Texas Indep Party v. Kirk

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: January 13, 1998
• Docket: 97-50247
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________

No. 97-50247

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TEXAS INDEPENDENT PARTY, MARTHA BYRAM, LINDA CURTIS, JULIUS DREW, SR., ROBERT EARL DUBOSE III, GILBERTO (“GIL”) GAMEZ, KEN HENDERSON, DAVID JONES, JACQUELYN MITCHELL, TERRY MOSER, STEVE ROSSIGNOL,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

RONALD KIRK, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Texas,

Defendant-Appellee. _________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (A-94-CV-175) _________________________________________________________________ January 13, 1998 Before DAVIS, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:1

Following this court’s opinion in Texas Independent Party

v. Kirk, 84 F.3d 178 (5th Cir. 1996), the Texas Independent Party,

eight candidates who sought nomination for public office in the

general election of November 8, 1994, and two independent

candidates for public office in that election (collectively

“appellants”) filed a motion in district court for an award of

attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, seeking $26,925 in

1 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. attorneys’ fees and $1,468 in expenses. The district court denied

the motion, and this appeal followed. Finding the district court

improperly denied the appellants’ motion, we reverse and remand for

further proceedings.

On March 10, 1994, appellants filed a claim against the

Texas Secretary of State, alleging that various provisions of the

Texas election laws, which prescribe deadlines and imposed voter

registration number requirements on nominating petitions for

independent candidates were unconstitutional. The appellants

sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees

and costs.

Finding no relief in the district court, the appellants

appealed the judgment to this court. This court affirmed the

judgment as it related to the challenged filing deadlines, but

reversed that portion of the district court’s opinion which upheld

the state law requiring that voter registration numbers be included

on independent candidate petitions. See Texas Indep. Party, 84

F.3d at 187.

On remand the appellants moved for attorneys’ fees and

expenses under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which provides that a prevailing

party may collect reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs.

The district court denied the motion, characterizing the

appellants’ appeal as a “limited success,” which represented “only

a tiny fraction of the relief sought,” and which did not afford the

appellants prevailing party status under § 1988.

We review the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees

2 for abuse of discretion, see Cooper v. Pentecost, 77 F.3d 829, 831

(5th Cir. 1996), but “the discretion afforded district courts to

deny attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs under § 1988 is

exceedingly narrow,” Ellwest Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653

F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. Unit B Aug. 1981). “Congress has

instructed the courts to award attorneys’ fees as an incentive for

parties who prevail in protecting important constitutional rights

. . . .” Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 546

(5th Cir. 1980). As a result, a prevailing party is entitled to an

award for attorneys’ fees under § 1988 “unless special

circumstances would render such an award unjust.” Kirchberg v.

Feenstra, 708 F.2d 991, 998 (5th Cir. 1983). This has come to mean

that “absent special circumstances, a prevailing plaintiff should

be awarded section 1988 fees as a matter of course.” Id.

Consequently, we must determine (1) if the appellants were the

prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees and

(2) whether special circumstances exists which would render an

award of attorneys’ fees unjust. See Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652

F.2d 458, 464 (5th Cir. Aug. 1981).

“‘The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be

the material alteration of the legal relationship between the

parties.’” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111, 113 S. Ct. 566, 573

(1992) (quoting Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Indep. Sch.

Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989)). This

court has held that a party prevails “if the relief obtained,

through judgment or settlement, materially alters the defendants’

3 behavior in a way directly benefiting the plaintiff.” Watkins v.

Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1993).

Following their appeal to this court, the appellants were

clearly the prevailing party in one aspect of this case. The

appellants challenged the district court’s decision upholding

Texas’s prescribed deadlines and voter registration number

requirement. This court affirmed the judgment as it related to the

challenged deadlines, but reversed that portion of the district

court’s opinion which upheld the state law requiring that voter

registration numbers be included on independent candidate

petitions. See Texas Indep. Party, 84 F.3d at 187. As a result,

the appellants have succeeded in obtaining at least part of the

relief they sought. Moreover, our opinion altered the legal

relationship between the parties in that the defendant must now

modify its behavior in a way that directly benefits the appellants

in all future elections in the state of Texas. See Farrar, 506

U.S. at 111-12, 113 S. Ct. at 573.

The district court’s order articulated no special

circumstances for denying the appellants’ motion for attorneys’

fees and costs. Even though the issue on which the appellants

prevailed in this case comprised only two pages of a twenty-page

motion for summary judgment and may or may not have required the

appellants to present novel or complex issues of law, “the

prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the

relief obtained.” Id. at 114, 113 S. Ct. at 574. Once “litigation

materially alters the legal relationship between the parties, ‘the

4 degree of the [appellants’] overall success goes to the

reasonableness’” of the fee award. Id., 113 S. Ct. at 574 (quoting

Garland, 489 U.S. at 793, 109 S. Ct. at 1494). Furthermore, our

review of the record reveals no special circumstances that would

render an award of attorneys’ fees unjust. See Riddell, 624 F.2d

at 543 (“Section 1988 requires a strong showing of special

circumstances to justify denying an award of attorneys’ fees and

costs to the prevailing party . . . .”).

Thus, the district court’s order is insufficient to

justify a total denial of an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to

the appellants, although the amount will be affected by the limited

extent of appellants’ victory. We REVERSE the district court and

REMAND for further proceedings in accord with this opinion. An

award should include an allowance for fees and costs incurred in

contesting the district court’s order in this appeal.