Terrence Paschall v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 21, 2019
• Docket: 18A-MI-2444
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 21 2019, 9:57 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Terrence Paschall Curtis T. Hill, Jr. New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana Frances Barrow Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Terrence Paschall, May 21, 2019 Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-2444 v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Kit C. Dean Crane, Appellee-Respondent Judge Trial Court Cause No. 33C02-1801-MI-42

Baker, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 1 of 4 [1] Terrence Paschall appeals from the denial of his petition for declaratory

judgment and preliminary injunction. Finding no error, we affirm.

[2] In May 2012, Paschall pleaded guilty to rape. He was sentenced to serve

twenty years and is currently incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional

Facility, with an earliest possible release date of December 14, 2019.

[3] In June 2018, Paschall filed a petition asking the trial court to order that, upon

release from incarceration, he (1) would not be designated as a sexually violent

predator; (2) would not have to register as a sex offender through the Indiana

Sex Offender Management and Monitoring program (INSOMM); and

(3) would not have to abide by parole conditions restricting his movements and

residency. On August 27, 2018, the trial court denied Paschall’s petition,

finding that it was not ripe because he was still incarcerated. Paschall now

appeals.

[4] Paschall’s petition refers to Indiana Code section 11-8-8-22, which provides a

process for offenders to file a petition to remove a designation or to register

under less restrictive conditions. We will reverse a trial court’s ruling under this

statute only if it is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and inferences

supporting the petition for relief. Lucas v. McDonald, 954 N.E.2d 996, 998 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2011). Paschall also requested declaratory and injunctive relief.

Because the trial court denied his request, he is appealing from a negative

judgment. Mann v. Johnson Mem’l Hosp., 611 N.E.2d 676, 677 (Ind. Ct. App.

1993). We will reverse a negative judgment only if it is contrary to law,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 2 of 4 meaning that “the evidence is without conflict and all reasonable inferences to

be drawn therefrom lead to but one result and the trial court has reached a

different result.” Id.

[5] Initially, we note that Paschall has raised multiple arguments for the first time

on appeal, including: (1) a sentencing argument under Indiana Appellate Rule

7(B); (2) a separation of powers argument; (3) an argument related to the

statutory authority of the Parole Board; (4) an argument about the

constitutionality of two statutes; (5) an argument about the breadth and

specificity of certain parole conditions; and (6) an Eighth Amendment

argument. He has waived all of these issues by failing to raise them below, and

we will not address them. E.g., Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town

of Goodland, 811 N.E.2d 425, 436 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

[6] With respect to Paschall’s argument that he should not have to register as a sex

offender under INSOMM and participate with that program, we agree with the

trial court that this issue is not ripe for review. He is still incarcerated and is not

participating in INSOMM. Moreover, even if we were to attempt to address

the substance of this argument, he fails to explain how participating in

INSOMM violates any of his statutory or constitutional rights. Under these

circumstances, the trial court did not err by ruling against him.

[7] Likewise, with respect to Paschall’s argument that he should not have to

comply with certain restrictive parole conditions, including being designated as

a sexually violent predator, we can only find that this claim is not ripe for

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 3 of 4 review. As he is still incarcerated at this time, we do not know what parole

conditions will be imposed upon him and any review would be purely

hypothetical. In other words, there is no evidence that he has been subjected to

any parole conditions that reflect a particular sex offender status, registry

requirement, or restriction on his activities and residency. Therefore, the trial

court did not err by ruling against him. See Gardner v. State, 923 N.E.2d 959,

960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that an ex post facto challenge to application

of the violent offender registry was not ripe for review while the petitioner was

still incarcerated).

[8] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Najam, J., and Robb, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2444 | May 21, 2019 Page 4 of 4