Terry Sharp v. City of Sacramento and County of Sacramento et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 TERRY SHARP, No. 2:25-cv-2691 DAD AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER and 14 CITY OF SACRAMENTO and COUNTY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF SACRAMENTO et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This matter was accordingly referred to the 18 undersigned by E.D. Cal. 302(c)(21). Plaintiff filed a request for leave to proceed in forma 19 pauperis (“IFP”), and has submitted the affidavit required by that statute. See 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) will therefore be granted. 21 Upon screening the complaint, however, the undersigned finds that this court’s exercise of 22 jurisdiction is barred by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The undersigned therefore 23 recommends dismissal of this action without prejudice. 24 I. Screening 25 A. Standards 26 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally 27 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A 1 claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 2 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court will 3 (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly 4 baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 5 (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton 6 Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 7 1037 (2011). 8 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint 9 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court 10 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must 11 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a 12 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 13 (1972). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 14 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 15 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice 16 to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 17 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 18 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to 19 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has 20 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 22 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity 23 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Noll v. 24 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in 25 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir.2000)) (en banc). 26 //// 27 //// 28 //// 1 B. The Complaint 2 1. Factual Allegations 3 In addition to the City of Sacramento (“City”) and County of Sacramento (“County”), the 4 complaint names as defendants Detectives Joseph Thebeau, Terrance Mercadal, Maxwell 5 Anderson, and Jonthomas Deardoff of the Sacramento Police Department (“SPD”) and Deputy 6 George Twigg of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”). ECF No. 1 at 1. Whether 7 the complaint intended to also name SPD Sergeant Todd Bevins as a defendant is unclear. See id. 8 at 2-3. 9 The complaint alleges as follows. On October 11, 2022, defendants Thebeau, Loscher, 10 Mercadal, and Bevins attempted to execute an arrest warrant for plaintiff. Plaintiff became the 11 victim of an officer-involved shooting that left him injured. Id. at 3, 5.1 The four officers were 12 placed on administrative leave, and the SPD was relieved of its jurisdiction over the criminal 13 investigation that led to the incident. Id. at 3, 5. The Elk Grove Police Department (“EGPD”) 14 was to conduct the investigation into the shooting, while EGPD Detective Bogdan Kostyuk took 15 over the criminal investigation. Id. at 3, 5-6. 16 Kostyuk received an emergency search warrant for Unit 343 in Bella Vista Apartments, 17 the complex where the shooting occurred, authorizing the seizure of “any items tending to 18 establish the identity of persons who have dominion and control of the location premises[.]” Id. 19 at 3-4. The warrant included specific examples of such documents and authorized the seizure of 20 electronics believed to contain such evidence, but explained that a separate search warrant would 21 be needed to actually search those devices. Id. at 4. 22 Although the police lawfully seized twelve cell phones (“Lawfully Seized Phones”) within 23 the premises, they also unlawfully seized five additional phones (“Disputed Devices”) – three 24 from plaintiff’s body, two from outside Unit 343. Id. Body camera footage also shows that while 25 administering medical aid to plaintiff after shooting him, Mercadal, Loscher, Thebeau, and 26 Bevins had removed some of the Lawfully Seized Phones from his pockets and placed them 50 27 1 This use of force, and the conduct of officers before and after the shooting, are the subjects of 28 Sharp v. Sacramento, 24-cv-2793 JAM CSK, in which plaintiff is represented by counsel. 1 feet away. Id. at 5. Because they had been placed on administrative leave and the SPD stripped 2 of jurisdiction over the criminal investigation against plaintiff, these four officers were barred 3 from actively participating in the investigation. Id. at 5-6. 4 Nonetheless, Mercadal, Loscher, Thebeau, and Bevins mentioned the Disputed Devices 5 during Detective Kostyuk’s investigation. Id. at 6. The Lawfully Seized Phones and the 6 Disputed Devices were all logged into evidence as having been found inside the premises covered 7 by the October 11 warrant, despite body cam footage and police reports showing otherwise. Id. 8 Plaintiff was charged in Sacramento County Superior Court case no. 22-05909 with 9 assault of a police officer with a semiautomatic firearm. Id. at 8; Cal. Penal Code § 245(d)(2). In 10 2025, during discovery, plaintiff learned that Mercadal, Thebeau, Bevins and Loscher had 11 obtained some of the evidence by searching the Lawfully Seized Phones and a hard drive. ECF 12 No. 1 at 8. This search had to have occurred on October 11, 2022, during the 24-hour period 13 before plaintiff and those devices were transferred to EGPD’s custody and possession. Id. at 8-9. 14 No judge had issued a warrant authorizing the search of the confiscated devices during that time. 15 Id. at 8. 