Testa's, Inc. v. Coopersmith

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: July 1, 2015
• Docket: CUMbcd-re-11-03
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT

Cumberland, ss.

TESTA'S, INC.

Plaintiff/ Counterclaim Defendant

v. Docket No. BCD RE-11-03 .,,...

JACK COOPERSMITH and SHERRI COOPERSMITH,

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs

and

TOURMALINE KING, LLC and TOURMALINE QUEEN, LLC,

Defendants

THOMAS J. TESTA, JR., ANNA T. STRIEFEL MLS PROPERTIES, LLC, and JOAN E. PURCELL

Parties-in-Interest

ORDER AFTER SITE VIEW AND HEARING

By agreement of the parties, the only remaining issue in this case involves the

specific terms of the Defendants' easement over the Plaintiffs property for purposes of

access to the Defendant's properties. After the Law Court mandate, the parties filed a Joint

Motion for Clarification of that point.

Pursuant to a previously issued notice and by agreement of the parties, the court

conducted a site view and a hearing June 30, 2016. At the hearing, Plaintiff and Defendants

presented evidence in the form of sworn testimony and exhibits. After the close of evidence

the court issued several oral rulings and set a schedule for further submissions by the

1 parties. This Order is to set forth that schedule and also to summarize the court's oral

rulings for the benefit of counsel in preparing their submissions.

Procedural Posture

Because the Business and Consumer Court has issued what is now a final judgment

by virtue of being affirmed on appeal, any "clarification" of the final judgment needs to be

pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bonner v. Emerson, 2014

ME IS5, ~ 10, 105 A.sci 102S, 1026 (Rule 60(b) is the source of trial court's authority to

modify final judgment). Although the parties' Joint Motion for Clarification does not

mention Rule 60(b), the court will proceed on the basis that the Joint Motion for

Clarification invokes the court's Rule 60(b) jurisdiction, and that the parties agree that Rule

60(b)( 1) and/or 60(b)( 6) authorize the court to issue an amendment to the judgment

clarifying the location and scope of the easements. Any objection to the foregoing should

be filed in writing within 10 days of this Order, or be deemed waived.

Format efAmended Judgment

The court further assumes that the end result of the present procedure will be at

least an amendment to the final judgment, and also either a recordable abstract of the

amendment or perhaps a separate recordable easement deed for each of the Defendants' two

properties. The parties are requested to confer on what documents are involved and what

form they should take.

Summary ef Rulings

The following summarizes the court's oral rulings made at the close of the June SO,

2015 hearing:

• The easements appurtenant to Defendants' properties will allow vehicles operated by persons seeking access to Defendants' properties to travel over any portion of the Plaintiffs parking lot that is now or hereafter accessible to other users of the parking lot, except that no vehicle operated by a person going to Defendants' 2 properties will be permitted to park in any of the Plaintiffs' parking spaces, and vehicles leaving Defendants' property will exit only via the same way they entered, i.e. to Main Street.

• Nothing in the easements will limit the Plaintiffs right to change the parking lot either as to its configuration or its usage, provided however, that the Plaintiff will not reduce the travel way for vehicles to go to and from Defendants' properties below the following minimums:

oa travel way IS feet wide at the Main Street entrance to the parking lot oa 16 foot-wide rectangular travel way centered on and running lengthwise from the Main Street entrance westerly to the southwesterly corner of the 20-foot wide travel way described below o a 20-foot wide rectangular travel way running northerly from the westerly end of the above-describedl6-foot wide travel way to the southerly edge of the building at the northwest corner of the parking lot. The easterly side of said 20-foot wide rectangular travel way abuts the 25 x 18 rectangle described in the following subparagraph. o a 25 foot by 18-foot rectangular area abutting the 20-foot wide travel way, with the longer sides abutting the 20-foot wide travel way on the west and the Defendants' property lines on the east. Defendants may determine where the 25 x 18 foot area is positioned along Defendants' westerly boundary lines.

The foregoing travel way sections are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "minimum travel way."

• No part of any parked vehicle shall be within or over the above-defined minimum travel way. (See below for potential limited exception for delivery vehicles).

• No vehicle parked on Defendants' property will protrude onto or over Plaintiffs property, and no vehicle parked on Plaintiffs property will protrude onto or over Defendants' property. This means that a vehicle parked on a party's property must be entirely on that party's property and may not overhang another party's property.

Further Potential Provisions

The court is considering the following additional provisions and invites the parties'

further input:

• A provision to the effect that delivery vehicles that stop partly or entirely in the above-defined minimum travel way solely for the purpose of making a delivery to a party will not be deemed to be in violation of the easement as long as the delivery vehicle does not interfere with any other vehicles using that portion of the travel way. This means that vehicles making deliveries or pickups for any party could stop anywhere within the Defendants' above-defined minimum travel way as long as they did not block other parties or other users of the parking lot. Such a provision could 3 benefit all parties. Without it, vehicles making deliveries to the Plaintiffs property or the Defendants' properties would be required to stop entirely outside the minimum travel way. The court is open to setting time limits as well.

• A provision requiring the parties to notify each other of any violations

• A provision defining the terms under which the easement can be terminated, but requiring that termination is effective only if ordered by a court with jurisdiction

• A provision authorizing any party to obtain legal and equitable relief for a violation by another party

• The court encourages, but will not require, the parties to include an ADR procedure to be exhausted before any party invokes the aid of the court

• In addition, the documents need to contain standard appurtenant easement language,

• Eventually a metes and bounds description of the "minimum travel way" will be needed, to be included in the easement description and also depicted on a plan.

Schedule

The court adopts the following schedule for the parties' further submissions:

By July 22, 2015, Plaintiff will draft and submit to Defendant on behalf of Plaintiff and

the parties-in-interest the document or documents that the Plaintiff will be asking the court to

adopt.

