Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation v. Terzia

138 So. 2d 874, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 1713
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 7, 1962
Docket9670
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 138 So. 2d 874 (Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation v. Terzia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation v. Terzia, 138 So. 2d 874, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 1713 (La. Ct. App. 1962).

Opinion

138 So.2d 874 (1962)

TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Mrs. Verne P. TERZIA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9670.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.

March 7, 1962.

*875 Massey & Fowler, West Monroe, for appellant.

Oliver, Digby & Fudickar, Monroe, Hargrove, Guyton & Van Hook, Shreveport, for appellee.

Before HARDY, AYRES and BOLIN, JJ.

HARDY, Judge.

This action was instituted by plaintiff praying for the expropriation of a fifty foot right-of-way and servitude over and across property of the defendant for the purpose of permitting the laying and maintenance of a twenty-inch gas transmission pipeline and the fixing of a price to be paid defendant as the just and reasonable value thereof, together with any damages in connection therewith. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff granting the fifty-foot right-of-way and fixing the consideration, including damages, in the sum of $790.00, the defendant has appealed.

Numerous preliminary pleas and exceptions filed by the defendant were disposed by the trial judge and the specifications of error, all pertaining to the merits, as asserted on behalf of defendant before this court, may be briefly summarized as follows:

(1). That plaintiff failed to establish on trial that it was a foreign corporation created for the purpose of supplying the public with natural gas and therefore entitled to the right of expropriation under LSA-R.S. 19:2(7);

(2). That the allowance of a fifty-foot right-of-way exceeded plaintiff's actual needs;

(3). That plaintiff failed to establish the necessity for the expropriation of defendant's property;

(4). That plaintiff failed to prove a proper description of the property to be taken and a plan for the construction of its pipeline; and

(5). That the award of the value of the land and damages in connection with the taking should be increased to the sum of $3,424.00.

Notwithstanding the fact that all of the above issues were raised on trial, and, as we think, properly disposed by written opinion of the district judge, we proceed to a discussion of the asserted specifications of error, seriatim.

Concededly, plaintiff is a Delaware corporation authorized to do business in the State of Louisiana and its charter specifically denominates numerous details with respect to the purpose for which it was organized, among which we quote the following excerpts as being pertinent and material:

"To store, transport, buy and sell oil, gas, * * *.
"To construct, install, maintain and operate * * * piping for the transportation of natural gas or oil; to buy, sell and supply the same to others, and to lay, buy, lease, sell, and operate pipes, pipelines and storage tanks to be used for the purpose of transporting oil and gas.
"To buy, sell and furnish oil and gas for light, heat and other purposes, to *876 * * * construct, renew, maintain and operate pipelines, * * *.
"To acquire, * * * use, sell and distribute natural gas for light, heat, power and other purposes * * *."

The right of expropriation of needed property is granted, inter alia, under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 19:2(7) to

"* * * any domestic or foreign corporation created for the piping and marketing of natural gas for the purpose of supplying the public with natural gas."

We regard the contention on behalf of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove that it was a corporation "* * * created for the piping and marketing of natural gas for the purposes of supplying the public with natural gas," to be so technical and unreasonable as to hardly be worthy of consideration. A similar argument was advanced before this court in Central Louisiana Electric Company v. Pugh, 96 So.2d 523 and involved a construction of the purpose for which a corporation was organized in the light of its charter provisions. With reference to this contention we made the observation that a construction that a corporation organized for the purpose of selling and dealing in electricity was not authorized to transmit such a commodity would lead to an absurd and ridiculous conclusion. The same observation is pertinent in the instant case. Conceding the validity of counsel's argument that expropriation statutes are strictly construed, in connection with which were cited the cases of Calcasieu & Southern Ry. Co. v. Witte, 224 La. 1091, 71 So.2d 854, and Louisiana Highway Commission v. Bullis, 197 La. 14, 200 So. 805, we are, nevertheless, impelled to the inescapable conclusion that the purposes for which plaintiff corporation was created, as evidenced by the above extracts from its charter, implicitly establish the right and purpose of supplying the public with natural gas, directly and indirectly. In this connection it is to be noted that plaintiff introduced in evidence a letter of the Federal Power Commission authorizing the construction and operation of a pipeline, which embraced the construction of the portion thereof involved in this action.

Attention should also be directed to the point that the right of expropriation is dependent not upon the public character and nature of the corporation but upon the public purposes and public interest which are served by such corporation; Central Louisiana Electric Co. v. Pugh, supra.

We find defendant-appellant's claim that the grant of a permanent right-of-way over her property, measuring fifty feet in width, exceeded the reasonable needs of plaintiff is entitled to much more serious consideration. Many years ago this court held that in those instances where the width of a right-of-way was not specified in the instrument establishing a servitude, the grant would be limited to a width necessary for an excavation adequate to receive the pipeline; Dickson v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (La.App.1939), 193 So. 246 (writs denied). To the same effect was our holding in Wilson v. Scurlock Oil Company (La.App.1961), 126 So.2d 429 (writs denied), to which case this plaintiff, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, was a party.

While the above holdings related to executed grants of right-of-way, we think the same consideration should be given to similar contentions by landowners where judicial pronouncements on the extent of the right to be granted is under consideration.

In the case before us plaintiff contends that a minimum of a fifty foot width is necessary for the purposes of maintenance, and to the contrary it is urged on behalf of defendant that a thirty foot width is completely adequate for such purpose. The record contains some material and pertinent testimony in support of each of these contentions, but we do not find that plaintiff has sustained its claim as to the necessity of a fifty foot grant by a *877 preponderance of the evidence. It must be conceded that the fifty foot area would be more convenient, agreeable and satisfactory to plaintiff, but it cannot be concluded that such a width is necessary. In the event of any need for the use of heavy equipment in connection with repairs or maintenance, the rights of ingress and egress, which are inherent in the use of the servitude granted, would authorize plaintiff to enter upon and use additional necessary areas subject to the co-existing right of defendant to claim damages occasioned thereby.

Learned counsel for plaintiff has cited numerous cases which it is claimed approved the expropriation of rights-of-way for pipeline purposes measuring at least fifty feet in width.

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138 So. 2d 874, 1962 La. App. LEXIS 1713, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-eastern-transmission-corporation-v-terzia-lactapp-1962.