Terrell v. City of Brentwood

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: September 8, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-04341
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JEREMY RYAN TERRELL, Case No. 25-cv-04341-LJC

8 Plaintiff, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 9 v. IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 10 CITY OF BRENTWOOD, et al., COMPLAINT; DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT; 11 Defendants. DENYING REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

12 Re: Dkt. Nos. 6, 11, 15 13

14 Plaintiff Jeremy Terrell sued the City of Brentwood (the City), Officer Dustin Greene, 15 Officer Doug Morrison, and former Officer Ryan Rezentes (the officer Defendants) (collectively, 16 Defendants) in Contra Costa Superior Court, alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights 17 during and after the officer Defendants’ entry into Plaintiff’s home in 2019. ECF No. 1-1. 18 Defendants removed the case to the Northern District of California and moved to dismiss. ECF 19 Nos. 1, 6. Plaintiff amended his complaint, ECF No. 9, and Defendants renewed their motion to 20 dismiss, ECF No. 11. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 6, is 21 denied as moot. For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First 22 Amended Complaint (FAC), ECF No. 11, is denied in part and granted in part. Defendants’ 23 request to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC is denied. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default 24 against the officer Defendants, ECF No. 15, is denied. 25 26 27 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1 1 Plaintiff was arrested for marijuana cultivation in 2010 and was subsequently held in 2 federal custody for two years. FAC ¶ 5. Following his release from custody in 2015, he was 3 placed on five years of federal supervised release, which was terminated early in September 2017 4 due to his “exemplary conduct and successful reintegration.” Id. During and after his supervised 5 release, Plaintiff lived with his parents in Brentwood, California, and worked as a painter. Id. In 6 April 2019, he was living with his parents, working full time, and saving to buy a house. Id. 7 Officers Greene, Morrison, and Rezentes of the Brentwood Police Department were on 8 duty early in the morning of April 16, 2019. See FAC at 29. They received a report of a burglary 9 at a gas station convenience store and began searching the surrounding area. Id. Officer Morrison 10 observed a white man in a t-shirt running down a street. The police dispatcher told the officers 11 that Plaintiff, who lived with his parents nearby, was on federal probation. Id. The dispatcher’s 12 description of Plaintiff matched the physical characteristics of the man seen running down the 13 street. Id. The officers approached Plaintiff’s parents’ home at approximately 2:00 am with a 14 police dog, Marco. Id. ¶ 1. They left for several minutes and then returned. Officer Rezentes 15 knocked on the door, Plaintiff’s elderly father answered, and the officers asked where Plaintiff 16 was. Marco was at the door with the officer Defendants, barking. Id. Plaintiff’s father turned to 17 call to Plaintiff (who was sleeping upstairs), and the officers and dog entered the home. Id. The 18 officers “proceeded upstairs to Plaintiff’s locked bedroom, where they ordered him—while nude 19 and disoriented—to open the locked door at gunpoint, handcuffed him, and conducted a search of 20 the room with the K-9.” Id. 21 Plaintiff’s mother and sister were also present inside the home. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Plaintiff’s 22 mother initially hid in a closet when the officers entered because she did not know who they were. 23 Id. ¶ 3. She and Plaintiff’s sister were then forced to wait downstairs while the officers searched 24 Plaintiff’s room. Id. ¶ 4. 25 The officers received updated information from the dispatcher and learned that Plaintiff did 26 27 1 not match the description of the burglary suspect. See id. at 31. They released Plaintiff, 2 apologized to his family, and left the home. Id. ¶ 2. 3 Plaintiff alleges that the April 2019 police entry “severely impacted [his] mental health and 4 ability to function.” Id. ¶ 5. He lost his job in May 2019, was hospitalized in November 2019 5 following a psychological crisis, and entered an inpatient psychiatric treatment program in January 6 2020, where he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, dissociation, and 7 depression. Id. His “psychological impairments persisted for over five years,” and, during this 8 period, he experienced “trauma-related episodes, including flashbacks, panic, sleep disturbances, 9 and dissociation,” and was hypervigilant and unable to “sleep or feel safe in his own home.” Id. 10 ¶¶ 10, 11. “His mental state rendered him unable to consult legal counsel or initiate litigation” 11 until December 2024. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that it took “years of emotional rehabilitation” for 12 him to reach “a point of psychological stability sufficient to” review the police report and a 13 neighbor’s surveillance footage showing the officers’ entry and “understand the constitutional 14 violations that had occurred.” Id. ¶¶ 6. 15 After the April 2019 incident, Plaintiff’s father requested a copy of the incident report 16 pursuant to the California Public Records Act. Id. ¶ 38. Thomas Hansen, then Chief of the 17 Brentwood Police Department, “denied the request until legally compelled to disclose the report.” 18 Id. In April 2025, Plaintiff submitted a public records request “seeking records of sustained 19 misconduct involving” each of the officer Defendants. Id. ¶ 39. “Records Supervisor Sonia 20 Cardinale, acting on behalf of Chief Tim Herbert” informed Plaintiff that the department had no 21 responsive records for Officer Rezentes. Id. ¶ 40. This was “knowingly false,” as the City had 22 records “relating to at least two violent K-9 deployments” involving Officer Rezentes. Id. Twelve 23 days later, the City disclosed limited records and photographs regarding one of the K-9 24 deployments, “alongside an excessive volume of irrelevant material.” Id. 25 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 26 Plaintiff sued the City of Brentwood and Officers Greene, Morrison, and Rezentes in 27 Contra Costa Superior Court on April 9, 2025, alleging that Defendants violated his civil rights 1 under the U.S. and California Constitution.2 See ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff served Defendants on 2 April 21, 2025, and Defendants removed the action to federal court one month later on the basis of 3 federal question jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1. Defendants then moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 4 claims, arguing that Plaintiff’s state law claims were barred because he had not first presented 5 them as required by the California Government Claims Act and his federal claims were time- 6 barred. ECF No. 6. 7 Plaintiff timely amended his complaint. See FAC. His First Amended Complaint alleges 8 that the officer Defendants’ April 2019 entry and conduct during the entry violated Plaintiff’s civil 9 rights. Plaintiff asserts that the officers entered his family’s home “without a warrant, without 10 consent, without probable cause, and without exigent circumstance” or any other lawful 11 justification and used excessive force against him when they pointed their firearms at Plaintiff and 12 handcuffed him while he was naked with a police dog present. Id. ¶¶ 19, 24. Plaintiff brings three 13 claims against the officer Defendants: a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claim alleging that the officers 14 violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights (Count One); a claim under California’s 15 Bane Act (Count Three); and a California common law trespass claim (Count Four). 16 Plaintiff also asserts a municipal liability claim against the City pursuant to Section 1983 17 (Count Two). He alleges that the officers’ conduct during the April 2019 incident was consistent 18 with the City’s “policy and longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries and excessive 19 force in non-emergency situations, frequently based on unsupported or demonstrably false 20 information provided by dispatch or officers.” Id. ¶ 34. He contends that the City failed to 21 properly discipline officers “with known misconduct histories,” which “enabled the 22 unconstitutional entry into Plaintiff’s home and the excessive, degrading detention that followed.” 23 Id. ¶¶ 41-42. He further alleges that the City had a “municipal practice of obstructing access to 24 police misconduct records” which was “ratified by municipal leadership.” Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. 25 Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss, in large part reiterating their previous 26

