1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 TERESA M. HARRIS, Case No. 1:25-cv-0287 KES GSA 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL, GRANTING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO AFFIRM, 14 COMMISSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY, AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 15 Defendant. Docs. 17, 21, 22, 23 16 17 Teresa Harris seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying her application 18 for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 19 Doc. 1. Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating the medical 20 opinions in the record—by accepting the opinion of Dr. Vu, who offered an opinion at the initial 21 level, over the opinion of Dr. Rudito—and in addressing her subjective complaints in determining 22 her physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Docs. 17, 22. The Commissioner asserts that 23 the Court should affirm the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 21. 24 I. Findings and Recommendations 25 The magistrate judge found that the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Drs. Vu and 26 Rudito, by addressing the supportability and consistency of each opinion. Doc. 22 at 6-9. The 27 magistrate judge also found the ALJ identified legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 28 subjective complaints concerning limitations on her manipulability. Id. at 9-11. The magistrate 1 judge concluded that “substantial evidence and applicable law support the ALJ’s conclusion that 2 Plaintiff was not disabled.” Id. at 12. The magistrate judge recommended the Court deny 3 Plaintiff’s appeal, grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and affirm the administrative decision 4 of the Commissioner. Id. 5 II. Objections 6 Plaintiff filed timely objections to the findings and recommendations. She objects to the 7 “finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Vu’s opinion was proper under the controlling 8 regulations and supported by substantial evidence.” Doc. 24 at 1 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff 9 contends: “The ALJ somehow found Dr. Vu’s opinion persuasive because Plaintiff’s ‘steady gait’ 10 was consistent with the limitations related to Plaintiff’s upper extremities.” Id. at 2 (citing AR 26 11 [Doc. 11-3 at 27]). Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the consistency 12 factor and instead accepted the manipulability limitations identified by Dr. Vu “without logical 13 articulation.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff does not object to the magistrate judge’s findings related to her 14 subjective complaints. 15 III. Discussion and Analysis 16 A district judge may “accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and 17 recommendations . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If objections are filed, “the court shall make a de 18 novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed finding or 19 recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. A de novo review requires the district judge 20 to “consider[] the matter anew, as if no decision had been rendered.” Dawson v. Marshall, 561 21 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 A. Evaluation of medical opinions 23 The regulations direct the ALJ to determine how persuasive a medical opinion is by 24 considering the following factors: supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, 25 specialization, and other factors showing the medical source’s “familiarity with … other evidence 26 in the record or an understanding of [the] disability program’s policies and evidentiary 27 requirements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). An ALJ is only 28 required to discuss supportability and consistency, which are the two most important factors 1 “when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 (quoting 20 2 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2) (“we will explain how we 3 considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions or 4 prior administrative medical findings in your determination or decision. We may, but are not 5 required to, explain how we considered the [remaining] factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5) 6 of this section…”). 7 The supportability inquiry is an assessment of “the extent to which a medical source 8 supports the medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical evidence.” Woods, 32 9 F.4th at 791-792 (quotation marks, citation omitted). Consistency compares a medical opinion 10 with other evidence to determine its persuasiveness. See id. at 792. The Ninth Circuit has 11 observed that “[e]ven under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating 12 doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by 13 substantial evidence.” Id. 14 B. Opinion of Dr. Vu 15 Evaluating the medical evidence, the ALJ observed that Dr. Vu opined that Plaintiff 16 “could perform work at the light level of exertion and could frequently handle and finger 17 bilaterally.” Doc. 11-3 at 27. The ALJ found Dr. Vu’s opinion persuasive, explaining:
