FILED Jan 24 2024, 9:04 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Caryn E. Wallace Emily A. Szczepkowski Chrzan Law, LLC Franklin Law, LLC Fort Wayne, Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re: the Visitation of: C.B. January 24, 2024
Terri Welbaum, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MI-1586 Appellant-Petitioner, Appeal from the Allen Superior v. Court The Honorable Lori Morgan, Courtney Bowser, Judge The Honorable Beth Webber, Appellee-Respondent, Magistrate
and Trial Court Cause No. 02D08-2110-MI-000871 Grant Bockelman, Appellee-Intervenor
Opinion by Judge May Judges Bailey and Felix concur.
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 1 of 9 [1] Terri Welbaum (“Grandmother”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion
to correct error following the dismissal for lack of standing of her petition for
grandparent visitation with C.B. (“Child”). Grandmother argues she had
standing to pursue grandparent visitation based on the plain language of
Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5, otherwise known as the Grandparent Visitation
Act (“GVA”). We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Child was born on April 21, 2014, to Courtney Bowser (“Mother”) and Grant
Bockelman (“Father”). Mother and Father were never married. Father
established paternity of Child approximately one year after her birth. Mother is
Child’s custodial parent. Grandmother is Mother’s mother.
[3] Mother and Child lived with Grandmother during the first year of Child’s life,
and Grandmother provided in-home care for Child from September 2014 to
May 2019. Starting in May 2019, Mother began restricting the amount of time
Grandmother spent with Child. Mother eventually allowed Grandmother to
visit with Child only with Mother’s supervision. In December 2020, Mother
began completely denying Grandmother visitation with Child, and
Grandmother has not seen Child since.
[4] On October 11, 2021, Grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation
with Child. She argued grandparent visitation was in Child’s best interests
because Mother had mental illness that made her an unfit parent and because
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 2 of 9 Grandmother and Child have a close relationship. On December 15, 2021, the
trial court ordered, among other things, the parties to engage in mediation.
[5] On April 7, 2022, Grandmother filed a motion for temporary supervised
grandparent visitation. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on May 6,
2022, and scheduled a follow-up hearing for May 27, 2022. However, the trial
court later vacated the May 27 hearing because Mother and Grandmother had
reached an agreement.
[6] On October 7, 2022, Father filed a motion to intervene. On October 25, 2022,
the trial court granted Father’s motion to intervene. On December 2, 2022,
Mother and Father filed a joint motion to dismiss Grandmother’s request for
visitation with prejudice. Therein, they argued Grandmother did not have
standing to pursue visitation pursuant to the GVA. On the same day, Mother
and Father filed a joint motion to dismiss Grandmother’s request for temporary
supervised grandparent visitation in which they made the same standing
argument.
[7] On January 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for dismissal
filed by Mother and Father. On February 1, 2023, the trial court issued its
order in which it determined Grandmother did not have standing to pursue
grandparent visitation because she was the parent of Mother, who was Child’s
custodial parent. It accordingly dismissed Grandmother’s petition for
grandparent visitation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 3 of 9 [8] On March 3, 2023, Grandmother filed a motion to correct error. The trial court
held a hearing on Grandmother’s motion to correct error on May 19, 2023. On
June 13, 2023, the trial court denied Grandmother’s motion to correct errors.
Discussion and Decision [9] We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of
discretion, reversing only when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances before the court or when the trial court has erred
as a matter of law. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). We
also consider the standard of review for the underlying ruling. See B.A. v. D.D.,
189 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Here, the underlying
order is the trial court’s order dismissing Grandmother’s petition for
Grandparent visitation based on lack of standing. We review de novo a trial
court’s decision dismissing a case for lack of standing. Pflugh v. Indianapolis
Hist. Pres. Comm’n, 108 N.E.3d 904, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
“Standing is a judicial doctrine that focuses on whether the complaining party is
the proper party to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Liberty Landowners
Assoc., Inc. v. Porter Cnty. Comm’rs, 913 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
trans. denied.
[10] The trial court’s dismissal of Grandmother’s petition is based on its
interpretation of the GVA. Grandmother asserts the current version of the
GVA, Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5 et seq., does not prohibit a parent of a
custodial parent from seeking grandparent visitation and, thus, she has standing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 4 of 9 to pursue visitation with Child. Interpretation of a statute is a pure question of
law that we review de novo. Jones v. Lofton, 201 N.E.3d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App.
2022), trans. denied. Our goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislature’s intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the language of the
statute itself. Id. If a statute is unambiguous, we must give the statute its clear
and plain meaning. Id. A statute is not necessarily ambiguous just because the
parties disagree about the statute’s meaning. Southwest Allen Cnty. Fire Protection
Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans.
denied.
[11] Prior to 1993, the statute regarding grandparent visitation stated, in relevant
part:
(a) A court may not grant visitation under this chapter after May 8, 1989, to a grandparent who is the parent of a person:
(1) who is not deceased; and
(2) who has been awarded custody of the grandchild.
