Terry Beachum v. Parker Evatt Attorney General of the State of South Carolina

48 F.3d 1215, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 10987, 1995 WL 106109

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: February 16, 1995
• Docket: 94-7202
• Status: Published

Opinion

48 F.3d 1215
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.

Terry BEACHUM, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Parker EVATT; Attorney General of the State of South
Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 94-7202.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 19, 1995.
Decided Feb. 16, 1995.

Terry Beachum, appellant pro se.

Donald John Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, SC, for appellees.

Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and SPROUSE, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals an order of the magistrate judge directing him to show exhaustion of state remedies in this 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 (1988) proceeding. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This Court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1988), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292 (1988); Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order.*

We therefore deny a certificate of probable cause to appeal and dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED

* We also note that Appellant filed his appeal outside the thirty-day appeal period established by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1), failed to obtain an extension of the appeal period within the additional thirty-day period provided by Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), and is not entitled to relief under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6)