18 The undersigned finds this opinion persuasive as it is supported by a review of the medical records and includes adequate 19 supportability. It is consistent with the record which demonstrates the claimant ambulates with a steady gait with even and unlabored 20 respirations. [Citation.] The claimant also has a history of psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis with a right ring finger pip dislocation that 21 failed conservative treatment, and resulted in ongoing limitations in the frequency the claimant can use their right upper extremity to 22 handle and finger. 23 Id. (citations omitted). Consistent with the opinion of Dr. Vu, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 24 “had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) 25 except she can frequently reach in all directions, handle, and finger with her right upper extremity 26 (non-dominant)” and Plaintiff needed to “avoid work in extremely cold environments.” Id. at 23. 27 Although Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in considering her “steady gait” without 28 labored respirations because her gait was not relevant to her upper extremity conditions, the 1 opinion of Dr. Vu was not limited to Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations with respect to her upper 2 extremities. At the initial level of review, Dr. Vu performed a complete physical residual 3 functional capacity assessment, and which included findings that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 4 and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and carry 10 pounds, “stand/or walk (with normal breaks) 5 for a total of [] about 6 hours in an 8-hour day,” and sit for “about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.” 6 Id. at 13-14. Dr. Vu concluded Plaintiff was capable of a “light RFC,” with additional 7 manipulative limitations. Id. at 11. Under the regulations, a job is categorized as light work 8 “when it requires a good deal of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). 9 Thus, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s ability to walk to determine whether the light work 10 limitation identified by Dr. Vu was consistent with evidence in the record.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 TERESA M. HARRIS, Case No. 1:25-cv-0287 KES GSA 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL, GRANTING DEFENDANT’S REQUEST TO AFFIRM, 14 COMMISSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY, AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT 15 Defendant. Docs. 17, 21, 22, 23 16 17 Teresa Harris seeks judicial review of an administrative decision denying her application 18 for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. 19 Doc. 1. Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in evaluating the medical 20 opinions in the record—by accepting the opinion of Dr. Vu, who offered an opinion at the initial 21 level, over the opinion of Dr. Rudito—and in addressing her subjective complaints in determining 22 her physical residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Docs. 17, 22. The Commissioner asserts that 23 the Court should affirm the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 21. 24 I. Findings and Recommendations 25 The magistrate judge found that the ALJ properly considered the opinions of Drs. Vu and 26 Rudito, by addressing the supportability and consistency of each opinion. Doc. 22 at 6-9. The 27 magistrate judge also found the ALJ identified legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s 28 subjective complaints concerning limitations on her manipulability. Id. at 9-11. The magistrate 1 judge concluded that “substantial evidence and applicable law support the ALJ’s conclusion that 2 Plaintiff was not disabled.” Id. at 12. The magistrate judge recommended the Court deny 3 Plaintiff’s appeal, grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and affirm the administrative decision 4 of the Commissioner. Id. 5 II. Objections 6 Plaintiff filed timely objections to the findings and recommendations. She objects to the 7 “finding that the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Vu’s opinion was proper under the controlling 8 regulations and supported by substantial evidence.” Doc. 24 at 1 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff 9 contends: “The ALJ somehow found Dr. Vu’s opinion persuasive because Plaintiff’s ‘steady gait’ 10 was consistent with the limitations related to Plaintiff’s upper extremities.” Id. at 2 (citing AR 26 11 [Doc. 11-3 at 27]). Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ did not properly evaluate the consistency 12 factor and instead accepted the manipulability limitations identified by Dr. Vu “without logical 13 articulation.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff does not object to the magistrate judge’s findings related to her 14 subjective complaints. 15 III. Discussion and Analysis 16 A district judge may “accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and 17 recommendations . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If objections are filed, “the court shall make a de 18 novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed finding or 19 recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. A de novo review requires the district judge 20 to “consider[] the matter anew, as if no decision had been rendered.” Dawson v. Marshall, 561 21 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). 22 A. Evaluation of medical opinions 23 The regulations direct the ALJ to determine how persuasive a medical opinion is by 24 considering the following factors: supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, 25 specialization, and other factors showing the medical source’s “familiarity with … other evidence 26 in the record or an understanding of [the] disability program’s policies and evidentiary 27 requirements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)-(5), §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(5). An ALJ is only 28 required to discuss supportability and consistency, which are the two most important factors 1 “when evaluating the persuasiveness of medical opinions.