Terrance O'donnell, V. Cecilia Carter

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 9, 2025
• Docket: 86800-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Parentage of T.O. and TS.O. No. 86800-4-I

DIVISION ONE TERRANCE O’DONNELL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant,

v.

CECILIA CARTER,

Respondent.

HAZELRIGG, C.J. —Terrence O’Donnell appeals the parenting plan and child

support order entered at the conclusion of an informal family law trial. O’Donnell

presents a number of challenges to the trial court’s findings of fact, conclusions of

law, and final orders, none of which are availing. Because O’Donnell fails to

demonstrate error, we affirm.

FACTS

Terrance O’Donnell and Cecilia Carter met in 2019 and never married. The

parties have two children together who were two and four at the time the parenting

plan was entered. The record on appeal establishes that the parties had a

contentious relationship, with several separations and reunifications, as evidenced

by the voluminous text correspondence included as exhibits and testimony.

O’Donnell filed a petition seeking a parenting plan in March 2023. The initial No. 86800-4-I/2

temporary order formalized a preexisting arrangement where the children resided

with Carter during the week, and then spent Friday through Sunday with O’Donnell.

This arrangement reflected the fact that Carter worked weekends. At the time of

trial, O’Donnell was not employed due to mental health diagnoses and received

supplemental security income (SSI).

The parties appeared for an informal family law trial in May 2024. Carter

was represented by counsel while O’Donnell appear pro se. The stated purpose

of the trial was to address a “parenting plan, including child-support determination

and the relocation.” In his opening statement, O’Donnell requested designation as

the primary custodial parent, for Carter to pay him child support, and denial of

Carter’s proposed order authorizing relocation. He also proposed a final parenting

plan with a substantially different residential schedule than the one in place at the

time of trial. Carter asked for the court to maintain the current residential schedule

because O’Donnell’s proposed schedule was not offered in good faith and, instead,

was based on “ulterior motives,” alleging that O’Donnell was “financially motivated”

and custody of the children could get him more advantageous housing. Carter

also noted that, at that time, O’Donnell had not provided any evidence of his

income and asked the court impute it for purposes of child support calculation. In

response, O’Donnell told the court he would upload documentation related to a

recent SSI hearing to assist the court in assessing his income and ability to work.

O’Donnell testified at length about his contentious relationship with Carter,

their conflicts over visitation and healthcare, his inability to work, and the

relationship he has with his sons. Carter testified about their “toxic, off and on”

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relationship, admitting that O’Donnell was a good father, but asserting that he is a

bad co-parent. Carter also provided her explanations for O’Donnell’s allegations

that she is an unfit parent and about the proposed relocation.

The judge took the testimony under advisement and entered orders and

findings approximately one week later. The parenting plan included a finding that

both O’Donnell and Carter “use conflict in a way that may cause damage to the

psychological development of the child[ren].” The plan also required the parents

to communicate through specific software, to not prevent the other parent from

contacting the children, and to not speak poorly about the other parent in front of

the children. It maintained the established residential schedule. The child support

order required O’Donnell to pay $100 a month to Carter. The judge also approved

Carter’s proposed relocation.

O’Donnell timely appealed and Carter declined to file a response brief.

ANALYSIS

I. Child Support Order

O’Donnell asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing his

income, despite the fact he only receives SSI which is statutorily excluded from the

calculation of income for purposes of child support. He further argues that the

court imputed his income in spite of his disabilities that render him unemployable.

O’Donnell misunderstands the child support order and worksheets; the trial court

did not impute any income to him, but rather applied the basic presumptive amount

owed as required by RCW 26.19.065(2) based on zero income attributed to him.

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We review child support orders for manifest abuse of discretion and will not

disturb the trial court’s order unless it relies on an incorrect interpretation of the

law. In re Marriage of Sprute, 186 Wn. App 342, 357, 344 P.3d 730 (2015). RCW

26.19.071 sets the standard for determining the parents’ income for the purposes

of a child support order. SSI is statutorily excluded from gross monthly income.

RCW 26.19.071(4)(e). If the court determines a parent is “voluntarily unemployed

or voluntarily underemployed,” it shall impute the income of that parent. RCW

26.19.071(6). However, “[i]ncome shall not be imputed for an unemployable

parent.” Id.

The trial court correctly interpreted and applied the controlling law here. The

judge determined that O’Donnell did not have a monthly income and explicitly

stated that “O’Donnell is disabled and receives SSI benefits which are not included

as income per RCW 26.19.071(4)(e).” Similarly, the trial court did not impute any

income; it used O’Donnell’s actual creditable income of zero dollars. 1 The court

then applied the presumptive minimal support obligation pursuant to RCW

26.19.065(2) because O’Donnell’s income fell below the self-support reserve. 2

When a parent’s monthly net income is below one hundred twenty- five percent of the federal poverty guideline for a one-person family, a support order of not less than fifty dollars per child per month shall be entered unless the obligor parent establishes that it would be unjust to do so in that particular case.

