Terrance Tyrone Mason v. State of Florida

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Terrance Tyrone Mason v. State of Florida

220 So. 3d 580, 2017 WL 2950843, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9892

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedJuly 11, 2017

DocketCASE NO. 1D16-3485

StatusPublished

This text of 220 So. 3d 580 (Terrance Tyrone Mason v. State of Florida) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Terrance Tyrone Mason v. State of Florida, 220 So. 3d 580, 2017 WL 2950843, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9892 (Fla. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Terrance Tyrone Mason, challenges the trial court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error, wherein he sought credit for time served. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion upon concluding that claims regarding jail credit must be raised in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801, and even if they could be raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, they were insufficiently pled. The State properly concedes that the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion on the ground that claims regarding credit for time served must be raised in a rule 3.801 motion and cannot be raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. See In re Amendments to Fla. R. of Crim. P., 204 So.3d 944, 944-45 (Fla. 2016) (explaining that the 2016 amendments to rules 3.800 and 3.801 “make clear that jail credit matters can be litigated in either a motion filed under rule 3.800(b) while a defendant’s direct appeal is pending, or in a motion filed under rule 3.801 after a defendant’s sentence has become final”); see also Cousnard v. State, 188 So.3d 936, 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversing the trial court’s denial of a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error that sought an additional award of jail credit); Lowe v. State, 152 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (quashing the trial court’s orders on the appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion seeking additional jail credit, which it had treated as a rule 3.801 motion, without prejudice to the appellant filing a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion or a rule 3.801 motion after the direct appeal concluded). Additionally, the trial court erroneously concluded that Appellant’s claims were insufficiently pled given that he identified the alleged errors with specificity and set forth the amounts of credit he claims he is entitled to receive. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b) (“The motion must identify the error with specificity and provide a proposed correction.”). Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Terrance Tyrone Mason, challenges the trial court’s denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error, wherein he sought credit for time served. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion upon concluding that claims regarding jail credit must be raised in a motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801, and even if they could be raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion, they were insufficiently pled. The State properly concedes that the trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion on the ground that claims regarding credit for time served must be raised in a rule 3.801 motion and cannot be raised in a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. See In re Amendments to Fla. R. of Crim. P., 204 So.3d 944, 944-45 (Fla. 2016) (explaining that the 2016 amendments to rules 3.800 and 3.801 “make clear that jail credit matters can be litigated in either a motion filed under rule 3.800(b) while a defendant’s direct appeal is pending, or in a motion filed under rule 3.801 after a defendant’s sentence has become final”); see also Cousnard v. State, 188 So.3d 936, 936 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (reversing the trial court’s denial of a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion to correct sentencing error that sought an additional award of jail credit); Lowe v. State, 152 So.3d 1279, 1280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (quashing the trial court’s orders on the appellant’s rule 3.800(a) motion seeking additional jail credit, which it had treated as a rule 3.801 motion, without prejudice to the appellant filing a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion or a rule 3.801 motion after the direct appeal concluded). Additionally, the trial court erroneously concluded that Appellant’s claims were insufficiently pled given that he identified the alleged errors with specificity and set forth the amounts of credit he claims he is entitled to receive. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.800(b) (“The motion must identify the error with specificity and provide a proposed correction.”). Therefore, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and BILBREY, JJ., CONCUR.

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220 So. 3d 580, 2017 WL 2950843, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terrance-tyrone-mason-v-state-of-florida-fladistctapp-2017.

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