Terrance Marsh, et al. v. Freedom Mortgage Corporation

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: May 4, 2026
• Docket: 1:24-cv-01304
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TERRANCE MARSH, et al., Case No. 1:24-cv-01304-JLT-CDB

12 Plaintiffs, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 13 v. DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED 14 COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND FREEDOM MORTGAGE 15 CORPORATION, (Doc. 17)

16 Defendant. 14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

17 18 Pending before the undersigned is the motion of Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation 19 (“Defendant”) to dismiss the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”), filed on January 8, 2025.1 20 (Doc. 17). Plaintiffs Terrance Marsh and Gesele Marsh (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, filed an 21 opposition to the motion on February 18, 2025, and Defendant filed a reply on February 27, 2025. 22 (Docs. 22, 27). Following review of the parties’ filings made in connection with the motion, the 23 Court deemed the motion suitable for disposition without hearing and oral argument and vacated 24 the motion hearing set for February 25, 2025. (Doc. 20) (citing Local Rule 230(g)). For the reasons 25 set forth herein, the undersigned will recommend granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC 26 with leave to amend.

27 1 On January 22, 2026, the assigned district judge referred the pending motion to dismiss to the undersigned for the preparation of findings and recommendations. See (Doc. 49). 1 I. Relevant Background 2 A. Procedural History 3 Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, initiated this action with the filing of a complaint against 4 Defendant in state court on March 28, 2024, before Defendant removed the case to this Court on 5 October 24, 2024. (Doc. 1). On December 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative FAC against 6 Defendant. (Doc. 13). 7 B. Factual Background of Plaintiffs’ FAC 8 In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that they entered into a verbal agreement with Defendant on 9 September 20, 2021, for a full modification agreement relating to a VA loan (the “Loan”) on their 10 residential property in California City (the “Property”) after Plaintiffs voluntarily exited a 11 forbearance program. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiffs allege they “did arrange and negotiate for a full 12 modification package with Defendant …, allowing for monies that were owed (during the 13 forbearance) and placed in arrears on Plaintiffs[‘] VA backed loan.” Id. 14 According to their allegations, the modification agreement required Plaintiffs to make 15 “higher monthly payments for a period of 90 days, after which, the original interest rate of 3.2% 16 before the pandemic would stay the same on Plaintiffs[‘] VA backed loan, and therefore, a full 17 modification would be sent after completion of trial payments.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs allege they 18 would have signed and returned the full modification agreement timely had Defendants sent the 19 modification agreement, and Plaintiffs continuously made payments for over two years waiting for 20 the agreed modification while Defendant “did not fulfill the promise to give Plaintiffs a full 21 modification agreement[.]” Id. Plaintiffs allege that “it was only after filing a lawsuit did [] 22 Defendant[] offer Plaintiffs an opportunity for a full modification agreement, however it was of a 23 higher interest rate.” Id. 24 Plaintiffs allege in July 2023 that Defendant sent Plaintiffs a partial modification plan “after 25 two years of broken agreement, and a continuous payment from Plaintiffs without any qualification 26 of rescindment[.]” Id. at 3. Plaintiffs allege they were prevented from using equity in their Property 27 to pay accounts because Defendant reported false information to Plaintiffs’ VA representatives, 1 modification in February 2024 and again received a higher interest rate than the 3.2% interest that 2 was agreed upon in 2021. Id. at 4. 3 Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated federal law by initiating the foreclosure process before 4 Plaintiffs’ loan was more than 120 days late. Id. at 6 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 3709(a)(2)).2 Plaintiffs 5 appear to allege a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure under Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6, asserting 6 “all [they] had to allege was that they met their statutory obligation by timely tendering the amount 7 required by Civil Code section 2924c to stop the foreclosure.” Id. at 6-7. 8 Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s acts have caused their “privacy to be interrupted and harassed 9 by numerous daily calls from solicitors asking to purchase home and this has caused Plaintiffs 10 embarrassment, [and] intentional [i]nfliction of emotional distress[.]” Id. at 8. 