27 2 Plaintiff separately sued the City of Brentwood in Contra Costa Superior Court on April 8, 2025 1 arguments regarding the statute of limitations and government claims requirement. ECF No. 11. 2 They also contend that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, Monell liability claim, and Bane 3 Act claim otherwise fail as a matter of law. Id. at 15-18. Defendants request that the Court strike 4 portions of Plaintiff’s FAC (id. at 19) and that the Court consolidate Plaintiff’s lawsuit filed in 5 Contra Costa Superior Court against the City with the instant action (id. at 18-19). 6 After the motion to dismiss was fully briefed, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default 7 against the officer Defendants, arguing that they had not defended themselves in this lawsuit. ECF 8 No. 15. Defendants opposed his request for entry of default. ECF No. 16. 9 III. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT 10 Plaintiff requests that default be entered against the officer Defendants pursuant to Federal 11 Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). ECF No. 15 at 2. Rule 55(a) provides, “When a party against 12 whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that 13 failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” To date, the 14 Clerk of Court has not granted or denied Plaintiff’s request for entry of default. 15 Plaintiff argues that the motions to dismiss at ECF Nos. 6 and 11 were filed only by the 16 City and, as the officer Defendants “have not filed an answer, Rule 12 motion, notice of joinder, or 17 any responsive pleading,” entry of default against them is warranted. ECF No. 15 at 2. To 18 Plaintiff’s point, the captions of the motions to dismiss identify the motions as “DEFENDANT 19 CITY OF BRENTWOOD’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO DISMISS” and the 20 notices of motion state that “the CITY OF BRENTWOOD defendants (‘Defendants’) (‘City’) will, 21 and hereby do, move to dismiss Plaintiff’s” Complaint and FAC. ECF Nos. 6 at 1, 2; 11 at 1, 2. 22 Based on this language alone, there is no indication that the motions were filed by all Defendants. 23 But the docket reflects that the motions to dismiss and Defendants’ reply in support of their 24 motion to dismiss the FAC were filed by “Dustin Greene, Ryan Rezentes, Douglas Morrison, 25 [and] City of Brentwood.” ECF Nos. 6, 11, 14. All Defendants are represented by the same 26 counsel, see ECF No. 11 at 1, and the notices of motion and motions are submitted by the 27 “Attorneys for Defendants CITY OF BRENTWOOD, DUSTIN GREENE, RYAN REZENTES, 1 motions to dismiss “identify defects applicable to all claims and all defendants. The same 2 limitations bar the claims against the officers, and the FAC contains no facts or theories that would 3 justify separate treatment.” ECF No. 14 at 4. The Court accordingly construes the motions to 4 dismiss as being filed by all Defendants. 5 While the motions to dismiss could have been drafted to more clearly reflect that they were 6 filed by all Defendants, not just the City, the officer Defendants have otherwise “indicated” that 7 they “intend to” participate in this lawsuit and “defend against the allegations therein.” Johnson v. 8 Chudy, No. 14-cv-04958, 2021 WL 6427918, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2021). Defendants’ 9 counsel added the officer Defendants to the case at ECF No. 3. All Defendants consented to 10 magistrate judge jurisdiction.3 ECF No. 7. The Opposition to Plaintiff’s request for entry of 11 default was unequivocally filed by all Defendants. ECF No. 16. 12 Moreover, if default was entered against the officer Defendants, it would ultimately be set 13 aside. See J.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 20-cv-00656, 2025 WL 524642, at *2 14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2025) (“In similar circumstances, other district courts in this circuit have 15 applied Rule 55’s good cause standard to determine whether any default ultimately would be set 16 aside, and thus whether default should be entered at all.”); Hankerson v. Nationwide Cap. Servs., 17 No. 21-cv-1229, 2022 WL 1432441, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2022). “The court may set aside an 18 entry of default for good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). “To determine if there is good cause” to 19 set aside an entry of default, courts consider “(1) whether the party seeking to set aside the default 20 engaged in culpable conduct that led to the default; (2) whether it had no meritorious defense; or 21 (3) whether reopening the default judgment would prejudice the other party.” United States v. 22 Signed Pers. Check No. 730 of Yubran S. Mesle, 615 F. 3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation 23 modified). The Court has “especially broad” discretion to set aside entries of default, and 24 “judgment by default is a drastic step appropriate only in extreme circumstances.” Brady v. 25 United States, 211 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted); Falk v. Allen, 739 F.2d 461, 26

27 3 Although a notice was issued on June 17, 2025, directing Defendants to file their consent or 1 463 (9th Cir. 1984). Were default entered against the officer Defendants, there would be good 2 cause to set it aside as 1) the default would have been the result of inartful drafting by counsel 3 rather than culpable conduct of the officers, 2) Defendants have raised arguments that may prove 4 meritorious, and 3) setting aside the default judgment would not prejudice Plaintiff. See Mesle, 5 615 F.3d at 1091. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against the officer Defendants is 6 accordingly denied. 7 IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE AND REQUEST FOR CONSOLIDATION 8 Defendants request that the Court strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal 9 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). ECF No. 11 at 19. Rule 12(f) permits courts to strike “any 10 redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” from pleadings. Defendants seek to 11 strike paragraphs 93-97 and 1024 of the FAC. ECF No. 11 at 19. Paragraphs 93-97 pertain to 12 Defendants’ removal of this case to federal court, which Plaintiff characterizes as “improper last 13 minute forum shopping.” FAC ¶ 97. At paragraph 102, Plaintiff alleges:

14 The defense’s posture amounts to: “Yes, this was unconstitutional— but we should escape liability because the victim wasn’t well enough 15 to sue us in time.” That is not justice.…Such conduct undermines public trust and reinforces the very sense of powerlessness that 16 victims of unlawful police action often feel. 17 Defendants argue that these paragraphs must be stricken because they have no bearing on 18 Plaintiff’s claims and serve “only to inflame, distract, and prejudice.” ECF No. 11 at 19. Plaintiff 19 argues that these paragraphs “are relevant to issues of credibility, institutional conduct, and 20 potential Monell liability.” ECF No. 13 at 8 (italics added). 21 Motions to strike are disfavored, Platte Anchor Bolt, Inc. v. IHI, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 22 1048, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2004), and “should be denied unless the matter has no logical connection to 23 the controversy at issue and may prejudice one or more of the parties to the suit.” Hatamian v. 24 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 14-cv-00226, 2015 WL 511175, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 25 2015). “In the absence of such prejudice, courts have denied Rule 12(f) motions even though the 26

