F 1) r i H ,jU: ti.
7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM $
CANDILYN MESHAE TERLAJE, CIVIL CASE NO. CVOO7O-20 10 Plaintiff, 11
12 vs. DECISION AND ORDER 13 ANGELICA DOREEN PADUA, 14 Defendant. 15
16 INTRODUCTION
17 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on December 22, 2020, upon the Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment filed June 17, 2020. Plaintiff Candilyn
19 Meshae Terlaje (“Plaintiff’) is represented by Attorney Daniel Somerfieck from the Guam
20 Legal Services Corporation Disability Law Center. Defendant Angelica Doreen Padua
21 (“Defendant”) is represented by Attorney David J. Highsmith from the Public Defender
22 Service Corporation.
23 Having reviewed the pleadings and considered the arguments and relevant legal
24 authorities in this matter, the Court issues the following Decision and Order and GRANTS the
25 Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment.
26 BACKGROUND
27 On January 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Temporary and Permanent
2$ Injunction seeking that the Defendant be enjoined and restrained from threatening, abusing,
annoying, harassing or disturbing the peace and physical well-being of the Plaintiff and her Decision and Order Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Candityn Meshae Tertaje v. Angetica Doreen Pacina e i minor children; enjoined and restrained from coming within five hundred feet (500 ft.) of 2 Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s minor children, Plaintiff’s residence, Plaintiff’s place of employment, and 3 the minor children’s daycare/school; and enjoined and restrained from contacting Plaintiff and 4 her minor children directly or indirectly. 5 On January 28, 2020, the Court issued a Preliminary Restraining Order and Order to 6 Show Cause Re: Temporary Restraining Order, which preliminarily enjoined and restrained the 7 Defendant from threatening, abusing, annoying, harassing or disturbing the peace and physical 8 well-being of the Plaintiff only, and not her minor children. 9 On February 5, 2020, the Court issued a Continued Temporary Restraining Order based 10 on representations that the Defendant would file an Answer following the Evidentiary Hearing 11 set for March 4, 2020. 12 On February 13, 2020, Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim seeking that the 13 parties be mutually restrained from annoying, harassing, disturbing the peace of, injuring and 14 - -cøntacting each other and their minor children; that the parties he mutually restrained from 15 coming within 500 ft. of each other and their minor children; seeking costs of suit and atso 16 seeking other relief that the Court might deem appropriate. 17 On February 20, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Reply to Counterclaim also requesting that 18 the parties be mutually restrained from coming within 500 ft. of each other and their minor 19 children. The counsel for both parties then engaged in negotiations and agreed to the Stipulated 20 Permanent Restraining Order. 21 The Stipulated Permanent Restraining Order (Stipulated Order”) was filed on March 4, 22 2020, wherein the parties agreed to be permanently enjoined and restrained from threatening, 23 abusing, annoying, harassing or disturbing the peace and physical well-being of the other and 24 the other’s minor children; to be permanently enjoined and restrained from coming within 500 25 ft. of each other, each other’s minor children, each other’s residence, place of employment, and 26 the daycare/school of the minor children; and to be permanently enjoined and restrained from
27 contacting each other and each other’s minor children, directly or indirectly. 28
Page 2 of6 Decision and Order . Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Candilvn Meshae Terlaje v. Angelica Doreen Padua
Three months later, on June 17, 2020, the Defendant filed a Motion for Relief from 2 Judgment pursuant to Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Plaintiff filed its Opposition to 3 the Motion for Relief from Judgment on August 6, 2020; and the Defendant filed a Reply to 4 the Opposition to the Motion for Relief from Judgment on August 19, 2020. 5 The Court conducted a hearing on the Motion for Relief from Judgment and took the 6 matter under advisement on December 22, 2020. 7
8 DISCUSSION 9 Pursuant to Guam Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), “the court may relieve a party or a 10 party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 11 reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; or (6) any other reason 12 justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” See G.R.C.P. § 60(b). “Rule 60 is 13 remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed.” Brown v. Eastmctn Kodctk Co., 2000 Guam 14 30 9[ 18(citing Faikv. A/ten, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9t1lCir.1984). Guam’s rule was modeled 15 after federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 60(b). Brown at ¶ 14. Thus, federal cases 16 interpreting the rule constitute highly persuasive authority in Guam. People i’. Quituguci, 2009 17 Guam 10,91 10.