16 Discovery also revealed discrepancies between deposition statements from the detectives 17 and the relevant bodycam footage, suggesting that defendants falsified their police statements. Id. 18 at 10. Meanwhile, plaintiff discovered via Pitchess motion that Mercadal had a history of 19 complaints regarding excessive force, dishonesty, and use of improper tactics. Id. This included 20 his involvement in the 2018 death of Stephon Clark at the hands of police, an event that sparked 21 protests nationwide. Id. at 10-11. Rather than prosecuting or firing Mercadal, the City kept 22 promoting him and giving him assignments with special units. Id. at 11. Even in plaintiff’s case, 23 the County “encouraged” Mercadal’s tactics by keeping the improperly seized devices for use in 24 subsequent investigation. Id. 25 Plaintiff was incarcerated in relation to case no. 22-05909 until January 2024, when he 26 was released pursuant to mental health diversion under the California Penal Code. Id. at 6. (The 27 complaint does not specify whether this case remained open or had reached a final resolution by 28 the time the complaint was filed.) Before plaintiff’s release, he and his attorney had negotiated 1 for the return of all seized cell phones. Id. When he contacted the EGPD property clerk, 2 however, he was informed that the County requires emails from the District Attorney authorizing 3 such release, as well as consent from the lead detective overseeing plaintiff’s case. Id. at 7. 4 Plaintiff emailed Detective Anderson, who replied that these phones contained potential evidence 5 of financial crimes and would not be released until completion of the investigation into those 6 crimes. Id. 7 Also in 2024, Deardoff conducted an investigation into Anderson and Thebeau’s unlawful 8 conduct. Id. Without a search warrant, Deardoff obtained from Thebeau, Loscher, Mercadal, and 9 Bevins the data from the Lawfully Seized Phones, which was already the product of a warrantless 10 search. Id. Deardoff used this illegally obtained data to obtain a search warrant for both the 11 Lawfully Seized Phones and the Disputed Devices, the data from which was then used to secure a 12 new arrest warrant for plaintiff. Id. 13 Deardoff submitted his request for an arrest warrant to the Sacramento District Attorney 14 on October 28, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 9. On November 5, defendant Twigg, who was an SCSO 15 probation officer at the time, lured plaintiff into the probation office and stalled him until 16 Deardoff arrived. Id. at 9-10. Deardoff arrested plaintiff, who was charged with possession of at 17 least ten other people’s personal identifying information with intent to defraud in Sacramento 18 County Superior Court case no. 24-35930. Id. at 8, 10; Cal. Penal Code § 530.5(c)(3). Plaintiff 19 has been released on a $2,500 bond and referred to a mental health diversion program, but the 20 charges remain pending. ECF No. 1 at 10. 21 2. Claims and Relief 22 Of the twelve causes of action, eight are brought against various combinations of 23 defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The bases for these claims include the seizure and retention 24 of the Lawfully Seized Phones and their use in subsequent investigations (id. at 11-12); the 25 unlawful search of the Lawfully Seized Phones before a warrant authorizing such search was 26 issued (id. at 12); justification of a further search warrant on all devices based on the prior illegal 27 search, thereby making such secondary search unlawful (id. at 13); unwarranted seizure of 28 property via refusal to release the devices following approval from the district attorney (id. at 14); 1 false arrest on November 5, 2024 based on data from the unlawful search (id. at 14-15); malicious 2 prosecution (id. at 15-16); false imprisonment (id. at 16-17); and the County and City’s failure to 3 supervise and discipline the individual officers for use of unlawful methods, either in prior 4 instances or in plaintiff’s case (id. at 18-19). 5 On the basis of all the conduct alleged to have violated his constitutional rights, plaintiff 6 also presents claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 17-18. 7 He asserts a putative Monell claim based on the County and City’s failure to supervise the 8 individual defendants. Id. at 19-20. A final cause of action, seeking injunctive relief, alleges that 9 defendants will continue to engage in unlawful acts and illegally retain plaintiff’s property unless 10 enjoined from doing so. Id. at 20-21. 11 The complaint seeks compensatory, special, and exemplary damages; attorney fees and 12 costs; and an injunction compelling defendants to set policies and procedures as necessary to 13 prevent unlawful arrest and incarceration without probable cause. Id. at 21. 14 C. Analysis 15 Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971), federal courts must abstain from 16 interfering in most ongoing state court cases. Younger abstention “remains an extraordinary and 17 narrow exception to the general rule” obligating federal courts to decide federal questions that 18 have been presented to them. Cook v. Harding, 879 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 19 Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Owen, 873 F.3d 716, 727 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal 20 quotation marks omitted)). “Abstention is not in order simply because a pending state-court 21 proceeding involves the same subject matter.” Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 22 69, 72 (2013). However, certain “exceptional” classes of cases do support—and may even 23 compel—abstention. New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 24 U.S. 350, 367 (1998). Younger itself “exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court 25 abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts 26 must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72. 27 As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “Younger principles apply in an action for damages 28 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which the federal plaintiff brings a constitutional challenge to a 1 state proceeding when that proceeding is ongoing; the state proceeding is of a judicial nature, 2 implicating important state interests; and the federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating his 3 federal constitutional issues in that proceeding.