Terrance Reeves v. Pete Hegseth

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 11, 2026
• Docket: 24-1568
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 1 of 11

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 24-1568

TERRANCE REEVES,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

PETE HEGSETH, Secretary, U.S. Department of Defense; FRANK D. WHITWORTH, VADM, Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga, Senior District Judge. (1:23-cv-01149-AJT-LRV)

Argued: December 10, 2025 Decided: March 11, 2026

Before RUSHING and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished opinion. Judge Heytens wrote the opinion, which Judge Floyd joined. Judge Rushing wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

ARGUED: Andrew O. Clarke, DISTRICT LEGAL GROUP, PLLC, National Harbor, Maryland, for Appellant. Peter B. Baumhart, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Erik S. Siebert, United States Attorney, Carolyn M. Wesnousky, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellees. USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 2 of 11

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

2 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 3 of 11

TOBY HEYTENS, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff Terrance Reeves brought three claims against his employer arising from his

negative performance review and termination. The district court dismissed one claim and

granted summary judgment to the defendants on the other two claims. We affirm in part

and vacate in part.

* * *

The district court correctly dismissed Reeves’ race discrimination claim (Count 1)

for failure to state a claim. To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint needed to

plausibly allege that the employer took some adverse employment action “because of ”

Reeves’ race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (emphasis added). We agree with the district court

that the complaint failed to do so.

The district court also correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on

Reeves’ hostile work environment claim (Count 2). To succeed on that claim, Reeves

needed to prove (as relevant here) that (1) he “experience[d] unwelcome harassment” that

was (2) “because of . . . [his] race” and (3) “so severe or pervasive that it alter[ed] the

conditions of [his] employment and create[d] an abusive atmosphere.” Robinson v. Priority

Auto. Huntersville, Inc., 70 F.4th 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks removed). The

latter two requirements are judged by an “objective” “reasonable person” standard. Id. at

781–82 (quotation marks removed).

Even resolving all disputed issues of material fact in Reeves’ favor, we conclude the

facts here do not satisfy the relevant legal standards and that the defendants are thus

3 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 4 of 11

“entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). For example, Reeves

testified about an incident in which a supervisor showed him a picture of an AR‑15 rifle

the supervisor had just purchased. But Reeves also testified he believed the supervisor “was

not motivated by race” in doing so, JA 149, and we see no reason to second-guess the

plaintiff’s own opinion. We also conclude that the other incidents described in the summary

judgment record—regrettable and inappropriate as some of them may be—are insufficient

to create the sort of “severe or pervasive hostile work environment” required by this Court’s

precedent. Robinson, 70 F.4th at 783.

In contrast, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment to

the defendants on Reeves’ retaliation claim (Count 3). To defeat the defendants’ motion,

Reeves needed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the defendants

discriminated against him “because he . . . opposed” “an unlawful employment practice”

or “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation . . .

under” the relevant statute. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added); see Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). 1 We conclude Reeves did so.

1 Although Section 2000e-3(a) does not, by its own terms, apply to federal employers like the defendants, a federal-sector provision of Title VII permits courts to remedy “violation[s] of section 2000e-3(a).” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A). This Court has held that provision “incorporate[s]” Section 2000e-3(a)’s “anti-retaliation provision’s protections,” Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2022), and the defendants have not challenged that understanding.

4 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 5 of 11

True, the defendants “asserted a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for any adverse

employment actions taken against Reeves”—specifically, a well-documented history of

poor job performance predating any protected activity, to which employees whom Reeves

did not accuse of retaliation attested. JA 1026. But unlike the district court, we conclude

the summary judgment record contains evidence that could—if credited by the factfinder—

support a finding of unlawful retaliation.

In July 2019—a few weeks after he was hired—Reeves met with two supervisors to

discuss his role. Reeves testified that, during this meeting, the supervisors told him one of

his predecessors had filed an EEO complaint against them. Reeves testified that the

supervisors further told him that “if [he] had any intentions on going through a EEO case

with them[,] that [he] was on a two-year probation and that they will fire [him], and [his]

pretty government career will be over.” JA 141; accord JA 397 (describing one of the

supervisors as saying they had “learned from” the previous EEO process and that “we will

get rid of you before we go down that road again”).

