Terri Stiles v. John Clifford
This text of Terri Stiles v. John Clifford (Terri Stiles v. John Clifford) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 11 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TERRI L. STILES and AHMAD No. 22-55993 ALKAYALI, D.C. No. 8:22-CV-00469-JGB- Plaintiffs-Appellants, DFM
v. MEMORANDUM* JOHN CLIFFORD, STEVEN SMITH, DARREN RUDE, and DAVID R. CHAFFEE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Jesus G. Bernal, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 4, 2023** Pasadena, California
Before: WARDLAW and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BENCIVENGO,*** District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. Terri L. Stiles and Ahmad Alkayali (“Appellants”) appeal the district court’s
order granting the motions to dismiss of Defendants (1) John Clifford, Steven Smith,
and Darren Rude; and (2) David R. Chaffee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we AFFIRM.
1. The district court properly dismissed Appellants’ First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”) based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413,
415–16 (1923). For Appellants to receive damages, the district court would need to
overturn a state court decision twice reviewed by the California Court of Appeal.
The FAC is therefore a de facto appeal of the state court’s multiple rulings that
Appellants lack an ownership interest in the disputed Neocell Corporation. See
Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
de facto appeal exists where the federal claims are “inextricably intertwined” with
the state court ruling). Nor have Appellants demonstrated that the extrinsic fraud
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, because their claim asserts that
the state court judge erred in his handling of the state court proceedings. See
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Extrinsic fraud on
a court is, by definition, not an error by that court.”).
2. The district court also properly dismissed the FAC because it was barred
by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.
2 The state court case that allegedly deprived Appellants of their rights was initiated
in 2008, and any alleged fraud was discovered no later than 2015. Appellants
brought this case in 2022, over ten years after the initial injuries occurred, and seven
years after discovery of the alleged fraud. The permanent injunction enforced
against Appellants is an “individualized claim” of injury that does not invoke the
continuing violations doctrine. See Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d 738, 748
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the normal discovery rule of accrual applies to a
continuing impact from a past violation). Furthermore, equitable estoppel did not
toll the statute of limitations, as there is no evidence in the record that Defendants
prevented Appellants from filing their federal claim until 2022. See Lukovsky v.
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
equitable estoppel inapplicable where “plaintiffs did not allege any fraudulent
concealment . . . above and beyond the actual basis for the lawsuit”).
3. Because an amendment to the FAC could not cure these deficiencies, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend. See Chappel
v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 725–26 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A district court acts
within its discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile . . ..”).
AFFIRMED.
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