Terrance Christopher; and T.C., a minor v. Clark County, et al.

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided February 24, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-01500·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA * * * Terrance Christopher; and T.C., a minor, Case No. 2:25-cv-01500-RFB-DJA Plaintiffs, Order v. Clark County, et al., Defendants. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Plaintiff Terrance Christopher is proceeding in this action pro se and has requested authority to proceed in forma pauperis (meaning, without paying the filing fee). (ECF No. 7). Christopher has also filed an application on behalf of minor Plaintiff T.C. (ECF No. 6). Plaintiffs have submitted an amended complaint. (ECF No. 8). Because the Court finds that both Plaintiffs’ applications are complete, it grants the applications to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court screens Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and not the original because an amended complaint supersedes the original.1 On screening, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and with leave to amend. I. In forma pauperis application. Plaintiffs filed the affidavit required by § 1915(a). (ECF Nos. 6, 7). Christopher explains that he is currently unemployed and the income from his former employment does not far exceed his monthly expenses. T.C. is eight and does not make any income. So, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown an inability to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the requests to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court will now review Plaintiffs’ complaint.

1 As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, rendering it without II. Legal standard for screening. Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally screen the complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of different states.” Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete diversity” among the parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). III. Screening the complaint. Plaintiffs sue Clark County, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, the Clark County Department of Family Services, the Animal Foundation, LVMPD Officer K. Rivera, LVMPD Officer R. Zavala, LVMPD Officer K. Reynolds, LVMPD D. Villegas, LVMPD Officer M. Moutafov, LVMPD Officer Z. Yates, LVMPD Officer K. Jones, LVMPD Officer Bright, and Detective R. Butler, Animal Control Officer Arizbeth Rodriguez, Animal Control Officer A. Acevedo, Animal Control Officer Avanzo, and Deputy District Attorney Marc DiGiacomo. Plaintiffs bring claims for illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, illegal arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, malicious prosecution, retaliation, “false arrest warrant,” “fabrication of evidence,” “illegal child seizure,” “unlawful taking and destruction of property,” and Monell liability.2 Plaintiffs allege that on May 14th and 15th of 2025, officers (Plaintiffs do not specify, but presumably they are referring to the LVMPD officers) unlawfully entered Plaintiffs’ backyard and arrested Christopher without probable cause. Those officers “deployed a drone,” “froze” Plaintiffs’ home, and conducted a search, all before securing a warrant. The warrant was not issued until 2:39 AM, long after the officers had searched and seized property. The officers “fabricated exigency, falsely claimed a knock and talk occurred, and omitted the illegal freeze and timeline in reports.” On an unspecified date, Child Protective Services removed Christopher’s son twice without a warrant or emergency. The family court “dismissed all allegations.” Animal Control also seized Plaintiffs’ dogs on an unspecified date despite “internal memos” stating that

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Terrance Christopher; and T.C., a minor v. Clark County, et al., (D. Nev. 2026).

Terrance Christopher; and T.C., a minor v. Clark County, et al. (Terrance Christopher; and T.C., a minor v. Clark County, et al.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Papasan v. Allain
478 U.S. 265 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis
519 U.S. 61 (Supreme Court, 1996)
Rasul v. Bush
542 U.S. 466 (Supreme Court, 2004)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd.
4 F.3d 1084 (Second Circuit, 1993)