizen of these rights, or to different punishments on account of his having at any time been held in a condition of slavery. The third section gives to the district courts of the United States cognizance of all crimes and offenses under the act; and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, cognizance of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the state or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal, has been commenced in any state court against any such person for any cause whatsoever, such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to the proper district or circuit court, in the manner prescribed by the “Act relating to habeas corpus,” etc., approved March 3, 1863, and its amendments. The act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 755), to which reference is made, authorizes the removal to the courts of the United States of suits and prosecutions commenced in a state court, against officers or others acting under authority of the United States, and, to effect such a removal, authorizes the party sued “to file a petition, stating the facts, and verified by affidavit, for the removal of the cause for trial at the next circuit court of the United States, to be holden in the district where the suit is pending,” etc. Thus, the statement on oath by the party himself is all the verification of the facts which the law required for effecting the removal. The question is, whether local prejudice against a colored person, by reason of his race and color, alleged to be so great that he cannot have a fair trial in the state courts, is good ground, under the civil rights act, for removing a criminal action against him from the state court into the district court of the United States. Is it a cause for removal within the act?

It is clear that in order to entitle to a removal of the cause the case must show the deprivation of a right guarantied by the first section of the act. The defendant says that he is deprived of such a right, and that the right of which he is thus deprived is, “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as enjoyed by white citizens.” But how does he say he is deprived of that right? Not by the laws themselves, but by the prejudice and enmity of the people. Is that sufficient? What says the third section? How does it describe and define those who are within the meaning of the act? It defines them as “persons who are denied, or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the state or locality where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this act.” Here are two classes: (1) Persons who are denied any of the rights secured to them by the first section of the act. (2) Persons who cannot enforce in the courts any of said rights.

Does the denial of rights or the inability to enforce them in the courts refer to a denial by the laws, usages and customs of the state, and to an inability to enforce rights in the courts in consequence of inadequate remedies to that end; or does it refer as well to other obstructions of right, such as personal or class prejudice, or political feeling and the like? It must be remembered that the privilege of removal is thus guarantied to every citizen of the United States, as well white as black. And if every citizen who is prosecuted in a state court can, on his own allegation, remove his case to the United States courts, it will present a powerful temptation to litigants, especially of the criminal class, and the United States courts will be flooded with cases, in which one of the parties imagines, or says, that he cannot have a fair trial in the state courts. We cannot think that this is the true construction of the statute. Besides, if it were, it might be open to very grave question whether it would be constitutional. The civil rights act has been reenacted since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. An examination of that amendment might be necessary in order to ascertain whether any interference with the equal rights of the citizen is guarantied, otherwise than as against state interference, and the operation of partial and unjust state laws. This, however, is rendered unnecessary from the view we have taken of the true construction of the civil rights act. We think it is intended to protect against legal disabilities and legal impediments to the free exercise of the rights secured, and not to private infringements of those rights by prejudice or otherwise, when the laws themselves are impartial and sufficient.

The ease must be remanded to the state court.