Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Elam

376 S.W.2d 780, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2010
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedFebruary 20, 1964
DocketNo. 6676
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 376 S.W.2d 780 (Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Elam) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n v. Elam, 376 S.W.2d 780, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2010 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964).

Opinion

STEPHENSON, Justice.

This is a suit brought under the Workman’s Compensation Law. Trial was by jury and plaintiff was awarded judgment for total and permanent disability. The parties will be referred to here as they were in the trial court.

This case turns upon the question as to whether plaintiff was an employee of Coleman Cliburn, who had workmen’s compensation coverage with the defendant insurance carrier. It is defendant’s contention that plaintiff was employed by Field Spikes, and that Field Spikes was an independent contractor with Coleman Cliburn.

Defendant’s points of error are that there is no evidence to sustain the findings of the jury that plaintiff was an employee of Coleman Cliburn, that there was insufficient evidence to sustain such findings, and that such findings are contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the burden was upon the plaintiff to prove he was an employee of Coleman Cliburn, at the time of the accident. Shannon v. Western Indemnity Co., Comm. of App., 257 S.W. 522.

The supreme test in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor is the test with respect to the right of control. Halliburton v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co., 147 Tex. 133, 213 S.W.2d 677. Under the evidence in this case, did Coleman Cliburn have the right to control the work of plaintiff, or did Coleman Cliburn enter into an independent contract with Field Spikes and was plaintiff an employee of Field Spikes?

The evidence as to the oral contract of employment is sparce and throws little light on the question as to whether Coleman Cliburn retained the right of control over plaintiff. It becomes necessary in solution of the question to consider not only the terms of the contract when made, but also evidence with reference to the control that was actually exercised, for it is relevant and admissible as tending to prove what the contract really contemplated. Lone Star Gas Co. v. Kelly, Texas Comm. App., 46 S.W.2d 656.

We first consider the question of “no evidence”, a question of law, by looking only to the evidence favorable to the findings of the jury. The plaintiff testified to the following: Field Spikes came to plaintiff’s house and told plaintiff Coleman Cliburn wanted a truck driver. Plaintiff and Field Spikes talked to Coleman Cliburn in the woods the next day, and Coleman Cliburn hired plaintiff to drive a truck for which he agreed to pay plaintiff $2.00 per load. Plaintiff frequently saw Coleman Cliburn in the woods on the job where plaintiff was loading and hauling pulpwood. Coleman Cliburn gave plaintiff instructions with reference to how he worked. Coleman Cliburn gave plaintiff orders how to handle the truck, not to tear them up, not to haul anybody and to limit the speed from 30 to 35 miles per hour. Coleman Cliburn told plaintiff to cut brushes and things to fix the road so they could get in and out. Coleman Cliburn didn’t want the pulpwood cut too small or the timber cut too close. Coleman Cliburn paid plaintiff in cash at his office in Newton. Coleman Cliburn furnished plaintiff transportation to and [782]*782from the job, by letting plaintiff drive the truck home at night with orders not to touch it until the next morning. Coleman Cliburn came out to the job the morning plaintiff got hurt and said they were cutting a little too close.

Roy Lee Ashworth testified to the following : Roy Lee Ashworth worked with plaintiff for Coleman Cliburn. Coleman Cliburn showed them what kind of timber to cut, and told them right from wrong. Coleman Cliburn came out to the j ob where plaintiff was hurt. Coleman Cliburn was Field Spikes’ and plaintiff’s boss.

Roy Lee Palmer testified as follows: He worked with plaintiff and Ashworth for Coleman Cliburn. Coleman Cliburn came to his home and hired him and gave them instructions how to cut. They should not cut warped trees and should not cut too low. Not to get on the line or cut marked trees, or trees that were too dead. Coleman Cliburn walked around the woods and told them what to cut and what not to cut. Roy Lee Palmer felt he had to follow Coleman Cliburn’s order or be fired. All of this evidence supports the findings of the jury.

In determining the points as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the jury as to employment, and the contention that such findings were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we consider the entire record.

Coleman Cliburn testified to the following: He is a pulpwood dealer and had been since 1951. As such, he bought pulpwood from subcontractors and sold it to the East Texas Pulp & Paper Co. Also, he had a contract to cut wood from company land and delivered it to the mill at a stipulated price per cord. Under the terms of his contract with the mill he carried compensation insurance to cover the men while working on company land. Once a week he would get an order from the mill for the number of cords to cut from company land, and also a supplemental order for outside wood. On company land the order designated the type of wood to cut as well as the place such wood is to be cut. The supplemental order designated no source for obtaining outside wood. He owned no trucks or equipment of his own, so all orders were filled by subcontractors. A subcontractor has to either own or have a truck available, and has to have a sufficient number of workers to cut, load and haul the wood. He made the arrangements with his subcontractors and had ten in 1961, who were paid a stipulated amount per cord for cutting, loading and hauling wood to the mill. On “outside wood” the subcontractor is paid according to the number of cords, with no social security or withholding and the only deduction being stumpage which is a stipulated amount per cord paid to the landowner. The owner of the truck paid the upkeep, gasoline, oil, cost of repairs and cost of tires. His records indicated Field Spikes was paid for 19.73 cords of “outside wood” during the week the plaintiff was injured. It was up to Field Spikes to pay all of the expense on his truck out of the money he received. Coleman Cliburn had no interest in the truck. The first time he noticed the plaintiff was about a week before plaintiff’s injury. He did not hire the plaintiff, and did not pay plaintiff any money. He did not know whose wood was being cut when plaintiff was injured, and did not go down to where the tract was located. He had no right of control or supervision over men working on outside land'* and did not in any way attempt to supervise them.

Walter Lavine testified to the following: He was in the general timber business. He was acquainted with people who owned tracts of pulpwood they wanted to sell and also acquainted with people who wanted h> buy pulpwood. He had arranged to sell Field Spikes pulpwood from time to time. Field Spikes contacted him in May 1961 and told him he was looking for some outside wood. He had charge of some land for the Claybars in Orange County, and showed it to Field Spikes and made the ar[783]*783rangements for it to be cut. He didn’t know Coleman Cliburn, had never spoken to him, and had no contact with him about this timber.

Field Spikes testified as follows: he had been in the pulpwood business from 1955 until June 1961 when his truck burned. He did contracting or subcontracting and hauled for himself.

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Related

General Motors Corporation v. Brady
477 S.W.2d 385 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1972)
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408 S.W.2d 241 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1966)

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376 S.W.2d 780, 1964 Tex. App. LEXIS 2010, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-employers-insurance-assn-v-elam-texapp-1964.