By July 29, 2015, Defendants will draft and submit to Plaintiff and parties-in-interest

the Defendants' response, along with a red-lined version of the Plaintiffs submittals, indicating

the Defendants' deletions and additions. If the Plaintiff agrees with any changes made by

Defendants, Plaintiffs counsel will endeavor to notify Defendants' counsel prior to August 5.

By August 5, 2015, all parties who wish to file proposed documents for the court's

consideration will do so, including memoranda in support of a party's position on any disputed

issue of fact or law.

The Clerk will schedule this case for oral argument on the parties' submissions on any

available date after August 5, 2015. If all parties agree, the oral argument may be held in

4 Portland with any counsel who wishes able to participate telephonically. Otherwise, the oral

argument will be at the court of origin in Ellsworth.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk is hereby directed to incorporate this order by

reference in the docket.

Dated July 1, 2015 l .,.. A. M. Horton Justice

Entered on the Docket: '1- d .. / £l( Copies sen! via Mail - Electronically

5 Testa's Inc. v. Jack Coopersmith, Sherri Coopersmith, Tourmaline King, LLC, Tourmaline Queen, LLC, Thomas Testa, JR., Anna Striefel, MLS Properties, LLC and Joan E. Purcell

BCD-RE-11-03

Testa's Inc.

Plaintiff

Counsel: Aaron Baltes, Esq. Two Canal Plaza PO Box4600 Portland, ME 04112-4600

Jack and Sherri Coopersmith, Tourmaline King, LLC and Tourmaline Queen, LLC,

Counsel: Gerard Fournier, Esq. and Joshua Randlett, Esq. One Merchants Plaza Suite 603 PO Box 2429 Bangor, ME 04402-2429

David Soley, Esq. 100 Middle St PO Box9729 Portland, ME 04104-5029

MLS Properties, LLC

Party-in-Interest

Counsel: Timothy Bryant, Esq. One City Center PO Box 9546 Portland, ME 04112-9546

Thomas Testa, JR. and Anna Striefel

Counsel: Douglas Chapman, Esq. and Thomas Wheatley, Esq. 109 Main St Bar Harbor, ME 04609 STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss . Location: Portland / Docket No. BCD-RE-11-03

TESTA'S, INC.,

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

V. FINAL DECISION AND JUDGMENT 1

JACK COOPERSMITH, et al.,

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

THOMAS J. TESTA,JR.,ANNA T. STRIEFEL, MLS PROPERTIES, LLC, and JOAN PURCELL,

On September 9 - 11, 2013, this matter was tried to the Court on Plaintiff's Complaint

and Defendants' Counterclaim. The central issue generated by the complaint and counterclaim is

1 On October 1, 2013, after a bench trial, the Court issued its Decision and Judgment in this matter. In the Decision and Judgment, in determining that Defendants had an easement over Plaintiff's property, the Court declined to address all but one of the theories by which Defendants maintained the existence of an easement. Plaintiff subsequently filed post-trial motions, which motions raised certain substantive and procedural issues. On October 8, 2013, the Court conducted a telephonic conference with counsel to discuss with the parties some of the issues raised in the motions and the future course of the case. One of the isi,ues raised by the motions and during the conference was the possibility that this Court would not be available to address any post-judgment issues that might be generated in the event of an appeal and subsequent remand. Citing the interests of judicial economy, the parties requested that the Court address all of Defendants' theories and any related legal defenses. The Court agrees that judicial economy militates in favor of the Court addressing some of the other issues in the case. The Court, therefore, issues this Final Decision and Judgment, which shall supersede and not be in addition to the October 1, 2013, Decision and Judgment.

I whether Defendants' property benefits from an easement over Plaintiff's property in Bar Harbor,

Maine.2 After consideration of the evidence, the Court makes the following findings:

FINDINGS OF FACT 3

1. Plaintiff owns certain real property located on the westerly side of Main Street in Bar

Harbor, Maine, which consists of several contiguous lots (the Testa property).

2. Defendants Coopersmith also own certain property on Main Street in Bar Harbor,

Maine, which property they acquired by deed dated November 1, 2005 (the Coopersmith

property). Defendants Tourmaline King, LLC, and Tourmaline Queen, LLC, (Defendants

Tourmaline), which are now owned by Defendants Coopersmith, own certain property on Main

Street in Bar Harbor, Maine, which property is described in a deed dated December 24, 2012 (the

Tourmaline property) .

3. The Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property include retail businesses with

space for parking ·immediately behind the building.

4. The deed to the prior owners of the Tourmaline property included a right of way over

adjoining property, at least a portion of which is now the Testa property, to permit access to the

rear of the Tourmaline property. The Coopersmiths' deed also includes a grant of a right of way.

5. The Coopersmith property consists of the consolidation of two lots. One of the

historical lots is located along the westerly side of Main Street. Lot two abuts lot one to the

west. The right of way in the Coopersmith deed describes a right over Lot two for the benefit of

Lot one.

2 Plaintiff had fil ed, bu t wi thdre w prior to tri al, a c laim for damages. 3 T h Court wi ll set forth some of the basic fac ts established at trial. The en umerated facts are not, however, an exhaustive list of all of the Court's fac tual findings . As part of the Court's analysis in the Discussion secti on that follows, the Court makes additional findings.

2 6. For many years, beginning in the 1950's and through and including the mid-1970's,

the Coopersmiths' predecessors-in-title accessed the rear of their property over the Testa

property for business deliveries and other purposes.

7. In the 1970's, Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title developed plans to expand the parking

area behind the Testa property and the Coopersmith property. The expansion included the

construction of a concrete wall that would prevent the owners of the Coopersmith property from

accessing the rear of their property in the manner they were accustomed.