1$ Rule 60(b)(1) deals with mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. With 19 regard to Rule 60(b)(1), “trial judges are vested with discretion when determining whether an
20 attorney’s neglect . . . is “excusable” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(l).” Harrington i’. City of 21 Chicago, 433 f.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Robb v. No,flk & W. Ry. Co., 122 F.3d
22 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997). “A ‘plaintiffs entire lack of diligence and attention to the matter’ 23 does not constitute excusable neglect.” Dttenas v. Brady, 2008 Guam 27 ¶ 20 (citing Martella 24 ‘. Marine Cooks Stewards Union, 448 f.2d 729, 729 (9th Cir.1971)). However, while
25 inattentiveness to litigation is not excusable, attotney carelessness cctn constitute ‘excusable
26 neglect’ under Rule 60(b)(1). Duenas at ¶ 21 (citing Harrington, 433 f.3d at 546). A trial
27 judge is afforded much discretion in evaluating an attorney’s neglect relative to Rule 60(b)(l).
28 Dttenas at ¶ 22 (citing Harringtoiz, 433 f.3d at 546).
Page 3 of 6 Decision and Order Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Canditvn Meshae Tertaje v. Angelica Doreen Padtta
Alternatively, Rule 60(b)(6) provides relief from judgment for “any other reason 2 justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” See G.R.C.P. § 60(b)(6). “The power 3 vested in the courts under rule 60(b)(6) is sufficient to enable them to vacate judgments 4 whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Brown at ¶ 18; Klapprott v. United 5 States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949). “[RJelief under subsection (6) applies only in exceptional or 6 extraordinary circumstances. . . .“ Mariano i’. Stir/a, 2010 Guam 2 at ¶ 34. An attorney’s gross 7 negligence constitutes an extraordinary circumstance which can justify overturning a judgment (9th $ pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6). Lal v. C’alifornia, 610 F.3d 518, 521 Cir.2010). Gross 9 negligence has been defined by the Ninth Circuit as “neglect so gross that it is inexcusable.” Id. 10 at 524. for example, failing to represent a client at all constitutes gross negligence. Id. ii However, a party that is completely at fault may not seek relief under subsection (6). Mariano 12 at ¶ 34. Alternatively, if a party is only partially at fault, relief must be sought within one year 13 and the party’s neglect must be excusable.” Id.; Brown at ¶ 32. 14 ------Here, the Defendant- argues that mistake, inadvertence, surise, excusable -neglect, or
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F 1) r i H ,jU: ti.
7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM $
CANDILYN MESHAE TERLAJE, CIVIL CASE NO. CVOO7O-20 10 Plaintiff, 11
12 vs. DECISION AND ORDER 13 ANGELICA DOREEN PADUA, 14 Defendant. 15
16 INTRODUCTION
17 This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on December 22, 2020, upon the Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment filed June 17, 2020. Plaintiff Candilyn
19 Meshae Terlaje (“Plaintiff’) is represented by Attorney Daniel Somerfieck from the Guam
20 Legal Services Corporation Disability Law Center. Defendant Angelica Doreen Padua
21 (“Defendant”) is represented by Attorney David J. Highsmith from the Public Defender
22 Service Corporation.
23 Having reviewed the pleadings and considered the arguments and relevant legal
24 authorities in this matter, the Court issues the following Decision and Order and GRANTS the
25 Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment.