1 The report of proceedings from the trial does suggest that the temporary child support

order previously entered by a court commissioner had in fact relied on imputed income for O’Donnell, in the absence of any documentary evidence regarding his finances. However, the judge here clearly accepted, and relied on, the documentation he provided at trial regarding his disability status and income. 2 “Washington State Courts use the self-support reserve to calculate low income limitations

when setting support. The self-support reserve is 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines for a one-person family.” 22 ELIZABETH A. TURNER, W ASHINGTON PRACTICE: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW HANDBOOK ch. 4, note at 1203 (2024 ed.).

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RCW 26.19.065(2)(a) (emphasis added). While O’Donnell emphasizes the statute

exempting SSI from income calculation for child support, he fails to engage with

RCW 26.19.065(2)(a) at all, much less explain how the court’s compliance with the

mandatory language of this statute conflicts with the SSI exemption language from

RCW 26.19.071(4)(e). Accordingly, he does not establish an abuse of discretion

in the calculation or award of child support.

II. Parenting Plan

O’Donnell avers that the residential schedule set out in the parenting plan

was improper because the court’s designation of Carter as the custodian was not

in the best interests of the children and the court further erred in finding that his

proposed plan was submitted in bad faith. We disagree.

A. Designation of Custodian

O’Donnell’s contention as to the residential schedule and designation of

custodian rests on his allegations of “Carter’s blameworthy conduct,” blocking his

access to the children, disparaging him in front of the children, and failing to attend

to the children’s medical needs and hygiene. However, O’Donnell simply attempts

to reargue the matter based on these assertions rather than demonstrate how the

court failed to apply the controlling legal standard.

“[W]e give broad deference to the trial court’s findings. An appellate court

will not lightly disturb the custody ruling due to the trial courts ‘unique opportunity

to personally observe the parties.’” In re Custody of SA-M, 17 Wn. App. 2d 939,

951, 489 P.3d 259 (2021) (quoting In re Custody of Stell, 56 Wn. App. 356, 366,

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783 P.2d 615 (1989)). “[T]rial courts are given broad discretion in matters dealing

with the welfare of children. A trial court’s decision will not be reversed on appeal

unless the court exercised its discretion in an untenable or manifestly

unreasonable way.” In re Marriage of McDole, 122 Wn.2d 604, 610, 859 P.2d

1239 (1993) (citations omitted). We uphold findings of fact that are supported by

substantial evidence. Id.

The trial court here credited Carter’s testimony and acted within its

discretion. While the court did enter findings of fact that indicate Carter involved

the children in the conflict, similar findings were made about O’Donnell. The court

expressly found that “[b]oth parties have demonstrated abusive use of conflict that

may have a detrimental effect on the children and the other parent’s relationship

to the children.” 3 The court acknowledged that Carter had “blocked [O’Donnell’s]

phone and video call access to the children” and she had “used manipulative

tactics to create conflict with” him.

However, the court did not make any finding of neglect, thereby crediting

Carter’s explanation of an incident that O’Donnell alleged demonstrated her failure

to attend to the children’s hygiene. There was also no finding that Carter was

withholding the children without a good reason; the court credited Carter’s

explanation that the times when the children stayed with her family instead of going

to O’Donnell were necessitated by him declining to take them. Carter also

3 “Abusive use of conflict includes, but is not limited to, abusive litigation as defined in RCW

26.51.020. If the court finds a parent has engaged in abusive litigation, the court may impose any restrictions or remedies set forth in chapter 26.51 RCW in addition to including a finding in the parenting plan. Litigation that is aggressive or improper but that does not meet the definition of abusive litigation shall not constitute a basis for a finding under this section.” RCW 26.09.191(3)(e).

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explained that both parents had taken the children to the doctor and she would

continue to allow O’Donnell to schedule appointments. But, Carter also stated that

she no longer “jump[s]” to take the children to a doctor’s appointment just because

O’Donnell has raised concerns, citing worries about having to pay out of pocket for

unnecessary visits for common ailments. Finally, the trial court found that Carter

and O’Donnell both have “a strong, stable, and loving relationship with the children”

and described these relationships as “equally strong.” The judge credited Carter’s

explanations of the alleged deficiencies, found the parents equally responsible for

conflict, but also that both parents had good relationships with the children.

While O’Donnell anchors this assignment of error in a claim that the court

failed to properly consider the best interests of the children, his disagreement with

the court’s conclusion on this point is insufficient to establish reversible error.

