Terry v. Life Ins. Co.

U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Kansas

Terry v. Life Ins. Co.

23 F. Cas. 856, 1 Dill. 403, 5 West. Jur. 496, 1 Ins. L.J. 132, 1871 U.S. App. LEXIS 1842

CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Kansas

DecidedMay 26, 1871

StatusPublished

This text of 23 F. Cas. 856 (Terry v. Life Ins. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Terry v. Life Ins. Co., 23 F. Cas. 856, 1 Dill. 403, 5 West. Jur. 496, 1 Ins. L.J. 132, 1871 U.S. App. LEXIS 1842 (circtdks 1871).

Pincite

Opinion

MILLER, Circuit Justice.

It being agreed

that deceased destroyed his life by taking poison, it is claimed by defendants that he “died by his own hand,” within the meaning of the policy, and that they are therefore not liable. This is so far true, that it devolves on the plaintiff to prove such insanity on the part of the deceased, existing at the time he took the poison, as will relieve the act of taking his own life from the effect, which, by the general terms used in the policy, self-destruction was to have, namely, to avoid the policy. It is not every kind or degree of insanity •which will so far excuse the party taking his own life, as to make the company insuring liable. To do this, the act of self-destruction must have been the consequence of insanity, and the mind of the deceased must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing. If he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason that was left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so far overthrown by his mental condition that he could not exercise his reasoning faculties on the act he was about to do, the company is liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption of law, prima facie, or otherwise, that self-destruction arises from insanity; and if you believe, from the evidence, that the deceased, although excited, or augry|'or distressed in mind, formed the determination to take his own life, because in the exercise of his usual reasoning faculties he preferred death to life, then the company is not liable, because he died by his own hand within the meaning of the policy.

The jury found for the plaintiff, and there was judgment accordingly.

[On error, the above judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. 15 Wall. (S2 U. S.) 580.]

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MILLER, Circuit Justice.

It being agreed

that deceased destroyed his life by taking poison, it is claimed by defendants that he “died by his own hand,” within the meaning of the policy, and that they are therefore not liable. This is so far true, that it devolves on the plaintiff to prove such insanity on the part of the deceased, existing at the time he took the poison, as will relieve the act of taking his own life from the effect, which, by the general terms used in the policy, self-destruction was to have, namely, to avoid the policy. It is not every kind or degree of insanity •which will so far excuse the party taking his own life, as to make the company insuring liable. To do this, the act of self-destruction must have been the consequence of insanity, and the mind of the deceased must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing. If he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason that was left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so far overthrown by his mental condition that he could not exercise his reasoning faculties on the act he was about to do, the company is liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption of law, prima facie, or otherwise, that self-destruction arises from insanity; and if you believe, from the evidence, that the deceased, although excited, or augry|'or distressed in mind, formed the determination to take his own life, because in the exercise of his usual reasoning faculties he preferred death to life, then the company is not liable, because he died by his own hand within the meaning of the policy.

The jury found for the plaintiff, and there was judgment accordingly.

[On error, the above judgment was affirmed by the supreme court. 15 Wall. (S2 U. S.) 580.]

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Bluebook (online)

23 F. Cas. 856, 1 Dill. 403, 5 West. Jur. 496, 1 Ins. L.J. 132, 1871 U.S. App. LEXIS 1842, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terry-v-life-ins-co-circtdks-1871.