26 BACKGROUND
27 On January 27, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Temporary and Permanent
2$ Injunction seeking that the Defendant be enjoined and restrained from threatening, abusing,
annoying, harassing or disturbing the peace and physical well-being of the Plaintiff and her Decision and Order Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Candityn Meshae Tertaje v. Angetica Doreen Pacina e i minor children; enjoined and restrained from coming within five hundred feet (500 ft.) of 2 Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s minor children, Plaintiff’s residence, Plaintiff’s place of employment, and 3 the minor children’s daycare/school; and enjoined and restrained from contacting Plaintiff and 4 her minor children directly or indirectly. 5 On January 28, 2020, the Court issued a Preliminary Restraining Order and Order to 6 Show Cause Re: Temporary Restraining Order, which preliminarily enjoined and restrained the 7 Defendant from threatening, abusing, annoying, harassing or disturbing the peace and physical 8 well-being of the Plaintiff only, and not her minor children. 9 On February 5, 2020, the Court issued a Continued Temporary Restraining Order based 10 on representations that the Defendant would file an Answer following the Evidentiary Hearing 11 set for March 4, 2020. 12 On February 13, 2020, Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim seeking that the 13 parties be mutually restrained from annoying, harassing, disturbing the peace of, injuring and 14 - -cøntacting each other and their minor children; that the parties he mutually restrained from 15 coming within 500 ft. of each other and their minor children; seeking costs of suit and atso 16 seeking other relief that the Court might deem appropriate. 17 On February 20, 2020, the Plaintiff filed a Reply to Counterclaim also requesting that 18 the parties be mutually restrained from coming within 500 ft. of each other and their minor 19 children. The counsel for both parties then engaged in negotiations and agreed to the Stipulated 20 Permanent Restraining Order. 21 The Stipulated Permanent Restraining Order (Stipulated Order”) was filed on March 4, 22 2020, wherein the parties agreed to be permanently enjoined and restrained from threatening, 23 abusing, annoying, harassing or disturbing the peace and physical well-being of the other and 24 the other’s minor children; to be permanently enjoined and restrained from coming within 500 25 ft. of each other, each other’s minor children, each other’s residence, place of employment, and 26 the daycare/school of the minor children; and to be permanently enjoined and restrained from
27 contacting each other and each other’s minor children, directly or indirectly. 28
Page 2 of6 Decision and Order . Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Candilvn Meshae Terlaje v. Angelica Doreen Padua
Three months later, on June 17, 2020, the Defendant filed a Motion for Relief from 2 Judgment pursuant to Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The Plaintiff filed its Opposition to 3 the Motion for Relief from Judgment on August 6, 2020; and the Defendant filed a Reply to 4 the Opposition to the Motion for Relief from Judgment on August 19, 2020. 5 The Court conducted a hearing on the Motion for Relief from Judgment and took the 6 matter under advisement on December 22, 2020. 7
8 DISCUSSION 9 Pursuant to Guam Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b), “the court may relieve a party or a 10 party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 11 reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; or (6) any other reason 12 justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” See G.R.C.P. § 60(b). “Rule 60 is 13 remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed.” Brown v. Eastmctn Kodctk Co., 2000 Guam 14 30 9[ 18(citing Faikv. A/ten, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9t1lCir.1984). Guam’s rule was modeled 15 after federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 60(b). Brown at ¶ 14. Thus, federal cases 16 interpreting the rule constitute highly persuasive authority in Guam. People i’. Quituguci, 2009 17 Guam 10,91 10.
1$ Rule 60(b)(1) deals with mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. With 19 regard to Rule 60(b)(1), “trial judges are vested with discretion when determining whether an
20 attorney’s neglect . . . is “excusable” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(l).” Harrington i’. City of 21 Chicago, 433 f.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Robb v. No,flk & W. Ry. Co., 122 F.3d
22 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997). “A ‘plaintiffs entire lack of diligence and attention to the matter’ 23 does not constitute excusable neglect.” Dttenas v. Brady, 2008 Guam 27 ¶ 20 (citing Martella 24 ‘. Marine Cooks Stewards Union, 448 f.2d 729, 729 (9th Cir.1971)). However, while
25 inattentiveness to litigation is not excusable, attotney carelessness cctn constitute ‘excusable
26 neglect’ under Rule 60(b)(1). Duenas at ¶ 21 (citing Harrington, 433 f.3d at 546). A trial
27 judge is afforded much discretion in evaluating an attorney’s neglect relative to Rule 60(b)(l).