27 4 Defendants also request to strike paragraph 101, but this appears to be a mistake as the language 1 offending matter literally [was] within one or more of the categories set forth in Rule 12(f).” Id. 2 (quotations omitted). Although the paragraphs that Defendants object to consist in large part of 3 Plaintiff’s commentary about the case and have little bearing on Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants 4 offer no substantive argument that Plaintiff’s commentary about the removal of this case or his 5 opinion of Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is prejudicial. ECF No. 11 at 19. Their 6 motion to strike is accordingly denied. See Hatamian, 2015 WL 511175, at *1. 7 Defendants also appear to request that the Court consolidate Plaintiff’s lawsuit filed in 8 Contra Costa Superior Court against the City on April 8, 2025, with this action. ECF No. 11 at 9 18-19 (requesting that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related state law 10 claims and cases and explaining that “consolidating the two cases in this Court would serve 11 judicial economy”). Plaintiff’s state-court case against the City has been dismissed. Defendants 12 cite no authority—and the Court is aware of none—that would allow it to consolidate a state court 13 case with a federal action, let alone a state court case that has been dismissed. See Or. Egg 14 Producers v. Andrew, 458 F.2d 382, 383 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Rule 42 applies to cases that are 15 properly before the same court.”); Watkins v. County. of Los Angeles California, No. CV 22- 16 02167, 2024 WL 3915206, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2024) (“[T]his Court has no jurisdiction over 17 state court cases and cannot consolidate such actions with a federal action.”). Defendants’ request 18 for consolidation is denied. 19 V. DEFENDANTS’ 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 20 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 12(b)(6). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual 22 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 23 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A 24 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 25 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. For purposes 26 of a 12(b)(6) motion, courts accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in 27 favor of the non-moving party. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-57. A court’s review under Rule 1 a complaint, and materials subject to judicial notice. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 2 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, as Plaintiff is here, 3 pleadings must be construed liberally and leave to amend must be given unless the pleading 4 deficiency cannot be cured. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). 5 A. The Timeliness of Plaintiff’s Federal Claims 6 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s federal claims are time-barred as Section 1983 claims 7 have a two-year statute of limitations, and Plaintiff has not pled facts to support delayed discovery 8 of the violations or tolling of the limitations period. Plaintiff brings two causes of action under 9 Section 1983. The first cause of action is brought against the officer Defendants for their conduct 10 on April 16, 2019, alleging that the officers used excessive force and entered Plaintiff’s home 11 without a warrant in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. FAC ¶¶ 17-29. The 12 second is alleged against the City of Brentwood based a municipal liability theory grounded on the 13 City’s purported “policy and longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries and excessive 14 force in non-emergency situations” and concealment of police records. Id. ¶¶ 34, 38. Plaintiff 15 alleges that equitable tolling is appropriate here because, after the April 2019 incident, he 16 experienced severe “psychological impairments” that made him “unable to view the police report 17 or surveillance footage” and “unable to consult legal counsel or initiate litigation.” Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. 18 He recovered sufficiently by December 2024, reviewed the police report and surveillance footage 19 for the first time in December 2024, and decided to sue. Id. ¶ 13. He requests that the statute of 20 limitations be tolled for the period between April 2019 and December 2024 when he was 21 experiencing severe psychological distress. 22 “A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the 23 applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the 24 complaint.’” Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 25 2010) (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th Cir. 2006)). “[A] 26 complaint cannot be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 27 facts that would establish the timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68 1 defense, the “burden of alleging facts which would give rise to tolling falls upon the plaintiff.” 2 Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1993). 3 There is no universal statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims. See Owens v. Okure, 4 488 U.S. 235, 239 (1989). Instead, 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 provides that the most analogous 5 state-law statute of limitation applies, if it is not otherwise inconsistent with federal law. See id. 6 To resolve the uncertainty of what state-law cause of action is most analogous to Section 1983 7 actions, the Supreme Court ruled that the forum state’s general or residual “personal injury statute 8 of limitations should be applied to all § 1983 claims.” Id. at 241. California’s statute of 9 limitations for personal injury claims is two years. Cal. Civ. P. Code § 335.1; Jones v. Blanas, 10 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, there is a two-year statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s 11 Section 1983 claims. Doe #1 M.L. v. San Bernardino Sheriff Dept., 753 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1028 12 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“[T]he statute of limitations for a Section 1983 or Section 1985 claim brought in 13 California is two years.”). 14 Even where a statute of limitations may jeopardize the viability of a claim, tolling may 15 stop the clock on that limitations period. The forum state’s law “regarding tolling, including 16 equitable tolling,” applies to Section 1983 claims. Blanas, 393 F.3d at 927. As there are two 17 relevant types of tolling under California law, one grounded in common law, and the other in 18 statutory law, the Court addresses each in turn. 19 1. Equitable Tolling Under California Law 20 Plaintiff characterizes his request that the two-year statute of limitations be tolled as one 21 for “equitable tolling.” FAC ¶¶ 7-8. California’s equitable tolling “doctrine applies when an 22 injured person has several legal remedies and, reasonably and in good faith, pursues one” rather 23 than seeking “redress” in multiple forums simultaneously. McDonald v. Antelope Valley Cmty. 24 Coll. Dis., 45 Cal. 4th 88, 100 (2008) (citation modified). “By alleviating the fear of claim 25 forfeiture, [the doctrine] affords grievants the opportunity to pursue informal remedies, a process 26 we have repeatedly encouraged.” Id. Under California law, equitable tolling is appropriate upon a 27 showing of “(1) timely notice of the claim to the defendant, (2) lack of prejudice to the defendant, 1 Pub. Utilities Com., 243 Cal. App. 4th 295, 316 (2015) (citing McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 102). 2 California’s equitable tolling doctrine is inapplicable here. See ECF No. 11 at 10-11. Plaintiff 3 does not allege that he had “several legal remedies” and pursued others only to resort to filing this 4 lawsuit when the other remedies were exhausted. McDonald, 45 Cal. 4th at 100. The first and 5 second elements are accordingly not satisfied. Plaintiff first sued the City of Brentwood on April 6 8, 2025, in Contra Costa Superior Court and filed the instant lawsuit one day later. Plaintiff did 7 not initiate any sort of claim against Defendants during the two-year statutory period or otherwise 8 put them on notice that he might later sue them for the April 2019 incident. Because Plaintiff did 9 not provide “timely notice of the claim” to Defendants during the statutory period such that 10 Defendants would not be prejudiced by the delay in filing the claim, the Court agrees with 11 Defendants that equitable tolling is unavailable here. San Pablo Bay Pipeline, 243 Cal. App. 4th 12 at 316. 13 2. Tolling Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 352(a) 14 Plaintiff’s request for tolling fits better into the framework of tolling under California Code 15 of Civil Procedure Section 352(a) for mental incapacity. 16 Section 352(a) provides that if a person who “at the time the cause of action accrued…[is] 17 lacking the legal capacity to make decisions, the time of the disability is not part of the time 18 limited for the commencement of the action.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a). “To invoke tolling 19 under Section 352(a), a plaintiff must show that he was ‘incapable of caring for [his] property or 20 transacting business or understanding the nature or effects of [his] acts.’” Avery v. Arreola, No. 21 22-cv-08940, 2023 WL 7026938, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2023) (quoting Estate of Stern v. 22 Tuscan Retreat, Inc., 725 F. App’x 518, 521 (9th Cir. 2018)); see Hsu v. Mt. Zion Hospital, 259 23 Cal. App. 2d 562, 571-72 (1968). Someone who has been adjudicated mentally ill or has been 24 hospitalized for mental illness may be “incapable of caring for his property or transacting 25 business,” but this is not dispositive. Hsu, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 571-72; see Avery, 2023 WL 26 7026938, at *3. Plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly show that his mental incapacity 1) existed 27 “at the time the cause of action accrued” and 2) was of such severity that he was “incapable of 1 for the duration of the tolled period. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a); Hsu, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 571. 