11 In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs seek actual damages, special damages, punitive damages, 12 including “damages for the real amount of estate property that is in question” and for emergency 13 preliminary permanent injunctive relief “because of broken promise from Defendants [of which] 14 Plaintiffs relied to their detriment.” Id. at 10. Plaintiffs request an “immediate removal of 15 derogatory billing” and for actual damages of $270,000.00 based on the “value of home[,]” special 16 damages and legal fees of $80,000.00, and punitive damages of $200,000.00. Id. 17 II. Governing Authority 18 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) asks a court to dismiss 19 a plaintiff’s complaint for failing “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. 20 P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint’s sufficiency. N. Star 21 Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n., 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Peck v. Hoff, 660 F.2d 371, 22 374 (8th Cir. 1981)). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law either for lack of a 23 2 Insofar as Plaintiffs assert a claim under § 3709(a)(2), Plaintiffs’ allegations are 24 insufficient. Section 3709(a)(2) provides that “the foreclosure commissioner shall withdraw the security property from foreclosure and cancel the foreclosure sale only if … (2) the commissioner 25 finds, upon application of the mortgagor at least three days prior to the date of the sale, that the 26 default or defaults upon which the foreclosure is based did not exist at the time of service of the notice of default and foreclosure sale[.]” 12 U.S.C. § 3709(a)(2). The undersigned agrees with 27 Defendants that the FAC fails to allege sufficient facts to state any claim under that provision or pursuant to the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosures Act generally. (Doc. 17 at 14); see generally 1 cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. 2 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Robertson v. Dean 3 Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984)). 4 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide sufficient 5 factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 6 678 (2009); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the 7 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief). A complaint satisfies the plausibility 8 requirement if it contains sufficient facts for the court to “draw [a] reasonable inference that the 9 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 10 (2007). 11 When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court 12 must accept as true all allegations put forth in the complaint and construe all facts and inferences 13 in favor of the non-moving party. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted); 14 Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 2010). The complaint need not include “detailed 15 factual allegations,” but must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 16 me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). The Court is “not ‘required to accept 17 as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to 18 judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 19 unreasonable inferences.’” Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t, Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 20 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 21 2010)). Nor does the court “necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they 22 are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Western Min. Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th 23 Cir. 1981). 24 Leave to amend should be freely granted “unless the court determines that the allegation of 25 other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Lopez 26 v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 27 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). 1 Finally, courts must construe pro se pleadings liberally and hold such pleadings to a less 2 stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) 3 (per curiam); see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (“It is settled law that the allegations of [a 4 pro se litigant’s complaint] ‘however inartfully pleaded’ are held ‘to less stringent standards than 5 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’”) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). A 6 court should dismiss a pro se complaint if “it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the 7 complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 8 2012). 