Less than a year later, Reeves contacted his agency’s anti-harassment hotline to

complain about the same two supervisors’ conduct. Both supervisors learned about the

allegations in July 2020. One supervisor admitted to having “assumed Mr. Reeves had

made” them, JA 226, and the other described having an “in-person meeting” that same

month that “included discussion about Mr. Reeves’ allegations,” JA 260 (emphasis added).

Reeves filed an anonymous informal EEO complaint against the same two

supervisors on August 7, 2020. Both supervisors learned about the informal complaint

several weeks later, and one of them (Reeves’ direct boss) admitted that he “surmise[d] . . .

5 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 6 of 11

that Mr. Reeves may have been the Complainant.” JA 226. On October 5, 2020, Reeves

filed a formal EEO complaint, again naming the same two supervisors. Three days later,

Reeves received an overall performance rating of “Unacceptable” on a form that listed one

of the supervisors as the “rater” and the other supervisor as the “reviewer.” JA 544. Reeves

was fired just over three months later.

We conclude the facts recounted above could—if believed—support an unlawful

retaliation finding. To be sure, just because one thing happened after another does not prove

the earlier event caused the later one. That is why closeness in time alone is often (though

not always) insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact about whether a later adverse

employment action was motivated by earlier protected activity. See, e.g., Hall Haggins v.

Wilson Air Cntr., LLC, 163 F.4th 872, 881 (4th Cir. 2026). But here there is more: Reeves

testified that his supervisors told him he would be fired if he ever filed an EEO complaint

against them, and the undisputed evidence shows that is what happened. Of course, the

factfinder might credit the supervisors’ assertions that they said no such thing, or conclude

that the ultimate decision to fire Reeves was made by other people or for other reasons. But

it is not a court’s job when reviewing a summary judgment motion “to determine what

really happened or figure out whose version of events is more likely to be true.” Alexander

v. Connor, 105 F.4th 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2024). And Reeves’ testimony on this point—

especially when coupled with his direct supervisor’s admission that he knew Reeves had

filed an informal EEO complaint before submitting the negative performance review—is

6 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 7 of 11

certainly some “evidence” “upon which pretext can be reasonably inferred.” JA 1028. 2 For

that reason, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the

defendants on Reeves’ retaliation claim.

The judgment is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the case is remanded for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SO ORDERED

2 Both supervisors submitted declarations claiming they only learned that Reeves “filed a formal EEO Complaint” months after they submitted their negative performance evaluation. JA 419, 422. Neither declaration, however, says anything about when the supervisors learned Reeves had called the anti-harassment hotline or submitted an informal complaint. See Defs.’ Br. 24 (acknowledging that Reeves’ contacting the hotline was “protected activity”).

7 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 8 of 11

RUSHING, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with the majority that the district court correctly dismissed Reeves’s

discrimination claim and correctly granted summary judgment to the defendants on

Reeves’s hostile work environment claim. But unlike the majority, I would also affirm

summary judgment in the defendants’ favor on Reeves’s retaliation claim. No reasonable

jury could find that the defendants’ asserted reason for Reeves’s negative performance

evaluation and termination—namely, his well-documented history of poor work

performance, which predated his protected activities and persisted throughout his

employment—was a pretext for retaliation. See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d

243, 250, 252 (4th Cir. 2015) (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973)). Accordingly, I would affirm in full.

Shortly after Reeves began his probationary employment at the National Geospatial-

Intelligence Agency in July 2019, his supervisors, Gondeck and Cichetti, grew concerned

about his performance. In September, Gondeck contacted the human resources department

for advice about how to address Reeves’s continuing performance problems. On October

10, Gondeck and Cichetti met with Reeves to discuss their concerns. They explained that

his work product was “neither timely nor of requisite quality.” J.A. 334. Reeves’s team

members felt “as though [Reeves did] not respect their experiences or opinions” and that

he had “been dismissive or condescending towards them.” J.A. 334. And his conduct was

“adversely affecting both substantive production and morale.” J.A. 334. His supervisors

specifically noted that Reeves was not on track to meet his performance objectives and

cautioned that they “need[ed] to see immediate significant improvement in the timeliness

8 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 9 of 11

and quality of the work product and the manner in which [he] engage[d] with [his]

teammates.” J.A. 335. They explained that they would “take a more direct role in the day-

to-day taskings” of Reeves’s division, asked him to attend training and coaching, and

provided him with specific guidance on improving his performance. J.A. 336.

