IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT ·To BE PUBLISHED OPINION ' (
THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, ~ UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS TBE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION · BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ,· ACTION. RENDERED: DECEMBER 14, 2017 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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· TERRY O'BANNON APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT v. HO~ORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE NOS. 15-CR-00156 AND NOS. 15-CR-00234
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING
A circuit court jury convicted Terry O'Barinon 1 of first-degree assault,
tampering with physical evidence, and being a first-degree persistent felony
offender, recommending a sentence of twenty years, which the trial court
accepted. Terry appeals the resulting judgment as a matter of right2, raising
three issues for review: the trial court's denial of Terry's motions for directed
verdict on his charges of (1) assault, (2) tampering with physical evidence, and
. (3) persistent felony offender. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we find no
error in the trial court's rulings and affirm the judgment.
We will refer to Terry O'Bannon as "Terry," because Terry's son, Tyson O'Bannon, is 1 also mentioned several times in this opinion. · 2 Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b). I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND., Terry O'Bannon, the defendant in this case, Tyson O'Bannon, Terry's
son, and Whitney Smith, Tyson's girlfriend, stopped to get gas. Tyson, the
driver of the car, pulled up to one of the pumps. As Terry got out of the car to
pump the gas, he realized Tyson pulled up to the pump on the wrong side of
the car, so he told Tyson to turn the car around. As Tyson turned the car
around, Herbert Yates pulled in at the same pump.
From this point forward, the facts of this case are in dispute. What can
be conclusively ascertained from the record is that a verbal exchange
immediately ensued between Yates and Terry. Terry directed Tyson to drive to a
different gas pump, and a further verbal exchange occurred as Yates and Terry
pumped gas into their vehicle.
Yates reached inside his car for some~ing and Terry and Tyson believed
he reached for a firearm. Yates admitted that he owns a firearm, that he did
not have it with him on that occasion. After filling their car, Terry and Tyson
then drove away. As they drove away, Yates called 911 and reported Terry and
Tyson for reckless driving.
Terry and Tyson returned to the gas station moments later, claiming that
they wanted to make sure they had paid for the gas. When Terry stepped out of
the vehicle, another verbal confrontation with Yates occurred, eventually
turning into a physical altercation. Numerous witnesses gave conflicting ·
testimony at trial about the altercation, including who was the initial aggressor
and what happened during the fight. At some point during the fight, Terry
2 produced a knife and cut Yate's arm, causing a seven to eight-inch laceration
to the bone, cutting several muscles and severing the ulnar nerve. As Terry and
Tyson drove a~ay, Terry threw his bloody shirt out of the car.
Terry admitted at trial that he knew police were looking for him after
leaving the gas-station melee, and he turned himself in four days later.
Eleven days after the incident, Whitney Smith, Tyson's girlfriend, gave a
statement to the police in which she stated that Terty threw a knife out the car
window, but at trial she stated that Terry threw his bloody shirt out of the
window and she assumed the knife was· inside the shirt. When the responding
officer initially arrived at the scene of the crime, he failed to locate the knife at
the gas station. After Smith gave her statement to the police, officers again
searched unsuccessfully for the knife at the gas station. On cross-examination
at trial, Terry stated that Tyson had purchased a knife for him that was very
similar to replace one that he had "lost."
At the close of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the trial court denied
Terry's motion for a directed verdict on the assault charge. At the clo&e of
· Terry's case-in-chief, Terry made a motion for directed verdict on the
tampering-with-physical-evidence charge, stemming from the accusation that
Terry had attempted to dispose of the knife used to cut Yates by throwing it out
the window. The trial court denied that motion.
Regarding the persistent felony offender charge, Terry did not move for
di~ected verdict at the close of the Commonwealth's case or his own case-in-
chief in the penalty phase of the trial. While the trial court was reading the
3 persistent felony offender sentencing instructions to the jury, the
Commonwealth asked to approach the bench. The Commonwealth then moved
for leave of court to reopen the evidence because the Commonwealth
recognized that it had failed to establish when Terry had been placed on parole
or probation, an element necessary to prove the charge ofpersistent felony
offender. Terry objected to allowing the Commonwealth to reopen the proof, but
the trial court overruled the objection and allowed the Commonwealth to recall
its witness to establish ~hen Terry was placed on parole or probation. Terry
then moved for directed verdict on the persistent felony offender charge, which
the trial court denied. ·
The jury found Terry guilty of first-degree assault, tampering with
physical evidence, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender. The
jury recommended a twenty~year sentence, which the trial court accepted and
entered the judgment accordingly. Terry then appealed to this Court.
II. ANALYSIS.
As a preliminary matter, Terry sufficiently preserved all three issues
before this Court. Because all three issues involve the alleged failure of the trial
court to grant a directed verdict, "On appellate review, the test of a directed
verdict is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for
a jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of
acquittal. "3 So we shall only overturn the trial court's denial of Terry's motions
'- 3Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citing Commonwealth v. Sawhill, 660 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Ky. 1983) (quoting Trowel v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 530, 533 (Ky. 1977)). · 4 for directed verdict if it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find Terry
guilty of his charges.
A. Assault Charge. Terry argues that, based on the evidence adduced at trial, it was clearly
unreasonable for the jury to find hirri guilty of first-degree assault because the I
jury should have found that he was privileged to act in self-protection and in
the protection of others.
KRS 503.050(1) and (2), the statute establishing the self-protection
defense, allows for the use of physical or deadly force by a defendant upon
. another person when the defendant believes that such fore~ is necessary to
protect himself against the use or· imminent use of unlawful physical, or
deadly, force by the other person. And KRS 503.070(1-2), the statute
establishing the third-party protector defense, allows for the use of physical
and even deadly force by a defendant upon another person if the defendant
believes that such force is necessary to protect a third person against the us.e
or imminent use of unlawful physical or deadly force. But KRS 503.060(3)
prevents a defendant from invoking the self-protection defense if the defendant
was the initial physical aggressor, unless: (1) the initial aggressor used non-
deadly physical force and was responded to with deadly force; or (2) the initial
aggressor withdraws from the encounter and effectively communicates to the
other person his intent to do so, but the other individual continues or
threatens the use of unlawful physical force.
5 In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on first-degree assault,
second-degree assault, fourth-degree assault, self-prote~tion, protection of
another, and initial aggressor. Numerous witnesses provided testimony
supporting the finding of the jury that the self-protection and protection-of-
others defenses did not apply to justify Terry's actions. Although other
witnesses provided testimony that would have supported a finding that Tercy
acted in self-defense or for the protection of another, this ~foes not make the
findings by the jury unreasonable.
Summarily, no matter the jury's verdict under these instructions, we
would be constrained to recognize the jury's verdict as reasonable. This case is
a classic example of the reason our legal system entrusts the jury with the ~
important task of determining a defendant's guilt or innocence. Tqis case
involves conflicting accounts of the day's events from the point of view of the
defendant, victim, and numerous other witnesses. Many of the accounts differ,
sometimes dramatically, from each other. To put this case in perspective: the
defendant, the victim, and six other witnesses provided testimony as to the ' day's events, ranging from accounts that Terry was the initial aggressor, to
Yates being the initial aggressor, to Tyson joining in the fight and actually
acting as the initial aggressor, to Terry believing.Yates possessed a firearm even
though it app~ars Yates did not, to Terry and Tyson throwing several punches
before Yates even reacted, to both Yates and Terry egging each other on in the
fight, and the differing accounts continue.
6 We must ultimately conclude from the evidence that the jury did not act ·
unreasonably when it found Terry guilty of first-degree assault. The jury heard
testimony from witnesses stating that Terry was the initial aggressor and
escalated the fight by using a knife. The jury also heard testimony from Terry
and Tyson that they believed Yates had a gun; however, the jury simply did not
believe Terry and Tyson, as Terry's conviction reflects. It is the jury's
prerogative to act as the ultimate fact-finder and determ:lnant of a witness's
credibility4, and because the jury's conclusion is adequately factually
supported in this record, we cannot deem it to be unreasonable. Based on all
the evidence adduced at trial, the jury's rejection of the self-protection and
protection-of-others defenses was not unreasonable. So we.affirm the trial
court's decision to deny Terry's motion for directed verdict regarding his
assault charge.
B. Tampering with Physical Evidence Charge. Terry argues that the jury unreasonably convicted him of tampering with
physical evidence, specifically, that he discarded the knife he used to cut Yates
by throwing it out the car window.
This charge stemmed from Whitney Smith's statement to police that she
saw Terry throw the knife out the window as their car was leaving the gas
station. But at trial, Smith stated that she actually saw Terry throw his bloody
4 Potts v. Commonwealth, 172 S.W.3d 349, 349-51 (Ky. 2005).
7 shirt out the window and simply assumed that the knife was inside. As stated,
two separate investigations by officers failed to locate the knife.
At trial, the defense introduced as evidence what Terry clai~ed to be the
actual knife he used to cut Yates. Terry testified that he kept the knife in his . . pants pocket after the altercation. But on cross examination, . . Terry stated that
Tyson p.ad bought a knife for him that was very similar to the one that he had
"lost." It appears that the only proof that the knife introduced at trial was the
same one as the one used to cut Yates is Terry's testimony. Based-on the
. evidence adduced at trial, the jury found Terry guilty of tampering with
.evidence by throwing the knife from the vehicle. '
KRS 524.100 provides that a person is guilty of tampering with physical
evidence when, believing that an official proceeding is pending or may be
instituted, he either: (1) destroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters
physical evidence which he believes is about to be produced or used. in the
official proceeding with intent to impair its verity or availability in the official
proceeding; or (2) fabricates any physical evidence with intent that it be
introduced in the official proceeding or offers any physical evidence, knowing it
to be fabricated or altered.
Our decision in Mullins v. Commonwealth5 provides guidance on this
issue. In Mullins, we stated, "The Commonwealth cannot bootstrap a tampering
charge onto another charge simply because a woefully inadequate effort to
s 350 S.W.3d 434 (Ky. 2011).
8 locate the evidence was made by the police."6 Additionally, we stated that a
defendant walking away from the scene of the crime in pos~ession of evidence
does not necessarily lead to a violation; in fact, charging someone with a
violation of tampering with physical evidence "would be an impermissible
'piling on"' of charges. 7 However, we went on to say, "This is not to say.that
failure to locate evidence means that a defendant cannot be charged and
convicted of tampering when there is evidence of an active attempt by the
defendant that demonstrated intent to impair ·the availability of the evidence. "8
Based on the evidence adduced at trial, and our decisions in Mullins and
Nourse, we cannot say it was unreasonable for the jury to find that Terry
tampered with evidence by throwing the knife .used to ctlt Yates out the
window. As Mullins states, even though officers were unable to find the knife
that T~rry threw out the window, the officers' searches were not claimed to be
inadequate, and other evidence exists to· support a finding that Terry did throw
the knife out the window in an attempt to "impair the availability" of the knife.
Whitney Smith's original statement to the police that Terry threw the knife out
the window, coupled with Terry admitting on cross examination that Tyson had
purchased him a knife that was very similar to replace one that he had "lost," and the fact that Terry's own testimony was the only proof Terry ~sserted, and
now asserts, to substantiate his claim that the knife introduced at trial is the
6 Id. at 444. 1 Id. at 443. a Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Nourse, 177 S.W.3d 691 (Ky. 2005) (throwing bullet casings down a drain)).
9 same knife he used to cut Yates, all could reasonably convince a jury that Terry
really did throw the knife out the window that day, even though police were
unable to locate it. As such, the jury's findings were not unreasonable, and we
affirm the trial court's decision to deny Terry's motion for directed verdict on
the tampering-witl?--physical-evidence charge.
C. Pe.rsistent Felony Offender. Terry argues that the trial court erred by denying_his motion for directed
verdict regarding the persistent felony offender charge. It appears that Terry's
argument here is actually two-fold: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing the Commonwealth to reopen its case upon discovering that it had
failed to establish when Terry had been placed on parole or probation, an
. essential element of his charge of persistent felony offender; and (2) the trial
court erred when it denied Terry's motion for directed verdict on the persistent
felony offender charge after the Commonwealth's witness testified to establish
when Terry was placed on parole or probation.
During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief during the penalty phase, the
Commonwealth called the circuit clerk as a witness to establish the elements of
the persistent-felony-offender charge. The clerk testified that Terry was
convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon on October 2, 2009.
But, the Commonwealth failed to ask the clerk when Terry was discharged
from parole or probation on the 2009 conviction. This meant that the
Commonwealth failed to prove the persistent-felony-offender element that Terry
"was discharged from· parole or probation from the sentence imposed on him
10 pursuant to said prior conviction no more than five (5) years before· August 12,
2015." 9
After both sides had closed their cases in the penalty phase, the trial
court read the sentencing instructions. As the trial court read the persistent
felony offender sentencing instructions to the jury, the Commonwealth
apparently realized it had failed to ask the clerk when Terry was placed on
probation or parole and asked the court to approach the bench. At th~ bench,·
the Commonwealth· moved to reopen the case because it had failed to establish
when Terry h~d been placed on parole or probation, to which Terry objected.
The trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion.
The clerk was then recalled and testified that Terry was released on
supervised releas.e for three years, within the five-year time period prescribed
by the persistent-felony-offender offense. Terry then· moved for directed verdict,
which was denied by the trial court. The jury found Terry guilty of being a first-
degree persistent felony offender.
Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.42 prescribes the order of
trial. Of particular relevance in this case, RCr 9.42(e) states, "The parties
respecti~ely may offer rebutting evidence, unless the court, for good reason in
furtherance of justice, permits them to offer evidence-in-chief." We review
9 See KRS 532.080(3)(c).
11 decisions by the trial court of this nature under an abuse of discretion
standard.10
In both Marshall and Haynes, we held that the trial court did not abuse
"its broad discretionary power" by permitting the introduction of evidence-in-
chief, after both sides had closed their cases, to establish that the previous
crimes committed by the defendants were felonies.11 We termed the
adjudication of a persistent felony offender charge a "bifurcated" stage of a
defendant's criminal proceedings, separate from adjuc:lication of the underlying
substantive criminal charge, like robbery.12
Terry relies on Davis v. Commonwealthl3 in support of his argument. In
Davis, the trial court allowed the Commonwealth to reopen its case to provide
previously unavailable testimony supporting a murder charge conviction
during rebuttal and after the close of all the evidence. Terry relies on our
following statements in Davis:
While a party should not normally be permitted to offer additional testimony after announcing the conclusion of its evidence, and certainly should be precluded from introduction of evidence-in- chief after announcing that no re_buttal evidence will be presented, we cannot overlook the probative nature of the evidence so offered and its prior unavailability. If the record demonstrated any bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth, we would not hesitate to· hold that the admission of such evidence amounted to an abuse of the trial court's discretion. This not being the case, however, we
10Marshall v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Ky. 1981); Haynes. v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Ky. 1981). 11 Marshall, 625 S.W.2d at 583; Haynes, 625 S.W.2d at 576. i2 Marshall, 625 S.W.2d at 583; Haynes, 625 S.W.2d at 576. 13 795 S.W.2d 942 (Ky. 1990).
12 find no abuse of the .trial court's discretion in its application of RCr 9.42(e). 14
We find that the situation in this case is more akin to our holdings in
Marshall and Haynes than in Davis. Although our statements in Davis would
seem to suggest a preclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence-in-chief in this
. case, our statements were made in the context of attempting to admit evidence-
in-chief during rebuttal and after the close of the case for the purpose of
obtaining a convictibn for intentional murder. In this case, just like in Marshall
and Haynes, the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to reopen its case for
the purpose of permitting evidence relating to a persistent-felony-offender
charge, not the underlying substantive criminal charge of assault. So because
of the trial court's traditional broad discretion in this regard, and because of
our holdings in Marshall and Haynes, we find that no error occurred with
respect to the trial court's decision to allow the Commonwealth to reopen its
case for the purpose of providing evidence-in-chief as to when Terry had been
placed on pifrole or probation.
Terry's argument that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for
directed verdict on this charge is supported by this same rationale. In addition,
the-Commonwealth established all the necessary elements of a first-degree
persistent-felony-offender conviction. So the trial court did not err when it
denied Terry's motion for a directed verdict because it was not unreasonable for
the jury to find Terry guilty of being a persistent felony offender.
14 I<;l.. at 947.
13 III. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons stated above, we find no error in the trial court's rulings
in this case and affirm the judgment.
All sitting. All concur.
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Robert Chung-Hua Yang Assistant Public Advocate
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky
Mark Barry Assistant Attorney General