(b) A child’s maternal grandparent may seek visitation rights, regardless of whether the paternity of the child has been established, if:
(1) the child’s mother is deceased;
(2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in Indiana; or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 5 of 9 (3) the child was born out of wedlock.
(c) A child’s paternal grandparent may seek visitation rights if:
(1) the child’s father is deceased;
(2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in Indiana; or
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED Jan 24 2024, 9:04 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Caryn E. Wallace Emily A. Szczepkowski Chrzan Law, LLC Franklin Law, LLC Fort Wayne, Indiana Fort Wayne, Indiana
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In Re: the Visitation of: C.B. January 24, 2024
Terri Welbaum, Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MI-1586 Appellant-Petitioner, Appeal from the Allen Superior v. Court The Honorable Lori Morgan, Courtney Bowser, Judge The Honorable Beth Webber, Appellee-Respondent, Magistrate
and Trial Court Cause No. 02D08-2110-MI-000871 Grant Bockelman, Appellee-Intervenor
Opinion by Judge May Judges Bailey and Felix concur.
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 1 of 9 [1] Terri Welbaum (“Grandmother”) appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion
to correct error following the dismissal for lack of standing of her petition for
grandparent visitation with C.B. (“Child”). Grandmother argues she had
standing to pursue grandparent visitation based on the plain language of
Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5, otherwise known as the Grandparent Visitation
Act (“GVA”). We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History [2] Child was born on April 21, 2014, to Courtney Bowser (“Mother”) and Grant
Bockelman (“Father”). Mother and Father were never married. Father
established paternity of Child approximately one year after her birth. Mother is
Child’s custodial parent. Grandmother is Mother’s mother.
[3] Mother and Child lived with Grandmother during the first year of Child’s life,
and Grandmother provided in-home care for Child from September 2014 to
May 2019. Starting in May 2019, Mother began restricting the amount of time
Grandmother spent with Child. Mother eventually allowed Grandmother to
visit with Child only with Mother’s supervision. In December 2020, Mother
began completely denying Grandmother visitation with Child, and
Grandmother has not seen Child since.
[4] On October 11, 2021, Grandmother filed a petition for grandparent visitation
with Child. She argued grandparent visitation was in Child’s best interests
because Mother had mental illness that made her an unfit parent and because
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 2 of 9 Grandmother and Child have a close relationship. On December 15, 2021, the
trial court ordered, among other things, the parties to engage in mediation.
[5] On April 7, 2022, Grandmother filed a motion for temporary supervised
grandparent visitation. The trial court held a hearing on the matter on May 6,
2022, and scheduled a follow-up hearing for May 27, 2022. However, the trial
court later vacated the May 27 hearing because Mother and Grandmother had
reached an agreement.
[6] On October 7, 2022, Father filed a motion to intervene. On October 25, 2022,
the trial court granted Father’s motion to intervene. On December 2, 2022,
Mother and Father filed a joint motion to dismiss Grandmother’s request for
visitation with prejudice. Therein, they argued Grandmother did not have
standing to pursue visitation pursuant to the GVA. On the same day, Mother
and Father filed a joint motion to dismiss Grandmother’s request for temporary
supervised grandparent visitation in which they made the same standing
argument.
[7] On January 6, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the motions for dismissal
filed by Mother and Father. On February 1, 2023, the trial court issued its
order in which it determined Grandmother did not have standing to pursue
grandparent visitation because she was the parent of Mother, who was Child’s
custodial parent. It accordingly dismissed Grandmother’s petition for
grandparent visitation.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 3 of 9 [8] On March 3, 2023, Grandmother filed a motion to correct error. The trial court
held a hearing on Grandmother’s motion to correct error on May 19, 2023. On
June 13, 2023, the trial court denied Grandmother’s motion to correct errors.
Discussion and Decision [9] We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to correct error for an abuse of
discretion, reversing only when the ruling is clearly against the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances before the court or when the trial court has erred
as a matter of law. Perkinson v. Perkinson, 989 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. 2013). We
also consider the standard of review for the underlying ruling. See B.A. v. D.D.,
189 N.E.3d 611, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. Here, the underlying
order is the trial court’s order dismissing Grandmother’s petition for
Grandparent visitation based on lack of standing. We review de novo a trial
court’s decision dismissing a case for lack of standing. Pflugh v. Indianapolis
Hist. Pres. Comm’n, 108 N.E.3d 904, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
“Standing is a judicial doctrine that focuses on whether the complaining party is
the proper party to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Liberty Landowners
Assoc., Inc. v. Porter Cnty. Comm’rs, 913 N.E.2d 1245, 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009),
trans. denied.
[10] The trial court’s dismissal of Grandmother’s petition is based on its
interpretation of the GVA. Grandmother asserts the current version of the
GVA, Indiana Code chapter 31-17-5 et seq., does not prohibit a parent of a
custodial parent from seeking grandparent visitation and, thus, she has standing
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 4 of 9 to pursue visitation with Child. Interpretation of a statute is a pure question of
law that we review de novo. Jones v. Lofton, 201 N.E.3d 676, 678 (Ind. Ct. App.