On October 21, Gondeck and Cichetti held a follow-up discussion with Reeves and

provided additional examples of his performance deficiencies. They also informed Reeves

they would initiate an Ombudsman Facilitated Self-Assessment of his division and its

workplace culture. Gondeck and Cichetti met with Reeves again on November 15 to

continue providing feedback and guidance about objectives he “was still not performing

successfully.” J.A. 314. Among other things, they expressed concern about his continuing

lack of subject-matter expertise and the “virtually daily” complaints they received from

employees and contractors about his “engagement and communication style.” J.A. 315.

Gondeck and Cichetti received the Ombudsman’s report on November 22.

Comments from division personnel in the report “confirm[ed] what [Gondeck and Cichetti]

were hearing and seeing” regarding the seriousness of Reeves’s performance and behavior

problems. J.A. 243; see J.A. 318–319. Through January and February 2020, members of

Reeves’s team continued raising concerns to Gondeck and Cichetti about his leadership,

management style, and lack of subject-matter expertise. And as of February 2020, Reeves

continued to have “performance issues on a daily to multiple per week” basis. J.A. 381.

In April 2020, Gondeck and Cichetti submitted an extensive formal memorandum

documenting Reeves’s “unacceptable performance and behavior” and recommending his

“removal during [his] trial period.” J.A. 303, 305. This 27-page memorandum chronicled

9 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 10 of 11

Reeves’s troubled tenure, including twelve specific scenarios and their impact on the

agency. Reeves’s supervisors concluded that he “regularly demonstrates poor decision

quality, lacks the ability to think critically, refuses to accept responsibility for his work or

that of his subordinates, fails to deliver quality work product in accordance with deadlines,

. . . routinely conducts himself in a manner inconsistent with [the agency’s] [v]alues, . . .

demonstrate[s] complete disregard for . . . feedback and constructive direction,” and treats

the personnel in his division in an “unwarranted, unprovoked, toxic, and degrading”

manner. J.A. 330.

That was all before Reeves engaged in the protected activity on which he bases his

retaliation claim. In May and June of 2020, Reeves complained to human resources that

Gondeck and Cichetti allegedly harassed and discriminated against him, and they became

aware of his complaints in July 2020. Reeves alleges that the following two events

occurred in retaliation for his protected activity.

In October 2020, Reeves received his performance evaluation for the year ending

September 30, 2020, in which Gondeck rated Reeves’s overall performance as a “1.0” on

a scale of 1 to 5—an “[u]nacceptable” rating. J.A. 532. After three phases of agency

reconsideration, Reeves’s overall rating remained unchanged. In December 2020, the

Personnel Evaluation Board met to discuss Reeves’s situation and recommended he be

removed. After reviewing the documentation, including “examples provided by

management about [Reeves’s] failure to meet expectations,” the director of human

resources decided that Reeves’s “poor performance . . . warranted removal during the trial

10 USCA4 Appeal: 24-1568 Doc: 66 Filed: 03/11/2026 Pg: 11 of 11

period.” J.A. 512. On January 15, 2021, the director issued a letter informing Reeves that

his employment would be terminated effective January 29, 2021.

Despite the undisputed evidence of Reeves’s poor performance predating his

protected activity, the majority believes a reasonable jury could find Reeves received an

“unacceptable” rating and was terminated, not because of his deficient performance as the

defendants claim, but in retaliation for his protected activity. The majority bases this

conclusion on Reeves’s assertion that, in July 2019 when he began his job, Gondeck and

Cichetti told him he would be fired if he brought “an EEO case.” J.A. 141.

On these facts, that alleged comment makes no difference. For a full year before

Gondeck and Cichetti became aware of Reeves’s EEO allegations, they had received

constant complaints from Reeves’s colleagues and had consistently documented his

unacceptable performance. And three months before they were aware of his allegations,

Gondeck and Cichetti recommended that Reeves be terminated. Even viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to Reeves, the actions that led to his negative

evaluation and termination “began before [his] protected activity, belying the conclusion

that a reasonable factfinder might find that [those decisions were] motivated by [Reeves’s]

complaints.” Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2006);

see also Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123, 133 (4th Cir. 2025). I would therefore affirm the

district court’s decision in full.