Because the custody determination was supported by substantial evidence, we will

not disturb it.

B. Rejection of Proposed Parenting Plan

O’Donnell next challenges the trial court’s finding that his parenting plan

was submitted in bad faith. The court found that O’Donnell’s proposed plan would

allow Carter residential time with the children only on days that she works. If it was

implemented, she would be able to see the children only by changing her

employment. The court called his proposal “patently unreasonable and done with

intent to harass and the intent to disrupt the mother’s relationship with the children.”

He argues that it is not supported by substantial evidence because he had

good faith reasons for filing the plan; the current plan limits his parenting time, the

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proposed plan reflects his desire to spend more time with the children and provide

them stability, and his submission better conforms with Carter’s alleged new work

schedule. Without citation to any evidence, O’Donnell asserts that Carter

“accepted a new shift, which she is working from Monday to Friday from 8 am to

4:30 pm.” There is nothing in the record on appeal that corroborates this

contention. We may not consider evidence that was not before the trial court.

Morgan v. Briney, 200 Wn. App 380, 394, 403 P.3d 86 (2017).

Again, we uphold findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.

McDole, 122 Wn.2d at 610. “‘We will not substitute our judgment for the trial

court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.’” In re Marriage of

DeVogel, 22 Wn. App. 2d 39, 48, 509 P.3d 832 (2022) (quoting In re Marriage of

Greene, 97 Wn. App 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999)).

At trial, Carter testified that she works 12-hour shifts Friday through Sunday

and she has done so since she was first pregnant, except for a period where she

and O’Donnell lived together. There is nothing before us to indicate that Carter

has accepted a new shift apart from O’Donnell’s unsupported assertion.

Accordingly, he fails to establish error as to this finding.

III. Order on Relocation

O’Donnell next relies on RCW 26.09.520 in support of his claim that Carter

failed to conform to procedural and notice requirements for relocation. However,

this statute does not provide any notice requirement, but rather provides the factors

the court will consider in making its relocation decision. The judge explained this

when she cited the statute and set out the factors at the start of the trial. The

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relevant notice requirements and the procedure for objecting to relocation are set

out elsewhere in the chapter. See RCW 26.09.430-.480. Because O’Donnell’s

brief fails to engage with the relevant law, and the record before us does not

include facts related to the timing of Carter’s notice of relocation, we decline to

consider this assignment of error. See RAP 2.5(a), 10.3(a)(6); In re Marriage of

Bernard, 137 Wn. App. 827, 833, 838, 155 P.3d 171 (2007), aff’d, 165 Wn.2d 895,

204 P.3d 907 (2009).

IV. Consideration of Testimony

Finally, O’Donnell avers that the trial judge erred in “dismissing” his

testimony regarding the circumstances of conception of the children and he was

not afforded “reasonable accommodations as a pro se litigant,” which violated his

due process rights. O’Donnell quotes from Mathews v. Eldridge, which establishes

that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be ‘heard

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct.

893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85

S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)). However here, O’Donnell sought, and was

granted, an opportunity to present testimony regarding the matter in question. He

also submitted a declaration with the same allegations. Carter rebutted

O’Donnell’s testimony with her own version of events. The trial judge noted that

O’Donnell did not raise this issue prior to submitting his declaration or “file a notice

under RCW 26.26A.465.” O’Donnell did not assign it any legal consequence in

the trial court or in his briefing on appeal. More critically, O’Donnell does not

identify what process he was denied.

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O’Donnell’s argument that he should have been offered reasonable

accommodations as a pro se litigant is directly contradicted by long-standing case

law. 4 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527

(1993); In re Vulnerable Adult Pet. of Winter, 12 Wn. App. 2d 815, 844, 460 P.3d

667 (2020); In re Est. of Little, 27 Wn. App. 2d 262, 274, 444 P.3d 23 (2019). He

further takes issue with the judge’s finding that his testimony in this regard was not

credible, “was made for purposes of manipulating and misleading the [c]ourt,” and

was “an attempt to disparage Ms. Carter.” But, as explained supra in Part II.B, we

do not review credibility determinations. Regardless, adverse findings are not a

denial of due process. In light of the expansive authority establishing that we do

not disturb the trial court’s credibility determinations and that pro se litigants are

held to the same standard as attorneys, and in the absence of any substantive

analysis of due process, O’Donnell has not established error on this matter.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

4 He also cites from the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule

2.2 comment 4, which suggests that judges may make reasonable accommodations for pro se litigants so that they may be heard fairly. However, he does not explain why this model rule might be binding on a Washington judge or address the fact that the rule permits judges to make accommodations, but does not require them to do so.

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