Terrell Avalon Lancaster v. Clark County, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedOctober 16, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-01986
StatusUnknown

This text of Terrell Avalon Lancaster v. Clark County, et al. (Terrell Avalon Lancaster v. Clark County, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Terrell Avalon Lancaster v. Clark County, et al., (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 Case No.: 2:25-cv-01986-JAD-EJY Terrell Avalon Lancaster, 4 Plaintiff Order Denying Motion for Temporary 5 v. Restraining Order and Motion for Order to Show Cause 6 Clark County, et al., [ECF Nos. 2, 3] 7 Defendants

8 Pro se plaintiff Terrell Avalon Lancaster sues Clark County, the District Attorney’s 9 Family Support Division (DFAS), and various district attorneys, DFAS agents, and state-court 10 judges for alleged constitutional violations stemming from his state-court child-support 11 proceedings. He moves ex parte for a temporary restraining order enjoining all defendants from 12 taking any enforcement actions in his state-court case. Because Lancaster doesn’t properly 13 support his motion or explain why he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims, his 14 injunction motions are denied. 15 Discussion 16 Temporary-restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary” remedies 17 “never awarded as of right.”1 The Supreme Court clarified in Winter v. Natural Resources 18 Defense Council, Inc. that, to obtain an injunction, plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely 19 to succeed on the merits, that [they are] likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of 20 preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the 21 public interest.”2 The Ninth Circuit recognizes an additional standard: if “plaintiff[s] can only 22

23 1 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 2 Id. at 20. 1 show that there are ‘serious questions going to the merits’—a lesser showing than likelihood of 2 success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the ‘balance of hardships 3 tips sharply in the plaintiffs’ favor,’ and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.”3 4 Lancaster recites this standard in his injunction motions, but he fails to identify his claims 5 or present any legal argument explaining why they are likely to succeed. In his “success on the

6 merits” section of his motion, he states that “[t]he evidence of the constitutional violations is 7 overwhelming” and offers “Five Smoking Guns” that he believes “establish a near-certain 8 likelihood of success.”4 Those “smoking guns” reference an audio recording of a DAFS agent 9 that Lancaster says contains proof of extrinsic fraud, a “false declaration” from another DAFS 10 agent, conflicting orders between a hearing transcript and the resulting written order, a statement 11 from the state-court judge that she does not “oversee the District Attorney,” and “failed emails 12 [that] prove the court system itself is a party to the due process violations.”5 13 But Lancaster doesn’t provide any context for this “evidence” or explain how it amounts 14 to any particular constitutional violation. The burden is on Lancaster to analyze the facts and

15 evidence he presents under the legal standards applicable to each of his claims and explain why 16 those facts warrant a finding that he is likely to succeed on the merits of those claims. 17 Lancaster’s failure to identify his claims, state the legal standards governing those claims, and 18 explain why the evidence he presents satisfies those legal standards means that this court cannot 19 adequately evaluate his motion or conclude that he is likely to succeed on the merits. So I deny 20 his motions. 21

22 3 Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281, 1291 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011)). 23 4 ECF No. 2 at 4. 5 Id.; see also ECF No. 2-1 (exhibits). 1 Conclusion 2 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Terrell Lancaster’s motions for a temporary 3] restraining order and order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue [ECF 4|| Nos. 2, 3] are DENIED. 5

US. Distridt Judge jemi A. Posey 7 Octobés-46, 2025 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

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Related

Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc.
709 F.3d 1281 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Cottrell
632 F.3d 1127 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)

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Bluebook (online)
Terrell Avalon Lancaster v. Clark County, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terrell-avalon-lancaster-v-clark-county-et-al-nvd-2025.