28 Dttenas at ¶ 22 (citing Harringtoiz, 433 f.3d at 546).
Page 3 of 6 Decision and Order Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Canditvn Meshae Tertaje v. Angelica Doreen Padtta
Alternatively, Rule 60(b)(6) provides relief from judgment for “any other reason 2 justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” See G.R.C.P. § 60(b)(6). “The power 3 vested in the courts under rule 60(b)(6) is sufficient to enable them to vacate judgments 4 whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.” Brown at ¶ 18; Klapprott v. United 5 States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949). “[RJelief under subsection (6) applies only in exceptional or 6 extraordinary circumstances. . . .“ Mariano i’. Stir/a, 2010 Guam 2 at ¶ 34. An attorney’s gross 7 negligence constitutes an extraordinary circumstance which can justify overturning a judgment (9th $ pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(6). Lal v. C’alifornia, 610 F.3d 518, 521 Cir.2010). Gross 9 negligence has been defined by the Ninth Circuit as “neglect so gross that it is inexcusable.” Id. 10 at 524. for example, failing to represent a client at all constitutes gross negligence. Id. ii However, a party that is completely at fault may not seek relief under subsection (6). Mariano 12 at ¶ 34. Alternatively, if a party is only partially at fault, relief must be sought within one year 13 and the party’s neglect must be excusable.” Id.; Brown at ¶ 32. 14 ------Here, the Defendant- argues that mistake, inadvertence, surise, excusable -neglect, or
is other reasons exist which would justify granting relief from judgment. In particular, Defendant 16 asserts that relief is warranted because (1) communication problems existed between the 17 Defendant and her attorneys and (2) because of the onerous nature of the order, which compels is the Defendant to vacate her usual residence when her boyfriend has visitation with his two 19 children, which are also children by the Plaintiff. In terms of communications issues, the
20 Defendant asserts that at the hearing on March 4, 2020, Defendant’s counsel Attorney 21 Highsmith had a schedule conflict and the Defendant was instead assisted by Assistant Public 22 Defender Jocelyn Roden. At the hearing, Defendant asserts that Attorney Roden put the
23 proposed order in front of the Defendant who signed it without reading it. Defendant asserts 24 that she did not fully understand the agreement’s provisions and is now forced to vacate her 25 usual residence when her boyfriend has visitation with his children by the Plaintiff. Due to 26 these reasons, the Defendant is seeking relief from judgment pursuant to G.R.C.P. 60(b)(l)
27 and G.R.C.P. 60(b)(6).
2$
Page 4 of 6 Decision and Order . Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; Candilyn Meshae Tertaje u. Angelica Doreen Padua
The Plaintiff on the other hand argues that the Defendant’s assertion that she did not 2 understand the written agreement or its consequences is directly contradicted by her verified 3 counterclaim which seeks the same terms contained in the written agreement. The Plaintiff 4 asserts that although the Defendant is complaining about the content of the Stipulated Order, 5 the order mirrors the Defendant’s own requests and grants what the Defendant sought in her 6 counterclaim. Additionally, the Plaintiff contends that there is an absence of gross negligence, 7 which is required to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). $ While gross negligence may not be present in this matter, the Court finds excusable 9 neglect with regard to the communications between the Defendant and her attorneys. While the 10 Defendant may have been assisted by Assistant Public Defender Roden on the day she signed ii the agreement rather than Attorney Highsmith, the fact that the order was put in front of her for 12 signature without further explanation supports a finding of excusable neglect on the part of the 13 attorneys. Defendant’s assertion that she did not understand the impact of the relief she was 14 seekingin hercounterclaim and theterms-she agreed to inthe StipulatedOrder further support 15 a finding of excusable neglect on the part of the attorneys, who should have thoroughly 16 explained the impact of the agreement and counterclaim. A thorough explanation would have 17 revealed to the Defendant that she would be required to vacate her residence during her 1$ boyfriend’s visitation with his children. Although Defendant was assisted by an alternate 19 Assistant Public Defender on the day of the hearing, it was still incumbent on the attorney to
20 fully discuss the impacts of the Stipulated Order with the Defendant prior to signing to ensure 21 her understanding of the order and its terms. While Defendant failed to read and fully 22 understand the agreement before signing it, such neglect on her part is excusable due to her 23 reasonable reliance on the advice of her attorney. Excusable neglect can also be seen in the 24 body of the Stipulated Order, which fails to specifically state the reasons for its issuance as 25 required by Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d). Because excusable neglect can be inferred
26 from the circumstances, relief from judgment is appropriate pursuant to Rule 60(b)(l).
27 Therefore, the Court GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. 28
Page 5 of 6 Decision and Order Civil Case No. CVOO7O-20; C’andilvn Mest,ae Tertaje v. Angelica Doreen Padua
CONCLUSION for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for 3 Relief from Judgment. 4
6 IT IS SO ORDERED iAR 2 3 2U21 7
11 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS Judge, Superior Court of Guam 12
I4
IS
SERVICE VIA E-MAIL acknowledge that an electronic 23 copy of dg al a-mailed to;
25 Date: ‘/2.. >/.J (7 ,*- 26 Deputy Clerk, Superior Court of Guam 27
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