Terra Insurance v. New York Life Investment Management LLC

717 F. Supp. 2d 883, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45967, 2010 WL 1910057
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedMay 11, 2010
DocketC 09-01609 WHA
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 717 F. Supp. 2d 883 (Terra Insurance v. New York Life Investment Management LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Terra Insurance v. New York Life Investment Management LLC, 717 F. Supp. 2d 883, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45967, 2010 WL 1910057 (N.D. Cal. 2010).

Opinion

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

WILLIAM ALSUP, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

In this civil action involving the alleged failure by an investment advisor to disclose material investment-related information to a client, defendant New York Life Investment Management LLC (“NYLIM”) moves for summary judgment against plaintiff and former client Terra Insurance Company. For the reasons explained below, NYLIM’s summary judgment motion is Granted in part and Denied in part.

STATEMENT

Terra is a “risk retention group” under federal law. In other words, it is a liability insurance company owned exclusively by its policyholders (Okcu Deel. Exh. 8, Exh. 11 at 37). These policyholders pay premiums to Terra, which are then invested and used to pay insurance claims (ibid.) Terra’s board of directors — which consists almost entirely of engineers' — employs the assistance of professional financial advisors to help manage the company’s investment portfolio (id. at Exh. 11 at 51-55, 311).

In this connection, Terra hired Towneley Capital Management as its investment ad-visor in 1989 (Wall Deck Exh. 1). Throughout this relationship, Terra worked primarily with Wesley McCain, the Chairman of Towneley, and Joan Sabella, who performed the role of Terra’s account representative (ibid.; Okcu Deck Exh. 11 at 69). Mr. McCain was responsible for devising investment strategies, while Ms. Sabella managed the account, answered questions, communicated information, and provided reports (Okcu Deck Exh. 11 at 71).

In 2000, Towneley’s mutual fund and investment advisory services were acquired by NYLIM, the defendant in this action (Wall Deck Exh. 2). NYLIM is a registered investment advisor that provides asset management and advisory services to various clients, including its parent company, New York Life Insurance Company (“New York Life”). NYLIM is a wholly' owned subsidiary of New York Life, who is not a defendant in this action (id. at Exh. 60).

Following this acquisition, Terra consented in writing to assign its investment advisory agreement — in other words, the continued management of its investment portfolio — to NYLIM (ibid.). Thereafter, Terra continued to work with the team of Mr. McCain and Ms. Sabella, who began working for NYLIM following the acquisition (ibid.). Sometime in 2004, Mr. McCain left NYLIM and ceased providing strategic advice for Terra’s investment portfolio (Br. 3; Opp. 3). His role was replaced by NYLIM strategist Tony Elavia (Okcu Deck Exh. 11 at 70-71). Ms. Sabella, however, remained Terra’s account representative at NYLIM until falling ill in late 2008. She passed away in mid-2009 (ibid.; Wall Deck Exh. 78 at 222-23).

Terra’s allegations in this litigation center on three events that occurred between 2005 and 2008. Painting with a broad brush, Terra accuses NYLIM of failing to *886 disclose (or outright fraudulently misrepresenting) material information about the declining health of credit markets and the economy to its board of directors in board meetings held in November 2007 in March 2008. According to Terra, had NYLIM disclosed this information, the board would have altered Terra’s investment approach regarding its equity holdings (which, as Terra emphasizes, consisted solely of NYLIM proprietary funds). As a result, between two to three million dollars in realized losses would have been averted. At the center of Terra’s claims are documents and testimony about an investment strategy implemented by New York Life— NYLIM’s parent company — called the “quality tilt.” This strategy, which was implemented by New York Life in 2007, shifted a small portion of New York Life’s investment portfolio away from its “normal” credit-market investments (BBB-rated bonds) towards “safe U.S. Treasury bonds” (Wall Decl. Exh. 59). While New York Life and NYLIM are different entities, Terra asserts that the “quality tilt” investment strategy originated from and/or was known to senior management and market analysts at NYLIM, and therefore NYLIM violated the law by providing investment advice to Terra that failed to reflect (and directly contradicted) the market outlook underlying the “quality tilt” strategy.

These three events — Terra’s board meetings in November 2007 and March 2008, and the development of New York Life’s “quality tilt” strategy — are discussed in more detail below.

1. Terra’s November 2007 Board Meeting

Well before Terra’s November 2007 board meeting, Terra President and CEO David Coduto had specific concerns about the health of the economy and Terra’s equity holdings in its investment portfolio (see, e.g., Okcu Deck Exh. 11 at 185, Exh. 6; Wall Deck Exh. 12). In June 2007, Mr. Coduto met with Ms. Sabella and another NYLIM representative, Veda Pai-Panadiker, to discuss “the appropriate level of equities of an insurance company of [Terra’s] size” and “issues ... about the U.S. economy” (Okcu Deck Exh. 11 at 185; Exh. 12 at 103). During this meeting, Mr. Coduto’s concerns regarding the credit markets — specifically, the commercial mortgage marketplace — were also supposedly discussed (Id. at Exh. 11 at 196-97).

Four months later, Mr. Coduto repeated his macroeconomic concerns at an October 2007 shareholder meeting. At that meeting, Mr. Coduto’s specifically stated that he “predicts] that the market will begin to unwind economically” and a “[b]ear market of epic proportions ... will begin sometime between the end of this year and November 2008 elections” (id. at Exh. 11 at 213-216). Mr. Coduto’s handwritten notes for the shareholder meeting also show that he had particular concerns about a “credit meltdown” and “massive worldwide debt” (id. at Exh. 6). 1 These opinions were all supposedly based upon Mr. Coduto’s independent research (id. at 215).

A number of these concerns became individual topics for discussion at Terra’s November 2007 board meeting. Leading up to the November meeting, Terra provided NYLIM with official “discussion points” that would be addressed during NYLIM’s presentation to the board, including “the current economy and its effect on investment decisions,” whether Terra should “consider expanding [its] portfolio’s [international] component” due to the ob *887 servation that “[s]ome [(International markets are booming,” and whether Terra should “reduce or eliminate our equity exposure and stay in cash for the next year or so” (Wall Decl. Exh. 12). NYLIM’s recommendations on these topics were expressly requested (ibid.)

The November 2007 board meeting was attended by NYLIM representatives Sabella and Pai-Panadiker (Wall Decl. Exh. 16). At the meeting, Mr. Coduto provided his views on the economy and asked NYL-IM whether Terra should liquidate its equity portfolio (given current economic conditions) and then transfer the balance into cash and cash equivalents until the financial markets and overall economy stabilized (ibid.). According to Mr. Coduto, it was his recommendation to the board that Terra’s equity portfolio be liquidated in this manner (Okcu Decl. Exh. 11 at 225). In response, Ms.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
717 F. Supp. 2d 883, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45967, 2010 WL 1910057, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terra-insurance-v-new-york-life-investment-management-llc-cand-2010.