8. Philip ' and Nathan Sanborn were the owners of the Coopersmith property at the time

of the proposed construction of the concrete wall. In the 1970's, Catherine Riccardo was the

record owner of the Tourmaline property, which abutted the Coopersmith property along Main

Street. Ms. Riccardo's daughter, Joan Purcell, operated a retail business out of the building on

the Tourmaline property.

9. Soon after learning of the proposed construction of the concrete wall, Philip and

Nathan Sanborn, together with Joan Purcell and Catherine Riccardo, commenced a lawsuit on

September 9 , 1977 , in Hancock County Superior Court against Joseph and Michael Testa, the

then owners of the Testa property, in an effort to prevent the construction of the concrete wall

(the Lawsuit). They alleged that the construction would interfere with their rights of way, and

their ability to access the rear of their property as they and their predecessors had done

historically. On September 29, 1977, the court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting

the defendants in the case (the Testas) from interfering with the access of the plaintiffs (in the

Lawsuit) to their property.

10. During the course of the Lawsuit, through their attorneys, the Sanborns and Riccardo

negotiated an agreement with Joseph and Michael Testa, Jr., (through their attorneys), by which

3 agreement the Sanborns and Riccardo would be able to continue to access. the rear of their

properties over a portion of the Testa property.

11. Joseph Testa, Michael Testa, Jr., Philip Sanborn, and Nathan Sanborn signed the

agreement, in June 1978. Other than the dismissal of the case in October 1980, the Hancock

County Superior Court's record does not reflect any court activity after the execution of the

agreement by the Sanborns and the Testas. Catherine Riccardo did not sign the agreement. Ms.

Riccardo's failure to sign the agreement was not the result of any objection that she had to the

terms of the agreement. Given that the parties undertook no further action regarding the lawsuit

after June 1978, and given that after June 1978, Ms. Purcell, Ms. Riccardo's daughter and the

occupant of the parcel owned by Ms. Riccardo, accessed the rear of the Tourmaline property

over the Testa property in accordance with the agreement without any objection from Joseph and

Michael Testa, all parties to the Lawsuit, including Ms. Riccardo, assented to the terms of the

June 1978 agreement.

12 . The Hancock County Superior Court dismissed the lawsuit on October 15, 1980,

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute the Lawsuit.

13. After the execution of the agreement in 1978, the Sanborns and Ms. Purcell accessed

the rear of their properties over the Testa property in a manner consistent with the parties' June

1978 agreement.

14. In or about 2010, the Town of Bar Harbor passed an ordinance that eliminated the

need for businesses to have a minimum amount of parking space available for customers. This

change made the. parking area behind the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property

available for potential development.

4 15. From time to time after their purchase of the Coopersmith property, Defendants'

ability to access their property from the rear of the building has been hindered.

DISCUSSION

In this action, both parties request that the Court enter a declaratory judgment regarding

Defendants' assertion of an easement over Plaintiff's property for the benefit of the Coopersmith

property and the Tourmaline property. Defendants also seek to recover damages for Plaintiff's

alleged nuisance and unreasonable interference with Plaintiff's easement rights. The Court will

first address the parties' request for declaratory judgment.

At trial, both parties presented evidence regarding the right of way or easement language

in the chain of title to the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline/Purcell properties.

Defendants also maintain that the deeds to the Coopersmith and Tourmaline/Purcell properties

contain express easements, which granted rights of way over the Testa property. In addition, the

parties submitted evidence as to the historical use of the parking area behind the Coopersmith

and Tourmaline/Purcell properties. Through the historical evidence, Defendants attempt to

establish the existence of a prescriptive easement and an implied easement over the Testa

property.

A. The June 1978 Agreement

Defendants' predecessors-in-title commenced the Lawsuit as the result of the efforts of

Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title to construct a concrete wall that would prevent Defendants'

predecessors-in-title from accessing their property over the Testa property. In the Lawsuit,

Defendants, Ms. Riccardo and Ms. Purcell maintained that they had a legal right to cross the

Testa property to access Defendants' property. The evidence and common sense establish that

5 the parties negotiated a resolution of the Lawsuit through an agreement that would allow

Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title to complete construction of the parking lot, including the proposed

concrete wall, and which agreement would also allow Defendants' predecessor-in-title to

continue to have access to the rear of their properties. Indeed, Plaintiffs have offered no logical

explanation for the failure of the plaintiffs in the Lawsuit to continue prosecuting the Lawsuit

without confirming their ability to continue to gain access to their properties as they had prior .to

the proposed construction of the wall. Consistent with this conclusion, the Court record contains

no reference to any substantive action in the case after the Testas and Sanborns signed the

agreement in June 1978. Given that the parties' reached a resolution of the access issues to

resolve the Lawsuit, the parties' failure to object to the dismissal of the action pursuant to M.R.

Civ. P. 4l(b) is not surprising.

Despite the fact that Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title signed the June 1978 agreement that

ended the lawsuit, Plaintiffs contend that the agreement is not valid because Catherine Riccardo

did not sign the agreement. First, Ms. Riccardo's signature was not necessary to establish an

enforceable agreement between the Testas and the Sanborns. In other words, the Testas and the

Sanborns are the only necessary parties to establish an easement over the Testa property for the

benefit of the Coopersmith property. Thus, all parties necessary to establish an easement over

the Testa property for the benefit of the Coopersmith property signed the agreement. 4

Furthermore, if Ms. Riccardo's assent to the agreement is necessary, the Defendants have

established that she consented to the terms of the agreement. In essence, Plaintiff argues that

even though its predecessors-in-title, Joseph Testa and Michael Testa, Jr., negotiated and signed

the agreement, acted in accordance with and abided by the terms of the agreement, the Court

4 Insofar as Defendants Coopersmith now own both the Coopersmith and Tourmaline properties, a right of way over the Testa property for the benefit of the Coopersmith property effectively would allow Defendants Coopersmith to access both properties.

6 should invalidate the agreement because Ms. Riccardo did not sign and thereby did not consent

to the terms of the agreement.

