Terry Van Tolar and Sarah Tolar v. Zachary Rodney, in his individual capacity

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedMay 8, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-00026
StatusUnknown

This text of Terry Van Tolar and Sarah Tolar v. Zachary Rodney, in his individual capacity (Terry Van Tolar and Sarah Tolar v. Zachary Rodney, in his individual capacity) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Terry Van Tolar and Sarah Tolar v. Zachary Rodney, in his individual capacity, (S.D. Miss. 2026).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI EASTERN DIVISION

TERRY VAN TOLAR AND SARAH TOLAR PLAINTIFFS

v. CAUSE NO. 2:25-cv-26-LG-MTP

ZACHARY RODNEY, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY DEFENDANT

ORDER

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Stay Proceedings [117]. Having considered the parties’ submissions, the record, and applicable law, the Court finds that the Motion [117] should be GRANTED. BACKGROUND On February 11, 2024, Plaintiff Terry Van Tolar (“Tolar”) was arrested by Defendant Zachary Rodney and other officers following a traffic stop which Plaintiff Sarah Tolar witnessed. Tolar was then charged with a felony, simple assault on a law enforcement officer, and three misdemeanors: “no tag,” resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. The felony charge was presented to a grand jury which resulted in a “no true bill” on November 2, 2025. On March 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed this action. In their Complaint [1], Plaintiffs assert various state law claims and federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including an unlawful arrest claim. Plaintiffs later filed a Supplemental Complaint [82] in which they added a malicious prosecution claim. On April 1, 2026, Defendant moved to stay this action pending resolution of the misdemeanor charges against Tolar. See Motion [117]. The misdemeanor charges have been pending since the time of Tolar’s arrest, but the municipal judge has reset the hearing on these charges multiple times, awaiting the disposition of Tolar’s felony charge. See [129] at 3. As previously mentioned, a grand jury did not indict Tolar on the felony charge, and the misdemeanor charges are now set for a May 13, 2026 hearing. See [117-1]. Defendant seeks a stay on the grounds that some claims may eventually be Heck-barred. As the parties cannot know if Heck applies until the misdemeanor charges are adjudicated and

there is an upcoming motions deadline, Defendant argues that staying the case ensures the parties have an adequate opportunity to brief the issue if convictions occur. Plaintiffs oppose the Motion [117] arguing that “a pending misdemeanor case does not warrant the Court’s discretionary use of a stay especially when practically all discovery has been completed.” [128] at 4. Plaintiffs further argue that Heck “should not be extended to apply to a case where there is no conviction, and where any upcoming conviction would not negate any element of the claims made in the civil case.” Id. at 6. Defendant filed a response, and the matter is now ripe for review. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that this case should be stayed in accordance with Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Fifth Circuit has explained the holding of Heck as follows: When a plaintiff alleges tort claims against his arresting officers, the district court must first consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. If so, the claim is barred unless the plaintiff demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.2007). Given that Tolar’s misdemeanor charges remain pending, Heck does not yet apply. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393-94 (2007). However, where a plaintiff files a civil claim “related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial[], it is within the power of the district court, and in accord with common practice to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-94. “If the plaintiff is ultimately convicted, and if the stayed civil suit would impugn that conviction, Heck will require dismissal; otherwise, the civil action will proceed, absent some other bar to suit.” Id. at 394.

“However, if the district court decides ‘that the plaintiff's [section 1983] action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.’” Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487).

Here, a ruling in favor of Plaintiffs on their unlawful arrest claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of a criminal conviction of resisting arrest. “[T]he Heck Court observed that § 1983 unlawful-arrest claims cannot lie in cases in which ‘a state defendant is convicted of and sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest … [because] he would have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been convicted.’” Daigre v. City of Waveland, Miss., 549 F. App’x 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n.6). Indeed, under Mississippi Code § 97-9-73, “[r]esisting arrest occurs when a person obstructs or resists his lawful arrest, by force, violence, threats, or in any other manner.” Chambers v. State, 973 So.2d 266, 269 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). Because a lawful arrest is an essential element of the offense, a

conviction would Heck-bar any claim that the arrest was unlawful. Furthermore, “a claim is barred by Heck if the plaintiff’s factual allegations supporting the claim are necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the conviction.” Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2020). In their Supplemental Complaint [82], Plaintiffs claim that “neither Plaintiff did anything which would warrant any reasonably competent officer to take any police action, and there was no probable cause either Plaintiff had committed any crime.” [82] at 3. The Supplemental Complaint further provides that “Plaintiff Terry Van Tolar was making no resistance [whatsoever], and his hands were being held down beneath his body” at the time of the arrest. Id. at 4. Should Tolar be convicted of resisting arrest, these factual allegations would appear to be inconsistent with that conviction. Thus, it is appropriate and within this

Court’s discretion to stay this claim pending resolution of the Columbia Municipal Court charges. Moreover, even if some of the Plaintiffs’ claims may not be subject to a Heck bar should Tolar be convicted on the misdemeanor charges, the Court finds that a temporary stay of the case is appropriate. All claims arise from the same facts as the resisting arrest claim - the February 11, 2024 incident and subsequent prosecution. Because these civil claims are not “temporally and

conceptually distinct” from the criminal charges, proceeding on a piecemeal basis would be impractical, and “the civil claims must be stayed.” McCollom v. City of Kemp, Tex., 2014 WL 6085289, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2014); Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746. Accordingly, the Court will stay the entirety of the proceedings pending the resolution of the criminal matter or until further order of the Court. Plaintiffs raise concerns regarding whether the municipal court matter will actually proceed on May 13, 2026. However, Defendant has submitted a letter from the Columbia

Municipal Court Clerk confirming the case is currently set for that date. See [117-1].

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Related

Mackey v. Dickson
47 F.3d 744 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi
488 F.3d 649 (Fifth Circuit, 2007)
Heck v. Humphrey
512 U.S. 477 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Chambers v. State
973 So. 2d 266 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 2007)
Dawn Daigre v. City of Waveland, Mississippi, et a
549 F. App'x 283 (Fifth Circuit, 2013)
Layne Aucoin v. Andrew Cupil
958 F.3d 379 (Fifth Circuit, 2020)

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Terry Van Tolar and Sarah Tolar v. Zachary Rodney, in his individual capacity, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terry-van-tolar-and-sarah-tolar-v-zachary-rodney-in-his-individual-mssd-2026.