2 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s “complete lack of medical records, declarations, or 3 corroboration” undercuts his claim that he was severely mentally incapacitated. ECF No. 14 at 3. 4 This is beside the point. At this stage in the litigation, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s non-conclusory 5 factual allegations as true. 6 Plaintiff alleges that the “traumatic and unlawful police intrusion [in April 2019] severely 7 impacted [his] mental health and ability to function” such that he lost his job by May 2019, was 8 hospitalized by November 2019, and entered in-patient psychiatric treatment in January 2020. 9 FAC ¶ 5. Plaintiff does not literally “allege that he was incapacitated at the time the claims 10 accrued…but…that his mental incapacity came on at some unspecified point after the incident” 11 due to the trauma he experienced during the April 2019 incident. Avery, 2023 WL 7026938, at *3 12 (quotations and citations omitted). Though the text of Section 352(a) states that the incapacity 13 must exist “at the time” of the cause of action, California courts interpret this as encompassing 14 situations where the incapacity is caused by the defendant’s wrongful act and do not require the 15 incapacity to preexist the cause of action. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352(a); see Feeley v. S. Pac. 16 Transportation Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 949, 952 (1991) (“The tolling provision applies even though 17 the plaintiff's insanity is caused by the wrongful act of the defendant, and the tolling continues 18 until the plaintiff is restored to sanity.”). Plaintiff’s allegations that the incident caused his mental 19 incapacity and his psychological distress began shortly after the incident are sufficient to satisfy 20 the “at the time the cause of action accrued” requirement of Section 352(a). See Feeley, 234 Cal. 21 App. 3 at 952; FAC ¶ 9. 22 In addition to alleging that he was incapacitated at the time his claims accrued or as an 23 immediate result of defendant’s acts, Plaintiff must allege facts to plausibly support his claim that 24 he was “incapable of caring for his property or transacting business, or understanding the nature or 25 effects of his acts” for the duration of the tolling period. Hsu, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 571 (citing 26 Pearl v. Pearl, 177 Cal. 303, 307 (1918)). He alleges that during the five-year period after April 27 2019, he suffered from “repeated trauma-related episodes, including flashbacks, panic, sleep 1 including hypervigilance, loss of basic personal security, and inability to sleep or feel safe in his 2 own home.” FAC ¶¶ 10-11. Due to his “continuing psychological incapacity” during the five 3 years, he was “unable to view the police report or surveillance footage without suffering emotional 4 breakdowns” and “unable to consult legal counsel or initiate litigation.” Id. ¶¶ 10-12. Plaintiff 5 alleges that although he was working over sixty hours per week before the April 2019 incident, he 6 did not work in 2020 while he was in treatment, attempted to return to work in 2021 and only 7 worked 1,054 hours that year, and did not work at all in 2022 or 2023. Id. ¶ 5. He does not allege 8 whether he worked in 2024. 9 “The standard for pleading continuous lack of capacity under section 352(a) is high.” 10 Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc., No. 20-cv-09483, 2021 WL 4133753, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 11 2021), aff’d Bamforth v. Facebook, Inc., No. 21-16681, 2023 WL 5925982 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 12 2023). At this stage of litigation, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and 13 construes them in his favor. But even under this standard, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to 14 plausibly support that he lacked the capacity to care for his property, make decisions, or 15 understand the nature of his acts for the entire five-year period. Plaintiff alleges that, after the 16 April 2019 incident, he experienced “hypervigilance, loss of basic personal security, and inability 17 to sleep or feel safe in his own home.” FAC ¶ 11. The Court credits these allegations as true and 18 is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s psychological distress. But Plaintiff’s hypervigilance and inability to 19 feel safe in his home do not show that he lacked an understanding of his actions and could not care 20 for his property or belongings. See Hsu, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 571; Avery, 2023 WL 7026938, at *3 21 (finding that plaintiff’s allegations of “despondency, severe depression, and PTSD” did “not meet 22 the standard for incapacity under Section 352,” as those conditions were “not the same as being 23 incapable of caring for his property or transacting business or understanding the nature or effects 24 of his acts”) (quotations omitted). Similarly, that Plaintiff experienced “trauma-related episodes, 25 including flashbacks, panic, sleep disturbance, and dissociation” does not support that he was 26 incapacitated continuously rather than during acute episodes of panic and dissociation. Id. ¶ 10; 27 see Est. of Stern, 725 F. App’x at 522-23. 1 that he worked in 2021 suggests that he was able to follow a schedule, complete assignments, and 2 interact with coworkers or supervisors. Tolling under Section 352 only lasts as long as an 3 individual is incapacitated. See Est. of Stern, 725 F. App’x at 522 (“[I]ncapacity must exist at the 4 time the claims accrue, and tolling lasts only until the plaintiff regains capacity.”). That Plaintiff 5 returned to work in 2021 suggests that, to the extent that he did not have capacity in 2019 and 6 2020, he regained capacity for at least part of 2021. Absent factual allegations explaining how 7 Plaintiff had the capacity to work (albeit part time) but not the capacity to care for his property, 8 transact business, or understand his actions, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations of psychological 9 harm insufficient to meet the high standard for continuous incapacity under Section 352. See Hsu, 10 93 Cal. App. 4th at 101. 11 Hsu establishes that “the basic question” under Section 352 “is whether the allegedly 12 [incapacitated] plaintiff is sufficiently aware of the nature or effects of his acts to be able to 13 comprehend such business transactions as the hiring of an attorney and the instigation of a legal 14 action.” 93 Cal. App. 4th at 101. Plaintiff alleges that he did not hire counsel or initiate litigation 15 before December 2024 because he was psychologically unable to review the police report and 16 footage and did not understand or perceive that what he experienced in April 2019 violated the 17 Constitution. See FAC ¶¶ 11-13. That he did not obtain counsel or initiate legal proceedings 18 during this time because he was too psychologically impaired to review footage of the incident is 19 not sufficient to show that, from April 2019 and December 2024, he was unable to make 20 decisions, care for his property, or understand the nature or effects of his acts. See Flores v. 21 Flores, No. 14-cv-00577, 2015 WL 251855, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2015). 22 The Court accordingly finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to establish tolling 23 under Section 352. As Plaintiff alleged that he was able to return to work in 2021, the Court 24 anticipates Plaintiff will have a difficult path alleging facts showing that he was “incapable of 25 caring for his property or transacting business, or understanding the nature or effects of his acts” 26 for all but two years between April 2019 and April 2025. Hsu, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 571. 27 However, he may be able to do so, and it would be improper to dismiss his claims without 1 establish the timeliness of the claim.” Supermail Cargo, Inc., 68 F.3d at 1206.5 Plaintiff’s Section 2 1983 claims regarding the April 2019 incident are dismissed without prejudice, except as to his 3 Section 1983 claim that the officer Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth 4 Amendment, which, for the reasons discussed below, is dismissed with prejudice. 5 3. The Delayed Discovery Rule 6 In the alternative to his argument that the statute of limitations should be tolled, Plaintiff 7 argues that his claims did not accrue until late 2024, which was when “he became mentally 8 capable of recognizing the legal implications of” the facts of his claim. ECF No. 13 ¶ 4. 9 Although California tolling law applies, federal law applies when determining when a 10 claim accrues. Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999); but see Bone v. City of Los 11 Angeles, 471 Fed. App’x 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying California’s delayed discovery rule, 12 which “which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to 13 discover, the cause of action”) (quotations omitted). “Under federal law, a claim accrues when the 14 plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Maldonado 15 v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted). “Thus, an action ordinarily 16 accrues on the date of the injury.” Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) 17 (quotations omitted). For Section 1983 claims regarding Fourth Amendment violations, “the 18 plaintiff is placed on constructive notice of the illegal conduct when the search and seizure takes 19 place.” Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 2017). “This principle holds 20 true even where the person is unaware that the search and seizure is warrantless.” Braddy v. Drug 21 Enf’t Agency, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1159, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1026). 22 Plaintiff alleges that even though he was subjected to the allegedly unlawful search in 23 April 2019, he did not “comprehend the constitutional and statutory injuries arising from the 2019 24 incident until late 2024, when he was finally able to review the police report and surveillance 25 footage.” ECF No. 13 at 4. This argument is foreclosed by Belanus. “[A] cause of action for 26