The absence of Ms. Riccardo's signature on the agreement is not the result of her

objection to any of the terms of the agreement. In fact, there is no evidence that Ms. Riccardo

expressed to any person that she had any concerns about the terms of the agreement.

The evidence in fact demonstrates that Ms. Riccardo consented to and, through her

daughter (Joan Purcell) who occupied the property and was a party to the Lawsuit, endorsed and

acted in accordance with the terms of the agreement. Ms. Riccardo was an owner of the property

in name only. Ms. Riccardo's daughter, Joan Purcell, transferred the property to Ms. Riccardo as

part of her effort to protect the asset should her husband incur any future liability .5 Ms. Purcell,

who occupied the Tourmaline property at all pertinent times, testified that she understood that

the parties ended the lawsuit with an agreement that permitted her to access the rear of the

property from Main Street over the Testa property. Ms. Purcell continued to operate a business

out of the property until she sold the property to Defendants Coopersmith in 2012. While

occupying the Tourmaline property, in accordance with the terms of the June 1978 agreement,

Ms . Purcell continuously accessed the rear of the property from Main Street over the Testa

property. Simply stated, Plaintiff's contention that the agreement is invalid because Ms.

Riccardo did not assent to the terms of the agreement is not supported by competent, reliable

evidence.

As mentioned above, Defendants also argued that they have an express easement by

virtue of the language in the deeds to the Coopersmith and Tourmaline properties. The express

5 Ms. Purcell testified that after her husband had been involved in a motor vehicle accident, she became concerned that if her husband were involved in a future accident in which a person was injured, the property could be at risk. She testified, therefore, that she transferred the property to her mother to avoid exposure for any claims that might arise as the result of her husband's future conduct.

7 easement language in the deeds does not grant to Defendants access to the rear of their properties

from Main Street over the Testa property. At most, the deeds contain easements that grant

access over the Testa property from the rear of the properties. While the Court cannot conclude

that the express language in the deeds is controlling, the inclusion of the easement language in

the deeds further convinces that Court that the parties reached a binding agreement by which

Defendants ' predecessors-in-title could continue to access their property. In the Court's view,

the deed language, as well as use consistent with the existence of the easement, provided

Defendants' predecessors-in-title with a compelling argument in support of their request for

injunctive relief in the Lawsuit. Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title faced the possibility that the

Lawsuit could end with an injunction prohibiting the expansion of the parking area. A

reasonable person in the position of Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title would recognize that risk,

and seek to resolve the Lawsuit in a way that permitted expansion of the parking area and

construction of the concrete wall. 6

Plaintiff also argues that because Ms. Riccardo did not sign the agreement, the statute of

frauds bars enforcement of the agreement. 33 M.R.S. § 51(4) (2012) provides in pertinent part

that "No action shall be maintained in any of the following cases ... [u]pon any contract for the

sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or of any interest in or concerning them ... unless the

promise, contract or agreement on which such action is brought, or some memorandum or note

thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith ... "

6 Plaintiff has argued U1at Defendan ts' predecesso rs-in-ti tle abandoned any express ease men t through no n-use. The " non-use" occu rred followin g execution of the June J 978 agreement. The consLruction of the concrete wall re ndered use of the easement im poss ible. Defenda nts, therefo re, did not abandon the easement. Instead, Lhe parties si mply agreed to relocate the easement, which is permissible. See Davis v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 660 (Me. 1980) (easement can be relocated by mutual con. enl of the owners of the dominant and serv ient estates).

8 Plaintiff's statute of frauds argument is essentially a reiteration of its contention that the

agreement is invalid because Ms. Riccardo did not sign the agreement. Contrary to Plaintiff's

argument, there is an agreement signed by "the party charge therewith ... " That is, the owners of

the property to be burdened by the right of way (i.e., Michael and Joseph Testa) signed the

agreement and agreed to bound by its terms. Plaintiff's statute of frauds issue fails for that

reason.

Furthermore, the purpose of the statute of frauds is not to invalidate meritorious claims.

Rather, "[t]he purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent actions based on false claims."

Brown Development Corp. v. Hemond, 2008 ME 146, ~ 11, 956 A. 2d 104, 108 (citing, Wells

Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., v. Spaulding, 2007 ME 116, ~ 20,930 A.2d 1025, 1030; Dehahn v.

Innes, 356 A.2d 711, 717 (Me. 1976)). The law recognizes that the statute of frauds should not

be a shield for a party to avoid a clear obligation to which the party plainly consented, and for

which the party received valuable consideration.7 In this case, despite the existence of a writing

signed by its predecessor-in-title, Plaintiff attempts to void Defendants' right of access, for

which right Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title received valuable consideration (i.e., the end of the

Lawsuit which permitted the expansion of the parking lot and the construction of the concrete

wall). As explained above, the lack of Ms. Riccardo's signature does not inv'alidate the

agreement. In short, the agreement satisfies the writing requirement of the statute of frauds.

("almost any writing is sufficient for statute of frauds purposes" Brown Development Corp.,

2008 ME 146, ~ 12).

7 In Chapman v. Bowman, 381 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Me . 1978), the Law Court, in adopting and applying the "broad formulation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel set forth in the .... Restatement (Second) of Contracts," observed, "since it is the purpose of the Statute of Frauds to prevent fraud, that Statute cannot be permitted to be itself an instrument of fraud."