9 III. Parties’ Contentions 10 Defendant moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC because the FAC fails to state a claim 11 upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 17 at 6). Defendant contends the claim for promissory 12 estoppel fails because it is barred by the economic loss doctrine, and Plaintiffs fail to identify what 13 law they rely on in seeking damages related to their credit. Id. at 7. Defendant further contends 14 that Plaintiffs’ claims related to false or inaccurate credit reporting fail under both state and federal 15 law. Id. Specifically, Defendant argues that any claim under California law for damages relating 16 to Plaintiffs’ credit is barred by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and any claim under the 17 FCRA fails because Plaintiffs do not allege that they complained to any credit reporting agency 18 (“CRA”), that the CRA notified Defendant or that Defendant failed to investigate any alleged 19 inaccuracies or otherwise failed to comply with the requirements of Section 1681s-2(b) of the 20 FCRA. Id. Defendant contends Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief fails because Plaintiffs’ 21 substantive claims are not cognizable. Id. Defendant argues the request for punitive damages 22 should be dismissed for failure to plead sufficient facts implicating such damages. Id. 23 Plaintiffs contend their promissory estoppel claim is not barred by the economic loss 24 doctrine because the doctrine “does not preclude recovery where tortious conduct or independent 25 wrongdoing is alleged” and Plaintiffs “allege that Defendant’s failure to fulfill its promise of a full 26 loan modification caused financial and emotional harm beyond mere contractual damages.” (Doc. 27 22 at 3). Separately, Plaintiffs argue their credit reporting claims are not preempted by the FCRA 1 misrepresented credit information to third parties resulting in reputational and financial harm, 2 actions of which are not covered by the FCRA’s immunity provisions. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs contend 3 the FAC sufficiently states a claim for wrongful foreclosure based on the allegations that Defendant 4 initiated foreclosure proceedings despite Plaintiffs not being delinquent beyond 120 days and while 5 they were actively pursuing a loan modification. Id. Plaintiffs assert their request for injunctive 6 relief is proper because Plaintiffs allege specific statutory violations that entitle them to injunctive 7 relief, including Defendant’s failure to acknowledge loan modification applications, prevent dual 8 tracking, and provide proper notice under Civil Code Sections 2923.55 and 2924.10. Id. at 5. 9 Lastly, Plaintiffs argue they sufficiently plead entitlement to punitive damages as Plaintiffs describe 10 Defendant’s intentional and reckless conduct including reporting false credit information and 11 initiating wrongful foreclosure proceedings. Id. 12 In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ admission that the FAC is predicated exclusively 13 on Defendant’s alleged breach of contractual obligations is fatal to their claim of promissory 14 estoppel and recovery of punitive damages. (Doc. 27 at 2). Defendant argues that to the extent 15 Plaintiffs attempt to assert state or federal claims for false or inaccurate reporting, wrongful 16 foreclosure, or injunctive relief, no factual allegations or independent causes of action were stated 17 in the FAC to support them. Id. Defendant contends that the Court should dismiss the FAC without 18 leave to amend because Plaintiffs’ new extraneous assertions and legal conclusions advanced in the 19 opposition are insufficient to establish that a valid cause of action has been alleged against 20 Defendant in the FAC. Id. 21 IV. Discussion3 22 A. Promissory Estoppel State Law Claim 23 1. Governing Authority 24 “Under California law, the elements of promissory estoppel are (1) a promise clear and 25 unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) the reliance 26

27 3 Because Plaintiffs’ FAC neither references nor otherwise plausibly asserts claims pursuant to the FCRA and is devoid of allegations supporting such a claim, the undersigned does 1 must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured 2 by his reliance.” Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 792 (9th Cir. 2012). “The 3 purpose of this doctrine is to make a promise that lacks consideration (in the usual sense of 4 something bargained for and given in exchange) binding under certain circumstances.” Boon Rawd 5 Trading Intern. Co., Ltd. v. Paleewong Trading Co., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 2d 940, 953 (N.D. Cal. 6 2010) (citing Youngman v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 70 Cal. 2d 240, 249 (Cal. 1969)). 7 2. Analysis 8 Plaintiffs premise their promissory estoppel claim on the allegations that Defendant verbally 9 promised to provide a full loan modification based on Plaintiffs’ completion of submitting 10 payments on the Loan at a higher monthly payment for a period of 90 days.4 See (Doc. 13 at 1-2). 11 Here, even if Plaintiffs’ allegations were sufficient to establish that they relied on a promise 12 by Defendant that was clear and unambiguous in its terms, Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claim 13 fails because Plaintiffs do not adequately plead that they reasonably and detrimentally relied on any 14 such promise. Plaintiffs’ allegations that they continued to make payments for over two years show 15 that they “complied with [their] preexisting contractual duties and are not sufficient to show 16 detrimental reliance on the alleged promise to provide [a full] loan modification. Mulato v. Wells 17 Fargo Bank, N.A., 76 F. Supp. 3d 929, 952 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing Lawther v. OneWest Bank, 18 FSB, No. 10-cv-00054-JCS, 2012 WL 298110, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2012) (“holding that 19 ‘where the injury alleged as a result of reliance is that the plaintiffs made payments that they were 20 already obligated to make under the loan contract, no claim for promissory estoppel is stated.’”). 21 See De La Cruz v. Citi Mortg. Inc., No. 1:12–cv–0141–AWI–BAM, 2012 WL 487004, *3 (E.D. 22