27 5 Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled under the federal doctrine of 1 illegal search and seizure accrues when the wrongful act occurs…even if the person does not 2 know at that time that the search was” illegal. Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1026. That Plaintiff did not 3 understand that he had been constitutionally injured until 2024 is insufficient to postpone the date 4 of accrual. See Venegas v. Wagner, 704 F.2d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[W]here…illegal 5 search and seizure is alleged, the conduct and asserted injury are discrete and complete upon 6 occurrence, and the cause of action can reasonably be deemed to have accrued when the wrongful 7 act occurs.”); Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 381 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court 8 accordingly finds that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 causes of action regarding the April 2019 incident 9 accrued on the date of the incident. 10 Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to show that the statute of limitations for his 11 Section 1983 claims regarding the April 2019 incident should be tolled under California law, and, 12 under federal law, his argument that these claims did not accrue until December 2024 is 13 unavailing. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims regarding the April 2019 incident are therefore 14 dismissed without prejudice as they were untimely when filed, though the Court notes that these 15 claims are dismissed with prejudice to the extent they are grounded on the Fourteenth 16 Amendment. 17 B. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Against the Officer Defendants 18 Plaintiff’s first cause of action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the 19 officer Defendants, asserts that they violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth 20 Amendment by entering Plaintiff’s home without a warrant, consent, probable cause, or exigent 21 circumstances, and handcuffing him while naked at gunpoint and with a police dog present. FAC 22 ¶¶ 19, 24. Defendants argue that this conduct is covered by the Fourth Amendment, and Plaintiff 23 cannot advance a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim for government conduct 24 covered by the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 11 at 16. 25 “[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the 26 Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that 27 specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.” United States v. Lanier, 520 1 Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against this sort of 2 physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 3 ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”). Plaintiff’s allegations 4 that the officer Defendants unlawfully entered his home and detained him are the type of 5 “intrusive governmental conduct” protected by the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 6 This claim thus must be analyzed “under the standard appropriate to” Fourth Amendment claims, 7 “not under the rubric of substantive due process.” Lanier, 520 U.S. at 272 n.7; see Cnty. of 8 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). To the extent that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim 9 is premised on an alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, it is dismissed with 10 prejudice. 11 C. Monell Liability Claim 12 Plaintiff alleges that the City of Brentwood is liable for the misconduct of its officers as it 13 “has maintained a policy and longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries and excessive 14 force in non-emergency situations, frequently based on unsupported or demonstrably false 15 information provided by dispatch or officers” and because the officer Defendants’ conduct was the 16 “direct and foreseeable result of the City’s failure to adequately train” or discipline its officers. 17 FAC ¶¶ 33-34. He further claims that the City had a practice of concealing records of police 18 misconduct, which was ratified by the former and current Chiefs of Police. FAC ¶¶ 40, 41. 19 Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not allege facts to plausibly state a claim under any theory of 20 Monell liability. ECF No. 11 at 17. 21 Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), 22 “established that municipalities can be liable for infringement of constitutional rights, under 23 certain circumstances.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602 (9th Cir. 24 2019). Although a municipality “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 25 employees or agents”—that is, it may not be sued under a respondeat superior theory— 26 municipalities “may be liable under § 1983 for constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an official 27 policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a failure to train, supervise, or discipline; or (4) a 1 show that “deliberate action attributable to the municipality itself is the ‘moving force’ behind the 2 plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 3 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Monell claims must comply with the 4 Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard and allege facts sufficient to plausibly state a claim for liability. 5 See AE v. Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 6 For the forgoing reasons, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not alleged 7 sufficient facts to state a claim for Monell liability. 8 1. Warrantless Entry and Use of Excessive Force During the April 2019 Incident 9 The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s claim that the City is liable for the alleged warrantless 10 entry and use of excessive force during the April 2019 incident. As an initial matter, the Court 11 finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show that his Fourth Amendment rights 12 were violated.6 See Monell,436 U.S. at 694. At issue is whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged 13 that the City’s actions were “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Id. The Court 14 construes the FAC as alleging two distinct theories of liability for this conduct: 1) that it was part 15 of a “pervasive practice or custom” of City’s police department and 2) that it was a result of 16 inadequate training or a failure to discipline the officer Defendants. Horton, 915 F.3d at 602; FAC 17 ¶¶ 32, 33, 37, 42. 18 a. Practice or Custom 19 Plaintiff contends that the alleged constitutional violations that occurred on April 16, 2019, 20 were a direct result of the City of Brentwood’s “policy and longstanding custom of permitting 21 warrantless entries and excessive force in non-emergency situations.” FAC ¶ 34. Although 22 Plaintiff uses the term “policy,” he does not appear to allege that the City has a formal, written 23 policy directing officers to conduct “warrantless entries and [use] excessive force in non- 24 emergency situations,” instead arguing that this conduct was pursuant to a widespread practice or 25 custom. Id.; see Monell, 436 U.S. at 661. “Absent a formal governmental policy,” a plaintiff 26 “must show a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure 27 1 of the local government entity.’” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 919 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 2 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)). “Liability for improper custom may not 3 be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient 4 duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying 5 out policy.” Id. To show that a constitutional violation was part of a longstanding practice, 6 claimants generally must provide specific examples of similar incidents where the municipality’s 7 employees engaged in the same or similar behavior. See Hunter v. Cnty of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 8 1255, 1233, 1234 n.8 (9th Cir. 2011); Zaragoza v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 20-1381, 2021 9 WL 968967, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2021). 10 In support of his claim that the City of Brentwood police department has a “longstanding 11 custom” of warrantless entries and using excessive force, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Officer 12 Rezentes was involved in two similar incidents involving the police dog, Marco, who was present 13 at the April 2019 incident. FAC ¶¶ 35-37. Plaintiff alleges that Office Rezentes deployed Marco 14 “on an unarmed woman hiding in an attic, causing a serious scalp injury” in January 2019 and that 15 Office Rezentes deployed Marco on another unarmed woman in February 2020. Id. The victim in 16 the February 2020 incident was seriously injured and sued the City, ultimately settling for 17 $967,000. See FAC ¶ 36; Bates v. Rezentes, 731 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (order granting 18 in part and denying in part defendant Officer Rezentes’ motion for summary judgment). 19 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations regarding these two incidents “do not establish 20 a pattern of similar unconstitutional conduct.” ECF No. 11 at 17. They appear to be making two 21 distinct, though related, points: two corroborating incidents are not enough7 and the two incidents 22 Plaintiff describes are too factually dissimilar to show a pattern. 23 The Court finds persuasive Defendants’ first argument as to Plaintiff’s warrantless entry 24