9 Plaintiff has asserted that if the June 1978 agreement is valid, it only conveyed a personal

license to the Sanborns. In other words, Plaintiff contends that the interest did not run with the

land and, therefore, Defendants are not the beneficiaries of the right of way. "The construction

of language creating an easement is a question of law." Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, ! 16,

714 A.2d 134, 138 (citing, Fine Line, Inc. v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Me. 1996)). 8 The

legal question is whether in the Court's view, Defendants obtained an appurtenant easement over

the Testa property or whether their predecessors merely obtained an easement personal to the

grantees.9

"The traditional rules of construction for grants or reservations of easements require that

whenever possible an easement be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for

whose use the easement is created." Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, f 10, 714 A.2d 134, 138

(quoting, LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 (Me. 1979)). Not insignificantly, the expert

witnesses for both the Plaintiff and Defendants opined that if valid, the agreement conveyed an

appurtenant easement. The indicia of an appurtenant easement are clearly present in the

agreement. Perhaps most importantly, use of the right of way as expressed in the agreement is

not limited to a specific person or persons, which is an essential distinguishing feature between

8 Plaintiff argued that the agreement could be read to convey a license , and, therefore , the agreement was amb ig uous and Plaintiff should be able to present the testimony of the Testas' counsel as to his intent when d rafting the agreement. Given that the expert witnesses for the P laintiff and Defendants agreed lhat the ag reement conveyed an app urtenant easeme nt, and given the plai n language of the agreement, the Court determined , conb·ary to Plaintiff's argume nt, that lhe agreement was not amblguous. In addition , the Court was not convinced thal Lhe intent of the Testas' counsel in drafting the agreement was relevant. The Court, therefore , excluded the testimony of T es tas counsel. · 9 "The law recognizes two different types of easements or ri ghts of use over the property of another: caseme nts ap pur tenan t and easements in gross . Grante rs create ease ments appurtenant to be nefit a do minant estate and such easements run wi th the land . To be appurtena nt, the easement must be attach ed or related to a domi na nt es tate. In contras t, easements in gross are personal in terests in land or the ri gbt to use another's land. They are not appu rtenant to any estate in lan d ru1d do not belon g to any pe rson by virtue of hi s ownershi p of an estate in olher land. An easement in gros is gene.ral ly nol assignable and terminates upon the death of the grantee." Wentworth v. Sebra, 2003 ME 97, ~~ 12, 13,829 A .2d 520,524. '

10 an easement in gross (i.e., a personal easement) and an easement appurtenant. Wentworth v.

Sebra, 2003 ME 97, !! 12, 13,829 A.2d 520,524. In particular, the agreement provided that the

right of way could be used by the "[Sanborns' and Riccardo's'] immediate families, for delivery

purposes or persons occupying said land of Sanborn and Riccardo under a written lease." In the

Court's view, consistent with the only expert testimony presented at trial, this language plainly

creates an interest that benefitted the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property and was

not, as Plaintiff argues, an interest granted only to Philip Sanborn, Nathan Sanborn and Catherine

Riccardo.

Plaintiff also argues that in the event the Court determines that the parties entered into a

binding agreement in June 1978, the agreement is terminated because Defendants abused the

easement. In support of its contention, Plaintiff cites the term of the June 1978 agreement that

provides, "[a]ny abuse of the access given hereunder by Sanborn [Defendants' predecessor] or

Riccardo shall terminate and cancel this Agreement with respect to the party abusing said

access.]" Plaintiff asserts that Defendants abused the easement because either Defendants or

those performing work for Defendants parked in or used portions of the parking area that were

beyond the scope of Defendants' rights of access.

Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff presented photographs that depicted the

temporary use in May 2013 of portions of the parking area by contractors or others who were

arguably Defendants' agents. Even if Plaintiff were to prove that Defendants were responsible

for some or all of the use of the parking lot as depicted on the photographs, Plaintiff has not

established sufficient grounds to terminate the agreement. The agreement does not permit

termination in the event of isolated, limited, use that might extend beyond the use contemplated

11 by the agreement. The fact that the conduct occurred well before the tourist season began in

earnest further convinces the Court that the alleged conduct does not constitute abuse.

B. Prescriptive Easement/Implied Easement

Defendants alternatively maintain that they acquired an easement by prescription over the

Testa property. "[f]he party asserting an easement by prescription must prove continuous use

for at least 20 years under a claim of right adverse to the owner, with his knowledge and

acquiescence, or a use so open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and

acquiescence will be presumed." Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124,

1130 (Me. 1984) (citation omitted). Acquiescence implies "passive assent or submission to the

use, as distinguished from the granting of a license or permission given with the intention that

the licensee's use may continue only as long as the owner continues to consent to it." Pace v.

Carter, 398 A.2d 505,507 (Me. 1978).

As explained earlier, the Court believes that Defendants' predecessors-in-title had a right

of way, which they exercised until resolution of the Lawsuit, which they initiated after Plaintiff's

predecessor-in-title decided to expand the parking area and construct a concrete wall. Even if the

Court found that the June 1978 agreement did not bind the parties, Defendants have

demonstrated the existence of a prescriptive easement, by which Defendants would continue to

access their property. The evidence at trial overwhelmingly established that for more than 20

years before the Lawsuit, and for the years after the Lawsuit until the dispute that resulted in this

action, Defendants' predecessors-in-title, delivery companies, and individuals regularly,

consistently, and without objection from Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title, accessed the

Coopersmith and Tourmaline properties over the Testa property. The Court concludes,

therefore, that even if Defendants had not persuaded the Court that the June 1978 agreement was

12 valid and binding upon the parties, Defendants would have an easement by prescription over the

Testa property .10

C. Nuisance

In their counterclaim, Defendants assert claims of nuisance and unreasonable interference

with easement rights. To prevail on their common law nuisance claim, Defendants must

establish that "(1) the [counterclaim] defendant acted with the intent of interfering with the use

and enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use; (2) there was some interference with the

use and enjoyment of the land of the kind intended, although the amount and extent of that

interference may not have been anticipated or intended; (3) the interference that resulted and the

physical harm, if any, from that interference proved to be substantial ... The substantial

interference requirement is to satisfy the need for a showing that the land is reduced in value

because of the defendant's conduct; and (4) the interference that came about under such

circumstances was of such a nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable

interference with the use and enjoyment of the land." Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME

104, ~ 36,774 A.2d 366,377.

