Terry L. Hopkins, Inc. v. Activation, Inc.

647 F. Supp. 748, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18260
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maine
DecidedOctober 31, 1986
DocketCiv. 86-0023-P
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 647 F. Supp. 748 (Terry L. Hopkins, Inc. v. Activation, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Terry L. Hopkins, Inc. v. Activation, Inc., 647 F. Supp. 748, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18260 (D. Me. 1986).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT ACTIVATION, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS

GENE CARTER, District Judge.

This action is before the Court on motion of the Defendant, Activation, Inc., to dismiss the complaint against it for lack of in personam jurisdiction, and, alternatively, on the ground of forum non conveniens. The Defendant, a distributor of fluid power components including hydraulic pumps, winches, reels and motors, is an Alabama corporation with its principal place of business in Theodore, Alabama. In May of 1984 Defendant contracted to sell hydraulic components to Eastern Marine, Inc., a shipyard located in Florida, for $24,079.04. The equipment was delivered to Eastern by September of 1984 and was accompanied by a one-line piping diagram, or schematic, and a brochure containing technical information about the components. Defendant maintained contact with Eastern while the equipment was being installed on a vessel Eastern was building for Plaintiff, and gave advice about installation by telephone and during personal visits to Eastern’s boat yard in Florida.

Plaintiff, Terry L. Hopkins, Inc., is a Maine corporation with its principal place of business in Yarmouth, Maine, where it is engaged in the fishing business. On or about January 31, 1984, Plaintiff entered into a vessel construction contract with Eastern Marine, Inc. The vessel, the F/V CAITLIN, was delivered to Plaintiff with the components supplied by Defendant having been built into its hydraulic system in the course of construction in Florida. Plaintiff alleges that the hydraulic system began malfunctioning almost immediately after the vessel was delivered and that the malfunctioning was the direct result of Defendant’s faulty design. Plaintiff further alleges that it incurred various expenditures and loss of profits as a direct result of the malfunctioning of the hydraulic system.

Defendant denies that it was aware of either the vessel’s destination or that it was being designed for a Maine purchaser. However, in affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff, officials at Eastern Marine state that over the years Activation has typically wanted to know the destination or hailing port of vessels for which it was supplying components and schematics and that, in this case, the hailing port of the vessel, Portland, Maine, was prominently displayed on the vessel when Activation inspected it. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that it had a telephone conversation with the Defendant in the spring of 1984, during which it informed Activation that the vessel *750 would be operating in the Gulf of Maine and needed to be specially designed to tow heavy gear on those waters. In its affidavits, Defendant claims no “specific recollection” of this communication.

When the Court’s in personam jurisdiction is challenged, the burden rests on the plaintiff to establish that jurisdiction is proper. Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7, 8 (1st Cir.1986). A showing of personal jurisdiction must be based on specific facts set forth in the record, and the record is to be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 8-9. See also Marino v. Hyatt Corp., 793 F.2d 427 (1st Cir.1986). This Court concludes that the Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish for the purpose of this motion that the Defendant knew or should have known that the hydraulic components that he was selling and the expertise that he was providing were being used to build a vessel that was being purchased for use in Maine.

The limits of personal jurisdiction under Maine law 1 are coextensive with federal due process requirements. 14 M.R.S.A. § 704-A(l); Architectural Woodcraft Co. v. Read, 464 A.2d 210, 212 (Me.1983). As this Court has previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has prescribed a three-step analysis for determining whether jurisdiction may be asserted consistent with due process:

First, the defendant must have some contact with the forum state; if it does not, due process prohibits the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 566, 62 L.Ed. 490 (1980). If the defendant has forum contacts, the court must proceed to the second step in its analysis: whether the suit arises out of or is related to defendant’s forum contacts? The answer to this question determines the test to be applied in the third step of the analysis. If the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum contacts, the critical question becomes whether the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation forms a fair and reasonable foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant. But if the cause of action does not arise out of and is not related to the defendant’s forum contacts, the court considers only the relationship between the forum state and the foreign defendant.

Jones v. North American Aerodynamics, Inc., 594 F.Supp. 657, 659 (D.Me.1984) (per Cyr, C.J.).

This Court must decide whether Activation’s activity in connection with the building of the F/Y CAITLIN constituted a contact with the forum of Maine, and, if so, whether the relationship among the Defendant, the forum, and the litigation forms a fair and reasonable foundation for the exercise of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has stated that a defendant who “ ‘purposefully avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,’ ” is deemed to have clear notice that he can be sued in that state. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). The Court said that

[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor ... is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of the States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others.

Id. 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. Activation delivered its components to Eastern and gave Eastern technical assistance in installing them with the expectation that the final product would be purchased by a Maine corporation. The presence of Activation’s products in Maine was not an iso *751 lated occurrence but arose from its efforts to serve the broad market reached by shipbuilders such as Eastern.

After World-Wide Volkswagen,

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Bluebook (online)
647 F. Supp. 748, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18260, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terry-l-hopkins-inc-v-activation-inc-med-1986.