25 7 Defendants note that the February 2020 incident that Plaintiff references “occurred ten months after” the April 2019 entry into Plaintiff’s home. ECF No. 11 at 17. The fact that the February 26 2020 incident occurred after the April 2019 incident does not render it irrelevant to Plaintiff’s municipal custom claim. ECF No. 11 at 17; see Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 518 (9th 27 Cir. 1997), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming that 1 and excessive force claims. First, the FAC includes no allegations regarding the Brentwood 2 Police Departments’ involvement in other warrantless entries. This is plainly insufficient to 3 plausibly allege that the City has a “longstanding custom of permitting warrantless entries.” FAC 4 ¶ 32. Next, Plaintiff describes two prior excessive force incidents involving Officer Rezentes and 5 Marco. “The line between ‘isolated or sporadic incidents’ and ‘persistent widespread conduct’ is 6 not clearly delineated,” but courts generally require allegations of “more than a few” similar 7 incidents to advance past the motion to dismiss stage. Lemus v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 15-cv- 8 00359, 2016 WL 2930523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2016) (collecting cases), aff’d, 711 F. App’x 9 859 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit, affirming a district court’s directed verdict, has held that 10 proof of two prior unconstitutional raids by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Special 11 Enforcement Bureau, “standing alone,” did “not support a finding” that there was a county “policy 12 of harassment or of nonintervention.” Meehan v. County of Los Angeles, 856 F.2d 102, 107 (9th 13 Cir. 1988). While Meehan does not control at the pleading stage, courts regularly require 14 allegations of multiple other incidents “factually pertinent to the [case] at hand” to survive a 15 motion to dismiss. McCoy v. City of Vallejo, No. 19-cv-001191, 2020 WL 374356, at *4 (E.D. 16 Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) (finding that plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to survive a 12(b)(6) motion 17 to dismiss where plaintiff had alleged that the municipality’s officers had been involved in six 18 incidents involving deadly officer shootings); Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, No.16-cv-02250, 2017 19 WL 5068567, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2017) (finding allegations of two other incidents 20 “insufficient to support a claim for municipal liability”); see also Nelson v. City of Los Angeles, 21 No. CV 11-5407, 2015 WL 1931714, at *10-11 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2015). Here, as in Bagley, 22 Plaintiff’s allegations of two other incidents involving excessive force “are insufficient to support 23 a claim for municipal liability” based on a “longstanding practice or custom.” 2017 WL 5068567, 24 at *5; Trevino, 99 F.3d at 919. 25 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claims fail because the two other incidents 26 involving Officer Rezentes and Marco are factually dissimilar to the incident here. ECF No. 11 at 27 17. While that is true to the extent Plaintiff alleges that the City has a practice of conducting 1 disagrees that the incidents are too dissimilar to support to Plaintiff’s claim that the City has a 2 custom of using “excessive force in non-emergency situations.” FAC ¶ 34; see Connick v. 3 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (requiring a “pattern of similar constitutional violations” to 4 support Monell liability); Bagos v. Vallego, No. 20-cv-00185, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 5 Oct. 13, 2020). The January 2019 and February 2020 incidents both involved Marco being 6 deployed on unarmed individuals who had surrendered or were in hiding. Id. ¶¶ 35, 36. In those 7 cases, Marco bit and seriously wounded the two individuals, whereas here Plaintiff only alleges 8 that the dog was present and barking. See FAC ¶ 1. But exact factual similarity is not required at 9 this stage. See Ochoa v. City of San Jose, No. 21-cv-02456, 2021 WL 7627630, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 10 Nov. 17, 2021). Construing Plaintiff’s allegations in the light most favorable to him, Plaintiff has 11 alleged that the officer Defendants handcuffing him at gunpoint with a barking German Shepard 12 present constituted excessive force. See FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding two other 13 excessive force incidents involving the same officer and same dog are of sufficient categorical 14 similarity to support Plaintiff’s claim that the City had a practice or custom of using K-9s in an 15 excessively forceful manner in non-emergency situations. See Ochoa, 2021 WL 7627630, at *6 16 (dismissing defendants’ arguments regarding factual dissimilarities as “too granular for the 17 pleading stage”); McCoy, 2020 WL 374356, at *4 (explaining that “use of force incidents” 18 involving “different circumstances” than the operative incident could be sufficiently “factually 19 pertinent” to support a Monell claim at the motion to dismiss stage) (citing Breen v. City of 20 Concord, No. 19-cv-05622, ECF No. 19 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2019)). 21 Additional allegations of incidents involving similar uses of excessive force, as well as 22 allegations of similar incidents involving warrantless entries, may be sufficient to state a claim for 23 Monell liability under this theory. See Zaragoza, 2021 WL 968967, at *4. As Plaintiff may be 24 able to amend his FAC to state a claim, his Monell liability claim based on the City’s custom or 25 practice is dismissed without prejudice. 26 b. Failure to Adequately Train or Discipline 27 Plaintiff claims that the officer Defendants’ alleged warrantless entry and use of excessive 1 adequately train, supervise, and discipline its officers.” FAC ¶ 33; see id. ¶ 42 (“The City’s failure 2 to remove or constrain officers with known misconduct histories…enable the unconstitutional 3 entry into Plaintiff’s home and the excessive, degrading detention that followed.”). 4 “Failure to train an employee who has caused a constitutional violation can be the basis for 5 § 1983 liability where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons 6 with whom the employee comes into contact.” Long v. City of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 7 (9th Cir. 2006); see City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). The same is true of 8 the “failure to investigate and discipline employees in the face of widespread constitutional 9 violations.” Hunter, 652 F.3d at 1234 n.8. The “deliberate indifference” standard is met when 10 “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the 11 violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have 12 been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, 109 U.S. at 390. “Only where a failure 13 to train reflects a deliberate or conscious choice by a municipality…can a city be liable for such a 14 failure under § 1983. Id. at 389 (quotations omitted). “A pattern of similar constitutional 15 violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference 16 for purposes of failure to train” because, “[w]ithout notice that a course of training is deficient in a 17 particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training 18 program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (quoting 19 Board of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). 20 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s allegations of two other incidents of excessive force 21 involving Officer Rezentes and Marco are insufficient to plausibly allege “[a] pattern of similar 22 constitutional violations” necessary to state a failure-to-train or failure-to-discipline Monell claim. 23 Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Plaintiff’s claim based on this theory is accordingly dismissed without 24 prejudice. 25 A failure to discipline theory may also fit into the ratification framework of Monell 26 liability. See Rabinovitz v. City of Los Angeles, 287 F. Supp. 3d 933, 967 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 27 Plaintiff alleges that “former Chief Hansen and current Chief Herbert…directly engaged in or 1 warrantless entry and use of excessive force, Plaintiff may be claiming that the City is liable for 2 this conduct because it was ratified by the Chiefs of Police. Id. To the extent Plaintiff is 3 advancing this claim, this claim fails as he has not provided more than conclusory allegations that 4 the Chiefs of Police “approved” the officer Defendants’ actions “and the basis for” their actions. 5 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). Plaintiff may amend his complaint to 6 include facts to support this ratification theory of liability. 7 2. Withholding of Records 8 In addition to alleging that the City is liable for the warrantless entry and excessive force of 9 the April 2019 incident, Plaintiff claims that the City is liable for withholding police records. 10 FAC ¶¶ 38, 40, 41. Plaintiff appears to allege that the City is liable for this particular conduct 11 under a practice or custom theory and under a ratification theory. Id. This claim is dismissed 12 because Plaintiff has not alleged how this conduct violated his constitutional rights. 13 Plaintiff alleges that after the April 2019 incident:

