Texas Southern University, Texas Southern University President Leisa Crumpton-Young and General Counsel Hao Le v. Mary Young

Opinion

Opinion issued February 23, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-22-00913-CV ——————————— TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY, TEXAS SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY PRESIDENT LEISA CRUMPTON-YOUNG AND GENERAL COUNSEL HAO LE, Appellants V. MARY YOUNG, Appellee

On Appeal from the 127th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2022-77744

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Texas Southern University, Texas Southern University President

Leisa Crumpton-Young, and General Counsel Hao Le (collectively, “TSU”) attempt to appeal from the trial court’s implicit ruling on an amended plea to the jurisdiction

in an underlying suit brought by appellee Mary Young.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Background

On November 30, 2022, Young sought mandamus relief, declaratory relief,

and an application for a temporary restraining order and a temporary and permanent

injunction against TSU regarding Young’s employment as TSU’s Chief of Police.

An ancillary court granted a temporary restraining order in favor of Young on

December 1, 2022. The next day, another ancillary court granted expedited

discovery.

On December 5, 2022, TSU filed a plea to the jurisdiction. On the same day,

TSU also sought reconsideration and a protective order to stay discovery. On

December 6, 2022, TSU requested the trial court to hear its plea to the jurisdiction

and its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Protective Order to Stay

Discovery at an emergency hearing previously set for December 8.

On December 7, 2022, another ancillary court granted a TRO in favor of

Young. And, on the evening of December 7, 2022, TSU filed an amended plea to

the jurisdiction.

During the morning of the December 8 hearing, TSU attempted to argue its

amended plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court reminded TSU that it had already

2 notified TSU on a telephone conference earlier in the day that it would not be

addressing the plea to the jurisdiction at the hearing since it was not prepared to

rule—especially since TSU filed the amended plea the day before.

On the afternoon of December 8, TSU filed this interlocutory appeal of the

trial court’s “implicit denial of the Defendants’ First Amended Plea to the

Jurisdiction during the December 8, 2022 hearing.”

On January 5, 2023, this Court notified TSU that it appeared we lack

jurisdiction. TSU responded to our notice within its appellate brief.

Analysis

Before considering the substantive issues presented, we must first determine

whether we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See Pike v. Texas EMC

Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. 2020). Whether we have jurisdiction is a

question of law that we consider de novo. Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co. v. Hart of Tex.

Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020). “[T]he general rule, with a

few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final

judgment.” Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). We

strictly construe statutes authorizing interlocutory appeals because they “‘are a

narrow exception to the general rule’ that ‘appellate courts generally only have

jurisdiction over final judgments.’” Bonsmara Nat. Beef, 603 S.W.3d at 390 (quoting

CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011)). The statute applicable

3 here provides that a person may appeal from an order that “grants or denies a plea to

the jurisdiction by a governmental unit.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(a)(8).

It is undisputed that the trial court has not issued a written order granting or

denying TSU’s amended plea to the jurisdiction. Nonetheless, TSU argues that the

trial court could have made an implicit ruling which would give this Court

interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 337

(Tex. 2006) (holding that trial court’s order ruling on merits of declaratory judgment

claim constituted implicit denial of plea to jurisdiction and was appealable under

section 51.014(a)(8)).

Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, TSU contends that the

trial court denied its plea because TSU “stated the grounds for the ruling it sought

with sufficient specificity to have made the trial court aware of what it wanted and

the grounds for it” and “it must have received a ruling, either explicit or implicit, or

a refusal to rule to which it objected.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. TSU thus contends

that it made the trial court aware that it wanted a dismissal of the case based on

sovereign immunity and that “it received an implicit ruling, in the refusal to

reconsider or stay the discovery it had ordered, and a refusal to rule, to which it

objected.”

4 TSU’s reliance on Rule 33.1 is misplaced. Rule 33.1 governs the preservation

of appellate complaints. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. It does not confer interlocutory

jurisdiction on this Court. See Hamlett v. Hamlett, No. 01-04-01097-CV, 2006 WL

241484, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(noting that Rule 33.1(a)(2)(A) does not constitute authority that confers jurisdiction

on the Court).

Moreover, the record does not show that any implicit ruling on the plea to the

jurisdiction occurred here. To the contrary, the trial court expressly stated on the

record at the December 8, 2022 hearing that it was not making a ruling on the plea

to the jurisdiction at that time; especially since the amended plea to the jurisdiction

had been filed just 24 hours before the December 8 hearing. Accordingly, because

this record does not show that the trial court made any ruling on the plea to the

jurisdiction, we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).

TSU alternatively argues that we should construe its appeal as a writ of

mandamus and issue a writ directing the trial court to stay discovery and rule on

TSU’s amended plea to the jurisdiction. We decline the invitation as TSU has not

complied with the requirements of Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 52.

5 Conclusion

PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Countiss and Rivas-Molloy.