Here, while Defendants introduced evidence that on occasion one of Plaintiff's

employees parked in an area that interfered with Defendants' ability to access their property, the

Court is not convinced that Plaintiff's employee acted at the direction of the Plaintiff in an effort

to inte1fere with Defendants' access. In addition, Defendants have not proven by competent,

reliable evidence that they have suffered monetary damages, including a diminution in value of

10 Defendants also assert that they have access to their properties over the Testa property by virtue of an implied easement. While the Court believes that Defendants and their predecessors-in-title have had access over the Testa property for a sufficient period of time and under circumstances to establish an easement by prescription, the Court is not convinced that at the time that the common owner of the properties divided the properties, the use was such that "it is reasonable to infer that the parties to the conveyance intended that the use continue." McGeechan v. Sherwood, 2000 ME 188, 1) 57, 760 A.2d 1068, 1080. The Court, therefore, determines that Defendants do not have an implied easement over Plaintiff's property.

13 Defendants' property, as the result of Plaintiff's interference with Defendants' access.

Defendants, therefore, cannot prevail on their nuisance claim. For the same reasons, Defendants

cannot prevail on their claim of unreasonable interference with their easement rights.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court orders:

1. On the parties' request for declaratory judgment, the Court determines that the June

1978 agreement grants an appurtenant easement from Main Street over the Testa property to the

rear of the Cooopersmith property and the Tourmaline property, which easement is for the

benefit cif the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property. The Court also determines

that Defendants acquired an easement by prescription over the Testa property, which easement is

for the benefit of the Coopersmith property and the Tourmaline property. The Court further

determines that Defendants do not have an implied easement over the Testa property.

2. On Counts II and III of Defendants' Counterclaim, the Court enters judgment in favor

of Plaintiff and against Defendants.

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Judgment

into the docket by reference .

Date: 11/rJ;/1

Entemek~: rj~ Gooies sP.11t vif.'I Mall ·-·- l::lectmnically Y

14 STATE OF MAINE BUSINESS AND CONSUMER COURT CUMBERLAND, ss. Location: Portland Docket No. BCD-RE-11-03

v. DECISION AND JUDGMENT

THOMAS J. TESTA, JR., ANNA T. STRIEFEL, MLS PROPERTIES, LLC, and JOAN PURCELL,

PaI1ies-in-Interest

On September 9 - 11, 2013, this matter was tried to the Court on Plaintiff's Complaint

and Defendants' Counterclaim. The central issue generated by the complaint and counterclaim is

whether Defendants' property benefits from an easement ove1· Plaintiff's property in Bar Harbor,

Maine. 1 After consideration of the evidence, the Court makes the following findings:

Findings of Fact 2

1. Plaintiff owns certain real prope1ty located on Main Street in Bar Harbor, Maine,

which consists of several contiguous lots (the Testa property).

1 At the trial, Plaintiff withdrew Its claim under the Unfair Trade Practices Act. 2 The Court will set forth some of the basic fncts established at trial. The enumerated facts are not, however, an exhaustive list of nil of the Court's factual findings. As part of the Court's analysis in the Discussion section that follows, the Court makes additional findings. 2. Defendants also own certain property on Main Street in Bar Harbor, Maine, which

property they acquired by deed dated November l, 2005 (the Coopersmith property).

3. The Coopersmith property includes a retail business with space for parking

immediately behind the building.

4. The deed to the pl'iot' owners of the Coopersmith prope1ty included a right of way over

adjoining property, at least a portion of which is now the Testa property, to permit access to the

rear of the Coopersmith property. The Coopersmiths' deed also includes a grant of a right of

way.

S. The Coopersmiths' predecessors-in-title accessed the rear of their property over the

Testa property for business de1iveries and other purposes.

6. In the I 970's, Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title developed plans to expand the parking

area behind the Testa property and the Coopersmith property. The expansion included the

constrnction of a concrete wall that would prevent the owners of the Coopersmith property from

accessing the rear of their property in the manner they were accustomed.

7. Philip and Nathan Sanborn were the owners of the Coopersmith property at the time

of the proposed construction of the concrete wall. Catherine Riccardo was the record owner of

real property that abutted the Coopersmith property along Main Street. Ms. Riccardo's daughter,

Joan Purcell, operated a retail business out of the building on the property (the Purcell property).

8. Philip and Nathan Sanborn, together with Joan Purcell and Catherine Riccardo,

commenced a lawsuit on September 9, 1977, in Hancock County Superior Comt against Joseph

and Michele Testa, the then owners. of the Testa property, in an effort to prevent the construction

of the concrete wall (the lawsuit). They alleged that the construction would inte1fere with their

rights of way. On September 29, 1977, the court entered a temporary restraining order

2 prohibiting the defendants in the case (the Testas) from interfering with the access of the

plaintiffs to their property.

9. During the course of the lawsuit, the Sanborns and Riccardo negotiated an agreement

with Joseph and Michele Testa, Jr., by which agreement the Sanboms and Riccardo would be

able to access the rear of their properties over a portion of the Testa property.

10. Joseph Testa, Michele Testa, Jr., Philip Sanborn, and Nathan Sanborn signed the

agreement in June 1978. The court's record does not reflect any court activity after the

execution of the agreement by the Sanborns and the Testas. Catherine Riccardo did not sign the

agreement. Ms. Riccardo's failure to sign the agreement was not the result of any objection that

she had to the terms of the agreement. Given that the parties undertook no further action

regarding the lawsuit after June 1978, and given that after June 1978, Ms. Purcell, the occupant

of the parcel owned by Ms. Riccardo, accessed the rear of the Purcell property over the Testa

property, Ms. Riccardo assented to the terms of the June 1978 agreement.