23 4 Defendant’s argument that Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine is unavailing. See (Doc. 17 at 9-10). First, in the chief case upon which Defendant 24 relies for its argument (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.), the California Supreme Court expressly declined to consider whether the rule bars a promissory estoppel claim. 12 Cal. 5th 905, 915-16, 25 943. Second, “[t]he purpose of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is to permit a court of equity to 26 excuse the absence of consideration for an otherwise enforceable promise.” JMP Securities LLP v. Altair Nanotechnologies, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1042 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Youngman, 27 70 Cal. 2d at 249). Because promissory estoppel is used as a substitute for consideration, it is not an alternate tort theory that is subject to the economic loss rule. Therefore, the undersigned 1 Cal. Feb. 14, 2012) (“[P]laintiffs do not allege sufficient reliance on the new representation, in that 2 plaintiffs already were bound contractually to make loan payments. Accordingly, Plaintiffs do not 3 state a claim for promissory estoppel”); accord Griffin v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, No. cv-14- 4 09408 MMM (VBKx), 2015 WL 10059081, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2015) (same) (citing cases); 5 Ortiz v. America's Servicing Co., No. ED-cv-12–191 CAS (SPx), 2012 WL 2160953, *7 (C.D. Cal. 6 June 11, 2012) (same); Newgent v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 09–cv–1525 WQH, 2010 WL 7 761236, *7 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010) (same).5 8 Stated otherwise, Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead facts from which a reasonable inference 9 may be drawn that they were “induced to take some specific action, that [they] actually changed 10 [their] position in reliance on Defendant[’s] purported promises, or that other possible … options 11 [they] might have pursued would have been successful[.]” Nguyen v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 12 No. SA-cv-12–01574 CJC (ANx), 2012 WL 6062742, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2012). Indeed, 13 Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendant “ruined Plaintiffs opportunity for an equity loan” is 14 insufficient to show that they could establish that they would have been successful in obtaining an 15 equity loan to save their home from foreclosure. See (Doc. 13 at 8); Newgent, 2010 WL 761236, 16 at *7 (“Plaintiff alleged[ ] she failed to take legal action to delay the trustee’s sale because she 17 believed Wells Fargo had already agreed to delay the sale in exchange for her $2,500.77 payment. 18 Plaintiff does not, however, allege facts that could establish that [she] would have been successful 19 in delaying the foreclosure sale, renegotiating her loan, and retaining possession of the home”); 20 Mehta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-cv-944 JLS, 2011 WL 1157861, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21 29, 2011) (“Plaintiff attempts to plead reliance by alleging that he would have pursued other means 22 to avoid foreclosure had Wells Fargo not promised to delay the sale. In support, [p]laintiff identifies 23 several means—tendering funds to cure the default, obtaining a temporary restraining order, and 24 seeking bankruptcy protection. What [p]laintiff has not alleged, however, is whether he realistically 25

26 5 Contrary to Defendant’s argument and as noted in one of the decisions cited by Defendant (see Doc. 17 at 11-12), FCRA does not preempt Plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel claims 27 “even to the extent that they assert damages related to the disclosure of credit information.” Desser v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No CV 13-09190 DDP (CWx), 2014 WL 4258344, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 1 could have pursued these options three business days before the sale. The SAC does not allege any 2 facts suggesting that [p]laintiff would have been successful in taking legal action[.]”). 3 B. Wrongful Foreclosure State Law Claim Under Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6 4 “[A] lender’s practice of negotiating with homeowners in default on their loans for a loan 5 modification while simultaneously advancing the foreclosure process is commonly referred to as 6 ‘dual tracking.’ In July 2012, California passed legislation referred to as ‘The California 7 Homeowner Bill of Rights’ (“HOBR”) which offers homeowners greater protection during the 8 foreclosure process. In particular, … § 2923.6(c)[] prohibits dual tracking.” Flores v. Nationstar 9 Mortg. LLC, No. CV 13–3898–PLA, 2014 WL 304766, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2014) (citing Singh 10 v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2013 WL 1858436, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2013)). 