Terito v. Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc.
This text of 978 So. 2d 403 (Terito v. Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Christopher TERITO
v.
WALL-VAUGHN MOTORS, INC.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Peter T. Dudley, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Christopher Terito.
Karl J. Koch, Baton Rouge, LA, for Defendant-Appellant, Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc.
Before WHIPPLE, GUIDRY, and HUGHES, JJ.
GUIDRY, J.
An employer appeals a judgment awarding a former employee a sum of *404 money for work performed during the time the employee was absent from work to have back surgery performed. Having reviewed the law and evidence governing this matter, we reverse.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2004, Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc. began operating a car dealership in Hammond, Louisiana called Hammond Suzuki. Christopher Terito was hired as the finance and insurance manager for the dealership. Shortly after commencing work with the company, Terito disclosed that he needed back surgery. On April 26, 2004, the surgery was performed.[1] In June 2004, Terito returned to work, but after a couple of days resigned from his position. Following his resignation, Terito made demand on Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc. for $3,100.00 in unpaid wages allegedly "agreed to be paid by [Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc.] for the services [Terito] performed on behalf of Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc., during the [months] of May 2004 and June 2004." Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc. denied owing Terito any unpaid wages.
On January 20, 2005, Terito filed a petition for damages against Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc. seeking $3,100.00 in wages and further seeking penalty wages and attorney fees pursuant to La. R.S. 23:631 and 632. Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc. answered the petition denying the alleged debt, and the matter went to trial. Following the trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Terito awarding him the sum of $880.00 for work performed by him while he was absent from work. Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc. appeals the judgment, asserting that the trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of Terito because there was no evidence introduced proving that a person with authority to bind the company obligated the company to pay Terito.
DISCUSSION
A mandate is a contract by which a person, the principal, confers authority on another person, the mandatary, to transact one or more affairs for the principal. La. C.C. art. 2989. The question of mandate/agency is basically a factual determination.[2] The essential test to determine whether implied agency exists is whether the principal has the right to control the conduct of the agent and whether the agent has the right and authority to represent or bind the principal. Lewis v. Succession of Johnson, 05-1192, p. 16 (La.4/4/06), 925 So.2d 1172, 1182.
In Barrilleaux v. Franklin Foundation Hospital, 96-0343, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/8/96), 683 So.2d 348, 354, writ denied, 96-2885 (La. 1/24/97), 686 So.2d 864 (citations omitted) (emphasis added), this court succinctly presented the principles governing a determination of apparent agency:
Apparent agency arises when the principal has acted so as to give an innocent third party a reasonable belief that the agent had the authority to act for the principal, and the third party reasonably relies on the manifested authority of the *405 agent. Apparent agency is established by the words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. An agency relationship may be created even though there is no intent to do so.
An agency relationship is never presumed; it must be clearly established. The burden of proving apparent authority is on the party seeking to bind the principal. A third party may not blindly rely on the assertions of an agent, but has a duty to determine, at his peril, whether the agency purportedly granted by the principal permits the proposed act by the agent. One must look from the viewpoint of the third party to determine whether an apparent agency has been created.
At trial, Terito testified that prior to having back surgery, he asked Michael D. Vaughn, the dealer principal and part owner of Wall-Vaughn Motors, Inc., if there was any work he could do from home, and Vaughn told him that he could not work from home and that the company would not pay him while he was absent from work for his surgery. Despite Vaughn's denial of Terito's request to work from home, Terito testified that "[m]y understanding was that once I started being contacted from work, I talked to my boss;[3] and I was explained (sic) that I would be taken care of, and that my insurance would be taken care of while I was out." Terito testified that he understood that being "taken care of meant that he would receive $2,400.00, plus insurance, based on a subsequent conversation with the dealership comptroller/accountant; yet he acknowledged that both his boss and the comptroller/accountant worked under Vaughn.
Vaughn likewise testified that he told Terito that he would not be paid while absent from work for back surgery. Vaughn testified that at the dealership, only he and Garry Lewis, the senior partner and the majority owner of the dealership, had authority to decide whether Terito would be paid during his absence. He explained that when Terito was hired, he allowed Kemp to make the decision to hire him;[4] however, Vaughn said that while Kemp negotiated directly with Terito about Terito's salary, he, Vaughn, actually made the final decision about what salary to offer Terito. As Vaughn stated, Kemp simply "delivered the message."
As for the circumstances surrounding the work performed by Terito while absent from the dealership for his back surgery, Vaughn stated that he knew that salespeople from the dealership were contacting Terito at home following his surgery to see how Terito was doing, but he said he did not know they were talking to him about business deals. As Vaughn explained, "I was paying Jeff to handle that job, and I assumed it was being taken care *406 of."[5] Moreover, a medical excuse entitled "Work Status Report" was introduced into evidence in which it is noted that Terito was "unable to work pending treatment" and that he could perform "zero" work until he was released from surgery.
Based on this evidence, we find the trial court erred in awarding Terito compensation for the work he performed while he was absent from work for his back surgery. Vaughn, the owner and principal authority at the dealership, expressly informed Terito that he could neither work nor be compensated while he was absent from work for his back surgery. Although the actions of Terito's immediate supervisor and co-workers (i.e., requesting Terito to perform some employment duties and assuring him that he would be compensated) were contrary to the express declaration of Vaughn, there was no evidence presented to show that any of those persons had authority to countermand Vaughn's prior directive. Thus, the trial court erred in awarding Terito compensation for the work performed under such circumstances.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. All costs of this appeal are cast to the appellee, Christopher Terito.
REVERSED.
WHIPPLE, J., concurs, for reasons assigned.
WHIPPLE, J., concurring.
In the instant case, the trial court undisputedly found that Terito had performed some work from home while absent from the dealership for his back surgery.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
978 So. 2d 403, 2007 La.App. 1 Cir. 0627, 2007 La. App. LEXIS 2294, 2007 WL 4463111, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/terito-v-wall-vaughn-motors-inc-lactapp-2007.