11. The Hancock County Superior Court dismissed the lawsuit on October 15, 1980,

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 4I(b) for failure to prosecute the lawsuit.

12. After the execution of the agreement in 1978, the Sanborns, their successors-in-title,

and Ms. Purcell accessed the rear of their property over the Testa property in a manner consistent

with the pal'ties' agreement.

13. The deeds in the chain of title to the Coopersmith property and the Purcell property

include language that provides for a right of way over a portion of the parking area currently

owned by Plaintiff.

14. In or about 2010, the Town of Bar Harbor passed an ordinance that eliminated the

need for businesses to have a minimum amount of pal'ldng space available for customers. This

3 change made the parking area behind the Coopersmith property and the Purcell prope1ty

15. From time to time after their purchase of the Coopersmith property, Defendants,

ability to access their property from the rear of the building has been hindered.

In this action, both parties request that the Court enter a declarato1·y judgment regarding

Defendants' assertion of an easement over PJaintiff's property for the benefit of the Coopersmith

property. Defendants also seek to recover damages for Plaintiffs alleged nuisance and

unreasonable inte1ference with Plaintiff's easement rights. The Court will first address the

parties' request for declaratory judgment.

At trial, both parties presented evidence regarding the right of way or easement language

in the chain of title to the Coopel'smith property and the Purcell property. In addition, the parties

submitted evidence as to the historical use of the parking area behind the Coopersmith and

Purcell properties. Through the historical evidence, Defendants attempt to establish the

existence of a prescriptive easement over the Testa property. As explained below, after

consideration of the evidence, the Comt concludes that Defendants have an appurtenant

easement over the Testa property from Main Street to the rear of the Coopersmith property as the

result of the June 1978 agreement by which the parties' predecessors in title resolved the

lawsuit.3

The lawsuit was commenced as the result of the efforts of Plaintiff's predecessors-in-title

to construct a wall that would prevent Defendants' predecessors-in-title from accessing their

property over the Testa property. In the lawsuit, Defendants, Ms. Riccardo and Ms. Purcell

3 Because tho Court concludes thnt the parties' ngreed to an express easement in June 1978, the Court does not address Defendants' contention that they have an express easement by deed, a prescriptive easement, or a quasi­ easement.

4 maintained that they had ft legal right to cross the Testa property to access Defendants' prope11y .

The only logical conclusion is that the parties negotiated a resolution of the lawsuit, which

agreement would allow Plaintiff's predecessor-in-title to complete construction of the parking

lot, including the wall, and allow Defendants' predecessor-in-title to continue to have access to

the rear of their property. Consistent with this conclusion, the Court record contains no reference

to any substantive action in the case after the Testas and Sanborns signed the agreement in June

1978. Given that the pai1ies' reached a resolution of the access issues to resolve the lawsuit, the

parties' failure to object to the dismissal of the action pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 41(b) is not

surprising.

Despite the fact that Plaintiffs' predecessors-in-title signed the June 1978 agreement that

ended the la)vsuit, Plaintiffs contend that the agreement is not valid because Catherine Riccardo

did not sign the agreement. First, Ms. Riccardo's signature was not necessary to establish an

enforceable agreement between the Testas and the Sauboms. In other words, the Testas and the

Sanborns are the only necessary parties to establish an easement over the Testa property fol' the

benefit of the Coopersmith property, Thus, all parties necessary to establish an easement over

the Testa property for the benefit of the Coopersmith property signed the agreement.

Fmthermore, if Ms. Riccardo's assent to the agreement" was necessary, the Defendants

have established that she consented to the terms of the agreement. In essence, Plaintiff argues

that even though its pl'edecessors-in-title, Joseph Testa and Michele Testa, Jr., negotiated and

signed the agreement, acted in accordance with and abided by the terms of the agreement, the

Comt should invalidate the agreement because Ms. Riccardo did not sign and thereby did not

consent to the terms of the agreement.

5 The absence of Ms. Riccardo's signature on the agreement is not the result of her

objection to any of the terms of the agreement. Indeed, there is no evidence that Ms. Riccardo

expressed to any person that she had any concerns about the terms of the agreement.

The evidence ln fact demonstrates that Ms. Riccardo . consented to and, through her

daughter who occupied the property, endorsed and acted in accordance with the terms of the

agreement. Ms. Riccardo was an owner of the property in name only. Ms. Riccardo's daughter,

Joan Purcell, transferred the property to Ms. Riccardo as part of her effort to protect the asset

should her husband incur any future liability.4 Ms. Purcell, who occupied the Purcell property at

all pertinent times, testified that she understood that the parties ended the lawsuit with an

agreement that permitted her to access the rear of the property from Main Street over the Testa

property. Ms. Purcell continued to operate a business out of the property until she sold the

prope1ty to Defendants in 2012. While occupying the Purcell property, in accordance with the

terms of the June 1978 agreement, Ms. Purcell continuously accessed the rear of the property

from Main Street over the Testa property. Simply stated, Plaintiff's contention that the

agreement is invalid because Ms. Riccardo did not assent to the terms of the agreement is not

supported by competent, reliable evidence.

In this case, Plaintiff has asserted that if the June 1978 agreement is valid, it only

conveyed a personal license to the Sanborns. That is, Plaintiff contends that the interest did not

run with the land and, therefore, Defendants are not the beneficiaries of the right of way. "The

construction of language creating an easement is a question of law." Anchors v. Manter, 1998

ME i52, 9 16, 714 A.2d 134, 138 (citing, Fine Lhie, Inc. v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Me.

4 Ms. Purcell testified that after her husband had been Involved In a motor vehicle accident, she became concerned

that if her lmsband were lm•olved in a future accident In which a person was Injured; the property could be at risk. She testified, therefore, that she transferred the property to her mother to avoid exposure for any claims that might arise ns the result of her husband's future conduct.