14 [T]he Brentwood Police Department refused to voluntarily release the incident report. Plaintiff’s father was forced to submit a formal 15 California Public Records Act (CPRA) request. Then-Chief of Police Thomas Hansen denied the request until legally compelled to disclose 16 the report—illustrating a municipal practice of obstructing access to police records. 17 18 FAC ¶ 38. Plaintiff further alleges that in April 2025, he “submitted a CPRA request seeking 19 records of sustained misconduct involving” the officer Defendants. Id. ¶ 39. The Brentwood 20 Police Department, “through Records Supervisor Sonia Cardinale, acting on behalf of Chief Tim 21 Herbert—responded in writing that it had ‘no responsive records for Officer Rezentes.” Id. ¶ 40. 22 Subsequently, “under legal pressure, the City reversed its position and selectively disclosed partial 23 records and photographs related” to Officer Rezentes’s deployment of Marco, “alongside an 24 excessive volume of irrelevant material.” Id. Plaintiff contends that this conduct “evidences a 25 deliberate policy of concealment ratified by municipal leadership.” Id. 26 At most, Plaintiff’s allegations support that the Brentwood Police Department made it 27 difficult for him and his father to obtain police records. He does not identify how this amounted to 1 necessary to state a claim under Section 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 2 (9th Cir. 2008). To the extent Plaintiff is alleging that the delay in releasing records was part of a 3 conspiracy to cover up the officer Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, a “‘cover up’ theory of 4 section 1983 liability is only viable where the cover-up itself deprives a plaintiff of constitutional 5 rights.” Johnston v. Cnty. of Sonoma, No. C 10-03592, 2011 WL 855934, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 6 2011). And a “claim for a cover-up is premature when the plaintiff's action seeking redress for the 7 underlying violations remains pending,” as is the case here. Bernier v. Rodriguez, No. 18-cv- 8 1131, 2022 WL 16804821, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2022) (quotations omitted). 9 Plaintiff’s claim that the City is liable for the concealment of police records is accordingly 10 dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff chooses to amend this claim, he must allege what 11 constitutional right he believes he was denied and nonconclusory facts supporting a theory of 12 Monell liability. 13 D. The California Government Claims Act 14 In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff asserts state-law claims against Defendants for 15 violation of the Bane Act (California Civil Code Section 52.1) and for common law trespass. 16 FAC at 1. Defendants argue that both claims are barred because Plaintiff did not first present his 17 claims to the City of Brentwood. ECF No. 11 at 13. 18 The California Government Claims Act (GCA) requires plaintiffs to timely file claims with 19 a public entity before suing the entity or its employees. See Willis v. City of Carlsbad, 48 Cal. 20 App. 5th 1104, 1118 (2020). The claim presentation requirement applies to “all claims for money 21 or damages against local public entities,” subject to an enumerated list of exceptions. Cal. Gov. 22 Code § 905. “Claims for personal injury must be presented not later than six months after the 23 accrual of the cause of action, and claims relating to any other cause of action must be filed within 24 one year of the accrual of the cause of action.” California Rest. Mgmt. Sys. v. City of San Diego, 25 195 Cal. App. 4th 1581, 1591 (2011). “Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural 26 requirement, but is a condition precedent to the claimant’s ability to maintain an action against the 27 public entity.” Id. “The claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the 1 “procedural requirements in the complaint.” DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 55 Cal. 4th 2 983, 991 (2012); Progressive Sols., Inc. v. Stanley, No. 16-cv-04805, 2017 WL 8294287, at *5 3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2017). 4 Plaintiff does not allege that he presented his state law claims to the City of Brentwood 5 prior to commencing this action. He instead argues that he was not required to do so as he is only 6 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Bane Act and for common-law trespass, and 7 thus the GCA does not apply. ECF No. 13 at 5; see FAC as 12-14 (seeking declaratory and 8 injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees for his state law claims). Defendants argue that “[a]s far 9 as defense counsel is aware, California law requires a timely government claim before suing a 10 public entity for tort liability—even if equitable relief is sought.” ECF No. 14 at 3. 11 Contrary to Defendants’ position, there is a “general rule that the claims statutes do not 12 apply to nonpecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific or declaratory relief.” 13 Gatto v. County of Sonoma, 98 Cal. App. 4th 744, 761 (2002). In Minsky v. City of Los Angeles, 14 the California Supreme Court held:

