Terry v. Detention Workers

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

KESHA TERRY, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-16-X-BH § DETENTION WORKERS, et al., § § Defendants. §

ORDER ACCEPTING THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Before the Court are the plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and Motion to Amend. [Docs. No. 20, 21]. The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation regarding the motions. [Doc. No. 22]. The plaintiff filed objections. [Doc. No. 23]. The Court therefore reviews the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation de novo. Having done so, the Court ACCEPTS the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. The Court previously dismissed the plaintiff’s suit with prejudice as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), or alternatively as time-barred.1 The plaintiff filed objections, which the Magistrate Judge construed as a motion to alter or amend the

1 Doc. No. 14. The Court found this suit frivolous because it is duplicative of a prior lawsuit that was twice dismissed for want of prosecution. See Terry v. Supervisor et al., 2018 WL 3489629 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 2018), rec. adopted, 2018 WL 3475666 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2018). Alternatively, the Court found this suit was also time-barred because the incident at issue occurred in 2014 and all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486, 496 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding that Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for personal-injury suits applies to federal section 1983 claims). judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).2 The Court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny this earlier motion.3 Now the plaintiff returns with two motions that the Magistrate Judge correctly construes as a motion

for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b).4 The Magistrate Judge recommended denial of both motions.5 Nothing the plaintiff brings up in her conclusory motions leads the Court to believe it should exercise its discretion to relieve the plaintiff from judgment.6 Contrary to her assertions, the plaintiff has not submitted new evidence to the Court.7 Attempting to add a new defendant post-judgment is not evidence. Rather,

construing her motions broadly, the plaintiff seems to ask the Court for relief under Rule 60(b)(6).8 The Fifth Circuit permits lower courts to grant such motions “only if extraordinary circumstances are present.”9 Moreover, “final judgments should not lightly be disturbed . . . [and] the Rule 60(b) motion is not to be used as a substitute for appeal.”10 But that is exactly what the plaintiff does here, making arguments against the substantive points of the Magistrate Judge’s findings. For instance, the

2 Doc. No. 17 at 1. 3 Doc. No. 19. 4 Doc. No. 22 at 1. 5 Id. 6 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)–(6) (explaining when a court may relieve a party from a final judgment). 7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2) (allowing relief from judgment due to “newly discovered evidence”). 8 See id. at 60(b)(6) (allowing relief from judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief”). 9 Hess v. Cockrell, 281 F.3d 212, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2002). 10 Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981). plaintiff insists that her complaint is not time-barred because her prior case was dismissed without prejudice. This does not follow. Actions in Texas under section 1983 for personal injury claims have a two-year statute of limitations, which begins to run “the moment the plaintiff becomes aware that [s]he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that [s]he has been injured.”" The plaintiff was aware of her potential injury in 2014. The plaintiff's case was time-barred two years from that date. It remains so now. Therefore, the Court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation, and DENIES the plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment. IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of April, 2021.

BRANTLE By UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 287 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted).