In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-19-00329-CV __________________
TERRY LYNN JOHNSON, Appellant
V.
STEVEN JAMES JOHNSON, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law Polk County, Texas Trial Cause No. CIV27540 __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Terry Lynn Johnson (“Terry”) appeals from the trial court’s
judgment in favor of appellee Steven James Johnson (“Steven”) as to his claim
against Terry for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when Terry shot his foot
during the marriage. In two issues, Terry challenges the trial court’s granting of
Steven’s motion for rehearing, which allowed his property and personal injury claim
to proceed, and she contends the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Steven
1 damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. We affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Terry filed a petition for divorce from Steven on October 4, 2012, and Steven
answered and then filed a counter-petition for divorce. In his counter-petition,
Steven asserted a cause of action against Terry for allegedly causing bodily injury
to him by shooting his foot, and he sought damages for past and future medical
expenses; lost earnings; diminution of earning capacity, loss of earning capacity, or
both; past and future physical pain and suffering, as well as mental anguish;
disfigurement; physical impairment; and exemplary damages.
On March 6, 2013, the trial court held a final divorce hearing, at which Steven
and Terry were placed under oath. At that time, the judge of the Polk County Court
at Law was the Honorable Stephen Phillips. Terry testified that she and Steven
intended to enter a compromise and settlement agreement, release of claims, and
covenant not to sue one another for personal injuries, including the shooting incident,
and that she wanted the trial court to approve that agreement. Steven testified that
he had reviewed the proposal for property division and that he wanted the trial court
to enforce and approve the parties’ agreement to release each other from liability. In
addition, Steven testified that, except for some personal property that he wanted
2 Terry to return, he otherwise agreed with the parties’ settlement. 1 With the exception
of testimony that the parties would agree to release each other from liability, no other
details about the nature of the agreement were revealed at the hearing. At the
conclusion of the hearing, Judge Phillips stated, “I’ll approve the agreement you’ve
reached and grant your divorce.”
The record indicates that on September 16, 2013, Steven’s counsel sent a letter
to Terry’s counsel, in which he stated that Steven rejected the proposed final divorce
decree and the proposed compromise and settlement agreement. The letter further
stated that Steven did not agree to waive any rights to proceed with his personal
injury lawsuit against Terry for the shooting. Terry subsequently filed a motion for
entry of judgment, in which she asserted that the trial court had issued an “order”
granting Terry’s petition for divorce, and that the trial court found in the order that
the parties agreed to the divorce and settlement of their property, as well as to “a
mutual release of indemnity” regarding the shooting.
1 An unsigned Compromise and Settlement Agreement, Release of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue, which stated that “in consideration of this Agreement,” Steven agreed to release Terry and her successors, representatives, and insurance companies, from all personal injury claims arising from the “accident” appears in the appellate record. The proposed agreement also stated that Steven would indemnify Terry for any subrogation claims filed by “any homeowners insurance company” regarding the incident.
3 In response, on May 9, 2014, Steven filed a motion for rehearing, in which he
asserted that the trial court should grant his motion because “at the time of the
hearing[,] the terms and conditions of any settlement of the assault . . . were not set
forth in sufficient detail to constitute a valid and binding resolution of the assault
cause of action[.]” Steven also asserted that if the trial court were to determine that
his cause of action for assault had been resolved, rehearing should be granted
because Terry breached their agreement by terminating Steven’s insurance. Steven
also alleged that “there is no mutual release[]” because the divorce decree does not
adequately set forth the parties’ agreement. Attached to Steven’s motion as an
exhibit was an excerpt from the transcript of the final divorce hearing that took place
on March 6, 2013. Attached to the transcript was Steven and Terry’s property
agreement,2 which does not reference Steven’s personal injury claim against Terry.
Judge Phillips held a hearing on Steven’s motion for rehearing and the motion
for entry of a decree in November 2014, at which time Steven’s counsel argued that
the parties’ settlement agreement “did not specifically address the fact of his
personal injury claims against [Terry] for shooting him with a gun. And I believe
their argument is that it was all taken care of in the settlement agreement.” Judge
Phillips asked why the personal injury claim is not an independent cause of action,
and Terry’s counsel responded that the parties had both stated in open court that they
2 The property agreement was attached to the transcript as exhibit P-1. 4 intended to release each other and read a portion of the previous hearing to Judge
Phillips. Terry’s counsel argued that he tried months later to obtain Steven’s
signature on the indemnity agreement and covenant not to sue, but Steven refused to
sign both the agreement and the decree.
Steven’s counsel argued that he could seek severance of the personal injury
claim from the divorce, and he noted that the proposed agreement “the parties drafted
between themselves makes no reference at all to any giving up of any rights under
that. And the questions asked of Mr. Johnson at the hearing on March the 6th did not
inquire as to whether he was going to compromise and resolve all of his claims
against her[.]” Steven’s counsel clarified, “that’s why we asked for a re[]hearing, to
clarify that this agreement that they had was for the division of their property, not
resolution of his claim for being shot by her.” At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge
Phillips noted that a property agreement was in the court’s file, stated that he would
take notice of the file and all exhibits and documents, but he did not make a ruling
on that date.
On June 30, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing to “clarify” its ruling.
By this time, the Honorable Tom Brown had succeeded Judge Phillips as judge of
the Polk County Court at Law. After hearing the arguments of counsel, Judge Brown
concluded that Judge Phillips had granted the divorce in 2013, and Judge Brown
granted Steven’s motion for rehearing regarding the “property issues and any other
5 claims between the parties.” Near the end of the clarification hearing, Judge Brown
stated, “the divorce is still granted.” On June 14, 2018, Terry’s counsel filed a
proposed final decree of divorce with the trial judge and noted in his correspondence
that the case had been heard in June 2016. According to Terry’s counsel’s letter,
Judge Brown approved of the parties’ March 2013 agreement at the June 2016
hearing and had severed the personal injury action from the divorce. Counsel stated
in his letter that the personal injury action remained pending.
In the final divorce decree, signed on June 18, 2018, Judge Brown found that
the parties have “a personal injury action severed from the divorce action still
pending.” The decree states that the Court considered the case on June 3, 2016. The
decree included a provision that the trial court “expressly reserves the right to make
orders necessary to clarify and enforce this decree[]” without affecting the finality
of the decree. The decree included language of finality, including a ruling that all
relief requested and not granted is denied.
On July 15, 2018, Steven filed a motion for new trial, in which he maintained
that when the trial court orally granted the parties a divorce on June 30, 2016, the
trial court “specifically carved out” and did not rule on Steven’s assault cause of
action regarding the injury to his foot. Steven argued that the final decree included
the statement that “all relief requested in this case and not expressly granted is
denied[,]” and he asserted that because his cause of action for assault was included
6 in the divorce petition, the trial court’s final decree constituted a ruling on his assault
claim. Additionally, Steven argued that due process required that he have notice and
opportunity to review the final decree. On July 23, 2018, the trial judge signed a
nunc pro tunc final decree of divorce, which states as follows, in pertinent part: “this
judgment does not [a]ffect or include any finding in regard[] to the severed personal
injury action of Steven James Johnson[.]”
On May 9, 2019, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the
personal injury claim. Terry and Steven were the only witnesses. Steven testified
that in December 2012, while he and Terry were separated and their divorce
proceeding had begun, he went to the residence they had shared. According to
Steven, he had “moved out to keep the peace[,]” but some of his personal belongings
were still at the residence. Steven explained that when he arrived at the residence,
he went to the front door and kicked it. Terry opened the door, and Steven went
inside, but his belongings had been moved. Steven and Terry began to argue and
exchange curse words. Steven testified that he cursed at Terry, and then she shot
him. Steven denied touching Terry. After the shooting, Steven drove himself to the
hospital in Livingston, and he testified that he was in the worst pain of his life. Steven
explained that he was transferred to Memorial Hermann hospital, and he required
two surgeries and spent ten days in the hospital. Counsel asked Steven to remove his
7 shoe and show his foot to the judge, and he did so. According to Steven, three of his
toes required pins, and he lacks feeling in some of his toes.
Steven explained that when the shooting occurred, he was working as an oil
operator on a pipeline, which involved “maintenance on heavy equipment.” Steven
testified that he was off work for approximately two months, and his employer did
not compensate him during that time. According to Steven, he was making
approximately a thousand dollars per week. According to Steven, he opted not to
have a recommended third surgery, which would have severed a nerve in his foot
because he would have lost all sensation in his foot. Steven testified that his doctors
wanted him to undergo rehabilitation, but he “never did.” Steven explained that he
stayed in bed for five or six months before he was able to walk, and he was unable
to work during that time. Steven testified that he was unable to return to work for
about a year, and he is currently on disability due to the injuries to his foot, as well
as an unrelated problem with his back.
A business records affidavit from Memorial Hermann Hospital, which
showed Steven’s outstanding medical bills in the amount of $29,002.13, was
admitted into evidence. Steven testified that he incurred lost wages for
approximately twenty weeks, and he explained that he also sought damages for pain
and suffering, as well as disfigurement. According to Steven, Terry carried him on
her medical insurance, so her insurance paid for eighty percent of the costs of his
8 care after the shooting. Steven testified that he was seeking six months of lost income
from the trial court. Steven’s medical records from Memorial Hermann were also
admitted into evidence.
During cross-examination, Steven testified that both he and Terry had
previously testified that they intended to enter into a compromise and settlement
agreement that they would ask the court to approve. According to Steven, Terry shot
him because he “called her a bad name.” Steven explained, “I did not do [anything]
else but run my mouth.” Steven testified that he stopped working in March 2016.
According to Terry, she let Steven into the house after he broke the glass on
the door, and he came around the corner and “slugged” her face. She explained that
he had never hit her before. Terry testified that when she shot Steven, he was turning
around to come back toward her, and he had already struck her. Terry testified that
she then picked up the gun and fired at Steven. Terry explained that when she shot
Steven, “[h]e was at the door. He was turning to come back and hit me again and get
on me again.” Terry testified that the police department had pictures of her face after
Steven hit her, but she did not bring them to trial. Terry testified that Steven was
“high and strung out and breathing like a bull.” According to Terry, Steven had been
smoking K2. Terry testified that she feared for her life when she shot Steven. Terry
explained that she agreed to delay finalizing the divorce until Steven had his
surgeries because he did not have insurance of his own.
9 On June 7, 2019, Judge Brown signed a judgment finding in favor of Steven
and awarding Steven a total of $92,002.13: $29,002.13 for medical expenses,
$13,000 of lost wages “for one half of lost wages related to community property[,]”
and $50,000 for pain and suffering. Terry appealed.
ISSUE ONE
In her first issue, Terry argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
granting Steven’s motion for rehearing and allowing his personal injury claim to
proceed. Specifically, Terry argues that the trial judge orally pronounced the parties’
divorce on March 6, 2013, and she maintains that the “2013 pronounced decree”
granted the parties’ agreement of a mutual release of all claims for personal injury.
In addition, Terry argues that the issues of divorce and property division were not
severable because the trial judge must divide the parties’ property in a divorce action.
We review the trial court’s decision on the motion for rehearing for abuse of
discretion. Bridgestone Lakes Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. Bridgestone Lakes
Dev. Co., Inc., 489 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet.
denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is arbitrary or
unreasonable, or when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). We
also review the trial court’s decision regarding severance for abuse of discretion.
10 Saxer v. Nash Phillips-Copus Co. Real Estate, 678 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
To address Terry’s arguments, we turn first to the question of whether Judge
Phillips’s pronouncement on March 6, 2013, constituted rendition of a final
judgment.3 A judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its
decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. Hall v. Hall,
No. 05-16-01141-CV, 2018 WL 1373951, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 19, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op.). “An intent to render judgment in the future does not satisfy this
test.” Id. To constitute an oral pronouncement of judgment, “the words spoken or
written by the trial court must evince a present, as opposed to future act that
effectively decides the issues before the court[;]” that is, “‘the trial court must clearly
indicate the intent to render judgment at the time the words are expressed.’” Id.
“Once a judgment is rendered by oral pronouncement, entry of a written judgment
is purely a ministerial act.” Id.
As mentioned above, at the conclusion of the final divorce hearing, the trial
judge stated, I’ll approve the agreement you’ve reached and grant your divorce.”
3 The record does not reflect that Terry ever asked the trial court to enforce the purported settlement agreement discussed in open court as a Rule 11 agreement, and Terry does not argue on appeal that the purported agreement was enforceable under Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 11. Therefore, we do not consider that issue in our opinion, and we make no determination as to whether the purported agreement would have been enforceable under Rule 11. 11 “I’ll” is a contraction of the phrase “I will.” Hall is instructive regarding whether the
trial court’s statement constituted an oral rendition of judgment. In Hall, at the
conclusion of the final hearing, the trial judge stated, “I’ll grant the divorce. I’ll
approve the agreement of the parties.” Id. at *1. The Hall court held that such
“[w]ords indicating what the trial judge ‘will grant’ and ‘will approve’ do not signify
a present rendition of judgment.” Id. at *2.