6 1996)). 5 The legal question is whether in the Court's view, Defendants obtained an appurtenant

easement over the Testa property or whether their predecessors merely obtained an easement

personal to the grantees.6

"The traditional rules of construction for grants or reservations of easements require that

whenever possible an easement be fairly construed to be appurtenant to the land of the person for

whose use the easement is created." Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, j 10, 714 A.2d 134, 138

(quoting, LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 (Me. 1979)). Not insignificantly, the expert

witnesses for both the Plaintiff and Defendants opined that if valid, the agreement conveyed an

appurtenant easement. The indicia of an appurtenant easement are clearly present in the

agreement. Perhaps most importantly, use of the right of way as expressed in the agreement is

not limited to a specific person or persons, which is an essential distinguishing feature between a

easement in gross (i.e., a persona.I easement) and an easement appurtenant. Wentworth v. Sebra,

2003 ME 97, fj 12, 13,829 A.2d 520,524. In particular, the agreement provided that the right

of way could be used by the 0 [Sanborns' and Riccardo's'] immediate families, for delivery

purposes or persons occupying said land of Sanborn and Riccardo under a written lease." In the

Court's view, consistent with the only expel't testimony presented at tl'ial, this language plainly

5 Plaintiff argued that the agreement could be read to convey a license, and, therefore, the agreement was ambiguous and PJaintlff should be nbJe to present the testimony of the Testes' counsel as to his Intent when drafting the agreement. Given that the eitpert witnesses for the Plaintiff and Defendants agreed that the agreement conveyed an appurtenant casement, and given the plain language of the agreement, the Court determined, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, thnt the agreement was not ambiguous. In addition, the Court was not convinced that the intent of the Testas' counsel in drafting the agreement was relevant. The Court, therefore, excluded the testimony of Testas' counsel. 6 "The law recognizes lwo different types of easements or rights of use over the property of another: easements appurtenant and easements In gross. Grantors create casements appurtenant to bencfil n dominant estate and such easements run with the land. To be appurtenant, the casement mus! be attached or related to a dominant estate. In contrast, casements In gross arc pcrsonnl lnteresls In land or the right to use another's land. They are not appurtennnt lo any estate In land and do not belong to any person by virtue of his ownership of an estate In other land. An easement In gross Is generally not assignable and terminates upon the death of the grantee." \Ve11tworrh v. Sebra, 2003 ME 97, 9! 12, 13,829 A.2d 520,524.

7 creates an interest that benefitted the Coopersmith property and the Purcell property and was not,

as Plaintiff argues, an interest granted only to Philip Sanborn, Nathan Sanborn and Catherine

Plaintiff nlso argues that in the event the Court dete1mines that the parties entered into a

binding agreement in June 1978, the agreement is terminated because Defendants abused the

easement. In support of its contention, Plaintiff cites the term of the June 1978 agreement that

provides, "[a]ny abuse of the access given hereunder by Sanborn [Defendants' predecessor] or

Riccardo shall terminate and cancel this Agreement with respect to the party abusing said

access.l" Plaintiff asserts that Defendants abused the easement because either Defendants or

those performing work for Defendants parked in or used portions of the parking area that were

Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff presented photographs that depicted the

tempora1·y use in May 2013 of portions of the parking area by contractors or others who were

arguably Defendants' agents. Even if Plaintiff were to prove that Defendants were responsible

for some or all of the use of the parking lot as depicted on the photographs, Plaintiff has not

established sufficient grounds to terminate the agreement. The agreement does not permit

termination in the event of isolated, limited, use that might extend beyond the use contemplated

by the agreement. The fact that the conduct occurred well before the tourist season began in

earnest further convinces the Court that the alleged conduct does not constitute abuse.

In their counterclaim, Defendants assert claims of nuisance and unreasonable inte1ference

with easement rights. To prevail on their common law nuisance claim, Defendants must

establish that "(I) the [counterclaim] defendant acted with the intent of inte1fering with the use

and enjoyment of the land by those entitled to that use; (2) there was some inte1ference with the

8 use and enjoyment of the land of the kind intended, although the nmount and extent of that

inte1ference may not have been anticipated or intended; (3) the interference that resulted and the

physical harm, if any, from that inte1ference proved to be substantial ... The substantial

inte1ference requirement is to satisfy the need for a showing that the land is reduced in value

because of the defendant's conduct; and (4) the interference that came about under such

circumstances was of such a nature, duration m· amount as to constitute unreasonable

interference with the use and enjoyment of the land." Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME

l 04, j 36, 774 A .2d 366,377.

Here 1 while Defendants introduced evide1.1ce that on occasion one of Plaintiffs

employees parked in an area that inte1fered with Defendants' ability to access their property, the

Court is not convinced that Plaintiff's employee acted at the direction of the Plailitiff in an effort

to interfere with Defendants' access. Jn addition, Defendants have not proven by competent, reliable evidence that they have suffered monetary damages, including a diminution in value of

Defendants' property, as the result of Plaintiff's inte1ference with Defendants' access.

Defendants, therefore, cannot prevail on their nuisance claim. For the same reasons, Defendnnts

cannot prevail on their claim of umeasonable interference with thei.1· easement rights.

1. On the parties' request for declaratory judgment, the Couit determines that the June

1978 agreement grants an appurtenant easement from Main Street over the Testa property to the

rear of the Cooopersmith property and the Purcell property, which easement is for the benefit of

the Coopersmith property and the Purcell property.

9 2. On Counts II and III of Defendants' Counterclaim, the Court enters judgment in favor

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 79(a), the Clerk shall incorporate this Decision and Judgment

--f.~- ~­ into the docket by reference.

Date: 10/t/t3 Ju tice, Maine Business & Consumer Court

10 ~nt~recJ on the Docket: /0 ·/ ·I 3 vop,es sent via Mall_ l:lectroni cally,C