Terrionna L-R Davis

CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedDecember 1, 2023
Docket22-31147
StatusUnknown

This text of Terrionna L-R Davis (Terrionna L-R Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Terrionna L-R Davis, (Mich. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

In re: Chapter 13 Terrionna LR Davis, Case No. 22-31147-jda Hon. Joel D. Applebaum Debtor.

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OPINION DENYING CONFIRMATION OF DEBTOR’S PLAN AND DISMISSING CHAPTER 13 CASE

INTRODUCTION A central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, as described by the United States Supreme Court, is to provide a procedure by which certain insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’ But in the same breath that we have invoked this ‘fresh start’ policy, we have been careful to explain that the Act limits the opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’

Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-287 (1991) (internal citation omitted). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s limiting language, the opportunity to receive a bankruptcy discharge is not afforded solely to the “honest but unfortunate debtor.” In a chapter 13 case, for example, while a case must be filed in good faith and a chapter 13 plan must be proposed in good faith, the debt to be discharged need not necessarily have been incurred in good faith. In re Smith, 286 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 2002). As a result, a “Chapter 13 plan may be confirmed despite even the most egregious pre-filing conduct where other factors suggest that the plan nevertheless

represents a good faith effort by the debtor to satisfy his creditor’s claims.” Id.; In re Heath, 649 B.R. 313, 318 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2023). In the Sixth Circuit, determining whether a debtor has made such a good faith effort or whether a debtor is abusing

the bankruptcy process requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances, of which a debtor’s pre-petition conduct is only one among many. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 851 F.2d 852, 858 (6th Cir. 1988) (considering whether plan filed in good faith); See Metro Employees Credit Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoreeh-

Baah), 836 F.2d 1030, 1033 (6th Cir. 1988) (“In a good faith analysis, the infinite variety of factors facing any particular debtor must be weighed carefully.”) This case tests Debtor’s ability to establish that she filed her case and proposed

her chapter 13 plan in good faith despite (i) fraudulently obtaining a paycheck protection program (“PPP”) loan by misrepresenting the existence of a business, (ii) repeatedly failing to disclose that PPP loan or its forgiveness on her petition, schedules and statement of financial affairs (“SOFA”), as repeatedly amended, and

(iii) failing to disclose yet another business on her petition, schedules and SOFA, as repeatedly amended. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Court finds that Debtor did not file this case in good faith and that her pre- and post-petition

conduct evidences an abuse of the bankruptcy process. Accordingly, this case will be dismissed. Moreover, because the Court finds a lack of good faith and an abuse of the bankruptcy process, the Court will also impose a two-year bar on refiling. See

Riddle v. Greenberg (In re Riddle), 2020 WL 3498438 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2020). JURISDICTION This matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) over which

the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157(a) and the statutory and constitutional authority to enter a final order. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Debtor’s Chapter 7 Case On August 5, 2022, Debtor, Terrionna LR Davis, filed her voluntary individual chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. On her bankruptcy petition, Debtor

indicated that she had not used any business name or d/b/a in the past 8 years, nor did she have an employer identification number (“EIN”) (questions 2 and 4). She also indicated that she was not the sole proprietor of any business, part time or full time (question 12).

On Schedule A/B, line 19, Debtor indicated she had no interests in “non- publicly traded stock and interests in incorporated and unincorporated businesses.” Debtor’s Schedule D listed one secured debt, a loan on Debtor’s vehicle in the

amount of $2,000. Her Schedule E/F listed no priority debts and $271,247.89 in unsecured debts, the largest of which is a state court judgment in the amount of $260,966.89.1 No debt was listed for a PPP loan.2

Debtor’s Schedules I and J stated that Debtor works as a security guard for Serrato Corporation with monthly income of $2,970 and has monthly expenses of $2,969 leaving net income of $1.33.

Debtor’s Statement of Financial Affairs (“SOFA”) indicated the following: Under Part 2 (“Explain the Sources of Your Income), Debtor earned $6,234.15 from “employment or from operating a business during this year or the two previous years,” although she did not specify whether that income was wages or from

operating a business. (Part 2, question 4). Part 2 question 5 stated Debtor received no other income “during this year or the two previous calendar years.” B. The United States Trustee’s Complaint

On October 28, 2022, the United States Trustee (“UST”) filed an adversary proceeding (AP Case No. 22-3036) asserting Debtor should be denied a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (c), (d) and (e). According to the UST’s Complaint, Debtor obtained an $18,000 PPP Loan and she was “either not entitled to the loan because

the business did not exist at that time, or if she was entitled to the loan, is concealing

1 No proof of claim was timely filed by the judgment creditor. 2 Presumably, Debtor did not include the debt because the loan had been forgiven pre-petition. the company in her bankruptcy filings.” (AP Complaint, Dkt. 1, pp. 1-2). Further, the UST’s Complaint asserted that “[i]n this bankruptcy, the Debtor did not disclose

the income she received from the PPP loan, or the business she claimed to have when she took out the loan. She also concealed records about this transaction by not disclosing them at her [section] 341 meeting of creditors and failed to explain the

dissipation of the PPP funds. Her discharge should therefore be denied as a result.” (AP Complaint, Dkt. 1, p. 2) On November 11, 2022, Debtor and the UST entered into a stipulated settlement of the Adversary Proceeding (AP Dkt. 8). The stipulation indicated that

Debtor wanted “to resolve the matter without the need for further inquiry or litigation, and without making any admissions” and “has chosen to waive her entitlement to a Chapter 7 discharge for any and all debts she incurred as of and prior

to August 5, 2022.” (AP Dkt. 8, ¶ 3). In exchange for Debtor’s chapter 7 discharge waiver, the UST agreed it would “not contest the Debtor’s right to convert this case to Chapter 13, and will neither contest the Debtor’s right to receive a discharge in Chapter 13 based upon the conduct alleged in the [UST’s] Complaint . . . or demand

a specific repayment percentage in Chapter 13.” (Id. at ¶ 9).

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Related

Grogan v. Garner
498 U.S. 279 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass.
549 U.S. 365 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Stern v. Marshall
131 S. Ct. 2594 (Supreme Court, 2011)
Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell)
851 F.2d 852 (Sixth Circuit, 1988)

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