Terry White a/k/a Terry D. White a/k/a Terry Dewayne White v. State of Mississippi

• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi
• Decided: May 14, 2024
• Docket: 2023-CP-00200-COA
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2023-CP-00200-COA

TERRY WHITE A/K/A TERRY D. WHITE A/K/A APPELLANT TERRY DEWAYNE WHITE

v.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/20/2023 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBRA W. BLACKWELL COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: AMITE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: TERRY WHITE (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED - 05/14/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ.

McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. A man pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent

to distribute. Just a few months later, the assistant district attorney who prosecuted him was

elected circuit court judge.

¶2. The defendant later allegedly violated his post-release conditions and was arrested.

He was brought before the judge who had previously prosecuted him. The trial court

revoked his release, and the defendant was incarcerated. He next sought post-conviction

relief. The same trial court judge reviewed his petition. The judge concluded that she should

not have presided over the revocation but that it was harmless. ¶3. Without finding evidence of bias, we nonetheless conclude the judge was disqualified

since she had previously served as prosecutor in the underlying action. Accordingly, this

error requires reversal, and we render relief in favor of the petitioner. We remand for a new

revocation hearing by a judge who is not disqualified.

BACKGROUND

¶4. On August 23, 2018, Terry White was indicted in Amite County. A grand jury

charged him with possession of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of methamphetamine

with intent to sell, and possession of marijuana with intent to sell. The indictment was signed

by then-Assistant District Attorney Debra W. Blackwell. On October 2, 2018, ADA

Blackwell requested the circuit court clerk issue six subpoenas for White’s forthcoming trial,

which was set for October 23.

¶5. A few weeks later, White filed a petition to plead guilty to the charges. On October

22, he entered a plea of guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the

intent to sell. ADA Blackwell represented the State in the guilty plea hearing. White was

sentenced to serve 20 years in custody for one conviction and 30 years for the other. The

sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. He was given credit for the time he had

already served; crucially, the balance of his sentences was suspended. White was further

required to serve five years of post-release supervision.

¶6. On November 6, just fifteen days after White’s guilty plea, ADA Blackwell was

elected circuit court judge for District 6, which includes Amite, Adams, Wilkinson, and

Franklin Counties.

2 ¶7. In December 2020, White was arrested after allegedly violating the conditions of his

post-release supervision by failing to report his change in residence. A home visit at his new

residence in neighboring Wilkinson County was conducted. According to the arrest warrant,

“a plastic baggie containing powder cocaine as well as an AR-15 rifle and .40 caliber

handgun were found in the bedroom” of White. Although not present in the record before

us, it appears these actions resulted in a new multi-count criminal indictment. Additionally,

in February 2021, White “was arrested . . . in Amite County for DUI and Speeding.” It

appears he pled guilty to DUI in the Amite County Justice Court.

¶8. The State sought to revoke White’s PRS on the basis of these charges. Although there

are two circuit judges in District 6, the warrant issued for White’s arrest was signed by Judge

Blackwell on March 4, 2021, and subsequently White appeared in a hearing before Judge

Blackwell on March 31, 2021. At stake was whether his PRS would be revoked. To be

clear, he was appearing before the same person now holding the position of circuit judge who

had previously caused him to be indicted for the underlying charges which resulted in him

being placed on PRS.

¶9. Judge Blackwell signed an order revoking White’s suspended sentences on April 1,

2021, finding that White should “serve the remaining balances [of his sentences] in the

custody of [the] Mississippi Department of Corrections.” The order was entered on April 13,

2021. White is currently serving the balance of the previously suspended sentences.

¶10. After the revocation, White contested it through a petition for post-conviction relief.

Through counsel, he argued that Judge Blackwell should have recused since she had served

3 as the prosecutor in his underlying conviction. White pointed out that the judge “should have

disqualified herself from presiding over Defendant’s revocation hearing,” citing five cases

from the Mississippi Supreme Court and one from this Court.

¶11. This civil matter was also presided over by Judge Blackwell. In an order denying

relief, the trial court held that White waived the request for her to recuse:

The facts of the record are clear in that the undersigned Judge’s name plainly appeared on the Indictment, and the plea documents. White cannot reasonably claim that he had no notice of the undersigned Judge’s previous involvement while working as an assistant district attorney. White failed to request or address recusal at the revocation hearing held on March 31, 2021, thus White waived any objection regarding the recusal of the undersigned Judge.