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 (quoting 20 2 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2) (“we will explain how we 3 considered the supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions or 4 prior administrative medical findings in your determination or decision. We may, but are not 5 required to, explain how we considered the [remaining] factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5) 6 of this section…”). 7 The supportability inquiry is an assessment of “the extent to which a medical source 8 supports the medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical evidence.” Woods, 32 9 F.4th at 791-792 (quotation marks, citation omitted). Consistency compares a medical opinion 10 with other evidence to determine its persuasiveness. See id. at 792. The Ninth Circuit has 11 observed that “[e]ven under the new regulations, an ALJ cannot reject an examining or treating 12 doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent without providing an explanation supported by 13 substantial evidence.” Id. 14 B. Opinion of Dr. Vu 15 Evaluating the medical evidence, the ALJ observed that Dr. Vu opined that Plaintiff 16 “could perform work at the light level of exertion and could frequently handle and finger 17 bilaterally.” Doc. 11-3 at 27. The ALJ found Dr. Vu’s opinion persuasive, explaining:
18 The undersigned finds this opinion persuasive as it is supported by a review of the medical records and includes adequate 19 supportability. It is consistent with the record which demonstrates the claimant ambulates with a steady gait with even and unlabored 20 respirations. [Citation.] The claimant also has a history of psoriasis and psoriatic arthritis with a right ring finger pip dislocation that 21 failed conservative treatment, and resulted in ongoing limitations in the frequency the claimant can use their right upper extremity to 22 handle and finger. 23 Id. (citations omitted). Consistent with the opinion of Dr. Vu, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 24 “had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) 25 except she can frequently reach in all directions, handle, and finger with her right upper extremity 26 (non-dominant)” and Plaintiff needed to “avoid work in extremely cold environments.” Id. at 23. 27 Although Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in considering her “steady gait” without 28 labored respirations because her gait was not relevant to her upper extremity conditions, the 1 opinion of Dr. Vu was not limited to Plaintiff’s abilities and limitations with respect to her upper 2 extremities. At the initial level of review, Dr. Vu performed a complete physical residual 3 functional capacity assessment, and which included findings that Plaintiff could occasionally lift 4 and carry 20 pounds and frequently lift and carry 10 pounds, “stand/or walk (with normal breaks) 5 for a total of [] about 6 hours in an 8-hour day,” and sit for “about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.” 6 Id. at 13-14. Dr. Vu concluded Plaintiff was capable of a “light RFC,” with additional 7 manipulative limitations. Id. at 11. Under the regulations, a job is categorized as light work 8 “when it requires a good deal of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). 9 Thus, the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s ability to walk to determine whether the light work 10 limitation identified by Dr. Vu was consistent with evidence in the record. 11 The ALJ also considered evidence regarding Plaintiff’s history of “psoriasis and psoriatic 12 arthritis with a right ring finger pip dislocation,” and the consistency of the manipulative 13 limitations identified by Dr. Vu with the objective medical record. Doc. 11-3 at 25. The ALJ 14 observed that following the dislocation and initial treatment, Plaintiff “underwent a right ring 15 finger PIP joint fusion.” Id. The ALJ observed that after the procedure, Plaintiff “reported doing 16 well overall,” exhibited difficulty with full flexion of her ring finger, but had “intact extension 17 and flexion of her thumb[] and adduction of her fingers.” Id. Having reviewed these findings, 18 the ALJ determined that Dr. Vu’s opinion was consistent with the evidence as to the degree of 19 Plaintiff’s limitations with respect to the use of her “upper extremity to handle and finger.” Id. at 20 27. The ALJ thus carried his burden to consider the consistency of the opinion of Dr. Vu with 21 other evidence in the record. 22 IV. Conclusion and Order 23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1), this Court conducted a de novo review. Having 24 carefully reviewed the matter, including Plaintiff’s objections, the Court concludes that the 25 findings and recommendations are supported by the record and proper analysis. 26 As the ALJ applied the proper legal standards, and the decision was supported by 27 substantial evidence in the record, the Court affirms the administrative decision. See Sanchez v. 28 Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Matney v. Sullivan, 1 | 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The trier of fact and not the reviewing court must resolve 2 | conflicts in the evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not 3 | substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ”). The Court ORDERS: 4 1. The findings and recommendations dated December 8, 2025 (Doc. 23) are 6 2. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and appeal from the agency’s decision 7 (Docs. 17, 22) are DENIED. 8 3. Defendant’s request to affirm the administrative decision (Doc. 21) is GRANTED. 9 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in 10 favor of Defendant, and close this case. 1] 12 13 | IT ISSO ORDERED. _ 14 Dated: _ June 18, 2026 4h | | 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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