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th 4 Cir. 2004). Younger thus prohibits federal courts from directly enjoining state prosecutions, 401 5 U.S. at 45, and also from substantially interfering with ongoing state prosecutions by entertaining 6 claims that seek to enforce the rights of the criminal defendant in the state forum. See Mann v. 7 Jett, 781 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986) (abstention appropriate where § 1983 plaintiff sought damages 8 for denial of right to counsel in ongoing state criminal case). 9 In sum, Younger abstention is appropriate if four requirements are met: (1) a state- 10 initiated proceeding remains ongoing at the time the federal case is commenced; (2) the 11 proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an adequate opportunity in the state 12 proceedings to raise constitutional challenges; and (4) the requested relief either seeks to enjoin or 13 has the practical effect of enjoining the ongoing state judicial proceeding. See Arevalo v. 14 Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018); Beltran v. State of California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 15 (9th Cir. 1988). All four elements must be satisfied to warrant abstention. See 16 AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). 17 All four elements are met here. First, it is clear that the relevant state proceedings were 18 pending when this action was initiated. See Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 19 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988) (critical question is whether state proceedings were 20 ongoing at initiation of the federal proceeding). The complaint expressly states that criminal 21 charges are presently pending in Sacramento County Superior Court case no. 24-35930. ECF No. 22 1 at 10. Second, there is no state interest more important than that in the state’s administration of 23 its criminal justice system. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986) (citing Younger, 401 24 U.S. at 44-45). Third, federal courts must assume that state procedures will afford an adequate 25 opportunity for the consideration of constitutional claims “in the absence of unambiguous 26 authority to the contrary.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987). There is no 27 procedural bar to the presentation of federal constitutional issues, including those going to the 28 1 legality of searches and the validity of arrest warrants, in California criminal proceedings.2 2 Finally, it is clear that the requested relief would interfere with the pending state court 3 proceedings. Plaintiff seeks an order generally enjoining defendants’ allegedly unlawful 4 behavior. ECF No. 1 at 20-21. Although plaintiff does not expressly ask this court to enjoin the 5 state court proceedings altogether, all of the allegedly unlawful behavior described in the 6 complaint involves plaintiff’s prosecution and the evidence on which it is based. Plaintiff 7 expressly seeks a judgment that his ongoing prosecution is malicious and therefore 8 constitutionally impermissible, and that evidence being used against him in the present case was 9 obtained unconstitutionally. Id. at 11-14, 15-16. It is therefore apparent that this court’s 10 consideration of the merits of the federal claims would interfere with the pending state case. See 11 Mann, 781 F.2d 1448. 12 Accordingly, Younger abstention applies and the case must be dismissed. See Beltran, 13 871 F.2d at 782 (“Where Younger abstention is appropriate, a district court cannot refuse to 14 abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the merits after the state 15 proceedings have ended. To the contrary, Younger abstention requires dismissal of the federal 16 action.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973)). 17 II. Leave to Amend is Not Appropriate 18 Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible that the defects in the complaint 19 could be corrected, especially if a plaintiff is pro se. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 20 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, the court may dismiss without leave to amend if it is clear 21 that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 22 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, because the requirements for Younger abstention are satisfied, dismissal is 23 mandatory. Beltran, 871 F.2d at 782. Because the gravamen of the complaint involves plaintiff’s 24 rights vis-à-vis an ongoing state prosecution, no amendment could avoid that result. Accordingly, 25 leave to amend should not be granted. 26

27 2 See Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ‘adequate opportunity’ prong of Younger. . . requires only the absence of ‘procedural 28 bars’ to raising a federal claim in the state proceedings.”). 1 III. Pro Se Plaintiff?s Summary 2 The Magistrate Judge is recommending that your case be dismissed because a federal 3 || lawsuit cannot be used to challenge an ongoing state court prosecution, including search and 4 || seizure issues related to evidence in the case. A rule known as Younger abstention prevents this 5 || court from considering your lawsuit at this ttme. You have 21 days to object to this 6 || recommendation if you wish to do so. The District Judge will make the final decision. 7 IV. Conclusion 8 For the reasons explained above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs request to 9 || proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 10 It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED 11 || without prejudice and that this case be closed. 12 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 13 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 14 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 15 || with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document 16 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure 17 || to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s 18 | order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 19 | 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 20 || DATED: January 29, 2026 ~ 21 _Hhters — Che ALLISON CLAIRE 22 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 23 24 25 26 27 28