11 Section 2923.6 provides that “[i]f a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien 12 loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower's mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, 13 mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of 14 sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale, while the complete first lien loan modification application is 15 pending.” Cal. Civ. Code § 2923.6(c). 16 Here, as noted above, Plaintiffs’ FAC appears to raise a cause of action under Cal. Civ. 17 Code § 2923.6 based on the prohibition against dual tracking. (Doc. 13 at 6). Although Plaintiffs’ 18 FAC details background information on the prohibition against dual tracking in referencing various 19 provisions of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2923 and 2924, and on the HBOR’s prohibitions thereto, Plaintiffs 20 fail to allege that they completed and submitted any application for a loan modification to 21 Defendant before Defendant proceeded with the foreclosure sale of the Property on November 16, 22 2023. See (Doc. 13 at 5). Indeed, Plaintiffs allege only that they “would have signed and returned 23 the full modification agreement timely had Defendant[] … sent the modification agreement.” Id. 24 at 2. To state a cognizable claim under § 2923.6, Plaintiffs must allege that they completed and 25 submitted a loan modification application that was pending before the mortgage servicer, i.e. 26 Defendant. See Flores, 2014 WL 304766 at *4 (denying motion to dismiss because “plaintiffs 27 allege that despite their submission of a loan application that was completed after January 1, 2013, 1 Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. 14-cv-02251-MEJ, 2014 WL 3900023, at *5 (N.D. 2 Cal. Aug. 7, 2014) (finding plaintiffs “plead facts to support the inference that they submitted a 3 complete loan modification application, and that [d]efendants initiated foreclosure proceedings 4 while that application was pending” where the FAC alleged that “they emailed Select the necessary 5 application form and all supporting financial documents … [and] acknowledged receipt of the 6 application two days later and informed [p]laintiffs that a decision would be coming in 30-45 7 days.”). 8 Because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under the HBOR, Plaintiffs’ requests for damages 9 and injunctive relief under the statute likewise fails. See Mulato, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 960 (denying 10 request for injunctive relief “[f]or the reasons set forth in the Court’s ruling on Wells Fargo’s 11 motion to dismiss the [FAC].”). 12 C. Leave to Amend is Warranted 13 As noted above, “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. 14 Civ. P. 15(2). However, district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can 15 be saved. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. A court should dismiss a pro se complaint if “it is absolutely 16 clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 17 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 18 Here, the undersigned is unable to find that it is absolutely clear that the FAC’s deficiencies 19 could not be cured by amendment. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend Defendant’s 20 motion to dismiss be granted with leave to amend. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. 21 V. Conclusion and Recommendation 22 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 23 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 17) be GRANTED. 24 2. Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint (Doc. 13) be DISMISSED with leave to amend. 25 3. Plaintiffs be ORDERED to file within 21 days of any order adopting these findings and 26 recommendations any second amended complaint (“SAC”) consistent with this order. 27 4. Defendants be ORDERED to file a response to any timely filed SAC within 14 days of ] These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the U.S. District Judge assigned 2 || to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days after being served 3 | with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written objections with 4 | the Court. Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate 5 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed 15 pages without leave of Court 6 | and good cause shown. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the 7 || extent any party wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), that party should reference the exhibit in the 8 | record by its CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the 9 | exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limitation may be disregarded by 10 | the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 11 | 636(b)(1)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 12 | waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014). 13 | ITIS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ May 4, 2026 | Word by 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11