¶12. Beyond this waiver, the trial court held that in light of clear precedent, it was “of the

opinion that it was error for the Court to have failed to recuse.” But in the view of the trial

court this did not require reversal, as the court reasoned “that said error is harmless” since

White was so clearly in violation of the terms of his post-release supervision. The trial court

concluded, “There exists no evidence that White received anything other than a

fundamentally fair hearing and fu[r]ther there are no set of facts that White can set forth that

would change the fact that White violated the conditions of his post-release supervision.”

¶13. In the end, the trial court ruled, “It is the opinion of this Court that while the Court

committed error in its failure to recuse, said error is harmless and not a reversible error.”

White appealed and the case was assigned to us for review.

DISCUSSION

¶14. Now acting pro se, White raises three issues on appeal. We find the first issue

dispositive; it asks whether the trial judge should have recused from reviewing his PCR

4 petition since she had previously served as a prosecutor in his underlying case. He claims

that the refusal to recuse was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his due process rights

afforded to him by the Mississippi Constitution. The State, bound as it is by decades of

precedent, has acknowledged that this is error and that White should be granted a new

revocation hearing with a different judge.

¶15. And the law is very clear on this point. Our Code of Judicial Conduct mandates an

independent and impartial judiciary. See Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 1, 3(E)(1). “In

fact, the Code of Judicial Conduct uses the word ‘impartial’ twenty-six times.” Davis v.

State, 347 So. 3d 1205, 1214 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). Our system of justice must strive

without fail to never “erode[] the neutrality and independence mandated for the judicial

branch.” Id. at 1216 (¶24).

¶16. Accordingly, there are times when a judge simply must not preside over a case. “A

judge shall hear and decide all assigned matters within the judge’s jurisdiction, except those

in which disqualification is required.” Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(B)(1). One such

instance is where the judge was a lawyer in the same case. “Disqualification is required

where a judge formerly served as a lawyer in the same case except by agreement of the

parties.” Miss. Code Ann. § 9-1-11 (Rev. 2019); Miss. Code Jud. Conduct Canon 3(E)(1)(b).

“Additionally, due process demands disqualification when a judge previously actively served

in an accusatory role in the case as a prosecutor.” Overstreet v. State, 17 So. 3d 621, 623

(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (emphasis added) (citing Jenkins v. State, 570 So. 2d 1191, 1193

(Miss. 1990)).

5 ¶17. We have previously addressed a very similar scenario as the one at hand, where a trial

judge reviewed a PCR petition despite previously “serv[ing] as one of the assistant district

attorneys of record appearing on behalf of the State.” Id. at (¶2). After pleading guilty, the

defendant was subsequently sentenced to life in prison without eligibility for parole. Id. He

later filed two PCR motions, both of which were denied. Id. at (¶3). Yet the second PCR

was dismissed “as a successive writ by the judge that had served as the prosecutor in his

case.” Id.

¶18. We made very clear that the law of our State required recusal, for “‘[w]here one

actively engages in any way in the prosecution and conviction of one accused of a crime, he

is disqualified from sitting as judge in any matter which involves that conviction.’” Id. at

(¶9) (quoting Banana v. State, 638 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Miss. 1994)). “Not only does this

require recusal from the original trial, this disqualification requires recusal from subsequent

post-conviction relief matters.” Id. (emphasis added).

¶19. Therefore we held the trial judge had “abused his discretion when he failed to recuse

himself and ruled on [the] post-conviction relief motion.” Id. at (¶11). The problem was

stark: “In effect, he served as prosecutor and judge in the same cause.” Id. This could never

be allowed, as “[t]he functions of a zealous advocate and a neutral adjudicator inherently

contradict one another.” Id. While we found no ill intent to violate this rule, and we

declined to make a finding the trial court acted as anything other than “a neutral adjudicator,”

we nonetheless reversed. Id. “The law, however, does not require that the judge actually be

biased in order to recuse . . . . It simply requires that the functions of the prosecutor and the

6 judge be performed by different parties.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶20. This case requires the same result. Just as in Overstreet, in the present case the “judge

previously actively served in an accusatory role in the case as a prosecutor;” therefore, “due

process demands disqualification.” Id. at (¶7). Then-ADA Blackwell signed Terry White’s

indictment, caused subpoenas to be issued for the upcoming trial on the merits, and

represented the State throughout his prosecution, which then resulted in a guilty plea and the

defendant’s subsequent conviction. Having been a former prosecutor in the case, when

White appeared on charges that he had violated his post-release conditions, she was

automatically disqualified from reviewing the State’s motion for revocation. Judge

Blackwell’s signature appears on one of the first documents in the criminal file—signing the

indictment as an ADA—and then on the last of the documents—signing the order revoking

post-release supervision as the trial judge. As in Overstreet, there is no indication the trial

court acted as anything other than a neutral arbitrator; nonetheless, these actions are

prohibited by judicial Canon and precedent and require reversal.

