Terrell v. Local Lodge 758, International Ass'n of MacHinists
This text of 296 P.2d 100 (Terrell v. Local Lodge 758, International Ass'n of MacHinists) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
This is an appeal from a summary judgment granted the defendant and respondent Menasco Manufactur *18 ing Company, against Hugh M. Terrell, plaintiff and appellant.
At the time in question, the respondent and Local Lodge 758, International Association of Machinists, hereinafter referred to as the union, were parties to a collective bargaining agreement, hereinafter referred to as the contract, which governed and controlled the terms and conditions of employment for all employees of the respondent represented by the union. Appellant, a member of the union, and employed by respondent, was discharged by the latter on or about September 11, 1953.
There is in the contract a part entitled “Grievance Procedure’’ 1 which provides the exclusive procedure for settling *19 all claims or disputes against the respondent by the union and by any employees represented by the union. The procedure provided for four steps of negotiations, in brief as follows: the first step we are not concerned with in this proceeding; the second step provides for a meeting of two company and two union representatives to attempt to reach a settlement; step three provides for an appeal board consisting of three company and three union representatives, and step four provides for arbitration by an impartial arbitrator in the event the company or the union requests in writing an appeal to such arbitrator. The contract provides that only the company or the union is empowered to appeal a grievance to either step three or step four.
Appellant filed his grievance on September 12, 1953, and a step two meeting was held and resulted in a failure to settle the grievance. The union appealed the grievance to step three. A step three meeting was held on September 18, *20 1953; however, the grievance was not resolved at that meeting. The union chose not to appeal the grievance to a step four proceeding.
Appellant brought this action against the respondent and the union. In the cause against the respondent he averred that he was a member of the union; that he was employed by the respondent under the terms of the agreement; that he was wrongfully discharged; that he took up his grievance with the union and demanded that the company and the union continue the grievance procedure through and including arbitration; that neither did so; that he suffered a loss of $24,320. In the cause against the union he averred that he became a member thereof in 1952; that he worked under the contract; that the union undertook to represent and protect him and that they failed to do so to his loss in the sum of $34,320.
Respondent, after proper preliminary proceedings, made a motion for a summary judgment, and pursuant to the provisions of section 437c of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed an affidavit of the personnel manager of the company wherein it was set forth that steps two and three were taken and *21 that no appeal to step four was taken as provided for in the contract. The affidavit of the personnel manager likewise sets forth the grievance procedure as is provided in the contract. Appellant filed a counteraffidavit wherein he set forth that he was discharged and that he demanded of the union that it process his claim and represent him. He further set forth that he made certain inquiries from time to time and made demands upon the union and the respondent that they proceed with the grievance procedure. It was not denied by appellant, but to the contrary it was vehemently claimed by him, that step four had not been taken.
The rule is well settled that the propriety of granting or denying a motion for a summary judgment depends upon the sufficiency of the affidavits that have been filed. (Coyne v. Krempels, 36 Cal.2d 257, 261 [223 P.2d 244] ; Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 558, 562 [277 P.2d 464].)
In the case of Cone v. Union Oil Co., supra, at pages 562, 563-564, the court said; “The obvious purpose to be served by the summary judgment procedure is to expedite litigation by avoiding needless trials. "While it is not a substitute for a regular trial and does not authorize the trial of any bona fide issues of fact which the affidavits may reveal, it permits the court to pierce the allegations of the pleadings to ascertain whether a genuine cause of action in fact exists or whether the defense interposed is sham or feigned. (Kelly v. Liddicoat, 35 Cal.App.2d 559, 561, 562 [96 P.2d 186].)
“• • . It is the general rule that a party to a collective bargaining contract which provides grievance and arbitration machinery for the settlement of disputes within the scope of such contract must exhaust these internal remedies before resorting to the courts in the absence of facts which would excuse him from pursuing such remedies. (Citing cases.) This rule, which is analogous to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to resorting to the courts (2 Cal.Jur.2d 304, § 184), is based on a practical approach to the myriad problems, complaints and grievances that arise under a collective bargaining agreement. It makes possible the settlement of such matters by a simple, expeditious and inexpensive procedure, and by persons who, generally, are intimately familiar therewith. (Utah Const. Co. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 174 Cal. 156, 159 [162 P. 631].) The use of these internal remedies for the adjustment of grievances is designed not only to promote *22 settlement thereof bnt also to foster more harmonious employee-employer relations. (Myers v. Richfield Oil Corp., 98 Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [220 P.2d 973].) Such procedures, which have been worked out and adopted by the parties themselves, must be pursued to their conclusion before judicial action may be instituted unless circumstances exist which would excuse the failure to follow through with the contract remedies. (Citing cases.) ”
Appellant has not alleged, and there is nothing in the record before us indicating that.under the terms of the contract either of the parties was required to appeal to steps three or four. The union, as heretofore pointed out, as the representative of appellant, exercised its discretion in this case and elected not to proceed to arbitration under the step four procedure. It therefore failed to exhaust the grievance procedure which is, by the contract, the exclusive method for adjusting claims or disputes of an employee against the company.
We have carefully examined the record in this matter and are of the opinion that the court was well within its discretion in granting the summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
White, P. J., and Doran, J., concurred.
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296 P.2d 100, 141 Cal. App. 2d 17, 1956 Cal. App. LEXIS 1807, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terrell-v-local-lodge-758-international-assn-of-machinists-calctapp-1956.