15 The uniform claims presentation procedure of section 905…applies only to claims for “money or damages.” Even as to local public 16 entities ... the coverage of the…general claims statute is not universal. Like nearly all the supplanted claims statutes, it applies only to claims 17 for money or damages.

18 11 Cal. 3d 113, 120 (1974) (quotations omitted); see Stronghold Engineering Inc. v. City of 19 Monterey, 96 Cal. App. 5th 1203, 1208 (2023) (“The claim presentation requirement does not 20 apply to ‘non-pecuniary actions, such as those seeking injunctive, specific, or declaratory relief.’”) 21 (quoting Minsky, 11 Cal. 3d at 121). The Northern District has found that “Minsky and its 22 progeny” establish that the claims requirement of the GCA is not applicable to claims for 23 injunctive or declaratory relief. Freeman v. Rohnert Park Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 18-cv-07661, 24 2019 WL 4082852, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2019); see Khan v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., No. 25 C 07-6209, 2008 WL 2024600, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2008) (holding that the GCA “does not 26 apply to actions in which the primary relief sought against the government is equitable in nature 27 1 Here, Plaintiff seeks “declaratory relief that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights” under 2 the California and U.S. constitutions and that “the April 16, 2019 entry into Plaintiff’s residence 3 by Defendants constituted unlawful trespass,” and injunctive relief to “prevent similar future 4 conduct by Defendants.” FAC at 12, 14. He specifies that he requests “such other and further 5 non-monetary relief as the Court deems just and proper.” Id. (emphasis added). Although he also 6 requests attorneys’ fees, this request is “incidental” to his request for declaratory and injunctive 7 relief and is not the primary relief he seeks. Khan, 2008 WL 2024600, at *4. Following Minsky, 8 the Court finds that as Plaintiff’s state law claims are not primarily for “money or damages,” he 9 was not required to first present his claims to the City of Brentwood and his claims are thus not 10 barred for failure to comply with the GCA. 11 Cal. 3d at 120. 11 Defendants’ request that Plaintiff’s state law claims be dismissed for failure to comply 12 with the GCA is accordingly denied. Although Defendants argue that the deadlines for Plaintiff to 13 present his claims to the City of Brentwood under the GCA cannot be tolled, as the GCA does not 14 apply to Plaintiff’s claims, Plaintiff is under no obligation to comply with these deadlines. ECF 15 No. 11 at 14-15. Defendants do not otherwise argue that Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by 16 the statutes of limitations for Bane Act and trespass claims, and the Court accordingly does not 17 address further whether these claims are time-barred. 18 E. Bain Act Claim 19 Defendants lastly argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under California’s Bane 20 Act. The Bane Act, at California Civil Code Section 52.1, prohibits interfering with another 21 individual’s “exercise or enjoyment…of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 22 States” or California “by threat, intimidation, or coercion.” “The elements of a Bane Act claim are 23 essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, with the added requirement that the 24 government official had a ‘specific intent to violate’ a constitutional right.” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 25 31 F.4th 1211, 1224 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Reese v. Cnty. Of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 26 (9th Cir. 2018); see Simmons v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 5th 1113, 1125 (2016) (“[T]he Bane 27 Act requires that the challenged conduct be intentional.”). The Bane Act “does not require the 1 constitutional violation alleged.” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043 (quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1)). 2 “[T]he coercion inherent in a Fourth Amendment violation could support a Bane Act claim if the 3 coercion occurred with ‘specific intent to violate the arrestee’s right to freedom from unreasonable 4 seizure.’” Sandoval v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 519-20 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Reese, 888 5 F.3d at 1044 n.4). 6 Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is based on the same facts as his Fourth Amendment claim: he 7 alleges Defendants entered his house “without a warrant, consent, or any lawful exigency,” awoke 8 him with a barking police dog and weapons pointed at him, and handcuffed him, naked, while they 9 searched his home. FAC ¶¶ 47-49. He further alleges that “Defendants acted with specific intent 10 to interfere with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Id. ¶ 50. Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff 11 has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation, or that Plaintiffs 12 failed to allege that Defendants acted intentionally. Instead, they argue that “the FAC contains no 13 factual allegations that Defendants used threats, intimidation, or coercion distinct from the 14 underlying seizure itself.” ECF No. 11 at 18 (emphasis added). They argue that as the only 15 coercion was the coercion “inherent in the alleged constitutional violation,” Plaintiff’s Bane Act 16 claim fails as a matter of law. Id. Their argument relies on Shoyoye v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 17 which held:

18 [W]here coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged… the statutory requirement of threats, intimidation, or coercion is not 19 met. The statute requires a showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the wrongful detention itself. 20 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 959 (2012) (quotations omitted). But courts have rejected Shoyoye and 21 established that a Bane Act claim does not “require threats or intimidation other than the 22 underlying” Fourth Amendment violation. S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1142 n.15 (9th 23 Cir. 2019); see Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043; Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 24 5th 766, 798-80 (2017), as modified (Nov. 17, 2017). That is, “[t]he elements of a Bane Act claim 25 are essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, with the added requirement that the 26 government official had a ‘specific intent to violate’ a constitutional right.” Hughes, 31 F.4th at 27 1224 (quoting Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043). 1 The Court accordingly rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim fails as 2 a matter of law because Plaintiff does not allege any “threats, intimidation, or coercion distinct 3 from the underlying seizure itself.” ECF No. 11 at 18. He is not required to do so. Plaintiff has 4 alleged that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that they did so with the 5 “specific intent to interfere with Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” FAC ¶ 50. This is sufficient. 6 Hughes, 31 F.4th at 1223; see Langham v. City of Union City, No. 22-cv-06284, 2023 WL 7 11868201, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2023) (finding that plaintiff had plausibly alleged a Bane Act 8 claim where he alleged that the individual defendants’ violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 9 was “done with the specific intent to deprive Plaintiffs [sic] of their constitutional rights”). 10 Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is accordingly denied. 11 VI. CONCLUSION 12 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC is denied as to 13 Plaintiff’s state law claims and granted as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims. Plaintiff’s 14 Section 1983 Monell liability claim and Section 1983 claim that the officer Defendants violated 15 his rights under the Fourth Amendment are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 16 claim that the officer Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment is dismissed 17 with prejudice. 18 Defendants’ requests to strike portions of Plaintiff’s FAC and to consolidate this action 19 with Plaintiff’s prior state case is denied. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original 20 complaint is denied as moot. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default against the officer Defendants 21 is denied. 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 1 Plaintiff's second amended complaint is due no later than September 29, 2025. His 2 amended complaint will entirely replace his prior complaints and so he must allege or re-allege all 3 || facts and claims that he wishes the Court to consider. The Court encourages Plaintiff to refer to 4 || the Northern District’s resources for pro se litigants, available online at: 5 || https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/. 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: September 8, 2025 8 po 9 Late wares LI¥A/. CISNEROS 10 Uhitéd States Magistrate Judge 11 12

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