Texas Power & Light Co. v. Jezek

302 S.W.2d 196, 1957 Tex. App. LEXIS 1790
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 2, 1957
DocketNo. 3430
StatusPublished

This text of 302 S.W.2d 196 (Texas Power & Light Co. v. Jezek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas Power & Light Co. v. Jezek, 302 S.W.2d 196, 1957 Tex. App. LEXIS 1790 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957).

Opinions

TIREY, Justice.

This action is grounded on negligence, and this is a second appeal. See 282 S.W. 2d 112 (n. r. e.).

[197]*197The jury in its verdict found substantially (1 and 2) that the electric wire was not effectively insulated at the place where Jezek contacted it with his hand, hut that such failure was not negligence; (4-A) that the Light Company knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the West Fair was using the utility poles in the City of West to hang banners at the time Jezek was killed; (4— B) and that it failed to object to such use; (4 — C) that a reasonably prudent person situated as was Jezek on the occasion in question and under the same or similar circumstances would have believed that the Light Company had consented to the hanging of the banners on the pole; (4 — D) that the Light Company benefited from the hanging of the banners on the utility poles; (4 — E) that the lack of effective insulation upon the light wire where Jezek touched it was not open and obvious to Jezek; (4) that the electric wire, as it was located on the pole at the time, was not less than 22 feet from the ground at the point where Jezek came in contact with the wire; (7) that the placing of the electric wire less than 40 inches above the telephone messenger wire was a proximate cause of the injury to Jezek; (8) that the sum of $8,000 will fairly compensate the plaintiff for the death of his son; (9) that an ordinarily prudent person situated as was Jezek at the time would have climbed the pole; (11-A and 11) that at the time and on the occasion in question Jezek caught hold of the electric wire, and that an ordinarily prudent person would have caught hold of the electric wire under the same or similar circumstances; (13) that an ordinarily prudent person would not have used a ladder in tying the banner to the pole under the same or similar circumstances; (14 — E) “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence, if any, that the injuries, if any, received by Dick Jezek were not the result of an unavoidable accident? Answer ‘It was an unavoidable accident’ or ‘It was not an unavoidable accident.’ ” The court instructed the jury as follows: “By the term ‘unavoidable accident,’ as used in this charge, is meant an event happening suddenly and unexpectedly and without being proximately caused by the negligence on the part of either the plaintiff or defendant.” The jury’s answer was “It was an unavoidable accident.”

The Light Company seasonably filed its motion for judgment non obstante vere-dicto, which was overruled, and the court granted plaintiff’s motion to disregard the jury’s answer to Issue 14^E that it was an unavoidable accident. This motion was granted and the court entered judgment for plaintiff, less the deduction of $1,250, which was stipulated.

At a former day of this court a unanimous opinion was rendered reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause on the ground that the answer of the jury to the effect that it was an unavoidable accident was tendered by the evidence. In that opinion this court held: “ * * * we have concluded that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to raise the issue as to whether the death of Dick Jezek was or was not proximately caused by any negligence on the part of appellant, or on the part of the deceased,” and further held that “ * * * since the jury found in favor of appellant on that issue,’ thereby presenting an irreconcilable conflict with their finding of actionable negligence on the part of appellant, we are of the opinion that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of appellee.” The cause is. now pending on motion for rehearing and our holding on the question of unavoidable accident is now assailed.

The Light Company’s fifth point of error,' as originally submitted to this court, is “The court erred in setting aside the answer of the jury to Special Issue No. 14 — E and in rendering judgment for appellee for the reason that the issue of unavoidable accident was raised by the evidence and answered favorably to the appellant.”

[198]*198Under the Light Company’s discussion of its" fifth point we find substantially the following statement: The uncontradicted evidence is to the effect that deceased climbed the pole to which electric wires of appellant were affixed, straddled the pole and sat on the telephone cable which was 36 inches below the lowest electric wire and caught hold of the electric wire and was killed. The lower wire was six or eight inches or less above deceased’s head after he ascended the pole; that the clearance between the cable and the lower wire as required by the National Electric Code was 40 inches. There is no direct evidence as to whether deceased took hold of the wire purposely. Pictures were introduced into evidence showing the spacing of the wires and cable on the pole and from which the relative position of a person’s head to the wires on the pole may be judged as the person was sitting on the cable and also from which the relative size of the deceased may be determined. The undisputed evidence is to the effect that deceased had been repeatedly warned of the danger of coming into close proximity to the wires, and that it was extremely well lighted in the area where deceased was killed. The evidence is further to the effect that the banner was tied about half way between the telephone cable and .the lower wire; that deceased had finished tying the banner and was ready to come down. There is also evidence in the record that no banner had been tied to the pole on which deceased was killed prior to the night in question. (End of appellant’s statement.)

As we understand the record, there were at most only two witnesses who testified that can be regarded as eye witnesses to the events that immediately preceded the death of young Jezek.

■ Mr. Nemecek testified substantially to the effect that the accident happened August 12, 1953, between 9:00 and 10:0C> P. M.; the weather was- warm and dry; that deceased was up on-a telephone pole string-, ing a banner to the pole; that Walter Kubala, nephew of Nemecek, was present and he and Jezek were working together and putting up banners at that particular spot; “A. Well, I wasn’t up there at the time when they were stringing that banner, but I came down in my car; I drove my car down and parked my car close by there; I drove down in my car at that time.” It was his recollection that they started their work around 9:00 P.M.; he warned them to be careful; that there might be some live wires there and to be careful out there doing that work and stringing the banners; that they had practically completed the job when he got around on Pine Street; that when he got around there Jezek was on the opposite side of the street from him and that Jezek took the ladder and set it up right next to the pole and tied the banner to the pole on the opposite side of the street; that in doing so he went up the ladder at that point and he tied the banner up across the street;

“Q. All right, then what happened? A. Well, he came down and was going across the street to tie the other side, and my nephew insisted that he tie the banner up thfere. I told him to take the ladder up there and use the ladder, and they said it would not be necessary, that there was some cleats, what they call cleats, on the pole, and it wouldn’t be necessary to use the ladder, that they would climb the pole * * *
“Q. Which boy finally went up the pole? A. Dickie did.
“Q. All right, did you stay there until Dickie had gotten up the pole?
A.

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302 S.W.2d 196, 1957 Tex. App. LEXIS 1790, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-power-light-co-v-jezek-texapp-1957.