¶21. Nor does the fact that this appeal comes to us in a slightly different procedural posture

than Overstreet compel a different result; indeed, precedent has addressed this precise point

before. In 1939, Vardaman Smith pled guilty for “unlawful possession of intoxicating

liquor,” with both fines and sentences suspended. Smith v. State, 212 Miss. 497, 499, 54 So.

2d 739, 739 (1951). The district attorney at the time was Homer Currie; twelve years later,

he was the circuit judge. Id. The new district attorney sought to have Smith’s suspended

sentences revoked, alleging he was selling liquor and running “two ‘joints’ in which such

7 activities took place and at which various crimes of violence had occurred recently.” Id. The

revocation was held before then-Judge Currie, who revoked the suspended sentences. Id.

¶22. The Mississippi Supreme Court first noted, as we did in Overstreet, that the trial

court’s “fairness and impartiality are unquestioned[.]” Id. at 741. That’s not the point;

rather, the point was that “the presiding judge was disqualified from presiding on the trial of

the petition to revoke the suspended sentences.” Id. The circuit judge had presented the

charge to the grand jury and was there at the plea. Id. “Under the circumstances,” the Court

declared, “we think that the presiding judge in the present proceedings to revoke the

suspended sentences was ‘of counsel’ for the State,” rendering him disqualified. Id.

¶23. Relying on the statutes in effect at the time, the Supreme Court was clear over seventy

years ago in Smith: “One who has been actively engaged in any way in the prosecution and

conviction of one accused of crime is disqualified . . . from sitting as judge in a matter

involving that conviction.” Id. (emphasis added). The Court magnified this same point

again nearly thirty years ago: “Where one actively engages in any way in the prosecution and

conviction of one accused of a crime, he is disqualified from sitting as a judge in any matter

which involves that conviction.” Banana, 638 So. 2d at 1330-31 (emphasis added) (finding

that “[b]ecause [the reviewing trial court judge] was the district attorney at the time that the

criminal information against Banana was filed, he was disqualified from ruling on the post

conviction motion, as was . . . the other circuit judge in the district, who was the assistant

district attorney during Banana’s prosecution”). And fifteen years ago we held, “Not only

does this require recusal from the original trial, this disqualification requires recusal from

8 subsequent post-conviction relief matters.” Overstreet, 17 So. 3d at 624 (¶9).

¶24. Then-ADA Blackwell signed the indictment triggering the prosecution of Terry

White. There is no dispute that she actively participated in his prosecution. Under the

standards set by our Supreme Court and Canons of Judicial Conduct, we must find

disqualification of a judge if the person had participated “in any way in the prosecution and

conviction.” Under the uncontested facts of this case, that situation is present here. Judge

Blackwell was disqualified from presiding over the revocation of White’s suspended

sentence because she had previously actively participated in the prosecution of the underlying

crime. It could not be harmless error to preside over this matter, as the trial judge was

disqualified as a matter of law. This error was compounded when the same circuit judge then

reviewed the petition for post-conviction relief which contended it was error to preside over

the revocation. There was not one error here, but two. As a result, we reverse the denial of

the motion for post-conviction relief, and render judgment in White’s favor that he is entitled

to a new revocation hearing with a different circuit judge.

¶25. This rule must remain utterly clear. There is a reason it must—for we are oathbound

to safeguard the integrity of the Judiciary and, in turn, our system of laws in Mississippi.

“Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary

will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.” Miss. Code of Jud. Conduct, Preamble.

“The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law.” Id.

Mississippians are entitled to “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary,” and that guarantee

“is indispensable to justice in our society.” Miss. Code of Jud. Conduct Canon 1.

9 CONCLUSION

¶26. For the reasons set out above, we find the trial court judge was disqualified from

White’s revocation hearing in the criminal matter as well as this petition for post-conviction

relief. We reverse the circuit court’s order. We render White’s PCR request and remand for

a new revocation hearing presided over by a different circuit judge who is not disqualified.

¶27. REVERSED, RENDERED, AND REMANDED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. SMITH, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.