2022), trans. denied. Our goal when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the
legislature’s intent, and the best evidence of that intent is the language of the
statute itself. Id. If a statute is unambiguous, we must give the statute its clear
and plain meaning. Id. A statute is not necessarily ambiguous just because the
parties disagree about the statute’s meaning. Southwest Allen Cnty. Fire Protection
Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans.
denied.
[11] Prior to 1993, the statute regarding grandparent visitation stated, in relevant
part:
(a) A court may not grant visitation under this chapter after May 8, 1989, to a grandparent who is the parent of a person:
(1) who is not deceased; and
(2) who has been awarded custody of the grandchild.
(b) A child’s maternal grandparent may seek visitation rights, regardless of whether the paternity of the child has been established, if:
(1) the child’s mother is deceased;
(2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in Indiana; or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 5 of 9 (3) the child was born out of wedlock.
(c) A child’s paternal grandparent may seek visitation rights if:
(1) the child’s father is deceased;
(2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in Indiana; or
(3) the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child has been established in the son of the grandparent.
Ind. Code § 31-1-11.7-2 (1992). In 1993, the Indiana Legislature amended that
statute by removing subsection (a). In 1997, the Indiana Legislature repealed
Indiana Code section 31-1-11.7-2 (1993) and recodified it, with virtually
identical language, as Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1, which provides:
(a) A child’s grandparent may seek visitation rights if:
(1) the child’s parent is deceased;
(2) the marriage of the child’s parents has been dissolved in Indiana; or
(3) subject to subsection (b), the child was born out of wedlock.
(b) A court may not grant visitation rights to a paternal grandparent of a child who is born out of wedlock under
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 6 of 9 subsection (a)(3) if the child's father has not established paternity in relation to the child.
Grandmother contends the Legislature’s 1993 amendment of Indiana Code
section 31-1-11.7-2, which removed “a provision that barred custodial
grandparents from seeking grandparent visitation[,]” indicates the Legislature’s
intent to allow the parent of a custodial parent to seek grandparent visitation.
(Br. of Appellant at 10.) As a result, Grandmother claims, under the current
language of the statute, she has standing to pursue grandparent visitation with
Child.
[12] We recently examined this issue in Stoner v. Stoner, 223 N.E.3d 278 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2023). In that case, the grandfather sought to establish grandparent
visitation with his grandson pursuant to the GVA. Id. at 279. The grandson’s
parents shared physical and legal custody of him. Id. The trial court found,
based on In re Matter of E.H., 121 N.E.3d 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), that the
grandfather, as the parent of one of grandson’s custodial parents, did not have
standing to pursue grandparent visitation. Id. at 280.
[13] The grandfather appealed and argued In re Matter of E.H. relied upon case law
decided prior to the 1993 amendment to the GVA, which removed language
regarding the parent of the custodial parent’s inability to pursue grandparent
visitation, and “‘[n]o longer does the GVA make any kind of distinction
between custodial parent and noncustodial parent.” Id. at 280. We outlined
the evolution of the GVA, including the 1993 amendment that “eliminat[ed]
the language precluding a court from granting visitation to a grandparent who is Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 7 of 9 the parent of a person who has been awarded custody of the grandchild.” Id. at
281. Based thereon, we concluded Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1, the current
version of the GVA, “does not preclude a grandparent from seeking visitation
with a child where the custodian of the child is the grandparent’s child.” Id. at
282.
[14] Here, Grandmother is the parent of Mother, who is the custodial parent of
Child. As stated in Stoner, Indiana Code section 31-17-5-1 does not preclude
Grandmother from pursuing grandparent visitation with Child. Therefore, the
trial court erred when it dismissed Grandmother’s petition for grandparent
visitation with Child based on her alleged lack of standing. See, e.g., Moses v.
Cober, 641 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the 1993 amendment
of the GVA “reflects [the legislature’s] purpose to protect a grandparent whose
child, as the custodial parent, was denying visitation with a grandchild due to
conflict between grandparent and child”) (abrogated on other grounds by
Daugherty v. Ritter, 652 N.E.2d 502, 503 (Ind. 1995) (Moses determined merits of
visitation claim by focusing on relationship between grandmother and
granddaughter, while ignoring evidence of conflict between grandmother and
her daughter, and Daugherty held trial courts should instead consider the totality
of the circumstances between the grandparent, parent, and child when
determining whether grandparent visitation is in child’s best interests).
Conclusion
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 8 of 9 [15] Because Grandmother is not precluded by the GVA from seeking visitation
with Child, the trial court erred when it dismissed Grandmother’s petition for
grandparent visitation based on her alleged lack of standing. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
[16] Reversed and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Felix, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MI-1586 | January 24, 2024 Page 9 of 9