Terry Wayne Souther v. the State of Texas
This text of Terry Wayne Souther v. the State of Texas (Terry Wayne Souther v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 26, 2022
S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-21-00809-CR
TERRY WAYNE SOUTHER, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 397th Judicial District Court Grayson County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 071771
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Carlyle, and Goldstein Opinion by Justice Goldstein Terry Wayne Souther appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to
suppress. In a single issue, Souther argues the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to suppress in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against warrantless searches and seizures. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In February 2020, appellant was indicted on charges of possession of
methamphetamine in an amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams and
possession of heroin in an amount of 4 grams or more but less than 200 grams. In
October 2020, Souther filed a pretrial motion to suppress all evidence obtained from
a warrantless search of his vehicle. The motion to suppress evidentiary hearing was held in November 2020.
Texas Highway Patrol trooper Greg Whitmire testified that, on November 21, 2019,
he was advised that Terry Souther had a felony arrest warrant, a parole warrant for
a narcotics charge, by a detective with the Sherman Police Department, along with
a description of Souther’s vehicle. Whitmire got behind Souther’s vehicle and
observed Souther cross over the center line while making a left turn. Whitmire
initiated a traffic stop and approached the vehicle on the passenger’s side. Souther
was alone in the vehicle. Whitmire asked for Souther’s driver’s license, but Souther
said he had no identification with him. Whitmire had Souther get out of the vehicle,
and he asked Souther his name. Souther was “shaking like a leaf.” Souther
identified himself as “Jeffrey Souther,” and Whitmire was able to pull up an
identification photograph under that name. However, the photograph did not match.
Whitmire went back to Souther, told him “Jeffrey Souther” was not his name,
and asked again for Souther’s name. This time, Souther identified himself as “Benny
Souther.” At that point, Whitmire placed Souther under arrest for failure to identify.
Whitmire ran the name “Benny Souther” and determined it was also not a match.
Whitmire asked again for Souther’s name, and Souther identified himself as “Terry
Souther,” said he had a parole warrant, and advised Whitmire that he was working
with a Grayson County narcotics agent. Whitmire testified that, based upon his
experience and training, when somebody is shaking, lying about who they are, and
–2– “working with someone that’s involved in drugs,” he believes there might be drugs
in the vehicle.
Once Whitmire identified Souther as “Terry Souther,” he confirmed that
Souther had a parole warrant. Whitmire placed Souther in the front passenger seat
of his patrol unit and informed him that he was going to do an inventory search of
Souther’s vehicle. Whitmire testified it is department policy to conduct an inventory
search of a vehicle that he was going to have towed in order to document the
vehicle’s contents. Inside Souther’s car, Whitmire found black tar heroin in the
driver’s seat and methamphetamine, heroin, and Xanax pills in a sock under a cup
holder. Whitmire found a total of 13.6 grams of heroin and 218.8 grams of
methamphetamine in Souther’s vehicle.
Souther’s counsel confirmed with Whitmire that, at about nineteen minutes
into a recording of the stop, Souther “specifically asked if the girlfriend at the
laundromat can come take possession of the vehicle.” Whitmire testified he refused
Souther’s request because, for officer safety, “we don’t want to bring anybody else
into that scene right there.” Whitmire also testified that, even if the girlfriend had
come to the scene, he still would have had to inventory the vehicle, and he did not
believe the girlfriend would have been the registered owner of the vehicle because
Souther did not “have a registration in his name at that point.” The trial court denied
Souther’s motion to suppress. Following a jury trial, a jury convicted Souther of
–3– possession of methamphetamine and heroin as charged in the indictment, and this
appeal followed.
In his sole issue, Souther argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion to suppress.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated
standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
We give almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact that are
supported by the record and its application of the law to facts if the resolution of
those questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. We review
de novo the trial court's application of the law to the facts when the issue does not
turn on credibility and demeanor. Id. The trial court is the exclusive trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony
at the suppression hearing. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000). In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808,
818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A warrantless search
of property is presumptively unreasonable subject to a few specifically defined and
well-established exceptions. McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). An inventory search of an automobile pursuant to a lawful impoundment is
–4– such an exception and does not implicate the policies underlying the warrant
requirement. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987); Jackson v. State,
468 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
Before an inventory search is lawful, there must be a lawful impoundment.
Jackson, 468 S.W.3d at 194. Among other situations, an automobile may be
impounded if the driver is removed from the automobile and placed under custodial
arrest and no other alternatives are available to ensure the protection of the vehicle.
Id. In Jackson, a trooper stopped appellant and arrested him for outstanding warrants
and conducted an inventory search of appellant’s vehicle even though the trooper
had contacted appellant’s mother and given her fifteen minutes to arrive at the scene
to pick up the vehicle. Id. at 191–97. The court reasoned that “[I]t was not
reasonable to expect the Trooper to wait 15 minutes for the Defendant's mother to
arrive, then take an additional 15–30 minutes to inventory the vehicle once he
realized that she was not coming.” Id. at 196.
Here, Whitmire stopped Souther for a traffic violation. After Souther failed
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