Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Mangum

4 S.W. 617, 68 Tex. 342, 1887 Tex. LEXIS 693
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMay 27, 1887
DocketNo. 5768
StatusPublished
Cited by57 cases

This text of 4 S.W. 617 (Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Mangum) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Mangum, 4 S.W. 617, 68 Tex. 342, 1887 Tex. LEXIS 693 (Tex. 1887).

Opinion

Stayton, Associate Justice.

This action was brought by the appellee to recover from the railway company and its co-defendant Ginocchio on account of an injury alleged to have been received by him by reason of a defective door step, which was placed at the entrance of an eating house owned and kept by Ginocchio.

[344]*344The house in which Ginocchio was keeping a hotel or restaurant was on ground leased to him by the railway company for the period of twenty years, with a view to have thereon a house erected for the accommodation of the traveling public. The house was erected by Ginocchio under plans furnished by the company, which are not claimed to have been in any way defective. The house belonged- to Ginocchio, who erected it at his own expense. The lease contained provisions which gave the company the right to purchase the house and terminate the lease if Ginocchio failed to keep a first class establishment of the kind contemplated. The land leased was contiguous to the platform of the railway company, and only thirty-eight feet distant from its track.

In front of the house of Ginocchio was a-small platform erected by him, which connected with the platform erected by the company. It becoming necessary to elevate the house built by Ginocchio, this was done, and to furnish a step from the platform erected by Ginocchio to the house, he caused a piece of timber, about ten by twelve inches thick, and extending in front of several doors, to be placed on the platform erected by himself. It is claimed that this was placed so far from the house as to leave a space between it and the house so wide that the plaintiff’s foot, in leaving the house came between the step and the house, and that thus his leg was broken.

It is not averred that any part of the platform erected by the company was defective, nor that the platform erected by Ginocchio was defective otherwise than as the step may be considered a part of the platform, nor that the injury resulted from any other cause than the defective step, and the want of proper lights.

The petition contains many general averments of negligence on the part of the railway company, without specification of the facts which constitute such negligence, further than that the railway platform was not well lighted; but the inference is sought to be drawn from the terms of the lease that it was the duty of the company to cause the leased premises to be kept in safe condition.

The plaintiff had come to the company’s depot, in the night, to take passage on the expected train, and while waiting entered the restaurant. It is further alleged that it was necessary for persons coming to take the train to use the platform erected by Ginocchio, as well as that erected by the company, but there is no evidence that this was so. It is alleged that, after the [345]*345lease was made, Ginocchio, in accordance with specifications furnished by the company, built a good and substantial house, in which he kept a first class hotel and restaurant, which was intended by the company, and was used by Ginocchio, “as an accommodation and convenience to the traveling public, and especially to the passengers of said company who were soon to take passage on or had just departed from the trains of said company, at said city of Fort Worth; that the traveling public, and particularly the passengers of said company, commonly and frequently resorted to said restaurant, eating house and hotel, at and before and subsequent to said December 5, 1883, which fact was well known to said Ginocchio, and to said company, its agents and servants; that the object and design of said railway company in leasing said land to said Ginocchio to have said building erected thereon as aforesaid, was to make the use of said building for the purposes mentioned a valuable auxiliary to its business as a common carrier of freights and passengers, and the purpose of said Ginocchio was his private gain; and by the use of said building for the purposes mentioned, the object of both parties has been effected.”

Ginocchio was alleged to be a resident of Harrison county, Texas, and the railway company to have its road and an agency in Tarrant county.

Ginocchio filed a sworn plea in abatement, in which he set up the continuous residence of himself in Har-rison county; and further that the railway company had no interest whatever.in the business conducted by him on the ground which he had leased from it, but, “that he leased the ground upon which the building is erected, and was erected at the time plaintiff claims to have received his injuries, in which said building, said lunch stand, eating house and drinking saloon was then, and is now, kept, from the said railway company, for the purpose of carrying on said business for his own benefit and not for the benefit and profit of said railway company, and that said railway company has no interest in or concern in the same, except to collect the rent for said ground as aforesaid. ”

The plea was sufficient to raise the question whether the plaintiff sought improperly to join Ginocchio as'a defendant in an action brought in a county other than that of his residence. This is not an action founded on some crime, offense or trespass committed by Ginocchio, which would authorize it to be brought in the county where the crime, offense or trespass was com[346]*346mitted, under the eighth subdivision of article 1198, Revised Statutes.

The fourth subdivision of that article provides that: “When there are two or more defendants residing in different counties, suit may be brought in any county where any one of the defendants reside.”

This, however, does not-mean that an inhabitant of this State may be sued in a county other than his residence whenever a a plaintiff, without sufficient ground, may join with him as a defendant some person who may be a resident of the county in which the action is brought. It means simply that, if one who-is a proper or necessary party defendant resides in the county in which the action is brought, that then other defendants may be joined with him who reside in other counties.

It is very generally held that a corporation is an inhabitant of the State under whose law it is.incorporated, and that it has a residence wherever it conducts its ordinary business. (Railway Company v. Litson, 2 Howard, 497; Coural v. Insurance Co., 10 Howard’s Prac., 403; Baldwin v. Railroad Co., 5 Iowa, 519; Richardson v. Railroad Co., 8 Iowa, 263; Pond v. Railroad Co., 17 Howard’s Prac., 544; Belden v. Railroad Co., 15 Howard’s Prac., 18; Glaise v. Railroad Co., 1 Strob., 72.) If, however, the statute which provides that “The public office of a railroad corporation shall be considered the domicile of such corporation” were held to fix the residence of such a corporation under the laws regulating venue, to which we have referred, then, as the plea does not negative the fact that -the public office of the railway company was in Tarrant county, for the purposes of the plea, it would have to be presumed that this was the residence of the corporation.

Conceding, for the purposes of this case, that the residence of the railway company was in Tarrant county, then, if there was no common obligation resting on it and Ginocchio to keep in proper condition and well lighted the entrance into the restaurant, the latter should not have been made a party defendant to an action brought in a county other than that of his residence.

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Bluebook (online)
4 S.W. 617, 68 Tex. 342, 1887 Tex. LEXIS 693, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-pacific-railway-co-v-mangum-tex-1887.