Texas Automotive Dealers Ass'n v. Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector

229 S.W.2d 787, 149 Tex. 122, 1950 Tex. LEXIS 429
CourtTexas Supreme Court
DecidedMay 10, 1950
DocketA-2534
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 229 S.W.2d 787 (Texas Automotive Dealers Ass'n v. Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Texas Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Texas Automotive Dealers Ass'n v. Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector, 229 S.W.2d 787, 149 Tex. 122, 1950 Tex. LEXIS 429 (Tex. 1950).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Griffin

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioners, John C. Reed et ah, filed a class suit under Rule 42 in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, for a declara *124 tory judgment determining whether or not dealers in automobiles are exempt under the provisions of H. B. 75 Acts 1947, 50th Legislature p. 732 from the payment of fees and penalties demanded by respondent Smith, the Tax Assessor-Collector of Harris County, Texas; also alleging that Smith is acting unlawfully in demanding of plaintiffs the payment of such fees and penalties, and asking for an injunction against Smith. Petitioner Texas Automotive Dealers Association, Inc., and others, intervened, and generally adopted plaintiffs’ pleadings. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case, styled therein Harris County Tax Assessor-Collector v. Reed, and reported in 225 S. W. 2d 586, states the nature and result of the controversy, and the point for decision.

Upon an investigation of the legislative history of Art. 1434, Penal Code, 1925, we find that as originally passed by Acts 1919, 36th Leg. Ch. 138, H. B. 417 p. 253, the pertinent portions of such Act required all persons offering to sell or trade a motor vehicle to have in his actual physical possession the tax collector’s receipt for the license fee for the current year (sec. 3a) and required the actual transfer by seller to buyer of such license receipt by indorsement (sec. 3b) and also required every person buying or trading for a motor vehicle to demand and receive such license receipt (sec. 3c) and sec. 4 (which later became Art. 1435 P. C. 1925) required that the seller make and deliver a bill of sale to the purchaser, and prescribed a form for such bill of sale. In the codification of 1925, Secs. 3a-3c became Art. 1434, Penal Code, without any material change, but merely a combining of said three sections under the one statute. Sec. 4 became Art. 1435 P. C. 1925.

Art. 1434, P. C., 1925, was amended first in Acts 1927, 40th Leg. 1st Called Session, Ch. 77 H. B. 87 p. 205, and no material change was made, except to provide for the use of certified copies of the tax collector’s receipt for the current year instead of permitting the use only of the original receipt as theretofore.

Art. 1434, P. C., 1925, was again amended by Acts 1931, 42nd Legislature, Ch. 29 S. B. 40 p. 36. In this amendment we find that for the first time there is language which specifically requires “any used or secondhand vehicle required to be registered under the laws of this State” to be “duly registered in this State for the current year under the provisions of said laws.” And significantly material to our inquiry this article for the first time exempts dealers having a dealer’s license plate from the requirement as to registration by the following lan *125 guage: “* * provided, however, that a dealer may demonstrate such motor vehicle for the purpose of sale, trade or transfer under a dealer’s license plate issued such dealer for demonstration purposes.” For the first time there was included in Art. 1484 a provision requiring the seller to deliver to the purchaser a bill of sale in triplicate. The provision for issuance of dealer’s license to a dealer, so he would not have to register a vehicle, came into the laws as Sec. 21, Acts 1917, 35th Leg. Ch. 190, H. B. 2, p. 416 et seq. and was carried into the 1925 revision as Art. 6686.

The first Certificate of Title Act was passed in 1939, and being Acts 1939, 46th Leg. Ch. 4, H. B. 407, p. 602. Sec. 4 of said Act defined an “owner” so as to specifically exclude a “dealer” and Sec. 19 defined a “dealer.” Sec. 27 read (as it now reads, without any changes from original passage) :

“Before selling or disposing of any motor vehicle required to be registered or licensed in this State on any highway or public place within this State, except with dealer’s metal or cardboard license number thereto attached as now provided by law, the owner shall make application to the designated agent in the county of his domicile upon form to be prescribed by the Department for a certificate of title for such motor vehicle.”

This section requires the owner of the vehicle to make application for a certificate of title prior to sale, and by its exception specifically exempts dealers who have a dealer’s license from the requirement that they procure a title certificate before selling or disposing of such motor vehicle. Sec. 33, which covers a subsequent sale of a motor vehicle, applies only to “owners”, thus excluding its application to dealers. This construction of such section has been recognized by the Highway Department by the fact that its regulations have consistently recognized that a “dealer” is not required to apply for a new certificate of title, and may transfer the certificate accompanying a used car bought by the dealer, by indorsement on the reverse of the certificate upon the form provided thereon by the Highway Department.

This demonstrates that the trial court’s judgment that dealers do not have to file the title certificate within ten days is a correct one. Also, that the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals that “dealers” must file the certificate of title within ten days is incorrect.

While the following cases deal with new cars and hold that *126 such dealer is not required to procure a title certificate before they sell a new car, they also support in principle the rule announced by us. Motor Inv. Co. v. Knox City, 141 Texas 530, 174 S. W. 2d 482, and Motor Inv. Co. v. City of Hamlin, 142 Texas 486, 179 S. W. 2d 278.

Sec. 65 of the Certificate of Title Act provided that “all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.” This provision of course repealed the provisions of Art. 1434 requiring triplicate bills of sale, and would leave a doubt as to the validity of other parts of the article regarding the necessary requisites of a sale of a motor vehicle. By Sec. 7, Acts 1941, 47th Leg. Ch. 187, H. B. 205, p. 343, Art. 1434 was expressly repealed “in so far as it requires the delivering of bills of sale or motor vehicles to the transferee when the same are sold or transferred.” By Acts 1947, 50th Leg. Ch. 364, H. B. 75, p. 732, Art. 1434 P. C. was amended to read as it does now, and as it is involved in this litigation. The change made was that the old article read that the used or secondhand vehicle to be sold, traded or otherwise transferred must be duly registered in this State for the current year “under the provisions of said laws” whereas the new article reads “under the provisions of said law.” In addition to requiring the delivery of the current year’s license receipt on such vehicle the new article has added “and a properly assigned Certificate of Title or other evidence of title as required under the provisions-of Art. 1436-1 of the Penal Code of the State of Texas.” The same provision is made in the punitive part of the said Art. 1434.

Thus we see that a dealer having a dealer’s tag has an exception from the requirements of Art. 1434 made for his benefit.

It is claimed by the respondents that Article 1434 and 1435, P. C.

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229 S.W.2d 787, 149 Tex. 122, 1950 Tex. LEXIS 429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/texas-automotive-dealers-assn-v-harris-county-tax-assessor-collector-tex-1950.