As in Hall, Judge Phillips’s statement expressing a future intent to approve
the agreement and grant the divorce, using the language “I’ll approve the agreement
you’ve reached and grant your divorce[]” did not constitute a present rendition of
judgment. See id. at *1-2. Therefore, the entire proceeding was properly before
Judge Brown at the June 2016 hearing, at which he ruled that the parties’ divorce is
granted but granted a rehearing as to “property issues and any other claims between
the parties.” Despite his apparent belief to the contrary, Judge Brown’s 2018 entry
of a divorce decree was not merely ministerial because Judge Phillips had not
rendered judgment by oral pronouncement. See id.
We turn now to the issue of whether Judge Brown’s 2016 severance of
Steven’s personal injury claim was proper. 4 Terry maintains that because section
4 The trial court signed two judgments: the divorce decree and the judgment on Steven’s personal injury claim. There can be only one final judgment rendered in this cause per Rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 301. The record reflects that although the trial court severed Steven’s personal injury claim from the divorce, the trial court did not assign the severed portion of the case 12 7.001 of the Texas Family Code requires the trial court to divide the parties’ property
in a divorce action, the trial court erred by “sever[ing] the issue of divorce from the
issue of property division.” According to Terry, “Judge Brown’s statement that the
parties were granted a divorce on March 6, 2013 should have precluded the granting
of a rehearing on the property issues at least and also any personal injury claim.”
Section 7.001 of the Family Code provides that a divorce decree “shall order
a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and
right[.]” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001. “The ‘estate of the parties’ has been
construed to mean only the parties’ community property.” Wilson v. Wilson, 44
S.W.3d 597, 600 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (citing Cameron v.
Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 214-15 (Tex. 1982); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554
S.W.2d 137, 139 (Tex. 1977)). Wages and salaries earned by the parties during the
marriage are community property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.002; Bell v. Moores,
832 S.W.2d 749, 752 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
However, the Texas Family Code also provides that a recovery for personal injuries
during the marriage, except for loss of earning capacity, is characterized as separate
property. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.001. Steven’s pleading sought damages from
its own cause number, such as by adding “-A” to the end of the cause number, to differentiate the severed portion of the case. We consider this a clerical error, where one of the parties could file a motion asking the trial court to correct this clerical error by signing a judgment nunc pro tunc. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 306, 316. 13 Terry for loss of earning capacity, but the trial court did not award such damages;
rather, Steven was only awarded damages for wages that he lost during his
convalescence after the shooting. 5
Furthermore, generally “[a]ny claim against a party may be severed and
proceeded with separately.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 41. Rule 41 grants trial courts broad
discretion regarding severance and consolidation of causes. McGuire v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co. of New York, 431 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. 1968). A claim may be
severed if (1) the controversy involves more than one cause of action, (2) the severed
claim would be the proper subject of a lawsuit if independently asserted, and (3) the
severed claim is not so interwoven with the remaining action that they involve the
same issues and facts. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793
S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990). Terry has not demonstrated that the trial court abused
its discretion by severing Steven’s personal injury claim. See id.; see also Tex. Fam.
Code Ann. §§ 3.001, 7.001; Tex. R. Civ. P. 41.
For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by severing
Steven’s personal injury claim against Terry. Having concluded that because Judge
Phillips’s March 2013 statement did not constitute a pronouncement of judgment,
the entire case was properly before Judge Brown, and having determined that Judge
5 We note that the trial judge apparently believed that the award for lost wages constituted community property, since he awarded Steven “one half of lost wages related to community property[,]” and $50,000 for pain and suffering. 14 Brown did not err by severing Steven’s personal injury claim, we further conclude
that Judge Brown did not abuse his discretion by granting Steven’s motion for
rehearing. Accordingly, we overrule issue one.
ISSUE TWO
In her second issue, Terry argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
awarding Steven damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering.
Terry asserts that the sufficiency of the evidence is relevant in determining whether
the trial court abused its discretion. According to Terry, Steven’s testimony was “not
credible.” Terry maintains that the damages awarded for pain and suffering were
excessive and that Steven did not properly prove the amount of his lost wages.
When, as here, a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of
law, “we must presume that the trial court resolved any disputed facts in a manner
that is consistent with the trial court’s ruling if the record contains evidence
supporting such a resolution.” Majors Mgmt., LLC v. Price and Co., No. 09-17-
00063-CV, 2018 WL 771008, at *3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 8, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op.). The trial court’s implied findings are not conclusive, and the appellant
may use the appellate record to argue that the evidence is insufficient to support
relevant implied findings. Id. “[When] an appellant attacks the legal sufficiency of
an adverse finding on an issue on which [she] did not have the burden of proof, the
appellant must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse
15 finding.” Univ. Gen. Hosp., LP v. Prexus Health Consultants, LLC, 403 S.W.3d 547,
550 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). Evidence is legally sufficient
if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under
review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). The factfinder
is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and is responsible for resolving
any conflicts in the evidence, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. at 819-21; Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza,
164 S.W.3d 607, 625 (Tex. 2004).
The factfinder may choose to believe one witness over another, and we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v.
Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003). When evaluating legal sufficiency, we
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings and
indulge every reasonable inference that would support it, and when there is
conflicting evidence, we presume the factfinder resolved the conflicting evidence in
favor of the prevailing party and disregard that evidence in our review. City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 810, 820-21. We credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder
could, and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id.
at 827.
In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we weigh all the
evidence, and we will set aside the judgment only if it is so against the great weight
16 and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Id. at 826; see
also Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). If the appellant did not have
the burden of proof at trial on the challenged finding, then we will “set aside the
verdict only if the evidence that supports the finding is so weak as to make the
[judgment] clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” City of Austin v. Chandler, 428
S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.) (citing Cain, 709 S.W.2d at
176).
As discussed above, Steven testified that he was making approximately $1000
per week before the shooting, and he testified that he was off work for approximately
two months. Steven also testified that he stayed in bed for five to six months. The
trial court awarded Steven lost wages in the amount of $13,000. It was the sole
province of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any
conflicts in the evidence, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from
basic facts to ultimate facts. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819-21; Sw. Bell Tel.
Co., 164 S.W.3d at 625. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s findings, we conclude that a reasonable and fair-minded factfinder could
have determined that Steven was entitled to lost wages in the awarded amount. See
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Therefore, the evidence of lost wages was legally
sufficient. In addition, weighing all the evidence, we conclude that the trial court’s
award of lost wages was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the
17 evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See id. at 826; see also Cain, 709 S.W.2d
at 176. The evidence was factually sufficient to support the trial court’s award of lost
wages in the amount of $13,000.
We turn now to the award of $50,000 for pain and suffering. The existence of
pain may be established by circumstantial evidence, as well as inferred or presumed
as a consequence of severe injuries. B.T. Healthcare, Inc. v. Honeycutt, 196 S.W.3d
296, 301 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.). “The process of awarding damages
for amorphous, discretionary injuries, such as . . . pain and suffering, is inherently
difficult because the injury constitutes a subjective, unliquidated, non-pecuniary
loss.” Waltrip v. Bilbon Corp., 38 S.W.3d 873, 881 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001,
pet. denied). The factfinder is given a great deal of discretion in awarding an amount
of damages it deems appropriate because there are no objective guidelines to assess
the monetary equivalent of such injuries. Id.
Steven testified that when his foot was shot, he experienced the worst pain of
his life, and he required two surgeries to repair the injuries to his foot. Also before
the trial judge were Steven’s medical records from Memorial Hermann Hospital,
which note that Steven suffered from acute pain due to trauma. Given the nature of
Steven’s injuries, as well as the discretion afforded to the trial court in determining
an appropriate value to assign to the subjective, non-pecuniary loss, we conclude
that a reasonable and fair-minded factfinder could have determined that Steven was
18 entitled to damages for pain and suffering in the awarded amount. See City of Keller,
168 S.W.3d at 827; Waltrip, 38 S.W.3d at 881. Therefore, the evidence of Steven’s
pain and suffering was legally sufficient. In addition, weighing all the evidence, we
conclude that the trial court’s award of $50,000 for pain and suffering was not so
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong
and unjust. See id. at 826; see also Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. The evidence was
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s award for pain and suffering.
Lastly, we turn to the evidence regarding Steven’s medical expenses. As
mentioned above, the trial court awarded Steven medical expenses in the amount of
$29,002.13. The Memorial Hermann Hospital billing records that were introduced
into evidence indicate that the balance owed after insurance payments was
$29,002.13. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
findings, we conclude that a reasonable and fair-minded factfinder could have
determined that Steven was entitled to medical expenses in the awarded amount. See
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. Therefore, the evidence of medical expenses was
legally sufficient. In addition, weighing all the evidence, we conclude that the trial
court’s award of medical expenses was not so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See id. at 826; see
also Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. The evidence was factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s award of medical expenses in the amount of $29,002.13.
19 We conclude that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support
the damages awarded in the trial court’s judgment. Therefore, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that Steven was entitled to damages of $92,002.13.
See Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241-42. We overrule issue two. Having overruled both
of Terry’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________ W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice
Submitted on January 26, 2021 Opinion Delivered April 8, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.