Texas Health and Human Services Commission v. Jessica Lukefahr

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided December 17, 2015·No. 03-15-00325-CV·Published

Opinion

ACCEPTED 03-15-00325-CV 8285331 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/17/2015 1:52:17 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE CLERK No. 03-15-00325-CV _________________________________ FILED IN IN THE 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS THIRD COURT OF APPEALS 12/17/2015 1:52:17 PM AUSTIN, TEXAS JEFFREY D. KYLE _________________________________ Clerk

TEXAS HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES COMMISSION, Appellant,

v.

JESSICA LUKEFAHR, Appellee. _________________________________

On Appeal from the 345th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Trial Court Case No. D-1-GN-14-002158 The Honorable Stephen Yelenosky, Presiding _________________________________

APPELLEE’S RESPONSE BRIEF _________________________________

MAUREEN O’CONNELL Texas Bar No. 00795949 SOUTHERN DISABILITY LAW CENTER 1307 Payne Avenue Austin, Texas 78757 T: 512.458.5800 F: 512.458.5850 moconnell458@gmail.com Attorney for Appellee TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 2

I. HHSC’s Exceptional Circumstances Rule Does Not Require the Submission of “Medical Literature” to Establish Medical Necessity for DME........................................................................................ 2

II. HHSC’s Explanation for the Agency’s Lack of Criteria for Integrated Standers Has No Merit ................................................................. 4

III. The Parties Agree that Jessica was Not Required to Seek Prior Authorization of a Separate Stander as Part of Her Request for a Custom Power Wheelchair with Integrated Stander .................................. 6

IV. HHSC Failed to Refute the Professional Opinion of Jessica’s Treating Medical Providers that She Cannot Utilize a Separate Stander........................................................................................................... 7

V. HHSC’s Defense of TMHP’s Denial Notice Does Not Affect the District Court’s Decision......................................................................... 8

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................................... 9

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 10

i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Koenning v. Janek, 539 F. App’x 353 (5th Cir. 2013) ......................................................................... 4

Koenning v. Suehs, 897 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. Tex. 2012) .................................................................. 4

TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) ................................................................................ 2

REGULATIONS

1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1039(a)(4)(D) ............................................................ 2, 3

42 C.F.R. § 431.12 ..................................................................................................... 3

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) ........................................................................................... 4

ii No. 03-15-00325-CV _________________________________

IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS _________________________________

JESSICA LUKEFAHR, Appellee. _________________________________

On Appeal from the 345th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas Trial Court Case No. D-1-GN-14-002158 The Honorable Stephen Yelenosky, Presiding _________________________________

TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL:

On December 7, 2015, more than 30 days after the filing of Appellee’s Sur

Reply, Appellant Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC) filed a

Response to Appellee’s brief.1 As before, Appellee, Jessica Lukefahr, respectfully

responds to Appellant’s most recent brief to address the matters addressed therein.

1 To the extent additional briefing is allowed, Tex. R. App. P. 38.6(c) suggests that such briefs must be filed within 20 days of the preceding brief. As such, HHSC’s Response Brief is untimely. 1 ARGUMENT

I. HHSC’s Exceptional Circumstances Rule Does Not Require the Submission of “Medical Literature” to Establish Medical Necessity for DME.

HHSC claims its denial of Jessica’s wheelchair request “should have been

affirmed” because she “failed to provide evidence-based medical peer-reviewed

literature in support of her exceptional circumstances request.2 Appellant’s

Response Brief, pp. 2-3. This is incorrect.3 HHSC’s exceptional circumstances rule,

1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1039(a)(4)(D), neither mandates nor mentions the

submission of medical literature to establish that a requested item of durable medical

equipment (DME) will meet a “specific medical purpose.”4 As explained by HHSC

at a recent public meeting, this “medical literature” requirement “has not been

previously posted in [agency] policy nor has that process been in Rule.” App. B, p.

2:16-18.

2 In fact, the medical literature submitted on Jessica’s behalf collectively reviews more than 40 research studies investigating the medical and functional benefits of supported standing. See Appellee’s Brief, pp. 24-26. Appellant’s assertion that this literature did not rise to the level of research required by TMHP’s process is incorrect. Appellant’s Response, p.3. 3 HHSC’s hearing decision contains no finding concerning this “medical literature” requirement. 4 Administrative rules must be construed “in the same manner as statutes” and the plain language of this rule does not include the “medical literature” requirement upon which HHSC relies. See TGS–NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 438 (Tex. 2011) (citation omitted). 2 In fact, this provision derives from an internal exceptions process established

by the Texas Medicaid and Healthcare Partnership (TMHP) in October 2012.5 As

part of this process, DME suppliers are informed they must submit:

a minimum of two articles from evidence-based medical peer-reviewed literature that demonstrate validated, uncontested data for use of the requested equipment to treat the recipient’s specific medical condition, and that the requested equipment has been found to be safe and effective.

TMHP’s “medical literature” requirement is an unreasonable standard for

determining eligibility for DME. This was recently demonstrated when HHSC

failed in its attempt to add this requirement to 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §

354.1039(a)(4)(D). In June 2015, HHSC submitted this proposed rule amendment

to the agency’s Medical Care Advisory Committee (MCAC).6 The MCAC flatly

rejected HHSC’s proposed “medical literature” requirement and unanimously voted

to send the rule amendment back to the agency.7 As explained by a MCAC member

and former medical director for HHSC:

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Related

TGS-NOPEC GEOPHYSICAL CO. v. Combs
340 S.W.3d 432 (Texas Supreme Court, 2011)
Bradley Koenning v. Kyle Janek
539 F. App'x 353 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
Koenning v. Suehs
897 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. Texas, 2012)